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This volume represents a comprehensive study of the 
contemporary aspects of private commercial bank cross-border 
lending to a developing country. 
The case of Peru is a controversial one and has proved 
to be an intriguing investigation. The study aims to provide 
previously inaccessible data on the nature of commercial bank 
lending to a developing country and attempts to critically 
evaluate the impact of the banks on economic development. 
The study's primary concern is clearly the private 
commercial bank. By honing in so closely on the commercial 
bank and its involvement in external finance one gains an 
unusually detailed treatment of an important subject that too 
frequently has suffered from insipid generalization. The 
disadvantage of such a centralized focus, however, is that 
the banks' role in Peru's political economy and well-
publicized problems may appear to some to be magnified 
beyond reasonable proportions. I should make clear right now 
that in my own view much (if not most) of Peru's economic 
difficulties have been self inflicted. However, this side of 
the story has been well-developed as there is a voluminous 
academic and journalistic literature which criticizes the 
contemporary economic management of the country (see 
bibliography). Much less attention has been paid to the role 
of external agents in Peru's difficulties. One very 
important agent - the private commercial bank - has virtually 
escaped scrutiny because of the dearth of specific information 
on the lending activities of these institutions. Thus, while 
not wanting to diminish the importance of the internal 
deficiencies in Peruvian economic policy, in the interest of 
counterbalancing the orientation of the current body of 
literature I have purposely placed very heavy emphasis on the 
banks' (and other external agents) involvement is the. country's 
economic difficulties. 
It also should be pointed out that while this is a 
case study, I feel that much of the data and analysis relate 
to the general issue of commercial bank lending to developing 
countries and therefore are relevant to broader applications. 
Of course, it is left to future studies to determine whether 
this observation is accurate or not. 
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The volume represents a joint effort of the Economic 
Development Division of CEPAL, of which I am a member, and 
the Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit in Santiago, Chile. The general 
scheme of the project, i.e., the role of banks in Peru's 
external finance, owes itself to Anibal Pinto, Chief of the 
Economic Development Division during the gestation period of 
the project. For its part, the U.N. Centre on Transnational 
Corporations provided finance for an external consultant who 
managed the collection of raw data in the field. The Centre 
has drawn upon material in this study for its Report on 
Transnational Banks to be presented to the U.N. Commission on 
Transnational Corporations in 1980. 
A number of people have provided valuable assistance 
to the project and should be mentioned here. Eduardo Gana, a 
former member of the Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit, was the supervisor 
of the study and provided continuous encouragement and 
guidance throughout the planning and implementation stages. 
Jan Kaakal, the former Acting Chief of the Joint Unit, also 
should be thanked for his support during the course of the 
project as should Arturo Nufiez del Prado, current Chief of the 
Unit, for his assistance in the revision and publication 
stages of the study. At the outset of the project Dr. Luis 
Barna was kind enough to orient me to the intricacies of the 
Peruvian public sector. I am especially grateful to Carlos 
Santistevan who as a consultant to CEPAL was responsible for 
managing the successful program of data collection in Peru; 
without Mr. Santistevan's gracious collaboration this study 
could not have been realized. Dr. Manuel Romero and Daniel 
Saba de Andrea were kind enough to provide data on some 
specific aspects of project finance in Peru. Oscar Ugarteche, 
both in conversations and in the kind loan of private research 
materials was of great assistance as well. I am also grateful 
to David Hoelscher and Richard Lynn Ground for the periodic 
dialogue that helped to clarify my own ideas on many aspects 
of the material. 
A number of people provided helpful comments on all or 
part of the first draft of the document and should be thanked 
here. Those having the patiance and time to comment on the 
entire document were Hector Assael, Eduardo Gana, Richard Lynn 
Ground, William Loer, John Mc Dermott, Michael Mortimore, 
Fernando Sanchez, Barbara Stallings and Larry Willmore. 
Meanwhile, helpful criticism on one or more draft chapters 
was received from Andres Bianchi, Robert Brown, David Hoelscher, 
Benjamin Hopenhayn, Norberto Gonzalez, Arturo Nunez del Prado 
and Roberto Zahler. 
Finally, the opinions expressed in the volume are my own 
and do not necessarily reflect the attitudes of CEPAL or the 
individual just mentioned above. Of course, I assume full 
responsibility for any errors and omissions that may be contained 
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The decade of the 1970s has witnessed the emergence of 
private international commercial banks as important 
participants in the extern1 finance of developing countries. 
In 1970 banks accounted for roughly 19% of the total current 
account financing (includi 	 reserve accumulation) of the 
non-oil exporting developg countries, most of which was 
short term (maturities of -less than one year) in nature. 
However, by 1974, banks gen: ated 33% of this finance, with 
the bulk of the transactions falling into the medium to 
long run (1-5 and over 5 ze:irs, respectively) category. In 
subsequent years bank fina.7.e has continued to approximate 
roughly a third of total finance, I/. 
While commercial bank finance has become important to 
LDCs taken as a whole, it in in the upper income developing 
countries like those of Latin America where much of the 
lending has been concentrated. As seen in table 1 Latin 
America accounted for nearly two-thirds of the gross 
indebtedness of non-oil exl=ting developing countries to 
commercial banks in 1978 a_d almost all the indebtedness on 
a net basis. While a great portion of this debt is carried 
by superborrowers like Braz._1 and Mexico, other countries 
such as Peru, Chile, Colon., .a, Argentina, Panama, etc., have 
become important clients of international banks as well. 
Likewise, the relat-:e weight of banks in the 
structure of Latin America 
	 external finance also has 
become considerable. In 196-1970, the average net 
contribution of banks to the current account finance of Latin 
America was only slightly greater than 12% of the total; 
however, by 1974 the banks accounted for more than two-thirds 
of net flows, 2/ and in subsequent years despite new lending 
by international organizations (e.g. IMF Oil Facility), their 
contribution has remained around 50%. 
Thus there is little doubt that private commercial 
banks have become a force to be reckoned with in the external 
finance of the region. And their importance must not be 
taken as a mere passive element in finance. As pointed out 
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Table 1 
INDEBTEDNESS OF NON-OIL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO PRIVATE 
COMMERCIAL BANKS, END DECEMBER 1978 a/ 
(Billions of dollars) 
Developing Countries 
Latin 	 Middle 
America 	 East b/ Africa Asia Total World 
Gross 	 79.4 	 3.1 	 12.0 25.4 119.9 903.0 
Net c/ 
	 48.2 -4.4 
	 5.5 3.9 53.2 • • • 
Source: Derived from the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), Forty Ninth Annual Report, Basle, 11 June 
1979, pp. 111-113 and subsequent revisions made by 
the BIS. 
a/ 	 Includes short term debt. Regional data exclude 
offshore financial centres and the residual estimates 
of the BIS. 
b/ 	 Excludes Israel. 
c/ 	 Debt less deposits in the banks. 
by Barnet and Miler: "... banks can exert considerable 
power over underdeveloped countries that are poor in foreign 
exchange because they control the faucets from which dollars 
flow". 3/ 
Unfortunately, while the banks' power over the affairs 
of many developing countries has been growing rapidly as a 
result of their control over foreign financial flows, there 
is an incredible dearth of information and analysis with 
respect to the specific nature of bank lending and the 
impact that this has had on the development of the periphery. 
What improvements that have been made in collecting data on 
the subject have been for very recent periods and have 
involved a high degree of aggregation that reflects the needs 
of regulatory authorities in the center (who are doing the 
collecting) rather than the requirements of developing 
countries. Thus, available data reveal little about the 
evolution of the borrowing and lending processes, the 
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underlying factors and actors, and the precise implications 
that all this has had for developing country borrowers. 
Because of the problem of a lack of information, or 
excessive aggregation of data, analysis of the phenomenon of 
bank lending to developing countries has been mostly limited 
to generalization, with little consideration as to whether 
events have differed among lending institutions and borrowing 
countries. The only studies that have penetrated somewhat 
the veil of aggregation have been those by Wellons and 
Sanchez Aguilar. 4/. The former gives a good orientation to 
the general institutional process of lending and complements 
this with some perspicacious, albeit very brief, analysis of 
the cases of a number of developing country borrowers (of 
which Peru is not one). The latter analyses the lending of 
U.S. banks to Mexico in the early 1970s. Both studies have 
made a valuable contribution to the enhancement of 
understanding of bank involvement in the external finance of 
LDCs; however, the scope and depth of analysis are severely 
handicapped by an obvious data constraint. 
1. Goals of the study  
In general terms, the basic goal of the case study is 
to take a first step in breaking the analytical bottleneck 
with regard to the lending and borrowing processes that have 
generated a massive accumulation of commercial debt in many 
developing countries. A more penetrating view of the 
phenomenon is sought in order to enhance the decision making 
capacity of governments with regard to the contraction of 
commercial debt. And it is hoped that comprehensive grass-
roots empirical analysis such as is attempted in this study 
will help to build a foundation for eventual development of 
new theoretical constructs that can better explain the 
behavior of transnational banks, particularly with respect 
to their lending to Third World governments. 
Since a principal interest is the lending/borrowing 
processes underlying commercial debt the chapters have a 
shifting focus between the banks and Peru. But it should be 
made clear from the outset that the main protagonist of the 
study is the international commercial bank. Analysis has 
been especially designed so as to shed more light on its 
behavior, not only generally, but also at the level of the 
individual institution. Indeed, a major hypothesis of the 
study is that individual banks can have distinct modes of 
behavior, creating variable relations with borrowePs at a 
point in time and intertemporaneously. Hence the need for 
more discriminating analysis of commercial bank lending than 
has been available to date. 
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The study also attempts to examine the reasons why 
the borrower became so reliant on commercial debt. This 
analysis, however, is purposely treated more summarily than 
other material because of an already voluminous literature 
on Peru's political economy over the last decade (see 
bibliography). Where there has been much less work done is 
on the impact of bank loans on the country's development, and 
therefore analysis is much more extensive in this latter 
area. 
2. The general methodoloEy  
One way of approaching the study of transnational 
banks would have been to ask individual banks to provide 
detailed information on their portfolio and their lending 
to individual countries. However, banks are notorious for 
their use of the protective shield of confidentiality, 
making it difficult for even home country governments of the 
banks to secure disaggregated data on lending operations. 
In view of this, an alternative would be to go directly to 
borrowing countries for data that will reveal the behaviour 
of banks and their impact on development. However, this 
represents a formidable task, requiring one to systematically 
dig deeply into raw data in the field for a number of selected 
countries, and then reaggregate this information in a manner 
which promotes a better understanding of the lending by 
banks and their influence on developing countries. 
Notwithstanding these obstacles the latter option represents 
the basic methodology of the study. However, given the 
complexity of the matter, and given limited resources, it 
was decided to initiate the project in one country and 
hopefully have CEPAL, or other researchers, follow up with 
similar case studies later, adjusting them to the findings of 
the initial effort. 
It was deemed impractical to begin the study with a 
superborrower such as Brazil or Mexico because of the fear 
that disaggregation of such voluminous lending by banks 
might create an unwieldy data base for the launching an 
initial case study. Peru finally was selected as the initial 
case due to the fact that, while still a major client of the 
banks, it offered prospects of a more manageable data base. 
Also, the country has recently passed through a complete 
credit cycle. In order to capture a more than contemporary 
view of bank lending, the study begins in 1965, thus 
incorporating at least 5 years of activity that reflect the 
traditionally conservative relationships between these lending 
institutions and developing countries. The 1970s, of course, 
would reflect the new style of world banking that made 
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developing countries acceptable, if not very attractive, 
clients for loans. The -,;-ear 1976 is the cut-off date for 
empirical work, because as will be seen, it is the end of the 
credit cycle and represents the last year in which Peru 
enjoyed general acceptability among the world's commercial 
bankers. 
Another decision has been to focus only on medium and 
long term lending to the public sector, or lending with 
guarantees of the public sector, excluding, however, loans 
directly related to national defense. 5/. Short term lending 
is qualitatively different than medium and long term 
transactions and data collection for the former would have 
been even more difficult to realize than for the latter. 
Meanwhile, the vast amount of medium term lending by 
commercial banks to Peru has been through the public sector, 
making the study of government loans practical from the 
standpoint of comprehensive coverage. 
Within this defined universe, the goal was to collect 
comprehensive "micro-level" data on ever loan extended by 
commercial banks over the period and more global macro-
economic data on loans from other sources of credit. The 
goal basically was realized and the processing and analysis 
of these data have provided for a study with an unusually 
complete view of the evolution of commercial bank lending to 
a developing country. More information on the specifics of 
how data were collected and processed can be found in 
Appendix 1 of the study The more than casual reader would 
be advised to review the aforementioned material, which in 
any event is very brief, in order to avoid misunderstandings 
about the scope and limitations of data presented throughout 
the study. 
3. A General Overview of the Study  
Chapters II, III and IV should be viewed as background 
material. With the exception of Chapter IV, most data 
employed in these sections are from secondary sources. 
Chapter II establishes the international setting and 
argues that the penetration of commercial banks into the 
external finance of developing countries was due to some 
special structural changes in world banking. It also 
establishes that in many ways the process was unique and 
different from previous periods in history when private 
capital flowed in abundance to developing countries and it 
queries whether the contemporary body of theory underlying 
capital flows is adquate for explaining events. 
The following two chapters are dedicated to the 
specifics of Peru. Chapter III provides background on the 
evolution of Peru's political economy over the period 
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1965-1976 with a view to analysis of the factors underlying 
its demand for foreign finance. It finds that despite the 
fact that the period was shared by two rather distinct 
political regimes, many of the factors underlying a heavy 
demand for foreign finance were very similar. Unique factors 
there also were and these are brought forth as well. 
Meanwhile, Chapter IV analyses the response of foreign 
suppliers of credit to Peru's demand for finance. It is 
determined that Peru has had a rather checkered history with 
regard to foreign credit flows. Throughout the period 1965-
1976 the country faced a continual variety of financial 
blockades by one or more official and private creditors. 
While banks on occasion held back finance from Peru, they 
more frequently proved to be the only real elastic source of 
foreign capital. They are found to have been surprisingly 
active lenders in Sixties and extremely aggressive and 
unconditional lenders in first half of the Seventies. The 
chapter goes on to show how the environment changed radically 
in 1976, when bankers adopted a much more restrictive attitude 
on Peru. 
The next four chapters make up Part II of the study 
and focus basically on the nature of bank lending to Peru. 
Chapter V documents the changing characteristics of 
bank lendings to Peru via an intertemporal comparison of 
loans in the 1960s and the 1970s. The former is seen to be 
a period when a handful of big U.S. banks controlled Peru's 
access to commercial credit. While surprisingly active 
lenders, they also were very cautious, as reflected in the 
amounts, terms and conditions of credit. In contrast, in the 
Seventies there is an explosion of bank lending with regard 
to the amount of credit and the number of lending institutions 
Also, the mode and type of lending as well as the terms and 
conditions of credit are found to have undergone rather 
dramatic change with respect to the Sixties. 
Chapter VI studies Peru's syndicated credits and the 
strategies employed in organizing them. It is determined that 
a handful of large banks had a disproportionate amount of 
power with regard to arrangement of credit for Peru and that 
these banks had different strategies for organizing their 
syndicates. The chapter also concludes that syndicated 
credits had advantages for Peru that were not available in 
individual bank loans, but once banks lost confidence in the 
country the competitive advantages of syndication disappeared 
and were substituted for a collusive environment. 
Chapter VII intends to provide support to the 
hypothesis that banks have heterogeneous behavoir. Empirical 
tests show that there was little significant difference among 
banks in the pricing of loans over time. However, there 
were important differences in commitments (scaled to size) 
among individual lenders, suggesting that banks are inclined 
to discriminate risk more by the volume of their lending than 
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by price. Certain banks also were found to be more aggressive 
or conservative lenders than other banks. And institutions 
displayed evidence of not being indifferent about the types 
of loans that they extended and the economic sectors for 
which they provided support. 
Chapter VIII reviews analysis of Part II of the study 
and attempts to tie together the section's major findings with 
respect to the changing characteristic of bank loans and 
the heterogeneous behaviour of lending institutions. 
The next three chapters make up the third part of the 
study and they shift focus, to the impact of bank loans on 
various aspects of the economic development of Peru. 
Chapter IX examines the role of banks in project 
development. Analysis reveals that banks have supported 
many projects of high national priority, some of which also 
may have been considered to be relatively risky in nature. In 
general, however, on specfic projects commercial banks are 
found to have been only one of many sources of finance so 
that their role clearly was only complementary in any given 
financial package. Their finance also only covered medium 
term periods. 
Chapter X analyses the evolution of commercial bank 
conditionality throughout the 12 years covered by the study. 
Looking at matter in detail, one finds that banks were highly 
conditional lenders in the Sixties and their policies 
sometimes severely restricted government policy making. In 
the first half of the Seventies commercial banks's attitude on 
conditionality changed drastically as virtually no conditions 
whatsoever were placed on commercial credit. But, then, in 
1976 bankers shifted gears once again and became highly 
conditional lenders. Moreover, the scope of their 
conditionality was amplified enormously as banks attempted to 
monitor the economy in a way which was not unsimilar to the 
IMF. 
Chapter XI attempts to provide a general overview of 
the impact of bank lending on the socio•economic development 
of Peru. While finding many positive aspects of bank 
involvement in the economy, the overall assessment is 
pessimistic about the ability of banks to satisfy the 
requirements of development finance. Bank credit is found to 
have aggravated rather than mitigated structural and policy 
dificiencies in the economy. Banks also are found to have been 
unable to cope with the accumulating weakness in policy and 
structure that their credit helped to foster; their sudden 
withdrawal of support for the economy provoked a crisis that 
was much more severe than would have been necessary if more 
stable sources of development finance had been available. 
tanks also are found to have been interventionist and very 
conditional lenders when the government's economic and 
political position was most vulnerable. 
The last pair of chapters represent the fourth and 
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concluding part of the study. Chapter XII summarizes some of 
the main findings of the investigation, draws some basic 
conclusions about the role of banks in development finance 
and makes some suggestions for future action. Chapter XIII is 
an epilogue which brings the reader up through 1979 with 
respect to the relations between Peru and its private 
creditors. 
4. Some concluding remarks  
Before entering into the body of the study it is 
important to point out clearly what are the limitations of 
analysis. 
A first, and very serious limitation of the study is 
that it does not treat the much publicized arms' build up by 
Peru in the Seventies. News media and other sources have 
estimated that in the latter half of the decade fifteen to 
twenty percent of the country's foreign debt has been related 
to national defense purchases. These expenditures undoubtedly 
have impacted the economy's performance and affected Peru's 
geopolitical and economic relations with the governments and 
financial entities of the centers. However, the subject is 
so closely tied to national sovereignty and social welfare 
functions that it has been decided to skirt the issue 
entirely. Fortunately, the arms build up was no secret and 
all foreign creditors, including the banks, many of which 
helped to finance the build up, acted in full awareness of 
Peru's defense strategies. In other words, the arms purchases 
were not an exogenous factor in commercial bank credit 
decisions. 6/. 
A second limitation of analysis is that no attempt has 
been made to comprehensively analyse relations between the 
banks and non-financial transnational enterprises. The 
study was originally designed to do this; indeed, a chapter 
was to be dedicated to the subject. 7/. However, it proved 
difficult to develop empirical support for comprehensive 
analysis, so that references to THB-INC relations in the 
study have had to be rather casual and are not presented in 
any systematic fashion. 
A last, and very fundamental limitation is that this is 
only a case study of Peru. Analysis of bank behavior is based 
on revealed preferences, and given the dearth of information 
on activities of individual banks one will find that there 
often is no alternative but to conjecture about the motivatiors 
underlying behavior. Furthermore, Peru is not an "average" 
developing country (if indeed there is such a thing), so that 
generalizations provoked by findings related to Peru must be 
considered highly tentative in nature and would be best 
treated as hypotheses awaiting further testing. 
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Chapter II 
COMMERCIAL BANKS: THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING 
The motivation behind bank lending to a specific 
developing country can be 'iewed from two perspectives. On 
the one hand there is the general international environment, 
i.e., that mixture of economic, socio-political and historical 
factors that are exogenous to the borrower and influence the 
general behavior of private capital, and banks in particular. 
On the other hand there are the factors peculiar to a given 
country's political economy that influence its demand for 
external resources and which also may condition the specific 
response of private lenders to that demand. These latter 
factors, while not acting independently of the former, can be 
considered to be more or less endogenous to the developing 
country itself. 
This chapter will .attempt to provide general background 
on the international setting for the study and will trace 
some of the fundamental reasons why commercial banks were 
disposed to lend heavily to developing countries in the 
decade of the Seventies. It will be the task of the two 
subsequent chapters to provide background on lending/borrowing 
from the standpoint of the peculiarities of Peru. 
This chapter on the international context is divided 
into 3 basic sections. The first will provide some historical 
antecedents on the role of banks and private capital in the 
external finance of developing countries. The second section 
takes a more contemporary view and analyses those factors that 
have contributed to the current involvement of banks in the 
external finance of developing countries. The third and last 
section will attempt to ;:eigimnarize the material and will 
inquire about a theoretica] framework for bank lending 
behavior. 
A. BANK LENDING TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SOME BRIEF 
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
The heavy involvement of private commercial banks in 
the external finance of Latin America during the decade of 
the Seventies ha's been the subject of much debate in both 
the industrialized and developing countries. The uninitiated 
could, however, derive the impression that the whole 
phenomenon is a new one, lacking precedent and therefore 
perplexing analysts. But, in fact, commercial banks, and 
priArate capital in general, have in the past played a 
significant part in the medium/long term external finance of 
developing areas. In some ways lending in the Seventies 
mirrors this earlier involvement; but in other more 
fundamental ways the whole process is rather unique. 
Prior to 1970, the main periods of very significant 
private capital flows from industrialized to developing 
countries had been the Nineteenth Century and the early part 
of the Twentieth Century. Between 1815 and World War I, under 
the impulse of stability provided by the Pax Britannica, 
coupled with the vigorous expansion of trade, vast amounts of 
private capital were transferred from Europe (particularly 
England) to the rest of the world, especially North America 
and Australia, and to a lesser extent the developing countries 
of Latin America. The First World War seriously disrupted 
world trade and capital flows, but this was followed by a 
vigorous recovery in the 1920s. Although England remained a 
major capital exporter in this latter period, the pillage of 
war left Europe somewhat debilitated. Meanwhile, the United 
States emerged as a major exporter of private capital and 
much of its resources flowed to Latin America. 8/ 
The bulk of the medium/long term capital exports up 
through World War I were of the portfolio type, i.e., bond 
issues and other debt instruments, rather than direct 
investment. 9/ The principal borrowers were governments 
- especially in the case of Latin America - and they sought 
foreign finance basically to support infrastructure projects 
such as those for transport networks and public utilities. 10/ 
However, wars and revolutions also were commonly supported by 
foreign issues. 11/ Importantly, maturities on debt 
instruments assumed by developing countries for infrastructure 
projects were very long term in nature, reaching up to 99 
years, and occasionally even being perpetual. 12/ 
What was the role of commercial banks in these 
activities? Direct lending by them focussed usually on short 
term commodity trade, but banks were also frequent underwriters 
of long term bond issues. 13/ The loans arranged by banks were 
voluminous, but also highly cyclical. 14/ While fluctuations 
in trade and commodity prices underlied many of the peaks 
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and troughs of capital flows, they were also a reflection of 
the uncontrolled euphoria of investors, followed by financial 
collapses and temporary retrenchment of loans. North has 
succinctly described much of the process throughout the 
Nineteenth Century: 
The initial interest in the revolutionary South 
American countries (by British investors) was 
followed by substantial lending. 	 In addition 
to government loans, there were also the 
activities of British companies in gold mining and 
similar exploits. Investors became increasingly 
uncritical in their evaluation of the prospects in 
these countries and the inevitable period of default 
occurred in 1825-26. Although this experience was a 
bitter lesson, it was to be repeated many times over. 
Almost every surge of capital exports to a country 
engendered a wave of enthusiasm which dimmed the 
critical faculties of the lender and produced a painful 
day of reckoning. 15/ 
Defaults were widespread and costly. Aside from the 
1825-26 debacle with Latin America, in 1841-42 nine U.S. state 
governments suspended foreign payments and in ensuing years 
many foreign financed railroads want bankrupt. In 1873-74 
the governments of Honduras, Costa Rica, 16/, Santo Domingo, 
Paraguay, Spain, Egypt, Peru, Turkey, Uruguay, Liberia, 
Guatemala and Bolivia all defaulted on their debt, "often 
because of the fear generated by the contemporary wave of 
defaults prevented otherwise creditworthy countries from 
refinancing existing obligations". 17/ 
Notwithstanding the boom and bust nature of lending, 
it is important to point out, as North does, that losses 
should not obscure the overall profitable character of lending 
by investors. 18/ Indeed, just before World War I about £3.8 
billion in foreign long term publicly issued capital was 
held by British investors, representing roughly 25% of the 
country's Gross National Product. French investors were 
somewhat similarly committed. Latin America alone owed 
foreign investors about $6 000 million in 1913.19/ 
After the First World War private capital flows to 
developing countries were renewed. In the 1920s, and in 
contrast to the Nineteenth Century, the U.S. was at the 
vanguard of capital exports to Latin America. Although there 
was a somewhat greater amount of direct foreign investment in 
the period, portfolio transactions with governments continued 
to dominate capital transfers. U.S. flows were extended or 
underwritten by commercial banks, the most important of which 
were related to the big New York institutions that dominate 
world finance today. They competed vigorously with each other 
as well as with European banks for business, approaching 
foreign states, cities, public utilities, etc., with offers of 
credit, often, as Davis oberves, without any serious 
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evaluation of repayment capacity. 20/ 
The crash of 1929 was followed by a severe fall in 
commodity prices and trade volume. The economies of many 
developing countries collapsed under the weight of their 
foreign debt and the ensuing disintegration of the world 
economy promoted prolonged defaults. By 1933 67% of the 
Latin America dollar bond issues were in default, 21/ Peru 
being a major country in this category. Recovery proved very 
difficult; for instance in the case of Peru, arrears stemming 
from its 1933 default to U.S. creditors were not liquidated 
until the early Fifties. 22/ 
The years preceeding World War II displayed little 
dynamism with regard to trade in goods and finance. 
Developing countries found access to foreign credit restricted 
as private creditors became extremely cautious under the 
weight of world depression and severe criticism about 
undisciplined behavior during the 1920s. To cite a U.S. 
government report that concerned itself with overseas lending 
by private institutions in the period: 
Under the high pressure salesmanship methods by 
which foreign issues were solicited and sold, our 
loans proved to be their undoing. The flotation of 
one loan frequently came to be regarded as adequate 
justification for further issues to the same borrower 
or the same country without regard to the growing 
burden of indebtedness. 23/ 
B. THE POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD: STRUCTURAL 
CHANGES IN WORLD BANKING 
Immediately after the War, developing countries' 
access to foreign credit followed patterns of the post-1929 
period; direct foreign investment and official government 
loans were the principal sources of expatriate capital. 
International agencies such as the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank added another dimension to finance 
in the late Fifties and in the decade of the Sixties. As 
for commercial banks, up to 1970 they generally were limited 
lenders to LDCs, with their activity restricted to short term 
lending for trade and occasional project loans that often 
were protected by export credit guarantees such as those 
offered by the U.S. Export-Import Bank. Underwriting of bond 
issues was virtually nil, as investors maintained a very 
restrictive attitude towards developing countries and 
governments of industrialized nations placed an impressive 
network of red tape in the front placements by Third World 
entities. However, this conservative posture hid some 
important changes that were taking place elsewhere in world 
banking and which would eventually culminate in bankers 
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becoming a major source of finance for developing countries. 
The change actually began in the United States in the 
1950s when there developed a new breed of banker who was a 
"salesman at heart" and wro would aggressively seek new 
business. 24/ The attitude was partly attributable to the 
high liquidity of banks during the 1950s. However, more 
fundamentally, banking officials conditioned by the 
depression of the 193Cs to conservative strategies were 
beginning to retire and "a whole new group of what was to 
become the 'go-go guys' of the 1960s were entering top 
management". 25/ Initially, U.S. banks focussed their 
expansion on domestic markets, as evidenced by the fact that 
prior to 1960 only 6 U.S. banks had foreign branches. 26/ 
However, the wheels already were in motion for a massive 
"transnationalization" of American banking activities that 
would later be followed by banks in Europe, Canada and Japan. 
The convergence of a number of factors promoted expansion 
abroad. One key ingredient was the development of the 
eurodollar market: 
The origin of the Eurodollar market can be traced 
back to the 1920s when U.S. dollars were deposited 
in Berlin and Vienna and converted into local 
currencies for lending purposes. These practices did 
influence the local money markets. After World War 
II, the U.S. dollar was designated by the IMF as an 
intervention currency in the foreign exchange market. 
This established the common acceptability of the U.S. 
dollar as a key currency for international trade, 
investment, exchange arbitrage, and balance of 
payments settlements. The continuous balance of 
payments deficits of the United States resulted in a 
growth of official reserve assets in Western European 
countries, and their central banks looked for 
investment opportunities for short-term gains. In 
the 1950s, Russian banks in Western Europe preferred 
to place their holdings of U.S. dollars with British 
and French banks against the risk of possible seizure 
by the U.S. authorities in case of crisis. Under 
these circumstances, Eurobanks simply practiced the 
principals of free economy by establishing competitive 
spreads between creditor and debtor rates of interest. 
Some French banks extended U.S. dollars loans to 
Italian banks during the 1950s as typical operations 
in small amounts. 27/ 
This market was an attractive place to do business; 
being essentially an offshore depository of foreign 
currencies, it was devoid of any regulation by national 
authorities. Thus, reserve requirements and other regulatory 
measures were absent, thereby in some cases lowering the 
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cost of banking operations and creating opportunities for 
enhanced profit-making. 
The market's growth was given impulse by a series of 
other factors. In 1957, British banks were forbidden to 
finance trade for non-residents, thus making "offshore" 
deposits of the eurodollar market a convenient tool for 
evading the regulation. In 1958, Western Europe adopted full 
currency covertibility, which promoted trade in goods and 
currencies, thereby generating requirements for international 
finance. The same year the EEC was formed. Then in the 
1960s when the U.S. government established a series of 
capital controls and interest rate regulations to stem its 
growing balance of payments deficit, U.S. banks found the 
Eurodollar market an essential source of funding for 
activities at both home and abroad. 28/ 
While the existence of the eurodollar market 
facilitated the expansion of international activities of U.S. 
banks, an important motivation for such overseas operations 
was the thrust of U.S. direct investment in Europe in the 
early 1960s. In order to avoid the risk of losing major 
corporate accounts to foreign financial institutions, big 
U.S. money - center banks acted defensively and followed 
transnational corporations to Europe and elsewhere, servicing 
their needs and simultaneously attempting to build up general 
market positions abroad. 29/ As these big banks increased 
their international lending operations, other smaller U.S. 
banks were obliged to follow for competitive reasons. And 
in the face of expanding U.S. banks, European banks had to 
consider a more aggressive lending posture as well. To a 
lesser extent, Canadian and Japanese banks also had to 
respond defensively to the growing presence of U.S. banks 
abroad. 
While U.S. financial institutions were at the vanguard 
of the growth of international banking, they also induced 
some major innovations that facilitated greater international 
lending. In the late 1950s and early 1960s lending from the 
eurodollar market usually was short-term (less than one year), 
reflecting the current nature of the banks' deposit base. 
However, banks soon found that they could "purchase" short-
term deposits on the market and, then, by continuously 
rolling them over on interest fixing dates, use these deposits 
to fund much longer term loans, 3-5 years being typical by the 
late 1960s. 30/ Of course, this created considerable 
mismatching between deposits and loans, but the risk was 
considered minimal given what was perceived to be an almost 
automatic refunding of the loans every 180 days. 
Another major innovation included the use of lending 
consortia or syndicates. Banks found that they could 
minimize their individual perceived risk if a group of them 
joined together to form a loan. 31/ In this way large 
amounts of money could be mobilized for a borrower, while at 
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the same time maintaining at modest levels the exposure of 
any one institution. Moreover, the syndicate, by reducing the 
lending requirements of a bank on any given transaction, 
facilitated the entry of smaller banks into the international 
arena. 
By the latter half of the 1960s the expansion of world 
banking had become intense. An enviroment of rapid growth of 
world trade and investment generated new opportunities for 
foreign lending and many more banks set their sights on the 
development of an international portfolio. Moreover, the 
desire to lend abroad was stimulated by the fact that the 
aggressive attitude found in some U.S. banks in the early 
1950s was by now becoming more pronounced and generalized; 
the business psychology of the times in world banking was 
growth at all costs via the expansion of assets and the 
leveraging of capital. And there was no better way to achieve 
this goal than by "going international" and tapping the 
deposits available in the fast growing eurodollar market. 32/ 
As an indication of the growth taking place, one can cons=r 
the expansion of overseas branches of U.S. banks, which were 
at this time the most aggressive group of institutions. In 
1965 there were 13 U.S. banks with 211 branches overseas; by 
1970 the number had risen to 79 banks with 536 branches.33/ 
This, of course, is a conservative indicator since it 
excludes from consideration foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
banks. 
Up until 1970, most medium-term bank lending activity 
took place among the industrialized countries, although as early 
as the mid-1960s some lending had been going to developing 
countries, mostly large ones such as Brazil and Mexico, and 
often as a result of banks following investments by 
transnational corporations. But around 1970, lending to 
developing countries became more widespread and increasing 
amounts of resources were being channelled to governments 
and to a lesser extent to local residents. By now lending 
clearly was motivated by considerations broader than the need 
to service TNCs. Thereafter the periphery was to become a 
major client of the international banks. 
The major reasons behind the lending to ',Xs included 
growing liquidity and competition, each of which fed upon the 
other. After 1970 successive waves of newcomers - notably 
U.S. regional banks and medium and small Japanese 
institutions - entered the international market in search of 
easy profits and the freedom of operation of a non-regulated 
market. This tended to further fuel international liquidity, 
which already had been growing very rapidly. As Weinert has 
pointed out: 
The size of Eurodollar pool grew steadily, fed 
partly by the continued U.S. deficits but also by 
deposit creation on the part of proliferating financial 
institutions. Each U.S. bank branch and consortium 
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bank established in London enlarged the Eurodollar 
pool by depositing their deposits with each other, 
thereby creating new diposits. Moreover, the 
increased number of financial institutions created an 
ever greater will to lend as each institution sought 
to build a portfolio. 34/ 
An important determinant in the drive for new markets 
in developing countries was the 1970-1971 recession in the 
center; with loan demand depressed in the industrialized 
countries, some of the more aggressive commercial banks 
turned to the Third World in search of clients. Such a 
strategy proved attractive because the new "transnational" 
economy of the period had made many developing countries 
appear as good risks to the banks. The opening up of world 
trade in the Sixties had been generating high growth rates 
and sound balance of payments positions in many countries. 
Moreover, given what had been the weak articulation between 
banks and developing nations, portfolios could be built up 
without much concern for excessive exposure. Another 
attraction was that loans to governments - often the principal 
entrepreneur in developing countries - were seen as being 
particularly secure because, unlike corporations, governments 
do not go bankrupt and therefore are usually available to 
service their loans. 35/ Finally, developing countries were 
generally eager borrowers - reflecting stagnation of official 
resource flows, 36/ coupled with the excessive red tape 
attached to these loans - and therefore disposed to pay very 
high risk premiums of 2% or more over base interest rates in 
order to secure bank credit. 
The initial flow of lending to LDCs was concentrated 
in the more advanced countries like Brazil. However, as 
competition pushed more banks into developing areas the base 
of lending expanded: 
... competitive pressures became so hectic that 
banks - many of them new entrants into the international 
scene - saw their lending spill over into the smaller, 
less-developed countries of the region; countries 
traditionally accustomed to obtaining capital from 
official sources found the Eurocurrency market to be 
a more than willing supplier of funds. Indeed, by 
1972 countries had discovered it to be a borrower's 
paradise; not only was there easy access to credit, 
but competition caused margins to be drastically 
reduced and maturities to reach unprecedented lengths. 
By way of example, Brazil, which was a leading borrower 
within the developing world, found that it could 
regularly secure credits with a 10-15 year maturity. 
As for spreads, they declined from 2.1/4% in 1971 to 
1.1/2% in mid-1972 and 3/4-1% in 1973. At the same 
time lending was so voluminous that the country even 
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found it necessary to introduce policieS to discourage 
foreign bank loans. 37/ 
When the OPEC petroleum price rise occurred in late 
1973, the banks became even more eager to lend, although the 
motivation behind the loans changed somewhat. Flooded with 
deposits from the OPEC surplus, banks simply had to turnover 
the funds in the form of new loans. Of course, developing 
countries, facing the sharply increased cost of petroleum 
(and other commodities such as food) were willing clients; 
after all, they had to avoid a radical balance of payments 
adjustment process and more appropriate sources of long term 
finance remained unavailable to them due to the failure of 
OPEC and the industrialized countries to organize an official 
mechanism for the recycling of surplus national resources. 
Some bankers have attempted to characterize their role 
in lending to LDCs during this period as simply a response to 
the demand of these countr:es for finance; in other words, 
lending was "demand driven". 38/ This is a half truth that 
needs clarification. 
While developing countries no doubt had a strong 
demand for resources, banks were just as eager and in some 
cases even more eager to lend; there was clearly a bandwagon 
effect in lending as banks aggressively attempted to stay 
ahead of their competitors. Indeed, the general strategy 
during this expansive period of banking on at least one 
occasion has been characterized as a "glad-handed, name-your-
price approach" to lending. 39/ 
But perhaps more importantly, bankers, in their desire 
to built up a portfolio, were often lax in their evaluation of 
such matters as the use of credit, facility for maturity 
transformation and medium term ability of a country to 
generate the foreign exchange needed to service debt. 40/ Phis 
problem was particularly acute in 1972-1974 as the new 
entrants to international banking were mostly small and 
medium sized institutions which had a willingness to lend that 
far exceeded their capacity to evaluate credits. 41/ 
The euphoric and rather haphazard expansion of banking 
ended abruptly in 1974 when a series of bankruptcies shook 
the world banking industry. The failure having the greatest 
impact was that of Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt of Germany in June 
in which losses on foreign exchange operations were report?d 
at more than 160 million dollars. 42/ International bankers 
then panicked and quickly reviewed their international lenling 
policies. Behavior became "reactive and conservative". A3 
a manifestation of the caution that prevailed it can be seen 
in Table 2 that lending to developing countries slowed down 
dramatically in the second half of 1974. Moreover, margins 
on loans to developing countries shot up to 1 1/2 - 1 3/4% and 
available maturities were considerably shortened. 
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Table 2 
PUBLICIZED EUROCURRENCY CREDITS TO NON-OIL EXPORTING 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(Billions of dollars) 
1973 	 1974 	 1975 
I II III IV 	 I II III IV 
6.1 	 2.3 3.0 1.4 1.6 	 1.1 2.0 2.5 2.9 
Source: IBRD, Borrowing in International Capital Markets, 
first quarter 1975, May 1975; fourth quarter 1975, 
February 1976. 
Lending remained depressed in early 1975. By the 
second half of the year, however, bankers realized that they 
had to renew the flow of loans to LDCs; on the one hand they 
still were flush with OPEC deposits, while on the other 
their clients in the industrialized countries were seeking 
relatively little credit as a result of the deep recession 
in the center. Thus, as shown in table 2, bankers increased 
their lending to developing countries. However, they were 
much more selective with regard to whom they granted loans. 
Furthermore, the terms of lending became particularly onerous. 
By the second half of 1975 many developing countries had to 
accept margins close to 2%, or more. With regard to 
maturities, less than 20% of all publicized credits to LDCs 
had a term in excess of 6 years, compared to 76% in 1974. As 
for loans with a maturity of more than 10 years, they 
virtually desappeared from the marketplace. 43/ 
The sudden retrenchment in the market's terms of 
credit undoubtedly contributed to the serious debt service 
problems that arose in a number of developing countries that 
had become heavily reliant on bank credit. The most severe 
problem cases at tl,e time were Zaire, Jamaica and Peru (plus 
the more developed Turkey), all of which were on the verge 
of default. The banks, fearing wide-spread defaults in the 
Third World, and sensitive to charges from the centers of 
overlending to less developed countries, approached each case 
very cautiously. In order to avoid the precedent of default 
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and/or rescheduling, the banks extended "short leash" 
refinance credits to these borrowers on the promise of 
deflation of the local economy, usually enforced by an IMF 
stabilization program. 44/ For these problem countries the 
social and economic costs of squeezing out foreign exchange 
for payment of debt were very heavy, but accepted in lieu 
of the adverse consequences of outright default. 
The market environment remained very restricted 
through 1977, but thereafter the terms of credit gradually 
began to ease because of (i) the growing pressures of 
accumulating liquidity; (ii) the waning of the uncertainties 
surrounding the bankrupticies of 1974 and the consequent 
return of some banks to the international market; and (iii) 
a perception that general default in the Third World was 
unlikely. Financial institutions remained, however, 
generally more cautious and selective lenders than they had 
been in the early part of the Seventies. 
C. 	 SOME BRIEF THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
There are some clear similarities between the years 
before 1930 and the more contemporary experience of 
developing countries with privately sourced debt. One of the 
more obvious ones is that in both periods large transfers were 
made to governments of developing countries, often under 
conditions of a flurry of lending that could be characterized 
more as a bandwagon effect than a controlled, deliberate 
process of credit evaluation. Also, both periods were 
generally lucrative ones for private creditors. After this 
the parallel is less certain, however. 
In the Nineteenth Century most non-short term 
borrowing by developing countries was undertaken in arms-
length bond markets, while today developing countries receive 
most of their credit directly from commercial banks, which, 
as will be demonstrated in late chapters, can be far from 
standoffish and remote in their dealings with government 
borrowers. Reflecting the different sources of credit, the 
maturities available for infrastructure projects in 
developing areas were much longer in the Nineteenth and early 
Twentieth Centuries than the 5-10 year maturities that 
commercial banks commonly offer today to government borrowers. 
Another major difference between the two periods is that 
unlike in the past when resources came from national financial 
institutions and national financial markets, today's 
resources are usually extended by transnational banks out of 
a transnational pool of eurocurrency that is devoid of 
national regulation. Thus, both the form and content of the 
contemporary external finance of developing countries would 
appear to be in many fundamental ways quite distinct from the 
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historical experience. This suggests new challenges and 
new problems for developing countries. Indeed, later 
analysis of the Peruwian experience will posit that 	 ere 
are great deficiences in the current system of "comercialized" 
development finance. 
The previous review of the bank lending to developing 
countries has purposely avoided a theoretical treatment. 
This is because there is some question as to whether 
available theoretical tools can adequately explain the 
phenomena in question. 
Conventional theory argues that interest rate 
differentials, appropriately adjusted for risk, explain 
movements of capital. At the very beginning of the process 
of penetration of developing country markets in the late 
1960s interest rate differentials, coupled with changed 
perceptions of risk, appear to have been factors behind 
lending. However, soon thereafter differential margins on 
credits between developing and industrialized economies 
were severely eroded to the point where maintenance of large 
and growing credit flows to the Third World could not, on 
appearance, be explained solely by rate differentials. 45/ 
When focusing on brief periods in history, such as in 
this study, real world market imperfections involving 
uncertainty (which distorts risk perception), time and 
liquidity preferences, institutional barriers to capital 
movements, etc., can be more powerful determinants of 
capital flows than rate differentials. Indeed, under 
conditions of real world imperfections almost anything can 
happen with regard to the flow of capital. Thus subjective 
perceptions of risk and non-economic factors can be 
sufficiently influential to cause the distribution of credit 
to be skewed in ways which are not always commensurate with 
the most efficient use of capital. 46/ Perhaps over the 
very long run the process of trial and error allows 
distortions and imperfections to be perceived so that 
retrospective analysis of extended periods would show that 
capital flows indeed do parallel relative interest rates. 47/ 
But one can only wonder to what extent short term behavior 
of capital movements imparts temporary advantages or 
disadvantages to borrowers that in themselves affect long 
term trends in resource flows. In any case, theoretical 
explanations for shorter term behavior of resource flows are 
clearly of great need to present day policy makers in 
developing countries for whom the very long term has little 
immediate relevancy. 
Undoubtedly a fundamental consideration in seeking a 
theoretical explanation for bank loans to developing countries 
is the transnationalization of capital that has taken place 
in the post-World War II period. 48/ 
Stephen Hymer was at the vanguard of work showing that 
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conventional portfolio theory is in itself inadequate as an 
explanation of capital movements when so much of the flows is 
derived from direct investments of firms. 49/ In an age when 
transnational firms are vertically and horizontally 
integrated across the globe, factors such as control, market 
penetration, collusion, rivalry, 50/ etc., can underlie 
investment flows in addition to rates of return on 
investments. It now also may be appropriate that a more 
discriminating theory should be developed for transnational 
banks. These banks operate globally, have strong links with 
productive transnational enterprises 51/ and themselves are 
integrating their operations both horizontally and vertically. 
Thus, it probably is excessively simplistic to look to only 
"indifferent" capital seeking out higher interest rates as 
an explanation for bank lending behavior. 
All the above would lead one to conclude that new 
directions are needed in explaining why banks behave the way 
they do. 52/ Perhaps the application of industrial 
organization theory might bear fruit in this regard. In any 
case, it is totally beyond the scope of this study to make 
the herculian effort of developing a theory on transnational 
banking. Our goal is much more modest: to construct the 
first comprehensive, empirical analysis of contemporary bank 
lending to a developing country. This, especially if coupled 
with later studies of other countries, hopefully will help 
to establish an empirical foundation for the eventual 




PERU: THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND ITS DEMAND FOR EXTERNAL 
RESOURCES 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight those 
events and factors that were decisive in the public sector's 
recourse to external finance over the period 1965-1976. It 
should be made clear from the outset that the ensuing 
analysis will take the form of a synopsis with all the 
associated shortcomings of such an approach. There is already 
a voluminous literature analysing the evolution of the 
Peruvian economy, especially for the years after 1968, and 
therefore there is little need to duplicate these efforts 
here. 53/ 
Material in the chapter is presented on two levels. 
On one plane, the chapter is designed to provide the reader 
with key background inforcation on the political economy 
of Peru over the 12 years under analysis. This material, 
which is of necessity descriptive, constructs the local 
setting that will be supportive of later analysis of bank 
lending. The focus, of course, is on those domestic economic 
and political events that influenced Peru's demand for 
external finance in general and bank finance in particular. 
Care also has been taken to incorporate local events that 
may have affected, either positively or negatively, foreign 
lenders' willingness to extend finance to the government. 
(The actual response of the supply side is for reasons of 
exposition reserved for Chapter IV, however.) These domestic 
events behind the recourse to external finance are treated 
in chronological fashion, using 1965 as the point of 
departure. 
On a second plane the chapter attempts to complement 
the chronological description of key events with some 
analytical view of just what factors were behind Peru's need 
for external finance. The analytical element is incorporated 
in two ways. Those factors of demand that are peculiar to 
a particular point in tine are woven into the description of 
the political economy of Peru. Meanwhile, those factors 
which are more generalized, or common to the 12 years, are 
brought into focus in an analytical overview that makes up 
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the second half of the chapter. This overview also will serve 
as a form of summary to the admittedly broad time span covered 
in the descriptive survey. 
A. A SYNTHETIC REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
PERU, 1965 - 1976 
In a simple framework, it can be said that the public 
sector's requirements for foreign finance are closely linked 
to the fiscal budgetary operations of the government and the 
behavior of the country's balance of payments. 
In the first instance, external borrowing may be needed 
to help support fiscal expenditure. The nature of this 
support can vary according to the circumstances. 
A budget may be in perfect balance yet be in need of 
foreign finance. This occurs because almost all budgets have 
a foreign component and foreign currency income may fall 
short of foreign currency expenditures. If a government wants 
to avoid drawing down on its international reserves, external 
borrowing may be its only alternative. 
But foreign borrowing more often is associated with 
deficit finance. Given a desired level of expenditure and a 
given level of tax revenue, a government has several options 
in terms of financing the gap between income and budgeted 
outlays. One is that it can borrow in the domestic financial 
market. There are often severe limitations to this approach, 
however, since developing country capital markets are 
notoriously very thin and therefore full domestic finance of 
a large deficit may prove to be highly disruptive to the whole 
economy, or simply impossible to realize at all. An 
alternative form of finance is to create the resources by 
taking recourse to the Central Bank's printing press. But 
this easy route to finance is also a very dangerous one 
because of its severe impact on inflation. Finally, if there 
is a ready access to private capital markets abroad, a 
government may opt to cover the fiscal gap through foreign 
borrowing. Because of interest differentials between home and 
foreign capital markets, the latter option may be attractive 
even if domestic finance is available to cover the fiscal 
deficit. 
In practice governments use all three methods of 
finance, with their respective importance varying with the size 
of the deficit to be financed, and the nature of access to 
financial capital at both home and abroad. But when domestic 
capital markets are small and the financial need large, the 
real options sometimes are between emissions and foreign 
borrowing. The latter is usually considered to be the more 
prudent source of finance, although feasibility depends on the 
willing hand of foreign financiers. 
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It also is important to point out that deficits can 
sometimes be more apparent than real. 	 This occurs when 
deficits are a manifestation of lagging tax effort. Thus, 
foreign borrowing and/or emissions can simply be an expedient 
measure to avoid the hard realities of a need for greater 
restraint in spending and/or a more intensive tax effort. 
With regard to the balance of payments, it is the 
public sector's responsibility to guarantee the "money-ness" 
of the local currency through its transformation into needed 
foreign exchange. In a developing country, current account 
transactions usually do not balance, requiring some form of 
external finance. Furthermore, there usually are requirements 
to finance debt service payments and capital outflows 
generated by nationals and foreign residents. Some of the 
need for finance can be covered autonomously as importers 
(including those of the public sector) often bring foreign 
credit to bear on their transactions; as foreigners are 
likely to be making some new investments in the country and 
national capital may be repatriated. However, more likely 
than not the net effect will be an unfinanced gap that the 
public sector will have to fill either indirectly, through 
a general program of borrowing, or directly through 
compensatory balance of payments loans or drawdowns of 
official reserves. In addition to financing the external gap, 
a government also may borrow simply to build up foreign 
exchange reserves, which are looked upon as a form of security 
by international creditors. 
The actual amount of finance required to support the 
balance of payments depends on many factors. The country's 
export vocation, income and price elasticities of demand for 
imports, terms of trade, level of factor payments, swings in 
private capital movements, etc., all are determinants. Some 
elements of the balance of payments performance are out of 
the governments control, e.g., external prices and natural 
events - weather, ecological changes, etc. - that can alter 
the exportable surplus or change import requirements. On the 
other hand, the government has policy instruments at its 
disposal that can influence the requirements for external 
finance. These go from the style of development that is 
officially promoted, down to demand management, exchange rate 
regimes, tariff levels, fiscal incentives and disincentives, 
policies towards foreign investors, etc. Some policy measures 
can have an immediate impact on the external sector, e.g. 
import quotas, while others take longer to work their way 
through the system, e.g., export incentives. But in any case 
timely policy measures are crucial to balance of payments 
mangement. 
It is within the framework of internal and external 
financial gaps that the following analysis on Peru will be 
persued. But one must not lose sight of the fact that 
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financial disequilibria are in themselves a rather superficial 
manifestation of more fundamental structural problems that 
are commonly associated with dependent developing economies. 
Foreign finance is useful to bridge financial gaps and time 
lags in public policy directed at rectifying structural 
imbalances, but care must be taken to ensure that finance 
does not become an opiate that hides the need to pursue 
diliberate corrective measures. Thus, if a borrower lacks 
discipline and foresight, easy access to foreign finance can 
actually be permissive, promoting an unnecessary widening of 
financial gaps, mounting external debt and extreme vulnerability 
to severe problems should an adequate flow of finance suddenly 
become unavailable. 54/ 
1. 1965 - 1966:  The Seeds of Crisis 
The study of commercial bank lending to Peru begins at 
a time when the economic program of Peru's newly elected 
Bela-ande administration was in full gear. The government, 
which came into office in mid-1963 was reformist in character 
and its program mirrored the principles of the Alliance for 
Progress, as expressed in the Charter of Punta del Este. 55/ 
Policy was oriented to pursuing the industrialiation process 
(via import substitution) that had begun in earnest in the 
late 1950s and which was progressively changing the structure 
of an economy that traditionally had been dependent on 
primary commodity exports generated by the investments of 
foreigners and members of the national oligarchy. 56/ But 
at the same time authorities also gave attention to programs 
of a social nature, especially in the areas of education and 
moderate land reform, that were designed to calm peasant 
unrest and narrow a gap between rich and poor that was 
among the widest in Latin America and in the world. 57/ 
Activist government policy was something of a novelty 
for Peru, as the public sector by tradition was relatively 
small 58/ and the economic environment had been for many 
years an "example par excellence in Latin America of that 
dream of orthodox development economists: an export led 
system in which cyclical balance of payments difficulties 
were handled by domestic demand restraint and exchange 
devaluation, in which entry of foreign capital and the 
repatriation of profits were virtually unrestricted and in 
which government intervention and participation were kept to 
a minimum". 59/ Partly as a consequence of the liberal 
tradition, the public sector was not as sophisticated as its 
counterpart in some other Latin American countries and there 
were few mechanisms for the control and coordination of an 
ambitious development program. In any event, the government 
expanded rapidly as reflected in the fact that outlays (exclusive 
of amortization) more than doubled over 1963-1965; 60/even in 
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real terms growth was substantial, roughly estimated at more 
than 50%. 61/ In expanding authorities were careful, however, 
to respect traditional boundaries of activity as public 
investment was largely confined to infrastructure (especially 
roads), leaving basically unchallenged the private sector's 
domination of productive activities. Moreover, direct 
foreign investment continued to be the explicit cornerstone 
for financing productive capital formation. 62/ 
By 1965 there was some sign of strain in the economy. 
The fiscal accounts were moving into increasing deficits 
= after having been practically in balance in 1962-1963, - 63/ 
and inflation was on the rise (see tables 3 and 4). Also, 
as the export boom of the early 1960s receded, so did the 
relatively high rate of growth achieved during the period. 
On the other hand, imports accelerated. Hxternal prices for 
imports were very much higher by 1965. Moreover, import 
volume was fueled by an increasingly overvalued exchange 
rate, 64/stagnant food production, public investment and renewed 
vigor in the private sector. As a result, the trade account, 
which had tended to balance in the early 1960s, recorded a 
sizeable deficit in 1965 and the current account needed 
considerable more finance than was customary for Peru (see 
table 5). 
The weakening fiscal situation stemmed from the 
considerable growth of expenditure associated with the 
administration's reform program and the effects of domestic 
inflation, coupled with the fact that the national tax base 
was narrow and relatively inelastic. Moreover, taxes were a 
sensitive political issue and an opposition Congress was 
little disposed to support: needed tax reform. 65/ 
The financing of the fiscal gap through the tapping 
of local savings was not easy, because of the underdeveloped 
nature of national capital markets and public official's 
lack of experience in the use of debt instruments. Thus, 
Central Bank primary emissions were a frequent source of 
finance, 66/ although recourse actually was minimized in 1965 
due to new awareness of the inflationary impact of such 
practices. 67/ Another important source of finance was 
relatively short term commercial borrowing abroad, which also 
conveniently helped to cover the external deficit. 
Here one also should point out that by 1965 there were 
clear signs of growing apprehension about foreign direct 
investment, traditionally a prime component of the country's 
external finance. While foreign influence in the Peruvian 
economy had long been considerable, and a source of concern 
for some sectors of the population, L/ it had by now become 
a public issue largely because of an intensification of a long 
standing dispute with the International Petroleum Company (IPC), 
a local subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, 69/ that 
raised passions about the role of expatriate capital in the 
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that included a promise to resolve the dispute with the IPC, 71/ 
a promise that remained frustrated throughout his 5 years 
in office and ultimately contributed to a change in 
government. As will be seen shortly, the issue of foreign 
investment eventually reached a peak in 1968, bringing about 
a fundamental change in relations with foreign capital. 
Turning to 1966, there were more indications of 
deterioration in the financial situation. 
In this year current expenditure growth continued to 
outstrip the generation of revenues, with a consequent sharp 
reduction in public savings (see table 4). Furthermore, the 
fiscal gap proved more difficult to finance, so that once 
again authorities returned to the Central Bank for assistance.72/ 
Another major resource of finance continued to be commercial 
loans contracted abroad on relatively short terms. 
The balance of payments also was under more pressure 
in 1966, notwithstanding a marked improvement in exports and 
the terms of trade. With imports continuing their rapid 
pace of growth, and an increasing proportion of export 
receipts drained away by profit remittances, the current 
account dificit rose by about 55%. This year, and unlike 
1965, the deficit could only be partially financed abroad so 
that there was an 11% decline in gross international reserves 
(see table 5). 
Few remedial measures were taken in 1966 to stem the 
tide as apparently the general public saw reasons to be 
optimistic about the government's economic and political 
prospects. 73/ About the only outward sign of concern was 
an intensification of the debate over tax reform and the 
renewal of an IMF stand-by agreement for $37.5 million in 
March. But perhaps as a sign of the general level of 
confidence, the credit - which would have been a first 
traunche - was not drawn upon that year. 
2. 1967 - 1968: A Financial Crisis 
By 1967 there finally was a general awareness of a 
difficult situation. Concern was growing about the viability 
of t he exchange rate, which had been stable since 1959. The 
fiscal situation was by now clearly grave, with public savings 
all but disappearing (see table 4) and financing becoming ever 
more difficult to realize. The balance of payments was in 
severe disarray; export earning actually declined and the 
current account deficit reached record proportions and was 
in need of finance (see table 5). 
The government, facing a large fiscal gap, continued 
to struggle with Congress over tax reform, to little avail. 
Import tariffs were increased early in the year; and while 
having little revenue effect, they did help to slow down the 
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rate of growth of imports. 74/ Budget financing was satisfied 
largely through emergency s71Trt term commercial loans. 
In August, the government negotiated a new 42.5 million 
stand-by accord with the IMF. Being a first traunche credit, 
conditions were relatively moderate. Key elements of the 
agreement were expenditure cuts and restrictions on new debt 
with a maturity of less than 5 years. 75/ This latter measure 
was introduced because of what was considered to be the 
haphazard and uncoordinated nature of borrowing by government 
agencies, 76/ most of which took ample recourse to commercial 
credit on relatively onerous terms. 
The IMF accord was complemented by additional medium 
term commercial credit. Nevertheless, the overvalued exchange 
rate could not be supported (see table 6). The government, 
retreating from an adament position taken earlier in the year 
against devaluation, 77/ had to make the unpopular decision 
to adjust the Sol by 4% on September 1. Notwithstanding the 
devaluation and additional credit, the year ended with the 
public sector still in a precarious financial situation and 
international reserves down to the equivalent of less than 
one and one-half months' imports (see again table 5). 
In 1968 problems once again intensified, complicated 
by what now was becoming a debt service problem due to the 
inevitable reverse flow on the numerous foreign loans 
contracted in earlier years (see table 7). 78/ The first half 
of the year was spent largely trying to convince Congress 
about the need for a tax reform. Meanwhile, economic growth 
slowed, inflation intensified and the internal and external 
finances were in chaos. Finally, in June 1968, Congress gave 
the President extraordinary powers (Emergency Law 17044), for 
a period of 60 days, to tackle the crisis. New tax measures 
were quickly introduced, bringing immediate revenue gains. 
Further budget cuts were undertaken. In order to counteract 
the increasing foreign control of the banking system, local 
banks had to convert into two-thirds national ownership. 
External problems were confronted with a new IMF stand-by 
credit for 75 million dollars that was negotiated in September 
1968. Under the stand-by agreement new debt was restricted; 
no loans were to be contracted with maturities between 181 
days and 10 years and specified semi-annual limits were placed 
on loans with maturities between 10 and 15 years. 79/ Armed 
with the IMF credit, authorities also managed to arrange 
rescheduling/refinance accords with major foreign creditors. 
The new measures brought immediate results, but they 
came too late to save the government. Facing growing 
unpopularity over its economic policy, and embroiled in a 
scandal over its proposed settlement of the IPC dispute, 80/ 
the administration fell victim to a restless military head 
by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, who took over power in the 
name of a revolutionary government on October 3, 1968. 
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Table 6 
PERU: APPARENT INTERNATIONAL PURCHASING POWER OF THE SOL 
(1964 = 100) 
Year 
Index of 


















Index of exchange 
parity 	 rate to 
3/4 	 parity 
2/5 
(5) 	 (6) 
1964 26.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1965 26.8 100.0 113.4 102.0 111.2 89.9 
1966 26.8 100.0 127.3 105.5 120.7 82.9 
1967 30.7 114.6 142.7 105.7 135.0  84.9 
1968 38.7 144.4 168.2 108.3 155.3 93.0 
1969 38.7 144.4 181.4 112.6 161.1 89.6 
1970 38.7 144.4 193.4 116.6 165.9 87.0 
1971 38.7 144.4 200.8 120.5 166.6 86.7 
1972 38.7 144.4 210.8 125.9 167.4 86.3 
1973 38.7 144.4 241.7 142.9 169.1 85.4 
1974 38.7 144.4 281.8 169.1 166.6 86.7 
1975 40.8 152.2 338.5 184.8 183.2 83.1 
1976 57.5 214.6 455.2 193.3 235.5 91.1 
1977 83.8 312.7 634.9 205.1 309.6 101.0 
Source: Derived from data of CEPAL and I.M.F., International  
Financial Statistics, Map 1978. 
Note: This is a very rough and ready index which should be used 
only as an aproximation of trends. The United States is Peru's 
major trading partner and its wholesale price index is used as 
a proxy for international prices. 
a/ GDP deflator. 
b/ (jholesale price index. 
3. 1969 - 1974: Consolidation of the Military Revolution 
The new government declared itself dedicated to 
transforming an economy which was in chaos and under the 
control of powerful national and foreign groups. 81/ Its 
basic intentions were to reduce dependence upon f5Feign 
capital, carry through intensive and extensive land reform, 
and achieve a rapid rate of economic development based on 
export-led industrialization. 82/ The transformation was to be 
styled as a bridge between capitalism and socialism and was to 
take place "without chaos and without death". 82/ 
The investment required for the restructuring of the economy 
was to come basically from internal as opposed to external 
resources. 84/ 
Given the precarious state of national finance, coupled 
with formal restrictions on foreign borrowing, the new 
government initially had little choice but to maintain 
stabilization efforts. In mid-October 1968, the authorities 
informed the IMF that they were disposed to "continue and 
strengthen" the program under the new stand-by credit that 
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was arranged in September by the previous government. 85/ 
The stabilization effort continued through 1969-1970 
and into 1971. During these years fiscal policy was orthodox, 
if not conservative. For 1969-1970 the current savings of the 
budget turned strongly positive (an average of 77% of capital 
expenditures), reflecting largely the effect of the full 
impact of the fiscal measures introduced in mid-1968. 
Meanwhile, investment expenditures by the public sector were 
restrained (see table 8) even in the face of depressed private 
sector investment that resulted from uncertainty over the 
Junta's policies. These factors contributed to a narrowing 
of the fiscal gap. Moreover, financing of the deficit was 
done principally through the use of domestic financial 
instruments; recourse to Central Bank financing was carefully 
avoided and there was little new external borrowing. 86/ 
The balance of payments also showed remarkable 
improvement in this period. Reduced import requirements in 
1969 and favorable world commodity prices in 1970 caused the 
current account to move close to balance in the former year 
and actually turn to a large surplus in the latter. Despite 
net outflows on the foreign investment account, the overall 
balance of payments was in surplus in both years, aided in 1970 
Table 7 
PERU: EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT2/ 













of 	 GDP 
Debt ser 
vice 	 as 
percentage 
of exports 
1960-1964 180 40 32 8 6.5 6.5 
1965 325 36 24 11 7.6 4.7 
1966 513 53 33 20 10.1 5.8 
1967 623 95 65 30 12.2 10.7 
1968 737 129 87 42 15.4 12.9 
1969 875 135 89 46 16.2 12.9 
1970 945 167 121 46 15.2 13.6 
1971 997 213 156 57 14.6 20.0 
1972 1 121 219 164 55 14.7 19.0 
1973 1 491 433 352 81 16.1 32.2 
1974 2 182 456 338 118 18.9 24.8 
1975 3 066 474 284 190 22.5 28.1 
1976 3 580 485 282 203 26.7 27.8 
Source: Actualidad Econ6mica (Lima),  October 1979, l\2 20. 
77-177Tlic and publicly-guaranteed debt with a maturity of more than 1 year. 
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Table 8 
PERU: PUBLIC SECTOR CAPITAL FORMATION AND FINANCE 
Year 
Fixed investment a/ Investment Percentage Percentage 
	
as 	 financed 	 financed 
e ta ceng 
	
perGNP 	 internally externally 
Central 	 Public 
government firms 	 Total 
Soles at 1970 prices (billions) 
1965 4.8 5.7 10.5 5.5 
1966 6.3 6.4 1 2.6 6.2 ... ... 
1967 4.7 3.6 8.3 4.0 ... ... 
1968 3.5 4.1 7.7 3.6 56.5 43.5 
1969 4.0 4.1 8.1 3.7 54.0 46.0 
1970 6.4 4.5 '0.9 4.6 64.6 35.4 
1971 7.7 4.5 2.2 4.9 76.6 23.4 
1972 8.2 5.3 '3.4 5.1 77.8 22.1 
1973 6.8 6.6 3.4 4.8 71.2 28.8 
1974 9.0 14.6 23.5 7.7 53.2 46.8 
1975 9.8 19.1 ,8.9 9.2 56.0 44.0 
1976 9.5 17.8 27.3 8.4 59.6 40.4 
Source: Investment and GNP figures are from Cabieses and Otero, pp.209 and 
with earlier data. Data for 1976 are estimated on the basis of 
data from the NCR (1976(. Finance data are from the MEF. 
a/ May not sum properly due to rounding. 
by the legislated repatriation of foreign assets by residents 
to the tune of nearly 200 millions dollars. 87/ By the end 
of 1970 reserves had risen to the equivalent of four month's 
imports requirements (see cable 5). 
The stronger balance of payments position was 
fundamentally aided by some major refinancing of the external 
debt. In London in September 1968, the former civilian 
government had negotiated a formal multilateral refinance 
package of $180 million, ,±.-.oviding relief for 1968 and 1969.8 
With large payments falling due in 1970 and 1971, foreign 
creditors were approached for another refinance operation in 
Brussels in November 1969, this time for $90 million and 
covering 75% of the debt service payments scheduled for the 
next 2 years. 89/ It is significant to note that at the time 
the government made every effort to maintain cordial relations 
with the IMF, 90/ whose goodwill, as will be seen clearly in 
later chapters, was crucial to the arrangement of the 
refinance accords. 
It is important to note that the government's 
stabilization efforts in the period were not accompanied by 
drastic reductions in economic growth. As can be determined 
from table 3, the regime reduced inflation and balanced the 
internal and external accolkits, all while maintaining 
respectable rates of economic expansion. 
By 1971 the military government had implemented most 
of its basic reforms (to be discussed momentarily) and its 
interests turned from stabilization to investment and 
industrialization. The government planned to raise the 
global investment coefficient from roughly 13% in 1970 to over 
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21% by 1975. 91/ Moreover, in contrast to the past, the state 
was to become a dominant factor in investment, with the 
programmed rate of growth for 1970-1975 being an average of 
32% per annum in real terms compared to less than 10% for the 
private sector; the government's share of gross interm,i 
investment was to rise from 36% in 1970, to roughly 58'', by 
1975. 92/ Significantly, the nature of investment also would 
undergo fundamental change, as the state was to give a 
secondary role to its traditional area of responsibility, 
i.e., infrastrugture, in favor of a new strategy, involving 
heavy investments in mining and basic goods manufacturing. 93/ 
Interestingly, the scheme did not display the export 
orientation that originally had been envisioned for the 
development program. Indeed, the nature of the 
industrialization program was not unsimilar to that of the 
previous government. Growth was to be stimulated by the 
substitution of imports. In support of the strategy, tariff 
levels remained high, reinforced by the introduction of quotas, 
or absolute bans, on the import of products produced locally. 
While the state was to be behind most of the new investment, 
the government nevertheless sought to stimulate the still 
reluctant private investors in industry through very liberal 
tax incentives and the attraction of a highly protected 
market. 
Implementation of the plan saw government capital 
outlays in 1972 rise in real terms above the peak level 
achieved in 1966. But the investment program really did not 
take off until 1974 when investment expenditure nearly doubled 
the 1966 figures (see table 8). Overall, the public sector 
investment coefficient rose from 4.6% in 1970 to 7.7% in 1974,247 
with a very high percentage being devoted to large projects 
in mining, oil exploration and intermediate goods 
manufacturing. 95/ Importantly, until 1974, external sources 
played a signifiTantly smaller role in the finance of 
investment (see again table 8), which was in keeping with 
earlier declarations of the government. At the same time, 
current outlays of the central government rose rapidly (see 
table 4), with subsidies 96/ and interest payments growing 
in significance. The spec acular growth of the public sector 
that was brought on by this program is reflected in the fact 
that by the end of 1974 the government was approaching control 
of roughly one-third of output and two-fifths of employment 
in the modern sector, one-half of all fixed capital formation, 
two-thirds of credit (excluding government finance) and nine-
tenths of exports and one-half of imports. 97/ 
The enormous expansion of the state in the economy 
during this period was contrasted by its relatively weak 
resource base. According to Fitzgerald, Peru's fiscal effort 
was not one of the more impressive ones in Latin America as 
a result of very heavy tax exemptions for industrial promotion, 
frustration of tariff revenue through import controls on 
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durable goods, and an unwillingness to irritate perceived 
areas of middle class political support through tax reform. 28/ 
Indeed, the ability of the central government to capture 
revenue actually declined steadily after 1970 with the 
concomitant erosion of government savings and considerable 
expansion of the overall deficit (see table 4). 
The scarcity of resources was compounded by the fact 
that state enterprises - by 1974 carrying out the bulk of 
investment activity (see table 8) - were unable to generate 
savings because of the very long gestation period of their 
projects and/or policies of subsidized pricing. 99/ After the 
oil crisis of late 1973 the latter problem became acute as 
subsidized prices were amply used to offset the effects of the 
higher external costs of food and petroleum. 100/ 
Despite the income bottleneck, the public sector had 
no difficulty financing its expenditures. The state, taking 
advantage of its greater control of domestic credit, took 
heavy recourse to internal finance; and around 1972 foreign 
borrowing began to take on a higher profile as well. 101/ It 
also should be mentioned that around 1973 primary emissions 
of the Central Bank once again became an important source of 
finance, and this eventually fueled inflation (see again table 
3). 
In 1971-1972, the balance of payments remained 
reasonable sound, in the former year because of continued 
restrictions on imports (which in both current and constant 
terms were still below the peak level of 1967) and in the 
latter because capital inflows began to recover due to new 
foreign investment in mining and oil exploration together with 
renewed recourse to foreign credit markets. As the investment 
program took off, and internal consumption expanded, imports 
began to accelerate, as reflected in a noticeable widening of 
the current account deficit in 1973. Policies promoting fast 
rising consumption and investment, coupled with higher prices 
for food imports (which traditionally are of considerable 
volume) and petroleum, as well as a progressively overvalued 
Sol (see again table 6) and speculation, caused foreign 
purchases to rise by nearly 65% in 1974. 102/ With factor 
payments also rising sharply, the current account deficit more 
than doubled, to represent roughly 40% of export earnings (see 
table 5). The imbalance in the current account was, however, 
totally masked by large inflows of foreign short and medium 
term capital which generated an overall balance of payments 
surplus and permitted international reserves to reach 
record levels. The state, through foreign borrowing, accounted 
for most of these capital flows. Likewise, the burden of 
external public debt was by now very significant (see table 7) 
and generating its own demand for resources. 
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a) 	 The reforms 
As noted in previous paragraphs, the military 
government preoccupied itself with reforms in the years 1969-
1974. Some of these reforms had a very significant impact 
on the demand for foreign finance and on relations with 
foreign capital. The purpose of this section is not a 
comprehensive analysis of any or all of the reforms introduced 
by the government, but rather a summary of those measures 
that had some importance to the demand for foreign resources 
and/or could have conditioned the attitudes of foreign 
suppliers of finance. In the examination, special attention 
is given to reforms in the institutional control of foreign 
borrowing and the role of foreign capital, since these two 
measures had a very direct impact on the demand for foreign 
resources. As will be seen in Chapter IV, the latter reform 
also had a profound impact on the supply of the external 
finance. 
i) Agrarian reform 
One of the basic and most far-reaching reforms was 
that applied to agriculture. Land reform had been a hot 
political issue throughout the Fifties and Sixties, with 
peasant frustrations ever increasing due to ineffectual 
reform programs. 103/ To diffuse peasant unrest, and overcome 
a long history of near-stagnant agricultural output, 104/ the 
government in 1969 decreed a new land reform law. Almost 
immediately the country's coastal estates and large livestock 
operations in the Sierra were expropriated. Altogether, by 
the end of 1975 over 7 million hectares had been expropriated, 
6 million hectares adjudicated, involving nearly 10 000 ranches 
and affecting 250 000 families. 105/ While the reform 
substantially changed the pattern of ownership in the sector, 
it had little impact on marketable surplus: although output 
did not fall below historical trends, it did not rise either, 
SO that a high demand for food imports continued to weigh 
heavily on the balance of payments throughout the period. 106/ 
ii) Labor communities  
In 1970, under a new industrial law, the government 
established what it termed industrial communities. Under this 
new regime a private industrial entity with 6 or more employees 
(or in cases where there were less than 6 employees, income 
greater than one million Soles ) had to provide 25% of its 
pre-tax profits to a workers' industrial community, 10% in the 
form of currency and 15% in shares of the firm. There were 
similar, but modified arrangements, for the mineral, fishing 
and telecommunications sectors. 107/ 
The reform enabled workers to participate in profits; 
more importantly, theoretically over some time span they 
could eventually gain control of the enterprise itself. (From 
the outset they had a representative on the board of the firm). 
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By mid-1974 some 3 700 firms in the industrial sector had 
established an industrial community, incorporating about 
245 000 workers. 108/ 
The communities, while well-intentioned, undoubtedly 
had some undesirable side-effects. One was that given the 
industrial structure of Peru, 62% of the industrial work force 
(as opposed to only 40% of the value-added) was not 
incorporated into the community concept. 109/ Another, which 
is more directly related to the focus of this study, is that 
owners of enterprises saw new investment as a way of 
postponing indefinitely the day in which workers could actually 
gain control of a firm. Thus incentive was given to new 
investment, and therefore imports, regardless of whether there 
was a real need for new capacity. 110/ 
iii) Institutional reforms  
Immediately after the change in government in 1968, a 
series of institutional reforms were adopted, making a 
reorganized Ministry of Finance the focus of power for fiscal 
and monetary policy. 111/ The reforms were quite comprehensive 
and therefore cannot be analized in any detail here; 112/ one 
can, however, attempt to highlight those actions whic7—Tad 
an impact on the demand for external finance. 
First, in 1970, the government instituted full foreign 
exchange controls. These were complemented by the creation 
of new institutions to regulate exchange; the Consejo de  
Transacciones Externas del Sector Pablico (CODEX) was 
instituted to control the foreign exchange outlays of the 
state, while the Junta de Transacciones Externas del Sector  
Privado (JUTREX) was organized to elaborate an annual foreign 
exchange budget for the private sector, based on applications 
submitted by individual entities. 113/ 
The government also was concerned about the casual 
nature of debt contraction in the 1960s and it took steps to 
centralize control over borrowing activities. In 1969 the 
Comision Permanents de Credits Externo (Peruvian Commission 
on External Credit - presided over by the Director General 
of Public Debt (an office in the Ministry of Finance) and made 
up of the general managers of the BCR, BN, INP and the 
Coordinator of the Secretariat of the Annual Economic Plan -
was created to formulate overall debt policy and approve all 
foreign credit operations of the state. 114/ 
The actual process of approval for credits was 
complicated, involving a multitude of government agencies. 
For instance, by 1970 project finance had to be approved by 
the Council of Ministers, be given a sectoral priority by the 
INP, meet with the approval of the Comision Permanente de  
Credit() Externo, have its terms scrutinized and registered 
with the Directorate General of Public Debt, and be reviewed 
by the Counsel General and Controller General of the Ministry 
of Finance. Each approved credit also was accompanied by a 
Supreme Decree. 115/ 
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Given the diverse levels of control over debt, it was 
decided in 1972 to establish the Comite Superior de Deuda  
Externa (Superior Committee of External Debt), headed by the 
Minister of Finance and incorporating the Chief of the INP, 
the Director General of Public Debt and the Presidents of 
the BN, BCR, and COFIDE. Its task was to coordinate the 
various offices in the debt control system in order to ensure 
that general guidelines on debt contraction were followed; 
it also was responsible for authorizing an agency to initiate 
negotiations for foreign credit. 116/ 
In 1972 another major innovation in the debt control 
system was introduced: the centralization of credit 
negotiations. The BN became the bargaining agent of the 
central government and also assumed responsibility for the 
short term financial needs of state enterprises. Meanwhile, 
COFIDE was created to handle the medium/long term credit 
needs of public enterprises (and under certain circumstances 
that of private and quasi-private enterprises). 117/ 
Significantly, in late 1973 the control system for credit 
authorizations through both institutions was streamlined in 
order to increase the flow of finance for programmed 
investment. 118/ 
The above demonstrates that in the Seventies there 
was an elaborate system of control of foreign debt contraction. 
It would be interesting to examine how well the system 
functioned. This subject, is, however, reserved for the 
analytical overview that makes up the second half of the 
chapter. 
iv) Reform of foreign capital  
As noted earlier, Peru traditionally had geared its 
economic policy to the attraction of foreign investment. 
The strategy met with great success, as the profile of foreign 
capital was extraordinarily high. By 1968 three-quarters of 
the mining sector, two-thirds of the sugar industry, and half 
of the cotton and wool processing industries were under 
foreign control, 119/ not to mention roughly 60% of the banking 
system's resources and credit. 120/ Expatriate capital also 
controlled one-third of manufacTiTing (two-thirds of the 200 
largest firms), 121/ and dominated enterprises in communications, 
power generation and trade. 122/ The profile of the United 
States was particularly high, as its national firms accounted 
l'or over 80% of all direct foreign investment. 123/ 
The new military regime was very concerned by what 
it saw to be excessive foreign control of the economy and 
therefore took steps that sharply altered the treatment of 
foreign capital. In some cases the role of foreign 
investment was modified directly, and in others it was 
changed indirectly as part of broader reforms. It is 
important that these changes be reviewed in some detail for 
severa- reasons. First, the change in "demand" for foreign 
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investment altered not only investment flows, but also had 
repercussions on the whole nature of external finance. 
Second, the treatment of foreign investment is theoretically 
an important factor in commercial banks' evaluation of 
creditworthiness. 124/ Third, commercial banks - some of them 
important actors in this study - were both directly and 
indirectly affected by the reform measures. 
The first major action taken by the authorities was 
on the IPC. On October 9, 1968, 6 days after its installation 
in power, the government expropriated the IPC's oil fields 
and refinery in Talara. Eater, in early 1969, it took over 
all other company assets, including its gasoline marketing 
network. Furthermore, no compensation was to be paid because 
of an alleged debt of nearly 700 million dollars owed by the 
Company to Peru for oil extracted from the Talara fields over 
the previous 40-odd years. 125/ Meanwhile, the expropriated 
assets were turned over to the state petroleum entity which 
was reorganized and renamed PETROPERU. 
One should not lose sight of the extrem boldness of 
the government's measures: the subsidiary's parent, Standard 
Oil, was one of the largest and most powerful corporations 
in the world. It also should be pointed out that in taking 
over the IPC's assets, authorities were quick to add that 
the action should not be construed as a general attack on 
foreign capital or private property, and that the government 
would support foreign investment which subjected itself to 
national laws and interests. 126/ 
In 1969 the government displayed its rather unique 
view on foreign investment by actions taken in the mining 
sector. The sector was a United States enclave with U.S. 
firms - Cerro de Pasco, Southern Peru Copper Corp. and Marcona 
Mines being most important - controlling over 80% of the value 
of production. Meanwhile, national interests controlled 
only 16% of output. 127/ In September it was decreed. that the 
numerous mining concessions held by private corporations 
must be exploited or revert to the state. After receiving 
no adequate proposals, the next year 8 major concessions 
were taken over: Cerro d.e Pasco lost four concessions 
(including Tintaya); Anacenda, two (including Cerro Verde); 
American Smelting; two (including Michiquillay); and Kaiser 
Aluminum, Charter Consolidated and Natomas one each. 128/ 
Also, at the end of 1969 the government announced that the 
state would nationalize all marketing and refining of mineral 
products, 129/ which were later to be put in the hands of a new 
public enterprise called IINEROPERU. Simultaneously, it 
signed a contract with Southern Peru for exploitation of the 
large Cuajone copper deposits, 130/ thereby giving a concrete 
example of how Peru was still interested in foreign capital. 
Another firm affeced by reforms in 1969 was W.R. Grace. 
Having widespread holdings in Peru, it lost its two big sugar 
plantations (and refineries) as a result of the agrarian 
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reform. 131/ As a reaction to the move, Grace took steps to 
divest. In the same year, ITT lost its local telephone 
company, 132/ and Peru enforced its sovereign control over 
maritime resources within 200 miles of the coast. 
In 1970 a law was issued implementing Decision 24 of 
the Cartagena Agreement, which, among other things, placed 
limits on profit remittances by foreign firms. Also, in an 
attempt to rationalize the automobile industry, General Motors 
and Ford had their production licences revoked in favor of 
new concessions to Japanese and European bidders. 133/ 
It was in this year that Peru introduced further 
reform of the financial sector. 134/ Branches of foreign banks, 
which at this time were Citibank, Bank of America Lloyds 
Bolsa, and Bank of Tokyo,(Royal Bank of Canada had recently 
closed its office), were allowed to remain in Peru under 
restricted conditions; there was a minium capital base, no 
time or savings deposits were permitted and special lines of 
credit in foreign currency had to be made available to the 
government. 135/ Furthermore, foreigners were not allowed 
to own local banks or insurance companies; those who already 
had subsidiaries had to reduce their participation to below 
20%. 136/ As a result of the law Chase Manhattan decided to 
sell its 51% ownership in Banco Continental to the government. 
Meanwhile, Banca Commerciale Italiana had its participation 
(through Sudameris) in the Ranco de Crdito reduced to below 
20%. Likewise, Credit Lyonnaise had to reduce its participation 
in the Banco de Lima to conform with the new rule. Finally, 
the financially troubled Banco International, of which 
Chemical Bank was a major shareholder, was taken over by 
the government. 
In 1973, the government nationalized the fishing 
industry, financially troubled because of the disappearance of 
the anchovy. While the industry as a whole was largely 
national, 137/ a number of foreign firms, especially of U.S. 
origin (Ralston Purina, H.J. Heinz, Cargill, Grace) were 
affected. Also at the end of 1973, Cerro de Pasco, which 
had its cattle ranches expropriated in 1969, was subject to 
a complete nationalization. This had far reaching implications, 
because Cerro, in addtion to having the largest mining 
operations, 138/ had interests in many other sectors of the 
economy. 1397--  
In most cases the reforms were met by indignation on 
the part of foreign firms. Amicable agreements, however, 
were in some instances worked out relatively quickly, as is 
the case of ITT. 140/ Chase Manhattan received a highly 
favorable settlement 141/ and also benefited from the private 
sector Cuajone agreement, a project for which it was to be 
lead financier. 142/ On the other hand, compensation for 
IPC, Grace, Cerro and some of the fishing firms were subjects 
of hot and long debate in which neither party could reach 
agreement. By mid-1973 the United States government was 
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interested in clearing up all outstanding claims as soon as 
possible and therefore appointed James Green, then a senior 
Vice-President at Manufacturers Hanover Trust, as a special 
negotiator. By February '974 a package deal was agreed to 
involving: (a) payments to the United States Treasury of 76 
million dollars, which would then be distributed to companies 
with claims by the United States Department, and (b) the 
release of $74 million in blocked company assets. 143/ Also 
implicit in the agreement was a large syndicated bank credit 
to the government of Peru, an operation which will be 
analysed in greater detail. in Chapter V. 
The examination of foreign capital reforms should not 
end without mentioning that aside from direct actions taken 
on capital of international banks, these institutions were 
also indirectly affected through their direct and indirect 
links with non-financial corporations that were nationalized 
or "Peruvianized". The connection varied from ownership of 
stock of the company to interlocking directorates and 
extensive lending and deposit business with the parent of 
a subsidiary. Table 1 of the statistical appendix displays 
links between major banks and some of the foreign firms 
affected by the program o: nationalizations. 
b) 	 The discovery of - petroleum in the Amazon 
Special attention oas been given to this event because 
it was perhaps one of the most decisive factors in the response 
of both the demand and sufply sides of external finance for 
Peru. The general highlights will be presented here, with 
later chapters analyzing its impact on bank lending. 
When Peru nationalized the Talara oil fields, it 
faced a problem of deteriorating national petroleum production. 
Policy makers found that national output was at only about 
70 000 barrels a day with another 12 million dollars of 
imports needed to cover the deficit with respect to local 
consumption. 144/ Nor were prospects good; this country, which 
was once a net exporter of petroleum, faced the likelihood of 
much higher national consumption by 1980. 145/ 
Impressed by Texaco-Gulf's discovery of large deposits 
of petroleum in an Amazon region of Ecuador that was near 
the Peruvian border, officials immediately took steps to 
explore for similar possibilities in jungle territory which 
was mostly adjacent to Ecuador's fields. In 1970 geological 
work was undertaken. Peru then invited foreign firms to join 
PETROPERU in the search, but under rather restrictive 
conditions for the time; instead of paying royalties or taxes, 
firms would have to explore at their own risk and any petroleum 
discovered would be split 50-50 with PETROPERU. 146/ 
The first firm to accept these conditions, then termed 
the "Peruvian Model", was Occidental Petroleum, a maverick 
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corporation, under the direction of Mr. Armand Hammer, that 
was known for dealing with governments that the 7 Sisters 
thought wiser to avoid. Contracts were signed in June 1971. 
By late 1971 PETROPERU and Occidental's operations were fully 
underway and in November a well in the Trompeteros region 
struck oil at 2 000 barrels a day. Then another well was 
developed in the Capirona region with similar success. A 
third was initiated at Pavayacu and it too produced oil. 147/ 
The results were truly promising; the traditional 
average ratio of success was roughly 10 wells to one discovery 
while Peru was finding oil at a ratio of 1:1. 148/ Not 
surprisingly, euphoria broke out in Peru. By early 1972 
papers were headlining articles to the effect that Peru had 
immense reserves equal to production in the United States or 
Russia. 149/ Petroleum officials expressed that the jungle 
"was floating on a sea of petroleum" 150/ Moreover, self 
sufficiency was forecast for late 1975 and export potential 
seemed bright; indeed a foreign geologist under contract to 
PETROPERU went so far as to predict production of 10 million 
barrels a day by 1980. 151/ 
After the initial finds, foreign petroleum firms, 
notwithstanding the stringent terms of the "Peruvian Model" 
contract, entered the jungle in droves. The companies, -16 
in all by 1974- however were secondary and terciary petroleum 
operators; the "top seven" were conspicuous by their 
absence. 152/ Meanwhile, the United States consulting firms 
Scientific Software Corp. and De Golyer and Mac Naughton had 
estimated recoverable reserves at 547 million barrels in 
1974. 153/ 
By 1974 Peru had already formulated plans to transport 
the jungle petroleum to the coast via a 200 000 barrels a 
day transandean pipeline. Feasibility studies had been 
prepared by the Bechtel Group (at a cost of 700 thousand 
dollars) and a complex financing package (analysed in Chapter 
IX), in which commercial banks participated, was arranged by 
mid-year. When the pipeline was originally conceived in the 
early 1970s, costs were estimated at 350 million dollars. 
However, escalations caused the actual price to prove to 
be nearly 800 million dollars. 
4. 1975 - 1976: Crisis Anew 
In the last two years covered by this study, Peru once 
again enters into a crisis, perhaps even graver than the one 
experienced in 1967 - 1968. 
By 1975 the economic situation was showing open signs 
of strain. A deep recession in the center was playing havoc 
on Peruvian exports, which had already been severely hurt 
by the disappearence of the anchovy and the sluggish growth 
of volume in mining. 154/ The adverse situation was reflected 
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in an absolute fall in both the unit price and volume of 
exports that year, further aggravating the long term decline 
in the export coefficient, which by this time had dropped 
to a level equivalent to only somewhat more than half of the 
average for 1960-64 (see table 5). Meanwhile, imports, fueled 
by higher petroleum prices, the investment program, an 
overvalued exchange rate, subidies on food and oil, over 
invoicing, etc., continued to grow rapidly. Coupled with a 
large deficit on factor services, the net effect of these 
trends was an enormous rise in the current account deficit, 
which could not be covered by the nevertheless large capital 
inflows. Again, the state was a major conduit for capital 
flows via foreign borrowing, much of which was used simply to 
offset the substantial outgoing payments related to the 
heavy service of foreign debt (see table 7). The shortfall 
in finance caused gross international reserves to fall from 
nearly one billion dollars in 1974 to less than 500 million 
dollars in 1975, which was insufficient to cover 2 month's 
imports. 
The central government's financial situation remained 
very precarious as well, with fiscal effort falling to one 
of its lowest points in recent history (see again table 4). 
At the same time, public enterprises continued to run large 
deficits. 155/ The financial gap had to be closed via heavy 
foreign borrowing, internal credit, and especially primary 
Central Bank emissions. It is worth noting that in the midst 
of these problems the government took the surprise move of 
nationalizing Marcona Mines. 
In August 1975 there was new leadership in the 
government. General Velasco was replaced by General Francisco 
Morales Bermudez and with him the "revolution" took on a 
much more conservative tone. Aside from some price 
adjustments, however, corrective economic measures were not 
undertaken until late in the year. In September a new 
economic team was formed. This was quickly followed by a 16% 
devaluation, the first adjustment of the exchange rate in 8 
years (see table 6). 
The slowness of adjustment was perhaps attributable 
to the confidence that financial problems would be rectified 
by upcoming petroleum (and mineral) exports. However, by the 
end of 1975 the prospect of massive petroleum exports was 
turning dim. Just as the transandean oil pipeline was reaching 
46% of completion, 10 of the foreign firms in the jungle 
terminated operations either due to dry holes or the finding 
of "uncommercial" deposits. 156/ 
The crisis deepened in 1976. In a historic multi- 
houred speech to the public in January 1976, the Minister of 
Finance clearly defined the nature of the problem and 
introduced measures to reduce the cost of fiscal subsidies, 
raise revenues and close the external gap. 157/ This was 
followed in June by a comprehensive stabilization program 
that, uniquely, did not involve the IMF. 
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Notwithstanding stabilization efforts, the banking 
study closes with the economy in continued crisis; high 
inflation, low growth, impressive fiscal and external gaps, 
a burdensome external debt and a precariously low level of 
foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, the prospects of a 
petroleum boom appeared ever more doubtful as during that 
year all but one of the remaining foreign oil companies 
closed down operations in the jungle due to "unsuccessful" 
explorations. At the end of 1976 the only foreign operating 
firm in the jungle along with PETROPERU was Occidental 
Petroleum. By now the oil pipeline was 98% completed, but 
the immediate prospects were that the two companies would 
generate petroleum sufficient to barely satisfy half of the 
formal capacity of 200 000 barrels a day. 158/ 
In subsequent years, events were to become even more 
turbulent, but, unfortunately, this later period goes beyond 
the scope of the study. However, in order to provide 
continuity, Chapter XIII provides an epilogue that will take 
the reader up through 1979, a year in which there were signs 
that Peru may have found the road to recovery. 
B. ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY 
The first part of the chapter attempted to provide the 
reader with a brief account of those events and factors 
underlying the public sector's demand for external resources 
during 1965-1976. Given the breadth of the material, it 
might be useful to review the factors of demand for the 
period as a whole. 
New loan commitments can be used as a proxy for the 
public sector's effective demand - i.e., demand that is met 
by a full or partial response from the supply side - for 
external finance. This is done in table 9 which displays 
volume indexes for new loans contracted by the public sector 
during 1965-1976. Index A represents commitments deflated by 
an import price index and is therefore best suited for 
showing trends vis-a-vis the external sector, while index B 
deflates commitments by an index of local prices, adjusted 
for the nominal exchange rate, and therefore is best related 
to domestic finance. 159/ 
The data clearly show that the public sector made 
increasing commitments to foreign finance in the periods 
1965-1967 and 1972-1976. Curiously, despite the different 
political orientation of public policy in the two periods, the 
factors behind demand were quite similar. At the risk of 
oversimplifying, the commonality of factors is presented 
below. 
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1. The Fiscal Dilemma 
One factor of demand for foreign resources that 
pervades most of the period is a severe imbalance in the 
fiscal accounts. On the one hand, there was almost continuous 
pressure to increase government expenditures, with the state 
taking on ever more importance in the economy. Starting from 
a low base of expenditure of 16% of GDP in the early 1960s, 
outlays averaged nearly 19% of product in 1965-1967 and 
roughly 20% in 1971-1976. These figures are much higher if 
amortization of debt is included (see again table 4). The 
expanded expenditure in these years is counterposed by a 
completely flat revenue base that averaged only 15% of 
product. In 1976, income as a percentage of product 
actually was lower than in 1965. Thus, one encounters the 
anomaly whereby the state sharply increased its economic 
participation, but did not give itself accesss to the domestic 
income needed to support the increased activity. The result, 
of course, was sizeable fiscal deficits to be financed. The 
imbalance was particularly severe in 1972-1976, when the 
deficits were consistently in excess of 6.5% of GDP. Only 
in 1968-1970, a period of relative restraint, was the fiscal 
situation reasonably sound. 
At least to some extent there were common reasons for 
fiscal difficulties. As just mentioned, government expenditure 
tended to expand vigorously, due to growing real activity, 
subsidies and inflation. On the other hand revenues were 
held back by an inelastic tax system and a perennial 
disinclination to raise tax pressure. Moreover, the flat 
revenue base was aggravated by an inclination to forego much 
income because of a desire to provide investment incentives to 
the private sector. Investment incentives, tariff reductions 
(and import restrictions in the post-1968 period) all were 
used extensively to promote industrialization. These same 
incentives, however, represented considerable foregone fiscal 
income. 160/ 
Table 9 
PERU: ANNUAL FOREIGN LOAN COMMITMENTS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
(1965 = 100) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Index A 100 328 147 115 86 128 162 288 471 519 307 442 
Index B 100 222 180 117 81 119 144 256 440 509 321 543 
Source: Derived from data in IDRD, World Debt Tables and CEPAL. 
Note: Index A is an index of annual foreign loan commitments 
deflated by the index of import prices; index B is an 
index of annual loan commitments deflated by an index 
of domestic consumer prices adjusted for movements in 
the nominal rate of exchange of the Sol with the U.S. 
dollar. 
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In the years of sizeable deficits, national sources 
of finance were limited by either an inadequate amount of 
local savings 161/ and/or insufficient instruments for 
tapping these resources. There was a greater degree of 
success in using domestic savings after 1968 as the government 
had considerable control over the domestic financial system. 
However, except in 1968-1970, when there were reduced financial 
requirements, domestic savings fell far short of the 
requirements for fiscal budget support. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, there was ample 
access to foreign capital in 1965-1967 and 1972-1976. And, 
there was no hesitation in either period to use foreign 
finance to cover fiscal requirements. Central Bank emissions 
covered gaps that could not be filled by foreign resources. 
In 1968-1971 there was little new foreign borrowing 
for fiscal purposes as finance requirements were much reduced 
and authorities were innovative in their efforts to employ 
domestic resources to cover the fiscal gap. But as will 
become evident in the following chapter, the innovative 
nature of public policy and the modes of finance undoubtedly 
in part were a response to the challenge presented by a very 
limited access to foreign finance. 
2. The External Debt Control Dilemma 
In both the Sixties and the Seventies the government's 
external debt contraction clearly lacked sufficient restraint, 
due especially to the fact that public sector expansion 
progressed more rapidly than the managerial skills of public 
servants. 
In the 1960s there was little institutional control of 
foreign debt contraction. Government agencies, in an 
uninformed and uncoordinated fashion, borrowed abroad, often 
using local private commercial banks as their financial 
agent. 162/ This resulted in haphazard debt accumulation under 
terms which fell short of market possibilities. Burdensome 
interest rates and short maturities provided the government 
with little breathing space, contributing to eventual 
financial troubles. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, with the 
introduction of the military government in 1968 an elaborate 
infrastructure was established to control and monitor 
foreign borrowing. This undoubtedly brought improvements, 
but the experience of the regime is exemplary of the gap that 
can occur between formal institutional controls and actual 
performance. 
As Ugarteche points out in his revealing study on the 
institutional control of foreign borrowing in Peru, the 
centralization of credit negotiations in the BN and COFIDE 
was an improvement over the old system whereby each public 
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entity was basically on its own with regard to foreign credit 
agreements.163/ These two agencies, and especially COFIDE, 
had staffs capable of enhancing the credibility of finance 
proposals and negotiating with creditors with a view to 
international market conditions (COFIDE maintains files on 
creditors). No doubt better terms were secured as a result 
of this system. However, the system apparently was not an 
effective filter for several reasons. 
First, according to Ugarteche, while the planning 
institute (INP) continuously showed concern about debt 
service and management, there were no precise parameters or 
guideliness established or how much debt should actually be 
contracted and under what conditions; nor, apparently, were 
precise policy guidelines ever laid down by the ComisiOn  
Permanente de Credit() Externo that was established for this 
purpose. 164/ 
Second, the fact that there were no explicit debt 
guidelines established meant the project approval was carried 
out without any overall constraint on foreign finance which, 
as Fitzgerald observes, was permissive to designers "who want 
the 'best' equipment and rapid delivery" and who "tend to 
favor foreign suppliers". 165/ This was aggravated by the 
fact that planners themselves saw projects as a means of 
borrowing foreign exchange in general, thereby releasing 
indigenous resources for other purposes. 166/ The situation 
led to what Fitzgerald terms as a "haphazard" accumulation 
of debt. 167/ 
Third, the system of project selection itself was 
prone to outside pressures and ministerial rivalries. As 
Fitzgerald notes: 
"... major projects tend to accumulate their own 
'pressure groups' among the beneficiaries and also 
within the administration, so that once underway to 
the feasibility stage they are very difficult to stop 
or modify. In administrative terms, the problem is 
felt to lie in the fact that the projects reach the 
INP 'too late in life' and are difficult to stop, or 
where they blatantly fail to conform to development 
objectives, to reformulate without rejection". 168/ 
Fourth, in practice these same pressures came into 
play when applications for foreign credit were being considered. 
With respect to the approval process Ugarteche concludes: 
"Usually the pressures of Ministers for approval of 
projects in their ministerial portfolio resulted in 
the Superior Committee (of External Debt) only 
approving what was proposed. It is an ex-post approval 
of an agreement made previously by the Council of 
Ministers." 169/ 
Moreover, Ugarteche points out that an inverted 
hierarchical relationship between the Comision Superior de la  
Deuda Externa and the Comite Permanente de Credits. Externo did 
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not help matters. The former, composed of Ministers, provided 
the go-ahead to initiate contacts for external credit, while 
that latter, composed of general managers of Ministries, had 
to consider the appropriateness of the amounts and terms 
offered. Unfortunately, the members of the Comite were of 
insufficient rank to resist the pressures generated from 
the Ministers. 170/ 
From the above one can conclude that the reform 
generated the infrastructure to regulate the demand for 
foreign credit, but credit proposals were nevertheless able 
to fully penetrate the screen of control because of a lack 
of definition in financial policy and inadecuate instruments 
to counteract the momentum generated by an ambitious 
development program. It was not until 1978 that most of these 
deficiences were remedied. 171/ 
3. The Balance of Payments Dilemma 
The balance of payments gap, of course, was not 
altogether unrelated to the fiscal situation. There were 
nevertheless some unique factors at play. 
Table 10 provides data that permit one to pinpoint some 
common characteristics of the balance of payments performance 
during the period 1965-1976. It demonstrates that the 
period of large financial requirements (as a percent of 
product) were 1965-1968 and 1973-1976. In both periods a 
negative trade balance, followed by mounting debt service 
were prime factors behind a rising need for external finance. 
In 1966-1967 outflows related to the direct foreign 
investment (DFI) account were even more important than debt 
service as a source of finance requirements. It also can be 
seen that in 1969-1972 DFI and debt service were a major 
burden on the balance of payments, but the trade account 
made a positive contribution to resource flows, creating less 
requirements for finance. 
Looking first at the trade balance, table 5, shows 
that in periods of deficit there was usually relatively rapid 
growth of imports. External prices often were a factor 
behind growth, but in most years the growth of volume also 
was considerable. There were some common factors behind 
volume growth: stagnant local food production, public and 
private investment, subsidies on basic consumer items, tax 
and tariff reductions on capital goods, and very importantly, 
policies that provided artificial support for prolonged 
periods to a fixed exchange rate. However, perhaps the most 
important determinant of the trade deficit was the abysmal 
performance of exports. Throughout the 12 years there was 
a secular decline in the export coefficient so that by 1976 
export volume as a percentage of product was only 50% of the 
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erosion of export performance was hidden by favorable prices, 
bL,t in the end the sluggish volume left the balance of 
payment very vulnerable. One cannot help but think that if 
there had been a more dynamic export sector, the crises of 
1967-1968 and 1975-1976 would have been manageable. 
There were some common features behind the lagging 
export performance. 
One factor was the long gestation period of mineral 
projects, coupled with uncertain policies on the role of 
foreign private investment. There was significant new 
investment in minerals in the late 1950s and the coming-on-
stream of production helped to boost exports in the early 
1960s. Any prospects for new private foreign investment in 
the 1960s, however, were dampened by the uncertainty 
surrounding official commissions examining excess profit-
making by foreign mining firms; 172/ the revision of the 
1950 Mining Code; and the renegotiation of the Toquepala 
contract. In retaliation the TNCs boycotted Peruvian mining 
reserves. 173/ No sooner were the problems ameliorated than 
a change in government took place in 1968 with a radically 
new view on foreign investment being introduced. This further 
delayed any prospect of foreign investment in minerals. 
After a while, an agreement was finally reached with the 
Southern Peru Copper Corporation (U.S.) to develop the 
Cuajone deposits and the government undertook the development 
of Cerro Verde and Michiquillay. But output from Cuajone 
and Cerro Verde, given lead times, could not come on stream 
until the latter half of the 1970s. (Development of 
Michiquillay had to be postponed indefinitely because of the 
1975-1976 crisis). Thus Peru went through roughly 20 years 
without new mineral output. 
Another crucial factor in the mining sector was 
petroleum. As has been seen, there was great anticipation of 
oil exports giving massive support to the balance of payments. 
Undoubtedly, the government formulated its investment program, 
and the finance of it, on the basis of eventual receipts from 
the Amazon oil. However, when an exportable surplus did not 
materialize as fast as originally expected, a gaping hole 
was left in the balance of payments. 
Another crucial element to the poor export performance 
was a lack of export vocation in the industrial sector. 
Theoretically, the import substitution program also could 
have provided a base for industrial exports; indeed the 
Velasco government originally talked of export-led 
industrialization. But little attempt was made to encourage 
efficiency as no-questions-asked protection was provided to 
industrialists. The fixed exchange rate also militated 
against industrial exports. Nor was there any effective 
program to promote such exports through instruments that 
would compensate the formal disincentives to selling 
abroad. 174/ 
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Finally, there were some factors beyond the government's 
control. The loss of anchovies was an ecological phenomenon 
that eroded to a considerable degree the country's ability 
to generate foreign exchange. 175/ Also, beginning in 1974 
Peru was struck like everyone else with the impact of a 
severe world economic crisis. 
Of course, except in the years of open external crisis 
the country was able to overcome the export bottleneck 
through foreign borrowing. But borrowing, along with 
occasionally buoyant world prices, appears to have generated 
a false sense of security with regard to external solvency 
and to have dampened incentive to introduce corrective measures. 
Moreover, as borrowing accumulated debt itself created a 
demand for more new loans to cover debt service payments. 
This latter demand by definition grew at an exponential rate. 
Perhaps the most grafic summary of what happened to 
Peru is in the national accounts data presented in table 11. 
It reveals that between 1965 and 1975 consumption rose from 
80% to 90% of Gross Domestic Product; investment rose from 
17% to 21% and imports rose from 18% to 22% of product. 
Simultaneously, exports fell from 21% of product to 12%. 
These somewhat striking trends were feasible, of course, 
only because of massive foreign borrowing. 
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Chapter IV 
THE SUPPLY OF EXTERNAL FINANCE FOR PERU: AN OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter reviewed the evolution of the 
public sector over the 12-year period 1965-1976 and some of 
the factors underlying its demand for external resources. 
The demand, of course, was conditioned by supply, and it is 
the task of this chapter to see how the various types of 
finance responded to the external needs of the government. 
The first part of the chapter provides a statistical overview 
of the behavior of the supply side for the same 12-year 
period, taking into account the amounts authorized, the terms 
of finance, etc. The second part will go into more detail 
on the factors behind the response of the various sources of 
finance. Commercial banks are part of the analysis; however, 
they will be treated in a very general way, leaving a more 
detailed examination for subsequent chapters. 
A. EXTERNAL FINANCE: THE STRUCTURAL SHIFT TO BANKS 
As was pointed out earlier, the public sector's medium 
to long term external debt was not exceedingly large at the 
outset of the period under study; at 325 million dollars in 
1965 it was equivalent to roughly 8% of the GDP. However, the 
debt had grown very rapidly, doubling with respect to 1960, 
and with most of the expansion having taken place from 1962.176/ 
One can gain an idea of exactly what sources of finance 
were important to the government at this time by reviewing the 
composition of external public debt at the middle of the 
decade. 
	
Table 12 provides such a profile for Peru and 
Latin America as a whole. 
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Table 12 
PERU AND LATIN AMERICA: DISTRIBUTION OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 










Peru 	 5 	 40 	 8 	 3 	 23 	 21 	 100 
Latin 
America 8 	 20 	 9 	 3 	 23 	 37 	 100 
1975- 
1976 
Peru 	 - 	 11 	 45 	 3 	 11 	 30 	 100 
Latin 
America 4 9 
	 39 	 5 	 21 	 22 	 100 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, External Public Debt  
of the Latin American Countries, Washington, D.C. 1978. 
Note: Data are not perfectly compatible with figures in table 
7 and figure 1. 
a/ Disbursed and undisbursed debt with maturity of more than 
1 year. 
From the table it is clear that at the beginning of the 
period under study the primary sources of finance for Peru 
were private and commercial, accounting for 56% of all public 
obligations. In contrast, for Latin America as a whole 
private commercial sources accounted for only 40% of the 
region's debt. Thus Peru, despite being a relatively poor 
country, by the mid-1960s already had an unusually 
"commercialized" external debt with the accompanying "hard" 
terms; concessionary official finance played a secondary role, 
accounting for only 44% of all obligations. For Latin America, 
however, concessionary sources of finance dominated the 
financial scene, as displayed in their 60% participation in 
the region's external debt. 
In the mid-1960s most of Peru's private funds came 
from commercial goods suppliers who held some 40% of all 
obligations, a representation that was double the figure for 
the region; and significantly, at this time commercial banks 
were minor lenders to both the governments of Peru and the 
region. 
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Over the 12 years, for Peru private commercial sources of 
finance continued their dominant role; however, there was a 
fundamental structural shift in the individual sources of 
supply. As shown in table 12, by the end of the period 
commercial banks were holding 45% of the country's debt, while 
the suppliers' portion had shrunk to 11%. Overall, private 
sources accounted for nearly 60% of all outstanding obligations 
at the end of the period. Similarly, the participation of 
banks in the external debt of the region increased dramatically 
over the period. However, in contrast to Peru the use of 
commercial banks was not at the expense of foreign commercial 
suppliers, but official sources of finance. Also, the relative 
increase in the importance of the banks was less pronounced 
for the region than for the government of Peru. 
The above clearly displays a general shift to commercial 
bank finance over the period 1965-1976. In the case of Peru, 
one can trace the shift by reviewing the annual data on net 
external financial flows to the government that are presented 
in figure 1. While these data are not directly comparable to 
the external debt figures already presented, they provide an 
adequate indication of how and when the shift took place. In 
order to provide a complete picture of the play of forces 
among the various types of finance, the figure also 
incorporates the annual net flows of foreign direct investment. 
Data confirm that '_curing 1965-1968 the principal sources 
of finance were commercial suppliers' credits. However, the 
fact that net 'lows from commercial banks were as significant, 
and in some cases more significant, than official finance 
means that the banks were gaining importance with respect to 
the relatively minor role attributed to them at the outset of 
the period. As for flows of direct foreign investment, they 
made an important financial contribution only in 1965; net 
inflows were marginally positive in 1966 and were negative in 
1967-1968. When viewed as a whole, total flows averaged 141 
million dollars per year in 1965-1968, although this figure 
is biased downward by the unusually small amount of finance 
realized in the last year. 
During the period 1969-1971, the most notable feature 
is the negative flows of finance. While total flows were 
strongly positive in 1969 - reflecting disbursements on prior 
commitments - they averaged a negative 16 million dollars in 
1970-1971. In these latter two years net financing from all 
sources was marginal, with direct foreign investment 
registering significant negative balances due to divestment. 
As shown in the figure, there was a general recovery 
in finance in 1972, which coincided with the reactivation of 
public sector activity. It also was the year in which finance 
clearly began to shift in favor of commercial banks. Indeed, 
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sources, with some balance among sources restored only in 1976. 
In this same period bilateral finance and direct foreign 
investment were of some significance. However, suppliers' 
credits ceased to be an important source of finance and 
multilateral flows - negative in 1972-1974 - became significant 
only in 1976. 
Leaving aside for now the qualitative implications of 
the shift towards commercial bank finance, it is of interest 
to examine the impact that the reliance on banks had for 
government finance. 
With regard to the cost of credit, the shift to banks 
pushed the government into the highest echelon of interest 
rates. This is clear from figure 2 which presents the average 
interest cost of the various types of foreign loans. By 
moving out of suppliers' credits and into bank loans the 
government gave up intermediate rates of interest for the 
highest possible rates. Moreover, the differential rate 
between banks and suppliers' credits was by no means marginal. 
Of course, toe difference with respect to official finance was 
of even greater magnitude. 
Another result of the shift to commercial bank finance 
was shorter repayment terms. By viewing figure 3 one can see 
that banks had the shortest available maturities. Again by 
shifting from suppliers' credits to banks, the government 
moved away from an intermediate tenor to the short and of the 
maturity spectrum. The weight of repayment terms was further 
aggravated by the fact that over the 12 years there was a 
noticeable shortening of maturities of official agencies. 
Thus it is evident that during 1965-1976 the role of 
commercial banks in public sector external finance took a 
dramatic leap, with the shift taking place most notably 
around 1972. Unlike the experience of many developing countries 
which increased their reliance on bank finance in the 1970s, 
the shift was not from official sources to banks, but from 
suppliers' credits to banks. The higher profile for commercial 
lending institutions meant that the bulk of government finance 
carried the hardest credit conditions as opposed to the 
nominally (see below) intermediate terms that suppliers offer. 
The weight of credit terms also was aggravated by a noticeable 
stiffening of conditions on official credit. 
Notwithstanding the impact of the shift to banks on the 
average terms of credit, it is by no means certain that Peru 
was worse off as a result. It is true that suppliers' credits 
commonly had average maturities of between 7 and 14 years and 
fixed interest rates of between 6 and 7 per cent - far softer 
than bank credit. But these terms severely understate costs 
in as much as additional margins probably were hidden in the 
purchase price of the goods financed and the charges for 
accompanying services. There also were implicit costs in 
having finance tied to specifically-sourced goods. In contrast, 















PERU: AVERAGE RATES OF INTEREST ON LOANS, 1%S-1976a 
(Percentages) 
5 
1965 	 66 	 67 	 68 	 69 	 70 	 71 	 72 	 73 	 74 	 75 	 76 	 Years 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data provided by the MEF. 
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suppliers; indeed, it largely was not tied to foreign 
purchases at all. This in turn introduced new flexibility 
into the finance of development. It would seem, then, that 
all one can really conclude about the shift to banks is that 
a relatively poor country remained under the yoke of 
inappropriately burdensome commercial sources of finance. 
B. FACTORS UNDERLYING THE BEHAVIOR OF SUPPLY 
After having traced the shift to commercial banks, the 
next step is to attempt to explain why the various sources of 
supply behaved the way they did. 
The response from the supply side is, of course, derived 
from a number of forces. On the one hand, the government must 
select a particular source of finance. While selection is 
undoubtedly based on a desire to secure the most favorable 
terms possible, more often than not availability is the 
overriding concern for a developing country. And availability 
is determined by many factors, including the credit 
institutions' perception of risk, its liquidity position, 
political motivation, marketing strategies, etc.; even 
personal rapport between government officials and key persons 
who control or influence decisions in credit institutions 
can be relevant. The following paragraphs will attempt to 
analyse in a brief way the factors underlying the behavior of 
the principal sources of supply. 
1. 1965 - 1968: Dependence on Suppliers' Credits 
As already shown, this was a period in which suppliers' 
credits dominated sources of supply. The government took 
recourse to these funds largely because of a lack of 
availability of more appropriate types of finance. 
In Chapter III, one saw that the public sector at this 
time was small and relatively unsophisticated by the Latin 
American standards of the period in question. The situation 
was reflected in the fact that officials were not particularly 
experienced in the preparation of proposals for project loans 
from international agencies; criteria for proposals were 
relatively stringent and apparently proved taxing to the 
limited capacity of the public sector. 177/ In contrast, 
commercial suppliers, eager to sell their equipment, asked 
few questions about the merits of projects and proved to be 
a very elastic source of finance. Thus the government embarked 
on a program of capital intensive investments - the SOGESA 
steel mill was a large absorber of foreign funds - that 
easily attracted credit from commercial suppliers. 
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Another factor of import behind the recourse to 
suppliers' credits was that the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (AID) - than a major source of long term 
concessionary finance to Latin America - had variously frozen 
or delayed credit through most of the 5-year terd of the 
government. 178/ Almost as soon as it came into power, loans 
to the new government were delayed as part of a policy 
designed to ensure a "satisfactory" settlement of the dispute 
over the IPC. Curiously, for nearly 3 years there never was 
an official reason given for the slowdown in loans. 179/ 
Not until early 1966 did an official statement appear about 
the freeze; however, shortly thereafter aid was officially 
renewed when Peru provided assurances that it did not intend 
to expropriate the IPC. 180/ Unfortunately, the program did 
not last long as the next year AID loans were once again 
frozen, because of a much publicized dispute stemming from 
the fact that the Peruvian government bought supersonic jets 
from France after having faced long delays in the approval of 
a request to purchase less sophisticated American 
aircraft. 181/ 
The net effect of hegemonic politics during the period 
was to blackball Peru from one of the more importance sources 
of long term credit in the 1960s. As displayed in table 13, 
AID's assistance to Peru was far below that granted to other 
countries. Ironically, it was the new Peruvian government 
which had one of the social programs in Latin America that most 
closely mirrored the principles of the U.S. - sponsored 
Alliance for Progress. 
Commercial bank medium term lending during the period 
- averaging about 30 million dollars per annum on a net basis-
was not terribly large in absolute terms. However, as shown 
earlier it was of some significance relative to other sources 
of finance. Moreover, its importance far exceeded the 
relative and absolute amounts provided. 
In the early Sixties commercial bank finance to the 
government was made up mostly of secured short term credits 
to the state development banks. 182/ But at the very end of 
1964 the government secured a 40 million dollar 3-year loan 




COMMITMENTS OF HSAID ASSISTANCE TO SELECTED 





( $ ) 
Brazil 	 1 067 	 12.5 
Chile 
	
346 	 40.1 
Colombia 	 353 	 19.0 
Peru 	 90 	 7.5 
Dominican Republic 	 244 	 67.0 
Nicaragua 	 73 	 43.2 
Panama 	 88 	 69.3 
Source: Reproduced from KUCZYNSKI, p. 125. 
Peru, at this time having a liberal economic 
environment, free foreign exchange regime and a large number 
of investments by transnational enterprises, apparently was 
perceived as a comfortable enough risk - notwithstanding its 
fiscal problems - for the banks to extend what was for the 
period a relatively sizeable medium term commercial credit.184/ 
However, the term was very short and repayment ultimately 
proved to be burdensome to the budget. 
In 1966, with fiscal problems intensifying, recourse to 
short term bank credit was considerable. The government also 
managed to refinance the balance due on the 1964 credit of 40 
million dollars on 5-year terms, and it obtained an additional 
12 million dollars as well. Then in 1967, with the fiscal 
situation in open crisis, a number of desperate short term 
bridge loans were arranged with commercial banks. In 
conjunction with the IMF accord the government also arranged 
a 40 million dollar 5-year general purpose budgetary loan. 
Then, in the chaotic period between the devaluation in late 
1967 and the tax reform of June 1969, it was commercial bank 
short term bridge finance that helped to fill the fiscal gap. 
Finally, after the tax reform, commercial banks agreed to 
restructure (refinance) repayments on earlier budgetary loans 
over a 5-year period. Along with this finance the banks also 
agreed to provide some "standby" credits for the use of the 
government during the IMF stabilization program. 
The credits just cited are by no means an account of 
all the bank transactions realized during the period; more 
detail on these is provided in Part II of the study. Here the 
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objective has been to demonstrate that, at the margin, bank 
loans played a key role in maintaining the fiscal accounts 
afloat, or looked at from another angle, they helped to 
postpone the need to take measures that would rectify the 
fiscal imbalance. 
2. 1969 - 1971: A Financial Blockade 
The last chapter pointed out that with the arrival 
of the new government in October 1968 there was a serious 
restructuring of relations with foreign capital. Foreign 
capital did not accept the measures passively and, in line 
with tradition, affected corporations sought to involve their 
home governments. Not surprisingly the U.S. government 
became involved; it introduced a series of measures to show 
displeasure with Peru's program to reorient foreign capital 
to national development objectives. One of the principal 
tools used was a financial blockade. 
After the nationalization of the IPC, the U.S. 
threatened Peru with its Hickenlooper Amendment. The 
implications of the Amendment have been concisely explained by 
Levinson and De Onis: 
To protect the interests of American companies abroad, 
Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, urged on by Harold 
Geneen, the president of IT & T, introduced an 
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. This 
amendment required the president to suspend all 
economic assistance to any country that expropriated 
the property of a U.S. company, repudiated a contract 
with a U.S. company, or made a U.S. company subject to 
discriminatory taxation or administration. Suspension 
of all forms of economic assistance included not 
just foreign aid, but such legislation as that allotting 
sugar quotas to favored nations. A country had six 
months in which to take "effective steps" to provide 
compensation for expropriated property in "convertible 
foreign exchange". Thereafter the president was 
allowed no descretion to waive enforcement of the 
amendment. 185/ 
In March 1969 the U.S. sent a delegation to Peru to 
discuss compensation for U.S. assets. It later agreed to 
defer implementation of the Amendment pending negotiations and 
court proceedings concerning compensation for the IPC. 
But what the U.S. agreed not to do formally largely 
was done informally. It revoked Peru's sugar quota, suspended 
arms supplies and froze most bilateral financial programs 
(including Export-Import Bank loans). Moreover, the U.S. used 
its leverage in multilateral agencies to freeze credit from 
these institutions. 
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It is important to point out that the financial 
blockade was not as absolute as it would have been had the 
Hickenlooper Amendment been evoked. The Peruvian government, 
facing informal rather than official legal sanctions, 
attempted to place pressure on multilateral agencies to honor 
their commitments to Peru. Efforts were particularly intense 
at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) - where there 
was a high degree of homogeniety among member governments -
and culminated in a Presidential speech at an annual IDB 
meeting in which multilateral agencies were blasted for being 
"used as an arm of political pressure"against member countries 
such as Peru. 186/ The initiative was somewhat fruitful at 
the IDB as a reasonable level of loan authorizations was 
maintained. 187/ Some loans also were approved by the U.S. 
government and the World Bank; however, reference to table 14, 
makes it is clear that authorizations by these latter two 
agencies were unusually scarce during 1968-1971. 
The blockade clearly was costly to Peru. As manifest 
in table 15 net bilateral loans from the U.S. were negative 
during the period. Donations were unusually large in 1970, 
but they represented extraordinary acts of mercy designed to 
help the government overcome the damage of a massive 
earthquake which struck Peru early that year. 
Table 14 
PERU: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD 
BANK SEPTEMBER 1968-DECEMBER 1971 
Source 




World Bank a/ 8-9-1970 30 Road construction 
Export-Import 
bank 121 8-9-1970 4.3 Hercules aircraft 
Other United 
States c/ 29-6-1971 3.0 Community development 
Sources: World Bank: Statement of Loans, May 31, 1977. 
EXIMBANK: Statement of Loans, June 30, 1976 
Other: United States AID Statement of Loans, 
November 1974 and United States Department of 
Treasury. 
Foreign Credits, (June 30, 1973). 
a/ Includes IFC. 
1/ Direct loans only. 
c/ Excludes Commodity Credit Program. 
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Table 15 
PERU: BILATERAL FINANCE ACCORDING TO SOURCE, 
(Millions of dollars) 
1965-1976 a/ 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1576 
United States 24 30 12 14 -1 -5 1 46 35 -13 12 	 37 
Europe 9 8 11 8 45 7 -8 -11 -9 - 4 43 	 40 
United Kingdom (-) (-) (1) (1) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (3) (14)(18) 
Germany (3) (4) (8) (5) (29) (-4) (-9) (-8)(-12) (-6) (-) 	 (4) 
France (-) (-) (-) (1) (4) (5) (7) (-1) (-3) (-6) (-1.3) (2) 
Japan - - - 
- - - 
- 8  36  169 153 	 62 
Centrally 
planned - - - - - 7 5 52 61 	 88 
Canada - - 3 13 9 2 6 19 28 	 13 
Other - - - - - 4 16 4 -6 14 28 	 39 
Subtotal b/ 35 37 23 22 47 19 -,9 55 65 237 323 279 
Donations 24 7 32 37 31 7 39 39 42 48 —47 58 
Total 57 65 55 59 78 101 ,L, 54 107 285 372 337 
Source: Table 2 of the Statistical Appendix. 
7/-177t flows. 
T/ May not sum properly because of rounding. 
Table 16 shows that disbursements from the World Bank 
also were minimal for the period; moreover, the lack of 
authorizations during 1969-1971 contributed to the very low 
level of disbursements in succeeding years. The only buoyant 
source of loan disbursements, the TDB, was the focal point of 
Peruvian resistence to the blockade, 
With respect to suppliers' credits, there is little 
empirical evidence to explain why they behaved the way they 
did. But it is of no coincidence that net flows from U.S. 
suppliers were negative in 1969-1971 (see table 17). The 
negative attitude of the U.S. government and difficulty in 
obtaining official export credit guarantees from its agencies 
undoubtedly discouraged credits from this source. Also, well-
publized investment disputes would have adversely affected 
the willingness of suppliers to extend unsecured external 
credit. Finally, as can be appreciated from the last chapter, 
the period was dominated by stabilization efforts. Thus 
investment activity was restrained and opportunities for "tied" 
external finance were commensurately reduced. 
It has been demonstrated that during this period 
commercial banks provided practically no new credit to the 
government. As noted in the previous chapter, many major 
73 
international banks had links with nationalized firms and it 
certainly would not be unreasonable to assume that the 
restrictive attitude on credit was related to Peru's 
treatment of foreign investors. Indeed, as the study All 
show, certain banks were openly hostile to the governor It. 
However, without greater investigation it would be he/ ic to 
implicate all Peru's commercial bank creditors in the blockade; 
presumably some lenders could have been simply responding to 
objective circumstances. It must be remembered that banks gen-
'rally were very cautions lenders to developing countries in this 
period. Not only was the public sector's external debt clearly 
burdensome, but there was great uncertainty about the government's 
treatment of foreign capital and the general direction of the 
economy. Moreover, far-reaching reforms were introduced and 
the nature of public policy was clearly interventionist, in 
contrast to the banks' ideological preference for free market 
economics. Furthermore, for U.S. banks, no loans guarantees 
could be secured because the doors of the Export-Import Bank 
were closed to Peru. Thus, a cautious attitude could have been 
expected even in the absence of a blockade, making general bank 
involvement in the affair somewhat problematical. 
Table 16 
PERU: MULTILATERAL FINANCE ACCORDING TO SOURCE, 1965-1976 a/ 
(Millions of dollars) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
I RD 	 14 	 14 	 15 	 3 	 5 	 2 	 4 	 2 	 - 	 -2 	 68 	 11 
IDB 	 11 	 8 	 10 	 12 10 16 20 21 10 6 9 10 
CAF 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 
IMF 	 - 	 - 	 22 	 4 25 -9 -7 30 -58 -17 - 220 
Total b/ 25 	 22 	 48 	 19 40 	 9 	 17 54 -49 -12 76 241 
Source:  Table 2 of the Statistical Appendix. 
a/ Net flows. 
T/ May not sum properly due to rounding. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the banks did 
reluctantly go along with the authorities' request in 1969 for 
a refinance of 1970-1971 obligations; in fact, their options 
were limited in as much as official lenders had agreed to 
refinance their loans and credits could go unpaid if refinance 
was not forthcoming. Chapter X will show that the refinancing 
exercise was not very pleasant as commercial banks attached 
rather severe conditions to their loans. 
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Table 17 
PERU: SUPPLIER CREDITS ACCORDING TO SOURCE, 1965 - 1976 a/ 
(Millions of dollars) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
United States 	 2 	 19 	 7 	 1 	 -7 	 -6 	 -3 	 8 	 -1 	 - 	 3 	 -5 
Western Europe 
	 27 	 38 	 21 	 48 	 65 	 18 -17 -30 -15 	 -9 	 35 	 31 
United Kingdom 	 (1) (-2) (-2) 
	 (3) 	 (5) 	 (2) 	 (1) (-3) (-4) 	 (2) 	 (1) 	 (-) 
Germany 	 (-2) (21) (2)(-10)(-14) (-9)(-21)(-11)(-16)(-17) (-7) (-5) 
France 	 (21) (-) (-1) (23) (19) (-4) (-9) (-7) (-9) (2) (29) (11) 
Italy 	 (2) (1) (12) (15) (58) (35) (20) (-3) (16) (-) (3) (9) 
Japan 	 9 16 11 -2 1 -5 -4 -7 8 13 -6 -6 
Centrally 
planned 	 - - - - - - 8 22 44 65 7 
Canada 
	 2 - 	 - -1 32 14 -2 -10 -6 -6 -6 
Mexico 
	
- 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	
- 	 - 	 14 
Other 	 - 1 1 1 - 1 1 15 2 -4 7 10 
Total b/ 	 38 	 24 	 39 	 47 58 	 39 	 -8 	 -8 	 7 	 39 98 	 46 
Source: Table 6 of the Statistical Appendix. 
7717et flows. 
T/ May not sum properly due to rounding. 
3. 1972 - 1975: From Financial Famine to Financial Feast 
In this period the pendulum changed and Peru actually 
became swamped with external credit. There were some special 
factors at play and it is worthwhile to treat them in detail. 
a) 	 The removal of the financial blockade  
By 1972 there appeared clear signs that the U.S. was 
reformulating its position on Peru. Around mid-year U.S. 
foreign aid agencies approved new loans in an amount close to 
28 million dollars (mostly for earthquake damage) and there 
were abundant food credits from the Commodity Credit 
Corporation. 188/ As further evidence of a thawing of the 
freeze, the IBRD convoked a consultative group meeting in 
Paris in which it declared Peru creditworthy (i.e., no 
longer in need of refinance) and formally supported the 
government's recently formulated development plan. It is 
clear why the U.S. was having second thoughts about the value 
of maintaining a hard line with the govenment: Peru had shown 
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that it had sufficient resolve to resist external pressures; 
European, Japanese and Soviet commercial/political interests 
had been actively penetrating the Peruvian economy - formerly 
an American preserve - and, perhaps most importantly, oil had 
been discovered in the Amazon, rendering the country 
potentially important to the U.S.'s global energy 
strategy. 189/ 
While steps were taken to remove the blockade in 1972, 
its effects lingered for several more years, with the 
consequent loss in terms of access to official credit. The 
World Bank actually did not renew the flow of credit to Peru 
until August 1973 when it approved an agricultural development 
loan of 25 million dollars. Meanwhile, the U.S. Export-
Import Bank (Eximbank) - important both because of its own 
loans and the guarantees it provides private lenders - did 
notauthorize a new credit until March 1974 , and it was for 
the benefit of the U.S. Southern Peru Copper Corporation. 
The first Eximbank credit to the public sector was not 
authorized until August 1974, amounting to 1.4 million 
dollars to help support the purchase of two new Learjets.190/ 
Thus, the military government of Peru had suffered through 
a financial blockade of official finance of varying degrees 
of intensity for a period of nearly 6 years. 
b) 	 Diversification of sources of finance  
Given that Peru encountered overt and disagreable 
political conditions attached to U.S. foreign assistance 
during 1963-1968, and then again in 1969-1974, along with 
frequent loss of access to credit from international 
institutions, it comes as little surprise that authorities 
became interested in diversifying their sources of finance.122( 
This is manifest in the fact that by 1972 the government 
was receiving finance from many non-traditional areas. 
According to table 15 now Japan, Canada and the Centrally-
Planned Economies - of no importance in the Sixties - were 
major sources of finance. Pursuit of this strategy intensified 
in subsequent years, such that the U.S. share of bilateral 
loans to the government fell from over 77% in 1965-1966 to 
only 8% in 1975-1976. 192/ 
The same phenomenon occurred with respect to suppliers' 
credits (see again table 17). The most notable feature is 
that type of credit, which relative to other sources of 
finance was of less significance in the Seventies, became 
dominated by the Centrally-Planned Economies. Indeed, the 
greater role of these countries in both suppliers' credits 
and bilateral finance most symbolized Peru's program of 
diversification. 
As it turned out, the key actors in the drive for 
diversification were commercial banks. Also, these institutions 
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constituted the principal factor behind the dramatic rise 
in external finance available to the government after 1971. 
While Part II of the study examines in detail the growing 
involvement of banks in the economy during the 1970s, as a 
form of introduction the more general trends can be sketched 
here. 
e) 	 Commercial banks: their penetration of the Peruvian 
market 
In 1971 Peru faced a severe dilemma. The government 
had formulated an ambitious development plan designed to 
restructure the economy and generate rapid economic growth. 
Moreover, the public sector designated itself as the principal 
agent of development, sponsoring large investments in 
productive sectors. While much of the finance could be 
secured locally, foreign funds clearly were crucial to the 
implementation of the program. But the logical sources of 
supply of long term development loans-international and 
bilateral official agencies- were relatively inelastic, owing 
to the aforementioned financial blockade and the unfortunate 
institutional limits on funding from these organizations. 
Massive direct foreign investment on the terms that TNCs 
customarily demanded obviously was not compatible with public 
policy. Thus, officials viewed foreign commercial banks as 
a potential source of external finance. 
Indeed, the government made some effort to court the 
banks' favor. As related in Chapter III, in the initial years 
of the reform period fiscal and monetary policy was 
conservative and the government maintained cordial relations 
with the IMF. In addition, commercial banks generally were 
not directly affected in an adverse way by the reforms on 
private capital; major banks could maintain their branches 
in Lima and those nationalized, such as Chase Manhattan, 
received rather generous settlements. Also, Chase, one of 
the most influencial institutions in the world banking 
community, benefited from the decision to allow foreign 
private capital to develop Cuajone. 
Coincidental with Perufs desire to secure commercial 
bank finance was the maturation of the structural changes 
in international banking - already analysed in Chapter II -
that eventually made these institutions more receptive to 
financing developing countries. By 1971 banks were actively 
courting developing country clients, and Peru eventually 
became caught up in the wave of new lending to these countries. 
Bank lending began to take on importance in Peru in 
1972. It is of little coincidence that the date of entry 
closely corresponded to a time when much publicity had been 
aired about petroleum in the Peruvian jungle. Moreover, 
banks undoubtedly were in a position to be informed about 
these developments because many of them had close corporate 
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ties with firms drilling in the jungle fields. But it 
should be pointed out that given the frantic nature of 
lending in the early Seventies, Peru probably would have 
become a client of the banks one way or the other. 
The penetration of the Peruvian market by commercial 
banks was by no means homogeneous. At the outset of 1972 
Peru's traditional commercial lenders of the Sixties (to be 
identified in the next chapter) continued to be very reserved 
about new loans to the government. However, some U.S. 
regional banks, and Japanese and European institutions had 
been aggressively seeking markets abroad in order to expand 
their international portfolios. They became attracted to 
Peru for three basic reasons: first there were the prospects 
of oil, and secondarily mineral, exports; second, these 
banks had little or no exposure in Peru, making the perceived 
risk of new credit all that more reasonable; and lastly, 
the government was prepared to pay very high interest rates 
in order to secure the credit and thereby break out of the 
straightjacket created by the aforementioned financial 
boycott. As the "newcomers" began lending to the government, 
most of Peru's traditional commercial bank creditors reacted 
defensively and attempted to match the amounts and terms 
of credit. Some traditional lenders, however, obviously 
piqued by Peru's reform government, continued to withhold new 
finance. Nevertheless, Peru soon became the focal point of 
a flurry of competitive lending among international bankers 
with trends usually led by the newcomers. When the Greene 
Accord was formalized in 1974 the remaining holdouts entered 
the market and intensified the competition. All this resulted 
in a very rapid growth in the volume of credit and a similarly 
rapid decline in its cost. 193/ By 1974 net disbursements 
of banking institutions had reached 400 million dollars, 
nearly 7 times the level recorded in 1972 (see again figure 1); 
the banks share of net flows of loan capital to the government 
rose over the same period from 34% to 61% of the total. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that bankers were highly 
aggressive in their penetration of the Peruvian market. 
Unsolicited letters offering lines of credit on highly 
favorable terms were frequent as were foreign bankers' visits 
to Lima for the purpose of generating interest in new 
loans. 194/ At its zenith, offers for finance were intense; 
as one local financier remarked: "foreign bankers wanted to 
give us money before we asked for it". 195/ 
One has already seen that the public sector's debt 
control system was not constructed to resist internal 
pressures to borrow abroad; the aggressive attitudes of 
bankers between 1972-1974 further burdened the effectiveness 
of the control system. It comes as little surprise, then, 
that a country with a current dollar per capita income of 
only 800 dollars in 1974 196/ accumulated by the end that 
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same year 1.1 billion dollars in disbursed and committed 
medium term bank debt, 197/ equivalent to roughly 75 dollars 
per habitant. Relatively speaking, Peru also became important 
to the banks; by 1975 it ranked among the top 7 non-oil 
exporting developing countries that had borrowed from these 
institutions. 198/ 
Figure 1 reveals that despite the retrenchment of 
world banking in the first half of 1975, net disbursements 
from these institutions rose slightly that year. Much of 
this disbursement represents the forward momentum generated 
by the hectic pace of lending in earlier years. Subsequently, 
however, banks would take a much more restricitive attitude 
towards lending to the government. 
4. 1976: Peru Loses its Creditworthiness 
The newly conservative attitude of bankers engendered 
by the failure of Herstatt and other difficulties in the 
world economy in late 1974 and in 1975 continued to dominate 
international lending in 1976. Terms of loans remained very 
onerous and banks tended to favor countries that, in their 
view, pursued adequate adjustment of their balance of 
payments. Peru, of course, at this time clearly had severe 
external problems and it was relatively slow in taking 
measures to adjust the balances of payments, in part because 
of a desire on the part of an insecure government to avoid 
eroding perceived areas of domestic political support. The 
new economic team installed in September of the previous 
year apparently generated enough confidence in bankers to 
maintain the flow of commercial credit, albeit at levels 
considerably inferior to 1974-1975. Indeed, authorities 
convinced banks to extend 400 million dollars in support of 
the June stabilization program - and without the protection 
of an IMF standby agreement. This credit, however, proved 
to be end of the honeymoon between Peru and international 
bankers and subsequently relations between the two parties 
underwent serious deterioration. At the close of the period, 
Peru's disbursed and committed medium term external debt to 




THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS 
AND THE NATURE OF BANK TENDING BEHAVIOR 

Chapter V 
BANK LENDING TO PERU: AN INTERTEMPORAL COMPARISON, 
1965 - 1970 AND 1971 - 1976 
Previous chapters have stressed the fundamental changes 
in the nature of commercial bank lending to developing 
countries during the decade !of the Seventies. However, up 
until now analysis has been very general and has provided 
little insight into the specific characteristics of the 
change itself. The task of this chapter is to present a 
comprehensive empirical base that documents the transformation 
as applied to Peru. This in turn also will initiate the 
process of penetration of aggregate data that is the raison  
d'etre of the study. 
In the following pages, through the use of an 
intertemporal comparison, analysis attempts to indicate how 
financial actors, relationships and functions altered 
radically between 1965 - 1970 and 1971 - 1976. The former 
time frame is reflective of a traditional period when bankers' 
interests basically focused on the industrialized countries 
and medium term lending to developing countries was an 
exception rather than a rule. Banks involved in Peru prior 
to 1971 then may be considered the country's traditional 
lenders. The second period, of course, is reflective of the 
effects of the boom years of world banking when a wholesale 
expansion into markets of developing countries occurred. Here 
the stage is shared between the traditional banks of the first 
period and the aggressive newcomers of the 1970s. One will 
see that the changed environment also brought fundamental 
changes in relationships and in lending activities. 
Before pursuing analysis, it should be made clear 
what the scope and limitations of the chapter are. As 
stated above, the main goal is to document the characteristics 
of bank lending in the two periods in question. While this 
does not preclude analysis of the factors underlying trends 
in lending, the latter element should be viewed as of 
secondary importance to the exercise and explains why 
examinations of this sort may not be as tight and elaborate 
as some readers might wish to see. 
As far as the material itself, the ensuing analysis 
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will identify which banks have lent to Peru in the two 
periods; the various modes of credit extension; how interest 
rates, maturities, commissions and penalties on their loans 
evolved; the relative importance of the various types of 
loans (e.g. projects, refinance, free disposition, etc.) in 
total lending as well as the terms carried by each; where 
loans were booked by the banks; currencies employed; and 
the degree to which restrictive legal clauses such as waivers 
of sovereign immunity and local legal jurisdiction were 
employed in loan agreements. 
A. THE ACTORS: PERU'S PRINCIPAL COMMERCIAL LENDERS 
Table 18 displays the government's principal lending 
banks for the periods 1965-1970 and 1971-1976. Institutions 
are divided into six groups according to the relative 
importance of the banks, using as a criterion the gross amount 
of all authorizations for each period. 199/ 
Several things are immediately apparent about the 
data within and between periods. 
In the earlier period, the predominant lending 
institutions were almost exclusively from the United States. 
This is evident from the fact that of the first 5 of the 6 
groups of commercial banks, only one bank was of a non-U.S. 
character - the Bank of Nova Scotia of Canada. 
Another characteristic of the period is that Peru's 
commercial lenders tended to he large in size. Major lenders 
(groups 1 
-3)  were clearly superbanks, ranking among the top 
22 of the world's largest banks. Moreover, all these 
institutions were relatively well-experienced in international 
lending and could be called money center banks, i.e., 
institutions at the hub of world commercial finance. Those 
banks of intermediate importance as lenders also were 
relatively large in size, ranking between 39 and 78 in the top 
300 of world banking. However, unlike the major lenders, 
these institutions generally were not at the vanguard of 
international finance at this time. 
A final observation that one can make about this first 
period is that a handful of institutions were responsible for 
the bulk of the lending. As shown in table 19 the six U.S. 
superbanks in the top 3 groups accounted for over 70% of the 
total value of commercial bank credit authorized in the 
period. Thus, the public sector displayed a high degree of 
dependence on a few key U.S. institutions. This situation 
probably manifests an unsophisticated borrower content with a 
cozy relationship with a coterie of convenient and familiar 
institutions. Indeed, Kuczynski has stated that in the 1960s 
the public sector was unfamiliar with non-U.S. banks and 
visa versa. 222/ 
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Turning to the second period, 1971-1976, there clearly 
was a dramatic change in the sources of private bank credit. 
Table 18 indicates that in terms of major lenders, 
groups 1-3 continue to be dominated by very large U.S. banks. 
However, Bankers Trust and Continental-Illinois, major lenders 
in 1965-1970, slipped to an intermediate level of importance 
in 1971-1976. There also is a newcomer to the group of major 
lenders-Wells Fargo. The role of this bank in Peru's finance 
is very important and will be discussed in greater detail as 
the study progresses. 
While the group of major lenders in 1971-1976 is still 
- with the exception of Wells Fargo - from the same club of 
U.S. money center banks that stood out as important lenders 
in the earlier period, the intermediate groups of lenders 
(4 and 5) are characterized by many new actors and a much 
greater degree of geographical dispersion. The only banks 
from the intermediate group of 1965 -1970 that maintained their 
relative importance in the second period are Crocker National 
Bank, the Bank of Nova Scotia, and Franklin National (which no 
longer exists due to bankruptcy in 1974). However, it is 
significant that they are joined by many other banks from the 
U.S., Canada, Japan, Europe and even one bank from South 
America. The one characteristic that is common to the two 
periods is that the banks in the intermediate group continue 
to be rather large in size; with the exception of the National 
and Commercial Banking Group, Bancal Tristate Corporation, 
Banque Francais du Commerce Exterieur, American Express and 
First Pennsylvania Corporation, all the banks are within the 
top 79 of world banking. 
With regard to minor lenders (group 6) their number 
increased dramatically, from only 15 banks in 1965 - 1970 to 
131 banks in 1971 - 1976. There is probably no better 
indicator than this of the massive transformation of banking 
in the decade of the Seventies. 
Perhaps the most dramatic change between the two 
periods is that unlike 1965 - 1970, when the major lenders 
also were responsible for the bulk of total credit (72%), in 
1971-1976 these same lenders accounted for only 23% of the 
total loans authorized (see table 19). The massive influx 
of new actors in the 1970s whose lending was of an 
intermediate or minor importance at the institutional level, 
in the aggregate accounted for more than three-fourths of the 
value of all loans in the period. Intermediate lenders 
accounted for 47% of total authorizations, compared to only 
17% in 1965 - 1970. Meanwhile, the 131 banks categorized as 
minor lenders - some of whose authorizations did not exceed 
1 million dollars for the period - as a group accounted for 
nearly a third of total lending, compared to only 11% in the 
1960s. Thus, in the changed environment of the 1970s 
important lending came from many new sources. 
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Table 18 
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1. X45 and <55 
Major lenders 
1. 	 123 and 	 <150 
Bankers Trust United States 11 	 Citicorp United States 2 
Citicorp United States 2 
Manufacturers Hanover United States 5 
2. 	 35 and 	 <45 2. )E95 and 	 <123 
Chase Manhattan United States 3 	 Manufactures Hanover d/ United States 16 
Continental Illinois United States 22 	 Wells Fargo United States 69 
3. )) 25 and 	 <55 5. ›.68 and 	 <95 
Bank of America United States 1 	 Bank of America United States 1 
Chase Manhattan United States 4 
Intermediate lenders 
4. 	 15 and 	 <25 4. ))41 and 	 <68 
Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 47 	 Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 53 
Bankers Trust United States 32 
Continental Illinois United States 30 
Morgan Guaranty United States 19 
Crocker National Bank United States 79 
Dresdner Bank Germany 14 
Banco do Brasil e/ Brazil 12 
Royal Bank of Canada Canada 22 
5. ).6 and 	 <15 5. 	 7 16 and <41 
Charter New York Corp. United States 39 	 Banda Comercial Italiana Italy 24 
Crocker National Bank United States 48 	 Bank of Tokyo Japan 28 
First National Bank of Lloyds Bank United Kingdom 31 
Boston United States 59 	 Franklin National Bank United States 
• Franklin National Bank United States 78 	 Union Bank of Switzerland Switzerland 41 
National Detroit Corp. United States 57 	 National and Commercial 
Banking f/ United Kingdom 102 
Bancal Tnstate Corp. United States 199 
Banca Nationale de Lavoro Italy 20 
Long Term Credit Bank 
of Japan Japan 44 
Credit Lyonnais f/ France 7 
Banque Francaisedu 
Comm. Exterieur f/ France 174 
Canadian Imperi,s7 Bank 
of Commerce Canada 29 
Fuji Bank Japan 13 
Amro Bank f/ Holland 48 
First Penn7ylvania Corp. United States 106 
Deutsche Bank Germany 6 
Bank of Montreal Canada 45 
Chemical Bank United States 23 
First Chicago Corp. United States 35 
Security Pacific Corp. United States 54 
Commerzbank A.G. 26 
American Express Int. Unit 	 States 223 
Toronto Dominion Bank Canada 66 
Minor lenders 
6. <6 	 6. 4'.1  
See table 10 in the statistical appendix for the 	 See table 11 in the statistical appendix for the 
names of the 15 banks in this group 	 names of the 131 banks in this group 
Source: 	 EGLI, on the basis of official data. 
a/ For credits with and without an export credit guarantee. 
b/- The range of authorizations in each group is different for the two periods due to the much greater value of 
— 
loans in 1971-1976. However, the scaling of the values for each group has been done in such a way that 
1971-1976 is roughly proportional to 1965-1970. 
c/ Ranked on a scale from 1-300 in world banking. Size is based on assets; 1968-1900 uses asset size for 1969 
— 
as published in The Banker, June 1970, P. 596; 1971-1976 uses asset size for 1975 as published in The Banker, 
June 1976, p. 6477--------  
d/ If credits with export credit guarantees are excluded, would fall into group 3. 
e/ If credits with export credit guarantees are excluded, would fall into group 5, 
f/ If credits with export credit guarantees are excluded, would fall into group 6. 
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Table 19 
PERU: DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL AUTHORIZATIONS AMONG MAJOR, 
INTERMEDIATE AND MINOR LENDERS, 1965 - 1970 AND 1971 - 1976 a/ 
(Percent) 
Major 	 Intermediate 	 Minor 
lenders lenders lenders Total 
1965 - 1970 71.7 17.4 10.9 100 
1971 - 1976 23.0 46.8 30.2 100 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Lending groups correspond to those of table 18. 
The much greater importance of intermediate and minor 
lenders as agents of finance could suggest greater 
independence for Peru as a borrower. This is undoubtedly true 
to some degree. However, as will be demonstrated in the next 
chapter on syndication, one can overstate the degree of 
independence by merely focusing on the number of individual 
actors in Peru's external commercial finance. 
1. Grouping banks according to country of origin  
Shedding more light on the subject is table 20, which 
views the sources of commercial lending from the angle of 
the country of origin of the lending bank; in addition, for 
each country group one finds data on the corresponding number 
of lending institutions, their average size, and the number 
of credits extended for the period. 
These data confirm the overwhelming presence of U.S. 
banks in Peru's commercial finance in the mid - and late -
1960s. Fully 86% of the value of all loans came from banks 
whose home office was located in this country. The lending 
was derived from 14 institutions, equivalent to slightly more 
than half of the total number of banks lending to Peru in the 
period. Moreover, given the concentration of lending in the 
hands of a few very large banks, the weighted average size 
(ranked by assets) of U.S. institutions relative to the top 
300 in world banking was a very large 5. 
The only other country with a significant presence was 
Canada, whose commercial banks numbered three and accounted 
for 8% of the loans authorized. 
Altogether there were 27 lending institutions for the 
first period, and due to the dominance of big U.S. institutions, 
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Table 20 
PERU: COMMERCIAL BANK AUTHORIZATIONS ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 
1965-1970 AND 1971-1976 a/ 
Country of banks 
Percentage 
of total 	 Number of 	 Average Number of 
loans 	 institutions b/ size c/ 	 credit 
authorized 	 transactions 
1965-1970 
United States 86.1 14 5 49 
Japan 0.1 1 26 1 
Canada 7.8 3 42 5 
United Kingdom 1.5 2 74 5 
Germany 1.1 1 14 1 
France - - - - 
Italy 1.0 1 25 3 
Switzerland - - - - 
Othor - - - - 
Consortium 1.0 2 301c/ 2 
Unknown d/ 1.2 3 5 
Total 100.0 27 5 71 
1971-1976 
United States 45.3 42 17 196 
Japan 11.6 26 41 160 
Canada 10.2 6 46 61 
United Kingdom 6.5 11 54 41 
Germany 6.4 11 18 27 
France 4.3 8 43 39 
Italy 2.1 8 30 24 
Switzerland 2.5 7 54 15 
Other 7.5 24 53 58 
Consortium 3.5 23 301c/ 48 
Unknown d/ 0.2 1 ... 3 
Total 100.0 167 27 672 
Source: =AL, on the basis of official data. 
a/ All credits, i.e., with and without guarantees of an export 
credit agency. 
b/ Subsidiaries have been consolidated into parent. 
c/ Ranked according to asset size on the basis of The Banker's top 
300 in world banking. The period 1965-1970 uses asset data for 
1969 and 1971-1976 uses asset data for 1975. The country average 
was calculated by weighting the asset size of each bank in dollars 
by the amount authorized in each period. The resulting average 
asset size was then assigned a rank according to where it placed 
in the top 300 of The Banker. A rank of 301 is used to indicate 
an average asset size too small to be ranked in the top 300. 
Banks whose origins are unknown, of course, received no ranking 
and do not figure in the overall averages. Since the number of 
unknown banks bear an insignificant weight, the absence of these 
banks in the ranking exercise had little effect on results. 
d/ Banks whose national origin could not be identified. 
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the weighted average size corresponded to the same size as 
that of the U.S. banks. 
The 1970s witnessed a much greater dispersion of 
lenders. The total number of lending institutions rises 
to 167, six times the number of participating institutions in 
the 1960s. Reflecting the greater number of banks of all 
sizes, the average international rank of lending institutions 
falls from 5 to 27. A rank of 27, however, indicates the 
continued importance of large institutions. 
Likewise, the weight of U.S. banks in total 
authorizations declines by nearly half, while Japan, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France and "other" areas take on 
much higher profiles. Notwithstanding more geographical 
dispersion, the U.S. participation remains 4 times the size 
of the next most important country group (Japan). Thus, the 
U.S. continued to dominate with the difference that 
concentration was considerably less marked and was spread 
among 42 instead of just 14 institutions. 201/ 
As an aside it is interesting to note that the nature 
of the role of U.S. banks is at least partially consistent 
with the general notion that in the 1960s commercial banks 
basically followed national trade and investment flows. The 
overwhelming dominance of U.S. institutions in 1965-1970 
conforms with the high profile of American firms as investors 
in Peru - as commented upon in Chapter III - 80% of all 
foreign direct investment originated in the U.S. This 
country also was a metropole for trade, being a source of 
some 40% of Peru's exports and 37% of its imports. The 
maximum trade captured by any other country was slightly more 
than 10% (see table 21). If traditional patterns were 
followed, U.S. banks dominated the servicing of trade and 
investments of American firms with Peru. Thus, the Peruvian 
market was highly familiar terrain to some U.S. banks. Not 
only would familiarity favorably affect perceptions of risk, 
but lending to the government could thus be deemed as 
consistent with protecting the business of corporate clients 
and therefore tha business of the banks themselves. 202/ 
The reduction in the role of U.S. lending institutions 
in 1971-1976 is in line with their lower profile in 
investment and trade in the period. Although it would be 
difficult to empirically position the U.S. as investor in 
Peru, it is felt that divestment in the reform period, coupled 
with increased activity of European and Japanese firms, 
provided for greater geographical dispersion in the sources 
of foreign investment. Table 21 also reveals a significant 
decline in the U.S.'s trade share. However, two factors 
suggest that forces other than trade and investment influenced 
the behavior of bank flows: (i) the decline of the U.S.'s 
share of lending is much more pronounced than its reduced role 
in trade and probably more severe than any decline that may 
have occurred in its share of foreign investment; and (ii) the 
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Table 21 
PERU: DIRECTION OF TRADE 
(Percentage) 
 
1965-1968 	 1972-1975 
Country Exports Imports Exports Imports 
United States 	 40 	 37 	 32 	 32 
Japan 	 12 	 7 	 14 	 10 
Germany 	 11 	 12 	 8 	 11 
France 	 2 	 2 	 2 	 2 
United Kingdom 	 3 	 5 	 3 	 4 
Canada 	 - 	 3 	 - 	 4 
Other 	 32 	 34 	 41 	 37 
Total 	 100 	 100 	 100 	 100 
Source: CEPAL on the basis of official data. 
relative change in importance of Japanese and European 
countries as commercial lenders generally is not proportional 
to the behavior of their shares in trade. (No data are 
available on investment flows.) These trends would support 
analysis presented in Chapter II that established conditions 
in which banks in the early 1970s expanded lending to 
developing countries, and Peru, for its own sake, i.e., the 
principal consideration was development of an international 
portfolio and not service or protection of business with 
home country non-financial corporations. 
2. Grouping Banks According to Their Size  
Mention has been made several times of the size of the 
banks lending to Peru. In order to clarify this point it is 
useful to view separately how gross authorizations were 
distributed among banks when they are grouped according to 
their size. Table 22 provides such information by breaking 
out total authorizations according to eight groups of banks, 
where each group represents a range of total assets 
denominated in U.S. dollars. 
The table contains impressive evidence of Peru's 
dependence on large commercial banks. In 1965-1970, 78% of the 
total value of authorizations derived from banks in the two 
largest ranges of assets, which were equivalent to numbers 
1-38 in the international rankings. In the second period, 
1971-1976, 59% of the gross value of authorizations came from 
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Table 22 
PERU: COMMERCIAL BANK AUTHORIZATIONS ACCORDING TO THE ASSET SIZE OF 
BANKS, 1965-1970 AND 1971-1976 
Asset range a/ 










1. 25 573 - 12 787 (1- 5) 3 33.2 
2. 12 786 - 	 6 394 (6-38) 10 44.6 
3. 6 393 - 	 3 197 (39-76) 6 16.2 
4. 3 196 - 	 1 599 (77-137) 2 2.9 
5. 1 598 - 	 800 (138-264) 1 0.9 
6. 799 - 	 706 (265-300) - - 
7. <706 ( > 300) 1 0.8 
8. Unknown size 4 1.5 




65 789 - 32 895 
32 894 - 16 448 






3. 16 447 - 	 8 244 (47- 91) 25 18.5 
4. 8 223 - 	 4 112 (92-147) 24 7.7 
5. 4 111 - 	 2 056 (148-263) 21 6.9 
6. 2 055 - 	 1 634 (264-300) 4 0.7 
7. <1 634 (>300) 26 5.1 
8. Unknown size 25 2.6 
All banks 167 100.0 
Source: CEPAL on the basis of official data. 
777TITie the asset range for the two periods involve different dollar 
values, the range for 1971-1976 is scaled in a manner which is 
proportional to 1965-1970. The asset range for 1965-1970 is from 
balance sheet data for 1969 and the range for 1971-1976 reflects 
data for 1975. 
b/ The world ranks are on a scales of 1-300 and correspond to the 
asset range for each period. Based on The Banker ranking of the 
top 300 in world banking for the years 1969 and 1975, respectively. 
c/ All credits, i.e., with and without guarantees of export credit 
agencies. 
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the top two groups, this time equivalent to numbers 1-46 in 
the international rankings. 203/ Thus large institutions 
clearly dominated commercial lending to the government. 
One may appreciate, however, some significant 
differences between the periods. In 1971-1976 there are 
many more institutions in the first two ranges of assets; for 
1965-1970 there are 13 banks in groups 1 and 2, representing 
nearly 50% of all lenders, while in the second period the two 
top groups incorporate 42 banks that represent only 25% of 
all institutions. Likewise, in the second period the 
intermediate - and small - sized banks are of relatively 
more importance, both in terms of their number and the value 
of their authorizations. 
In the 1970s, then,there clearly was greater dispersion 
of lending, both within the group of large banks and among 
the groups of all banks ranked according to assets. But this 
does not diminish the fact that among the 167 lenders to Peru 
in 1971-1976, 42 very large institutions had great influence 
over the government's external resource flows. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF CREDIT 
During the first period, 1965-1970, banks extended 
credit on an individual basis, providing the impression that 
finance was a rather personalized affair; that is, the public 
sector had direct contact with its bankers. 
Although banks lent individually, it was not uncommon, 
however, for them to band together in the extension of a 
credit. Such multibank loans accounted for roughly 68% of 
the value of authorizations in 1965-1970. 
Multibank loans were characterized by a common umbrella 
loan agreement. However, no bank was explicitly identified 
as the organizer of the credit,204/ nor was any bank 
designated to administer or enforce the loan over its 
duration. Likewise, no explicit fees were charged for 
organization or administration. Thus, each bank disbursed 
on its own and the borrower channeled repayment directly to 
each institution. Presumably the attraction of these multi-
institutional agreements were threefold: (i) a larger amount 
of resources could be mobilized, providing less risk for each 
individual bank; (ii) by joining into a group the banks 
became all that more imposing to the borrower, thereby 
enhancing leverage during both the negotiation and 
enforcement periods of the credit and (iii) group lending 
provided psychological security. i.e., a bank could enjoy the 
comfort of knowing that its peers accompanied it in taking on 
a certain perceived risk. 
The multibank loans to Peru had no international 
character in the sense that all the banks came from the same 
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country. Moreover, the number of institutions joining together 
in a loan did not exceed 11 on any one agreement. 
The multibank credit of the 1960s was precursor of the 
syndicated credit that became commonplace in the 1970s and 
which generated nearly 80 percent of the total authorizations 
of 1971-1976. In a syndicated credit a lead bank(s) initiates 
negotiations with a borrower and solicits participantion from 
other institutions. Thus, in the age of syndication a bank's 
importance to a borrower can exceed the mere level of its 
loan authorizations. 
Once a loan is arranged, one of the lead banks is 
designated as agent for the other participating banks and it 
has the responsibility of administrating the credit, e.g., 
making disbursement and receiving repayment. The agent also 
is responsible for enforcement of the credit agreement should 
the borrower fail to comply with the terms of the contract 205/ 
Both the lead banks and the agent receive special fees 
for their services. And it also has become customary to 
give fees to other banks as an inducement for them to 
participate in the syndicate. Syndicates generally have 
some international character, as banks of various nationalities 
often cooperate in the arrangement of a loan. The attraction 
of a syndicate to a bank is similar to the attraction of the 
aforementioned multibank agreements with one additional 
incentive: the existence of fees which increase the yield 
on a given loan. Chapter VI will analyse syndicates in some 
detail in order to reveal their character and to consider the 
advantages such arrangements have for the borrower. 
C. TERMS OF CREDIT 
With regard to interest charges and maturities of 
commercial bank loans without external guarantors, they are 
presented in tables 23 and 24 for the two basic periods under 
examination. 206/ 
1. Interest Rates 
a) 	 1965-1970  
The most prevalent way of costing loans in 1965-1970 
was by use of a floating prime rate - a spread or margin 
added to an interest rate for prime borrowers that was subject 
to periodic adjustment. Fully 81% of the total value of 
authorizations used this type of rate, which for practical 
purposes was the prime rate prevailing in the U.S. 207/ 
The average prime rate spread in 1966 was 1.5% and 
thereafter it rose to 1.75%. The increase in the spread was 
fully consistent with the open manifestation of fiscal and 
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PERU: MATURITIES ON COMMERCIAL BANK CREDITS, 1965-1976 a/ 
Years 






1965 1.53 4.79 6.32 
1966 0.52 3.84 4.38 
1967 1.18 3.51 4.70 
1968 1.47 3.90 5.38 
1969 0.87 1.09 3.09 
1970 0.50 4.50 5.00 
1965-1970 
average 1.03 4.01 5.05 
1971 1.50 3.50 5.00 
1972 2.54 3.67 6.22 
1973 3.75 4.87 8.71 
1974 4.79 4.64 9.51 
1975 2.69 2.99 5.68 
1976 2.00 2.83 4.84 
1971-1976 
average 3.20 3.82 7.06 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
a/ 	 Averages are weighted by authorizations. Only for 
credits without guarantees of export credit agencies. 
b/ 	 The sum of grace and amortization periods may be less 
than the total maturity because of the existence of 
bullet loans, i.e., loans with one payment. 
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An interesting feature of prime rate loans at this 
time was that many transactions carried a floor, and 
sometimes a ceiling, on the absolute interest rate that could 
be charged. For instance, in 1967 a large loan that bore a 
spread of 1.75% had a minimum absolute interest rate of 7%. 
In 1968 many floating rate loans carried a 1.75% spread 
accompanied by not only a floor of 6 3/4%, but a ceiling of 
8 3/4% - a curious concession given the deteriorating 
economic situation of the government. By 1970, the prime 
rate loans had returned to the practice of a simple floor, 
this time of 7%. 
Although a floor interest rate could have worked 
against the interests of the borrower, by eliminating any 
advantage from a sudden drop in the floating prime rate, a 
band, or mini-max interest rate could have been attractive in 
as much as it put a predictable cost on a credit over the life 
of the loan. Thus, both borrower and lender were protected 
against any wild and adverse swings in the floating rate. 
Unfortunately, the virulent nature of world inflation in the 
1970s put an end to these types of arrangements in loan 
agreements. 209/ 
The table indicates that the second most common form 
of costing loans in 1965-1970 was the use of a fixed interest 
rate. A fixed rate loan can be attractive to a borrower 
seeking a predictable cost over the life of a loan; it also 
conveniently passes the risk of unexpected inflation onto the 
lending institution. However, bankers naturally prefer 
floating rates, which explains why in absolute terms the 
percentage of credit with a fixed rate was relatively small 
(16%). Given that world prices were rising at a rate of 
4 1/2-5% in the late 1960s, the cost of this type of credit 
in real terms could be calculated at roughly 3 1/2-3% at 
the time of contraction. 
It is significant to note that in this early period 
the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) was of little 
importance as a costing mechanism; indeed, only one relatively 
small credit had its cost determined by the LIBOR. This no 
doubt reflects the dominance of U.S. banks in lending to Peru. 
For these banks it proved more profitable to lend out of New 
York than London. 210/ And Peru, by virtue of its being a 
relatively small borrower, could be attended from domestic 
offices in spite of U.S. government ceilings on the amount of 
foreign credit that could be extended by the headquarters of 
its banks. 211/ From the standpoint of the borrower this 
also constituted an attractive arrangement; loans from the 
U.S., assuming identical spreads, were more economical given 
that the U.S. prime rate was usually lower than the eurodollar 
rate (see figure4.) 
b) 1971-1976  
Turning to the second period, 1971-1976, there is a 
96 



























EVOLUTION OF THE EURODOLLAR AND U.S. PRIME INTEREST RATES, 
1965-1970 AND 1971-1977a 
Percent 
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Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. , World Financial Statistics, March 1972 and 
World Financial Markets, March 1978. 
aEurodollar rate is the 6-months prime banks' bid rates in London. 
D 	 1977 
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profund shift in the costing of credit. As revealed in the 
table almost all the loans carried the LIBOR. This reflects 
the fact, that by the early 1970s U.S. and most other banks 
had been funding their loans to Peru from the highly liquid 
eurocurrency market where the LIBOR was the prevalent pricing 
mechanism. Loans funded from domestic markets were much less 
prevalent, as demonstrated by the negligible representation 
of the prime rate spread and fixed rate loans. The latter 
diminished in importance also due to the virulent rate of 
inflation in the 1970s. 
Another notable feature at the outset of the second 
period, 1971 and 1972, is the steep spreads over LIBOR, 2.25% 
and 2.08% on average, respectively. The spread was markedly 
higher than the margin charged on floating rate loans in 1965-
1970. However, thereafter the spread on loans declined 
dramatically, reaching a low of 1.14% in 1974. This was 
followed by a full circle on borrowing conditions, with a 
sharp rise in spreads in 1975 and ending with an onerous 
2.17% average margin in 1976. 
It would be instructive to compare Peru's spreads with 
those of other countries in order to gain some idea as to 
whether trends in Peru where due to general market conditions 
or to factors unique to that country. While it would be 
hazardous to draw firm conclusions from such an exercise,212/ 
one can establish trends that are, at a minimum, indicati177--  
of the relative cost of borrowing and the factors behind 
any changes over time. 
Figure 5 presents the study's data on spreads for Peru 
and the average weighted spreads for Brazil and Mexico - two 
countries perceived by the banks in the early Seventies to be 
very creditworthy - based on their publicized eurocurrency 
credits. 
No comparable data are available for 1972, but it is 
know that Brazil paid about 1.50% on its commercial money 
around mid-year,213/ compared to a rate of 2.25% for Peru. 
This is fully consistent with a priori notions of how bankers 
might assess the creditworthiness of the two countries; while 
Peru's revolutionary government was an uncertain entity in 
the eyes of the bankers, Brazil had clearly established itself 
as dynamic economy enjoying what was then termed an economic 
miracle. 
In 1973, with growing bank liquidity and thus greater 
pressure on these institutions to expand their lending, there 
was a general decline in margins for developing countries; 
however, as shown the figure, the differential charge between 
Peru and "seasoned" developing country borrowers like Brazil 
and Mexico remained very large, suggesting that risk 
perception with respect to Peru remained basically unchanged. 
Interestingly, the figure suggests that in 1974 the 
banks markedly altered their perception of risk in Peru. 
Spreads for Brazil and Mexico rose with respect to the 
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Figure 5 
AVERAGE SPREADS OVER LIBOR OF COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS FOR 




	 O PBerrazuil 
	
0 Brazil 




Brazil 0 	 o Mexico 
Mexico 0 
1973 
	 1974 	 1975 	 1976 	 Years 
Source: Peru: ECLA; and World Bank, Borrowing in International Capital Markets, 
various issues. 
aWeighted by amounts authorized. Public sector loans only. 
previous year, reflecting the effects of a general tightening 
of market conditions due to uncertainities surrounding the 
oil crisis, inflation and, of course, the failures of 
Bankhaus Herstatt and Franklin National Bank. Peru, however, 
went against general market trends as its average spread 
declined markedly. Thus, although the government continued 
to pay a margin superior to either of the other two countries, 
the differencial was very much reduced. One can speculate 
on the reasons for the apparent change in the assessment of 
risk. First, Peru by now was more familiar to the banks and 
had straightened out its disputes with foreign firms, as 
manifest in the Greene Accord of 1974. Second, by 1974 Peru 
had publicized very favorable estimates of its petroleum 
reserves and was arranging for construction of a pipeline to 
bring the crude to the coast for export; also, Cuajone and 
Cerro Verde scheduled new mineral exports for the latter half 
of the 1970s. Third, previous borrowing contributed to a 
rather large accumulation of reserves (see table 5) that 
provided an appearance of security, i.e., the liquidity needed 
to service the external debt. All these factors probably 
contributed to a more favorable assessment of risk. Whether 
the real underlying circumstances of the Peruvian economy 
altered to a degree commensurate with the changed perception 





In 1975 one finds a general rise in margins, which is 
consistent with a further tightening of market conditions 
that year. However, while the differential between Peru 
and Mexico remains roughly the same, there is a narrowing of 
the gap in spreads between Peru and Brazil. Thus, one 
perceives a relative erosion of Brazil's position vis-a-vis 
the other two countries. This.also would appear consistent 
with outward circumstances. Brazil's enormous external debt, 
its lack of national oil resources, and "slowness" in 
adjusting the balance of payments were by now clearly of 
concern to its creditors. Although in Peru the balance of 
payments also had deteriorated sharply, there was still the 
security (though waning) of prospects of oil in the Amazon. 
Meanwhile, Mexico continued to enjoy one of the lowest spreads 
among developing country borrowers, in part because of its 
special relationship with the United States, where most of 
its major commercial creditors were domiciled. 214/ 
In 1976, borrowing conditions on international markets 
continued to be roughly as onerous as in 1975. Reflecting 
this, Mexico shows no real change in its average spread, 
apparently, the aforementioned special relationship with the 
U.S. overrode the uncertainty surrounding the 1976 devaluation 
and change in government, or alternatively, the effects of 
these events had not yet had a chance to work their way into 
the average spreads available to the country. However, Peru 
and Brazil underwent further deterioration, with Peru clearly 
suffering the greatest erosion with respect to the bankers 
perception of risk. Again this appears to be consistent with 
objective circumstances. Brazil was still a source of concern 
for the banks, 215/ but relative to Peru it benefited from a 
continental-sized economy, political stability and an economic 
and political team that had philosophical links with the banks. 
Peru, on the other hand, had a vigorous internal reform 
program; was a vocal Third World advocate of the New 
International Economic Order; it suffered from an unforeseen 
change in government in mid-1975; its balance of payment was 
in severe disarray and there was a high degree of political 
and economic uncertainty. But perhaps most importantly, 
the euphoria surrounding petroleum in the jungle had 
completely evaporated, with all but one of the foreign 
companies drilling for oil having terminated operations. 
2. Maturities  
In the first period, 1965-1970, maturities on 
commercial bank credits averaged only 5 years, incorporating 
a short grace period of 1 year and 4 years of amortization 
(see table 24). This would appear to have been in line with 
general market trends as term loans of 3 to 5 years are 
considered to have been the norm for the market in the latter 
half of the 1960s. 
1 00 
Figure 6 
AVERAGE MATURITIES ON COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS FOR 
PERU, BRAZIL AND MEXIC0,1973-1976a 
Peru 1 













0 	 5 	 10 	 15 
Total maturity (yrs) 
Source., 
 Peru: ECLA; and Brazil, Mexico: World Bank, Borrowing in International 
Capital Markets, various issues. 
aWeighted by amounts authorized. Public sector only. 
It is worthwhile to point out that the longest 
maturities appeared in 1965, at somewhat more than 6 years. 
This was less than a coincidence since the government's 
creditworthiness undoubtedly reached a peak that year. It 
would be difficult to state emphatically that the arrival of 
the military regime in late 1968 affected the bank's 
willingness to accept extended maturities; only in 1969, a 
year of little foreign borrowing, was the tenor of credit 
unduly short. However, the unusually brief grace periods 
applied to loans in 1969-1970 are indicative of the bankers' 
reserve with respect to the new regime. 
The second period, 1971-1976, witnessed a 40% 
lengthening in the average maturity to 7 years. The average, 
however, hides much longer maturities of 8.7 and 9.5 years 
for 1973 and 1974, respectively. What the data confirm, 
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however, is that commercial banks merely provided medium term 
finance and, notwithstanding occasional periods of extended 
maturities, their loans did not fulfill the requirements of 
long term development finance. 
Again, it would be instructive to compare Peru's 
maturities with the two superborrowers, Brazil and Mexico. 
The caveats applied to the data on interest margins are 
equally applicable to maturity information. 
Although comprehensive comparative data for 1972 are 
unavailable, it is known that Brazil regularly secured loans 
with at least a 10 year maturity in 1972.216/ Peru, on the 
other hand, secured an average of 6 years. The difference 
was not attributable to differentials in margins - i.e., higher 
margins for longer maturities - since in this year Peru also 
had a considerably higher cost of credit. Thus, the short 
maturity would be another confirmation that Peru was viewed 
as a relatively high risk in 1972. But the large differential 
also may have been partly reflective of Peru's inexperience in 
negotiating maturities with international banks; as will be 
shown momentarily, in later years the respective trends in 
creditworthiness among the three countries were accompanied 
by much less marked differences in maturities. 
Figure 6 indicates that although Peru's maturities 
lengthened in 1973, they still were considerably less than 
those available to prime developing country borrowers such as 
Brazil and Mexico. 217/ 
There already has been evidence from interest margins 
that in 1974 banks viewed Peru as a better risk. This is 
confirmed with regard to the behavior of maturities as the 
tenor of Peru's credit was about the same as Brazil's and 
even longer than Mexico's. Then, in 1975, when the market 
tightened all borrowers experienced a notable contraction of 
terms; however, and perhaps in part owing to its higher 
interest margin, Peru's average maturity was actually slightly 
longer than that of either Brazil or Mexico. In 1976 Peru 
again fell on the short end of maturities; along with the 
considerably higher interest margin this suggests serious 
deterioration of creditworthiness from the viewpoint of 
private creditors. 
D. FEES AND PENALTIES 
Most loans carry clauses that establish fees and 
penalties. The fees are charged for services, while penalties 
are for breach of contractual terms. The following paragraphs 
will show the evolution of these charges for Peru. Analysis 
does suffer, however, from the general dearth of information 
on bank loans; no comparisons could be made with other 
developing countries because little or no data of this kind 
reaches public scrutiny. 
102 
1. Fees 218/ 
There are several types of fees accompanying loan 
agreements. One common charge is a commitment fee that is 
paid to a bank to reserve fundsuntil they are fully drawn 
down. The most common commitment fee is a periodic charge on 
undisbursed balances. The fee also can be a flat charge on 
the face value of the loan, but this practice was of little 
importance for the credits to Peru. 
Other fees are charged for the organization and 
administration of a loan. These can be variously termed 
management fees, agent's fee, participation fee, etc. They 
are usually at the front end of a loan; namely, a once and 
for all flat percentage of the face value of the credit paid 
at the beginning of a loan period. If more than one bank is 
involved, these fees are distributed in various ways according 
to some predetermined pattern agreed to by the banks. 
Most loans also carry a provision for the 
reimbursement of a bank's miscellaneous costs - often termed 
"out-of-pocket" expenses - for legal services, preparation 
of the credit agreement, publicity, etc. 
Table 25 presents data on the average cost of fees in 
both periods. 
What is striking about the period 1965 - 1970 is that 
fees as an explicit cost item were the exception rather than 
the rule. Flat fees were most uncommon and less than 15% of 
the total authorizations carried commitment fees. In 
cont..•ast to the first period, however, 1971-1976 witnessed a 
general proliferation of fees. Two principal reasons appear 
to have been behind this trend. 
First, banks discovered flat fees to be a discreet 
way in which to raise the yield on their loans. Moreover, 
in a bargaining environment a borrower may be more receptive 
to an increase in fees than an increase in interest margins; 
the former are not well publicized and therefore acceptance 
of higher fees could enable a borrower to hide embarrassingly 
high interest margins which would reflect badly on its 
creditworthiness. Also, the longer the maturities on a loan 
the more amenable fees become to a borrower. 
A second reason behind the employment of fees was the 
growing use of syndication for arrangement of loans. In these 
loans, institutions that organize such a credit (the managers) 
and the bank that administers or enforces the loan agreempt 
(the agent) expect to be reimbursed for their services. 
Indeed, some banks particularly consortium or merchant banks, 
rely mostly on fees :Tor their earnings; they organize and/or 
administer credits, capturing the management and/or agent fee, 
while placing only a nominal (or even no) amount of interest 
bearing money in the loan itself. Also in syndication, lead 
banks have introduced the practice of granting fees to banks 
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With regard to the fees themselves, commitment fees 
appeared on nearly three-quarters of the loans and averaged 
0.56% on outstanding balances. Flat fees of all kinds appeared 
on 87% of all credits in 1971-1976 and averaged 0.77% of the 
face value of the loans. 
It appears that these fees too were at least partly 
a function of Peru's attractiveness as a borrower. In 1972-
1973, a period when fees began to gain wide acceptance among 
bankers, the flat service charge averaged around 0.46%. 
However, in 1974 the average cost of fees declined markedly, 
which would be in line with what has been shown to be a 
possible change in the bankers' perception of risk in Peru. 
But a shift to a creditors' market in 1975, coupled with the 
manifestation of problems in Peru, caused the average fee to 
triple to nearly 1.0%. Then, in 1976, when Peru was on the 
werge of losing its creditworthiness, the fees attached to 
the already high margins was a stiff 1.3% on average. 
The fees associated with the reimbursement of "out-of-
pocket" expenses, legal fees, etc., generally constituted a 
minor cost item, but at least on the surface appear to have 
involved a rather odd arrangement. In the vast majority of 
cases banks gave themselves a "carte blanche", i.e., the loan 
agreements simply state that the borrower must reimburse all 
such expenses. On some occasions vague parameters were set 
by the use of the term "reasonable" costs. And in the least 
frequent of cases some dollar ceiling was placed on the 
amount that could be charged for miscellaneous expenses. Thus, 
in general this latter type of fee was not subject to 
competition. 
2. Penalties  
Turning to penalties, two types have been quantified: 
late payment penalties and premiums charged on any prepayment 
of a loan. 
In the first period, the most common type of penalty 
was a premium on the basic interest rate for payments arriving 
after the due date of an interest or amortization period (see 
table 26). And the penalty for any late payment was stiff, 
bringing on average for the period a 70% increase in the cost 
of interest over and above the basic rate. In the second 
period, this type of penalty became more pervasive, covering 
71% of all credit. However, the average increase in the 
interest rate was lower, 58%. It was not possible to 
determine to what extent the borrower actually encountered 
these penalties; nor was it possible to systematically assess 
to what extent creditors enforced such penalties. One assumes, 
however, that banks flexibly applied this instrument. In any 
case, the penalty fees can be viewed as an "escape valve" 
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which is a contractually legal, but drastic way for dealing 
with lagging payments. 
As for prepayment penalties, they are placed on loans 
to discourage a borrower from prepaying an expensive credit 
with a new cheaper loan that may become available to a borrower 
due to a favorable turn in market conditions.219/ Banks as a 
rule dislike prepayment because they can lose a profitable 
loan and, if not participating in the new credit, they also 
receive an unanticipated (and perhaps unwanted) inflow of 
liquidity that would have to be placed again in the market. 
The penalties themselves can consist of one basic flat 
fee on any amount prepaid. A more common practice, however, 
especially in the 1970s, was to scale the flat fee according 
to when prepayment would be effected. For example, a large 
10-year loan contracted in 1973 had a 3% penalty for 
prepayment during the first year of the loan, 2% during the 
second, and 1% during the third, with no penalty thereafter; 
a 5-year loan in 1976 had prepayment penalties of 1/2% during 
the first year with a reduction of 1/2% for each year up to 
the fifth and last year, when prepayment could be effected at 
a cost of 1/2%. 220/ 
As can be appreciated from table 26, about 28% of the 
credits in 1965-1971 had arrangements for prepayment penalties. 
The credits that carried such penalties had an average cost 
(for 1965-1970) of 0.39% for the full maturity. In 1971-1976 
prepayment penalties became much more common, borne by over 
60% of the credits. Moreover, the penalty averaged 1.18%. 
As one might expect, prepayment penalties were most 
often applied when the borrower's terms were most onerous, 
either due to a lender's market, a relatively low level of 
creditworthiness, or both. This is confirmed by the fact that 
coverage is the most extensive and the penalties themselves 
most severe in 1973 and 1975. In contrast, 1974, a year in 
which bankers appear to have taken a sanguine wiew towards 
Peru, displays relatively lower coverage and lower prepayment 
penalties. 
There is no doubt that from the standpoint of an 
individual lending institutions discouragement of prepayment 
makes good commercial sense. However, one cannot help but 
think that in a broader perspective such penalties on developing 
country borrowers may be counter-productive for all concerned. 
Prepayment strategies of developing countries are a convenient 
way for borrowers to assuage the surges in interest margins 
and contractions of maturities that frequently occur because 
of changing market conditions and/or deterioration of 
creditworthiness. A borrower who can trade in old expensive 
loans for new cheaper loans is effectively enhancing its 
debt service capacity. Thus, through prepayment (and refinance) 
strategies a borrower can become a better overall risk and 
assume a larger volume of new debt, generating more resources 
for development and more business for the banks. 
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E. CREDITS WITH EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES 
The preceeding analysis of the terms and conditions of 
credit pertained to loans without an explicit guarantee of an 
export credit agency such as the U.S. Export Import Bank. It 
would be instructive to briefly review the terms of these 
"guaranteed" loans as a way of comparison with unguaranteed 
bank credits. Table 27 provides such information for the 
period 1971-1976. 
Not surprisingly, the terms are considerably more 
favorable, as banks were able to pass the risk of credit onto 
the export credit agency and therefore could provide less 
than "commercial" terms. In almost all cases the interest rate 
was fixed, and not so high - an average of a little more than 
7% for the period 1971-1976. (In the same period world consumer 
prices rose by more than 10%). Moreover, the average maturity 
was 8 years, one full year more than the average for 
unguaranteed loans. Also, the frequency and amount of front-
end fees were considerably less than that associated with 
unprotected loans. 
Table 27 
PERU: BASIC DATA ON COMMERCIAL BANK CREDITS WITH GUARANTEES 
OF AN EXPORT CREDIT AGENCY, 1971-1976 a/ 
1. Interest 
7177;77ent of loans with fixed rate 
Average rate (%) 
b) Percent of loans with LIBOR spread 
Average spread (%) 
c) Percent uT loans with prime spread 
Average spread (%) 
2. Average total maturity (years) 











Source: CEPAL on the basis of official data. 
it7 ---07ly on credits where it was possible to determine the 
existance or not of guarantees. 
One must be cautious, however, about generalizing with 
regard to the nominal differential between guaranteed and 
unguaranteed credit. First, costs are understated because the 
export credit agency generally charges the borrower a fee for 
its services. Second, the loan is tied to the purchase of goods 
in the country of the export credit agency, which invariably 
has implicit costs for the borrower. Third, what appears to be a 
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commercial credit on the surface, really becomes a bilateral 
government to government loan, which generates potential for 
the home government of the commercial bank to interfer in the 
domestic affairs of the borrower. 
F. TYPES OF LOANS EXTENDED BY COMMERCIAL BANKS 
It is interesting to view commercial bank loans when 
they are broken down into their basic type. This also provides 
a forum for a more detailed analysis of the lending activities 
of commercial banks. Before pursuing analysis it is important 
to point out that the categories of loans are based on a 
formal typology which reflects to some degree the legal 
purpose of a credit; for instance, a refinance credit is 
understood to be for payment of a prior debt obligation, 
whether to the lending bank or another credit institution; a 
free disposition credit formally is for any purpose whatsoever; 
a project credit is linked to finance of a specific fixed 
investment, etc. However, money is fungible and on a 
functional basis the differences among credits sometimes are 
more formal than real. For instance, refinance credits 
postpone the outflow of resources via debt payments, thereby 
freeing a country's foreign exchange for general purpose use, 
much like a free disposition credit. Similarly, a free 
disposition credit can be used to repay debt and a project 
loan for local costs provides free foreign exchange for any 
purpose. But even though there may be little functional 
difference among the types of loans, there formal differences 
sometimes are viewed as real variants by the banks and therefore 
can be important with respect to credit decisions. Indeed, as 
will be shown in Chapter VII, it appears that some banks have 
preferences for participating in certain types of loans. 
Table 28 divides bank credits (without an external 
guarantor) into 7 basic categories and shows the relative 
importance of each for the two basic periods under 
consideration. 
In the period 1965-1970, bank lending activity was 
extremely concentrated in refinance operations. This type 
of credit accounted for nearly 80% of all credit operations. 
Loans of free disposition placed a distant second with 15% of 
the total value of loans. And a lending for projects and 
capital goods imports ranked as minor activity. 
In the second period, 1971-1976, one finds much greater 
dispersion, which is indicative of the transformation of 
world banking and the general willingness of these institutions 
to lende to LDCs. Refinance operations still dominated 
lending activities, but their share of total lending fell to 
less than 50%. Meanwhile, loans of free disposition rose to 
nearly one-third of all loans; and projects, which received 
little bank support in 1965-1970, accounted for nearly 
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Table 28 
PERU: BREAKDOWN OF COMMERCIAL BANK CREDITS INTO TYPE, 
1965 - 1970 AND 1971 - 1976 a/ 
(Percent) 
Type of loan 1965 - 1970 1971 - 1976 
Import of K goods - 2.0 
Import of other goods - 0.1 
Refinance 79.9 48.6 
Free disposition 15.3 27.8 
Projects 4.8 14.7 
Nationalizations - 6.1 
Other - 0.7 
Total 100.0 100.0  
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
7-  Only for credits without guarantees of export 
credit agencies. 
one-sixth of all commercial credit in the 1970s. Notably, a 
significant part of bank credit was formally authorized to 
compensate for nationalized assets. Thus it is clear that 
in the first half of the decade of the Seventies commercial 
banks markedly diversified the nature of their lending 
activities in Peru. 
1. Free disposition loans 
Loans of this type are usually considered attractive 
to a borrower. Since no specific use is attached to the funds, 
such credits provide borrowers with greater flexibility in the 
allocation of external and domestic resources. Moreover, by 
not being attached to purchases of goods and services, loans 
of this type facilitate repayment of debt (domestic and 
foreign) and foreign exchange accumulation,221/ the latter 
an essencial ingredient in keeping commercial bankers confident 
of a country's creditworthiness. Such loans also demand 
discipline on the part of the borrower; since there is no 
ex ante specification for the resources, the borrower must 
ensure that funds eventually are channeled into areas where 
returns exceed the cost of credit. 
From the standpoint of the lender, free disposition 
loans could be less attractive. With no ex ante purpose 
attached to the loan, the bank has no assurance that the 
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Table 29 
PERU: TERMS ON CREDITS GROUPED ACCORDING TO TYPE, 1965-1970 AND 1971-19761/2 
Category of loans 
Interest rate 	 Flat fees and prepayment 
penalties  
Percentree of credit in 
	 Percentage of credit in 
each category with: 	 Total 	 each category with: 
(i) 	 (ii) 	 (iii) 	 maturity 
fixed 	 I,bor 	 prime 	 (in years) 	 / 	 prepayment 
flat fee- 
rate 	 spread 	 spread 	 penalty 2 
Acturf rate 	 Actual rate 
	 Actual rate 
1965 - 1970 
1. Import of K goods 
 









	 13.0 4.2 82.9 5.07 1.0 14.9 
7.96 1.74 1.72 1.00 0.12 
4. Free disposition 
	 5.5 - 94.5 4.78 100.0 100.0 
8.75 - 1.69 
- 0.42 
5. Projects 	 100.0 








1971 - 1976 
1. Import of K goods 
	 9.0 53.1 37.9 6.34 35.3 21.9 
10.43 1.61 1.15 0.65 1.28 
2. Import of other goods 
	 100.0 








- ',6.1 1.61/ 6.98 83.0 69.6 
- 1.81 1.55 1.00 1.23 
4. Free disposition 
	 3.9 :5.2 1.0 7.15 93.3 70.1 
8.12 ].79 0.75 0.61 1.39 
5. Projects 	
- 18.1 6.9 6.87 92.0 61.6 
- :.71 1.78 0.67 0.52 
6. Nationalizations 10 ,.0 
_:. - 8.38 100.0 100.0 
].31 0.22 
7. Other 12.2 87.8 4.63 100.0 100.0 
u.59 1.25 
Source: 	 ECU, on the basis of official 
a/ Credits without guarantees of export cre?.it agencies. 
b/ Average weighted by amounts authorized. 
c/ See footnotes in tables 28 and 26. 
d/ 2.3% of the refinance credits had a rate other than, those cited in the table. 
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resources will be used wisely, placing the prospect of 
repayment squarely on the value of a sovereign guarantee. 
Also, a bank faces the risk that funds will be employed to 
prepay more expensive loans granted earlier by the institution, 
something that, as shown earlier, generally is not viewed 
favorably. 
a) 1965-1970  
In this period, only 15% of the credit authorizations 
related to freely disposable loans (see again table 28). 
Almost 95% of the value of these credits carried floating 
interest rates, which was much higher than the global average 
for all loans and consistent with the attractive nature of the 
credit for the borrower. The average interest cost was roughly 
on par with the global average for all loans in the period 
and the maturity was slightly shorter than the overall 
average tenor (see table 29). No flat fees prevailed, but 
consistent with the attractive nature of the credit, banks 
had sufficient leverage to place prepayment penalties on all 
such money with the average penalty amounting to 0.44%. 
A majority of the untied funds for the period pertained 
to two multibank loans in which the core lenders were Bankers 
Trust, Manufacturers Hanover, Citibank and Continental 
Illinois. 222/ 	 One loan, extended in 1966, involved some 
new money that was rolled into a 40 million dollar credit 
geared basically to refinance earlier debt to the banks. In 
July 1967 another 40 million dollar loan was extended, this 
time entirely for the general use of the government. The 
funds - which costed at 1.75 over the prime rate and carried 
a maturity of 5 years - were employed to prop up the ailing 
fiscal budget and balance payments. 
In 1967 the granting of considerable freely disposable 
funds to the government could be viewed with surprise given 
the mounting economic and political problems of the country, 
which by now were clearly manifest. But the banks apparently 
agreed to participate in a financial package, which included 
a standby credit from the IMF, because of what Kuczynski 
termed a "need to do business with a country that had until 
recently, and might again have, large foreign exchange 
reserves to deposit abroad". 223/ 	 But if the banks had 
any doubts about lending to Peru when they agreed to the loan 
in mid-July 1967, by the time of the signing later that month, 
the chaotic events in the country clearly had the banks 
second-guessing the wisdom of their decision. If it had not 
been for the fact that the banks had fully committed 
themselves to the credit, the offer probably would have been 
withdrawn. 224/ 
b) 1971-1976  
Turning to the second period, free disposition loans 
rose to represent nearly one-third of all authorizations. In 
this case, the average interest margin for the period of 1.79% 
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over LIBOR approximately equalled the average spread for all 
loans (1.75%) and the average maturity of 7.15 years did not 
differ much from the global average (7.06 yrs.). The 
percentage of these loans which carried flat fees was somewhat 
higher than the average for all loans, but the cost of the 
fees, at 0.61%, compared favorably to the average for all 
credit (0.77%). And consistent with the rather attractive 
nature of these loans for borrowers, bankers had relatively 
greater success in negotiating prepayment penalties, with 70% 
of all such credit carrying a penalty. Moreover, the average 
penalty of 1.4% was substantially higher than the general 
average for all credit of 1.18%. 
One must point out that the average terms above are 
not independent of years in which this type of credit was 
extended. Roughly 63% these loans appeared in 1973 and 
another 29% pertained to 1975. 
The accumulation of freely usable funds in 1973 resulted 
from interaction of two phenomena. 
First, it reveals a borrower who had an interest in 
fortifying the foothold it had established in the international 
commercial bank markets in 1972. The public sector's 
investment program was still largely in the planning stage 
and therefore the capacity to absorb debt into real activities 
clearly was limited. Thus, the only practical way to contract 
funds was through untied loans. Receipts could then be used 
to build up reserves - something that bankers like to see -
and occasionally prepay more expansive older loans with 
undesirable conditionality. Second, on the supply side it 
reflects the desire of aggressive non-traditional lenders to 
capture a piece of the Peruvian market - which was becoming 
more attractive because of oil and a general consolidation 
of the military regime's economic and political program, 
coupled with the efforts of traditional lenders to defend 
their market position. Because of the intense competition, 
by the end of 1973 freely disposable loans were being 
contracted at 1.25% over LIBOR and some loans even carrying 
fixed interest rates for up to 7 years. 
After 1973 this type of credit became less prevalent. 
One reason is that subsequent to this year the government 
could more readily absorb credit into the many new projects 
that it began to implement. Another factor is that after mid-
1974 banks became generally more cautious lenders, perhaps 
making them less inclined to extend free disposition finance. 
This is especially true with respect to Peru, which by late 
1975 displayed an economic situation that clearly was 
worrisome to the bankers. 
2. Nationalization credits 
One has seen that 6.1% of the loans extended by 
commercial banks in the period 1971-1976 represent 
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transactions designed to compensate foreign firms nationalized 
in the government's reform program (see table 28). This is 
certainly interesting because it means that in the medium term 
the government effectively exchanged interface with 
transnational corporations for interface with transnational 
banks. 
Credits of this type should be viewed as very political 
in character. Banks usually acted in ways which were 
explicitly designed to bail out corporate clients entangled 
in real or potential disputes with Peru. The loans also may 
have been politically useful to Peru in as much as the funding 
facilitated terminal settlements with affected corporations, 
thereby concluding or avoiding conflicts with home country 
governments. The political orientation of the credit is 
partly mirrored in the relatively favorable terms: the average 
interest rate of 1.31 over LIBOR (see table 29) compares 
very favorably with global average of 1.75 over LIBOR and the 
8.3 year average maturity is notably longer than the 7 years 
for all commercial credit. 
The most conspicuous loan of this type was a 76 million 
dollar credit headed by Morgan Guaranty Trust Company and 
nine other large U.S. banks in 1974.225/ The amount 
corresponded to the direct payment that Peru was to make to 
the U.S. Treasury for compensation of nationalized U.S. firms, 
as agreed to under the Greene Accord of that same year. 226/ 
Terms were very attractive, 1% over LIBOR, a 10 year maturity, 
a flat fee of only 0.11 of one percent and no prepayment 
penalty. Another important credit of this type appeared in 
1976 involving a group of six Swiss banks headed by the Swiss 
Bank Corporation. 227/ It amounted to 40 million dollars, 30 
million of which was to compensate various Swiss entities that 
held shares or debt of nationalized firms in the power, 
communications and manufacturing sectors of Peru. (The 
remaining 10 million dollars was of free disposition). 228/ 
The loan carried more severe terms than the previously 
mentioned credit, with a spread of 1.75% over LIBOR and a 
maturity of 5 years; but taking into account the generally 
tight borrowing conditions in the market, as well as Peru's 
eroded creditworthiness, the terms of the loan can be viewed 
as having been relatively favorable. 
Other loans extended in 1973 facilitated nationalization 
of the fishing industry. One was a 14 million dollar credit 
by a group of U.S. banks headed by Manufacturers Hanover. The 
cost was a spread of 2% over LIBOR and a maturity of 7 years, 
both favorable relative to the general conditions prevailing 
at the time for credit to Peru. Moreover, other credits, 
totalling more than 45 million dollars formally were classified 
as free disposition or refinance credits, but really were used 
to effect the nationalization of the fishing industry. 229/ 
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3. Refinance Credits  
In both periods credits related to the refinance of 
debt represented the most frequent form of loan transaction. 
A commercial bank can refinance debt owed to itself, another 
bank, a commercial supplier or an official agency. Refinance 
may be for debt payments falling due in one year, or less 
commonly, for the whole balance of the loan, thereby 
effectively restructuring the original maturity. 
Commercial lenders profess not like to refinance their 
own loans because of the notion that contractual repayment 
schedules are sacrosant;230/ nevertheless, in practice banks 
often do refinance. In a highly competitive environment 
such as in the early 1970s, if a bank does not agree to 
refinance its loans, another more aggressive bank may be eager 
to do so, eroding the former institution's market position. 
On the other hand, if a borrower is in financial difficulty, 
refinance is often an alternative to default, something that 
the banks would want to avoid if possible because of the 
precedent it could create and the adverse impact that this 
has on their annual financial statements. Refinance also can 
be viewed as an alternative to rescheduling, something that 
the banks resist at all cost. 231/ 
A bank most often will refinance an obligation to 
another lender when it is seeking to generate new business 
in a competitive environment. However, as a favor to a major 
corporate client, it may refinance a suppliers' credit which 
the client had extended to a borrower and for which it may 
be unwilling or unable to refinance itself. 
a) 	 1965 - 1970  
Refinance credits in this period were basically costed 
with a margin over the prime rate. (See table 29) Both the 
average margin and maturity for these credits closely 
correspond to the global averages for all credits. 
The majority of all refinance credits appeared in 1968 
and 1970 under conditions of economic stress. The 
concentration in these two years represents the results of the 
formal negotiations between the Peruvian government and 
foreign creditors for the rescheduling or refinance of debt. 
Both due to multilateral and bilateral agreements, bank 
refinance totalled roughly 140 million dollars in 1968 and 94 
million dollars in 1970. American banks accounted for 88% of 
the total, while Canadian, European and Japanese banks shared 
the rest. It is important to note that notwithstanding a 
difficult economic environment, banks insisted on rather severe 
lending terms that precluded real debt relief. As a result 
of commercial banks' time and risk preferences, authorities 
never were able to negotiate loans with more than 6 year 
maturities and the bulk of credit carried only 5 years. 
Moreover, grace periods were extremely short, 1.5 years in 
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1968 and only 0.5 years in 1970. This left prospects of a 
heavy debt service burden almost immediately after the 
refinance exercise. 
For this earlier period it is relatively easy to specify 
the nature of refinance because such loans were not very 
large and were associated with a specific purpose, thereby 
providing for a transparency that allows one to trace 
obligations covered by the new loans. Such was not the case 
in the 1970s when credits tended to be very large and tied to 
general requirements for refinance. 
In 1965 - 1970, 92% of all refinance credits provided 
information sufficient to determine what it was that banks 
actually refinanced. Of these "specified" credits, 90% of the 
total value simply refinanced prior obligations to the 
lending bank. Table 30 shows a sequence of loans of one bank 
in the study. As can be appreciated, the new credits (nos. 1 
and 3) in the period never really were repaid as banks 
continuously refinanced the obligations. This series is 
typical of many transactions undertaken by banks in the 1960s, 
and underscores W. Arthur Lewis' observation that in the end 
the bankers are most concerned that interest payments are 
met and will, even if displaying reluctance, tend to refinance 
their obligations. 232/ 
The remaining 10% of the specified refinance credits 
went to refinance suppliers credits, and debts owed to 
bilateral agencies and multilateral institutions such as the 
World Hank and IDB. 
As noted in Chapter IV, in the early 1960s the Peruvian 
government had taken heavy recourse to suppliers credits. 
As payments began to accumulate in 1965-1968, the banks 
financed a significant amount of these obligations with new 
loans, beginning the process of the shift of dependency from 
suppliers to banks. 
Since there is no empirical evidence to explain the 
bankers motivation for underwriting suppliers credit assets, 
one can only conjecture about the dynamics behind the process. 
It is suspected that the banks first began to refinance owing 
to a desire to generate new loan business. 233/ It must be 
recalled that at the opening of the period the banks viewed 
Peru as rather creditworthy and the loans for refinance of 
suppliers credits were small in comparison with other loans 
extended by these institutions. However, as the country's 
financial crisis deepened in 1967-1968, one is led to believe 
that the motivation to finance obligations due to suppliers 
was: (i) to remain in favor with their corporate clients and 
(ii) to cover promissory notes on suppliers credits that had 
already been taken into the banks' portfolio. 
Another interesting aspect of refinance in this period 
was that in 1968 and 1970 banks also refinanced debts owed 
to official agencies such as the World Bank and USAID. The 
need to refinance these "soft" loans with "hard" commercial 
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Table 30 
PERU: A TYPICAL SEQUENCE OF LOANS BY A COMMERCIAL BANK FOR THE 
PERIOD 1965-1970 
Year of 	 Amount Interest 








	 12.5 	 3.0 	 A free disposition 
loan for general 




	 12.5 	 1.5 + prime 
	 0.5 	 4.5 	 5.0 	 Refinanceof unpaid 
balance of credit 
1 plus $3.8 million 
in new money. 
	
3. 1967 	 8.4 	 1.75+ prime 
	 1.0 	 4.0 	 5.0 	 A new credit 
extended that is of 
free disposition 
for use in the 
fiscal budget.Over-
all term is the same 
as credit 2, but with 
extended grace period. 
The latter might be 
considered useful for 
a borrower with 
temporary cash flow 
problems. 
	
4. 1968 	 17.2 	 1.75+ prime 	 1.5 	 3.5 
	
5.0 	 Refinance of unpaid 
balances on credits 
2 and 3. Extended 
grace period again 
favourable to a 




	 15.4 	 1.75+ prime 
	 0.5 	 4.5 	 5.0 	 Restructured unpaid 
balance of credit 4. 
Note short grace 
period which requires 
more discipline from 
the borrower. 
Source: CEPAL on the basis of official data. 
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credit is reflective of the various problems that Peru had 
encountered with one or several official agencies during the 
1960s and early 1970s. 
b) 	 1971 - 1976  
Turning to the second period one finds the cost and 
maturities of refinance credits in line with the global 
averages. However, there was a higher than average frequency 
of flat fees and penalties on these loans and the rates 
employed also were higher than for all loans. The years in 
which refinance credits were most voluminous were 1974 and 
1976, incorporating 65% of all such authorizations. Actually, 
in the period the government pursued a vigorous strategy of 
continuous refinance, with motivations changing over time. 
In 1972, the government faced what it felt to be a 
continued debt service problem. Banks refinanced their 
obligations and obligations of other entities to the sum of 
roughly 150 million dollars, even though the balance of 
payments maybe could have supported regular repayments. The 
banks' receptiveness undoubtedly related in part to the 
growing talk of petroleum in Peru and the very aggressive 
behavior of some banks with regard to expansion into this 
market. Refinance also was attractive because, by virtue of 
it being an uncertain (and perhaps inexperienced) entity, the 
rate that Peru paid for such credit was 2.25% over LIBOR. 
This was very much higher than the cost of refinance in the 
1960s (1.75 over prime) and even higher than the average cost 
of all credit for that year (2.08 over LIBOR), not to mention 
the fact that other developing country borrowers had been 
paying considerably less for their commercial credit. 
In 1973 and 1974 the motivation for refinance clearly 
changed. Here the government, interested in accumulating 
resources for the development program, had also to be motivated 
by the generally easy access to bank credit and the 
remarkably more favorable lending terms of a borrower's market. 
By 1974 margins on credit for refinance of older debt had 
fallen to 1.19% over LIBOR and maturities reached 10 years. 
In an environment in which banks were eager to lend, Peru 
sought to repay its more expensive credit of 1972/1973 with 
the newer cheaper loans available to it in 1974. 
In 1975 and in 1976 refinance credits stemmed mainly 
from considerations of debt service. With the balance of 
payments faltering and service on accumulated debt mounting, 
the government needed assistance. In mid-1976 a historic 
arrangement was struck between the government and its 
commercial bank creditors. Peruvian officials, for political 
reasons, wished to eschew an IMF standby agreement and 
therefore approached commercial creditors for 400 million 
dollars in refinance credits, which for administrative reasons 
had the formal designation of balance of payments loans. As 
shown in earlier chapters the banks - for reasons that are 
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examined in Chapter X - agreed to refinance the government 
without the protection of an umbrella IMF accord. The 
finance secured was as follows: 
United States banks $210 million 
Canadian banks 
	 $ 30 million 
European banks 
	 $ 90 million 
Japanese banks 
	 $ 32 million 
Swiss banks 
	 $ 24 million 23111 
and corresponded roughly to the annual payments falling due 
to each group. 
As in the economic crisis of the 1960s the time and 
risk preferences of commercial banks dictated that the 
refinance loans be extended on very harsh terms. Maturities 
on all the loans were only 5 years with a very short 2-year 
grace period. The interest margin was a full 2.25% over 
LIBOR and front-end fees exceeded 1.5%. Moreover, there was a 
unique form of conditionality based on the performance of the 
government's economic program. Given the importance of this 
credit, and the unusual conditionality applied to it, special 
in-depth analysis of the whole operation is reserved for 
Chapter X. 
4. Other types of loans  
Loans solely for the purpose of importing goods and 
not covered by guarantees of a foreign export credit agency 
accounted for a very minor part of credit in both periods. 
Most unguaranteed finance for imports came via project lending 
which was indeed significant. The percentage of total lending 
for unguaranteed project finance rose from 5% to 15% between 
the two periods. (See again table 28). The rather sharp 
rise in the share of project loans is another manifestation 
of the profound changes in world banking in the 1970s. One 
must be concerned, however, by the fact that average 
maturities on project loans extended only 5.6 years in 1965-
1970 and 6.9 years in 1971-1976. In general, one would 
suspect that these short maturities scraped the bare minimum 
required for commercial ventures and were wholly inadequate 
for any investment of less than a commercial nature. 
The above leads to a natural interest in knowing 
precisely what projects were financed by the banks. However, 
the whole subject of project lending is so intimately linked 
to the development program of the country that no further 
analysis will be carried out here, reserving a detailed view 
for Chapter IX, which dedicates itself to the subject of 
project development. 
G. CURRENCIES OF COMMERCIAL BANK CREDITS 
As illustrated in the methodological appendix, all loans 
have been converted into M.S. dollars for the purpose of 
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generating comparable data. Nevertheless, as table 31 shows, 
dollars were almost exclusively the original currency of 
Peru's loans, accounting for 98% and 88% of authorizations 
in 1965-1970 and 1971-1976, respectively. This is not 
surprising in as much as Peru is in a dollar zone and, in 
any case, the U.S. dollar was the principal world reserve 
asset and therefore the currency most employed in international 
lending during these periods. Not until 1976 did the sharp 
falls in the value of the dollar cause currencies such as 
the yen and D-mark to take on importance as media for 
international bank loan transactions. For these reasons, data 
merely reveal Peruvian authorities preferences and common 
practices of the time with regard to choice of currency. 
H. WHERE COMMERCIAL BANKS BOOKED THEIR LOANS 
Commercial banks can book their loans in any number 
of locations. The headquarters of the commercial bank is one 
logical site, but banks also may place a loan transaction 
in any one of their branches and subsidiaries throughout the 
world. There are various motives for booking loans in 
entities other than the headquarters of the banks. Some 
banks have a rather decentralized network and a branch or 
subsidiary could simply have taken initiative on a loan and 
booked the transaction in its office. On the other hand, a 
parent may simply wants a loan to appear on the books of a 
subsidiary for reasons associated with marketing strategies, 
politics or convenience. But it has become most common for 
banks to book loans in certain entities abroad for tax 
purposes. 
Most international banks have established branches and 
subsidiaries in so-called offshore centers. 235/ Different 
centers serve different purposes. Some centers can prove 
attractive basically as a locus for interbank deposits and 
funding. London, the seat of the eurocurrency market is a 
case in point. Other centers can prove attractive because 
of their relative freedom from regulations, thus permitting 
banks to engage in activities that home government authorities 
restrict (e.g. German banks in Luxemburg). Other offshore 
centers, however, are unabashed tax havens where the main 
attractions for the banks are the absence of income taxes, the 
complete freedom to transfer funds according to the 
prerequisites of the bank, and a time zone which facilitates 
the global movement of funds around the clock. These centers 
serve as formal way-stations for bank assets and liabilities, 
but their branches and subsidiaries are often only shell 
offices with a name plate and post office box. Actual 
transactions are undertaken by headquarters and movement of 
funds into and out of the center is merely a bookkeeping event 
u0ertaken by headquarters. 
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Table 31 
PERU: CURRENCES OF COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS, 1965-1976a/ 
(Percentage of total) 
1965-1970 
	 1971-1976 
U.S. Dollars 	 98.1 
	 88.9 
D. Marks 	 1.4 
	 1.9 
Swiss France 	 0.1 	 0.4 
French Francs 
	 - 	 2.9 
Yen 	
- 	 0.5 
Pounds 
	
- 	 3.2 
Lira 	 0.4 	 - 
Guilders 
	
- 	 1.5 
Canadian Dollars 




Total 	 100.0 
	 100.0 
Source: CEPAL on the basis of official data. 
771i credits, guaranteed and unguaranteed. 
These tax havens car be used in various ways. One 
common way is to generate profits on foreign exchange 
transactions. 236/ Another type of transaction which is of 
more relevance to this study involves loans. The value of 
booking a loan in a tax haven depends to some extent on tax 
regulations of the home country of the parent bank. For 
instance, in the case of U.S. banks tax officials permit 
their banks to credit taxes paid on foreign income in excess 
of the U.S. rate of 48% to other foreign income taxed at 237/ 
lower rates than the U.S. rate. 
	 Thus, U.S. banks have 
an incentive to generate income in low tax areas an there is 
no better place to do so than in a tax haven. Two favorite 
tax havens of U.S. banks are the Cayman Islands and the 
Bahamas. Non-U.S. banks also operate out of these centers.238/ 
Table 32 breaks out areas where banks have booked their 
loans to Peru. 
As is seen, in the first period, headquarters was the 
source of an overwhelming number of loans to Peru. This is 
consistent with the circumstances in the period. First, loans 
to Peru were small in absolute terms and therefore could be 
funded easily out of domestic financial centers. And many 
banks would be inclined towards home country finance because 
often the cost of funds could be less than in an offshore 
center such as London. Second, medium term loans to developing 
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countries were not yet commonplace, so such transactions were 
of personal concern to top executives at headquarters. Third, 
in the 1960s expansion of branches and subsidiaries abroad 
for the purpose of building up an international loan portfolio 
was still at an early stage of development; moreover, bunks 
were just beginning to realize the tax advantages of oC -shore 
banking centers. 
Table 32 
PERU: WHERE COMMERCIAL BANKS BOOKED LOANS, 1965-1976a/ 
(Percentage of total lending) 
1965-1970 	 1971-1975 
Headquarters 	 95.1 	 46.9 
London 	 - 	 14.1 
Bahamas 	 - 	 17.4 
Panama 	 0.2 	 3.0 
Cayman Isles 	 - 	 2.1 
Paris 	 - 	 0.7 
New York 	 1.0 	 1.1 
Luxemburg 	 - 	 5.4 
Switzerland 	 - 	 0.3 
Other 	 - 	 0.9 
Unspecified b/ 	 3.6 	 8.1 
Total 	 100.0 	 100.0 
Source: CEPAL on the basis of official data. 
a/ All credits, guaranteed and unguaranteed. 
b/ Unable to determine where booked. 
The table shows a profund change in the booking of loans 
in 1971-1976. While headquarters remained the dominant station 
for loans, its share fell from 95% to 47%. Meanwhile, London 
rose in importance, as loans to developing countries became 
frequent enough to require the tapping of liquid dollar pools 
in the eurocurrency market. 239/ Meanwhile, tax havens like 
the Bahamas came into vogue among bankers. 
One may observe that bookings in the Bahamas are quite 
high at 17% of total authorizations, while Panama is quite 
low at 3%. This came as something of a surprise since it was 
thought that an established offshore center like Panama might 
be a major station for loans to a Latin American country such 
as Peru. This suggests that the two centers play distinct 
roles for international commercial banks. It also suggests 
that the Bahamas, a country that has attracted little study, 
may merit detailed analysis as a financial center. 
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I. SOVEREIGN =UNITY AND LEGAL JURISDICTION 
In this last section of the chapter, two legal aspects 
of commercial bank loans to Peru that have been a source of 
friction for developing country borrowers will be reviewed: 
waivers of sovereign immunity and local jurisdiction over 
credit agreements. 
Lending to governments obviously is different from 
lending to private entities. The differences are reflected 
in the fact that bankers see not only commercial risks in 
lending to governments, but also sovereign risks. Sovereign 
risks stem from three special privileges that governments 
enjoy: 
First, they may not be sued within their own courts 
or the courts of another country. There are some 
exceptions: in some countries,but as a general 
proposition, a government or its instrumentality has an 
immunity against service of legal process. Second, the 
courts of one country will not ordinarily sit in 
judgement as to the acts or omissions of another country 
ocurring within its own territory. Again, there are 
some exceptions, but as a general proposition, even if 
a government can be sued, it may successfully defend on 
the ground that the propriety of its acts or omissions 
in its own country is not open to question in any county. 
Third, property of a government or its instrumentality 
is immune. So even if a government consents to be sued, 
and even if a court pronounces judgement against it, the 
judgement may not be enforceable. 240/ 
While banks may make an excellent assessment of the 
economic and commercial risks associated with a government 
loan, the element of sovereign risk is a highly uncertain 
factor that is difficult to control. 
Bankers try to protect their loans as far as possible. 
They generally like to resolve repayment problems without 
recourse to legal measures, but in the event that this proves 
necessary, bankers want to ensure that a borrower cannot escape 
due process. Thus, banks usually seek disclaimers of 
sovereign immunity. This so-called waiver of sovereign 
immunity is generally considered to be an indispensible 
protective clause. 
On the other hand, developing country borrowers show 
their distaste for such waivers. Many governments find the 
clauses to be an affront to their national sovereignty and 
a limitation on their freedom of action. Nevertheless, 
bankers demands for this type of protection generally have 
prevailed and the waiver has become a standard clause in loan 
contracts. In the case of Peru, the clause was frequently 
observed in loan agreements throughout the 12 years of the 
study. Because of the many ways such a clause can be 
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incorporated into an agreement, it was difficult to 
systematically quantify the existance of waivers. But data 
in the study suggest that at least one half (and probably more) 
of the value of all credit in 1971-76 carried disclaimers of 
immunity. Peru was not alone in this case, as virtually all 
other developing country borrowers have had to submit to the 
same clause in order to secure commercial credit. 
Only recently have some borrowers openly defied banks' 
efforts to have them sign away their immunity to prosecution. 
However, success is far from generalized and the waiver 
remains the rule rather than the exception. One cannot help 
but wonder to what extent such clauses are a needless irritant 
to developing countries. In the event that an open 
confrontation arises over a loan, if a government does not 
have the political will to settle the disagreement, no court 
inside or outside the borrowing country can force it to submit 
to the views of the bank. In the last instance, repayment 
rests on the good will of the government to honor its 
obligations. Any clause that makes a government waive its 
right to sovereignty is really a form of false security for 
the bank that covers over the real underlying forces behind 
repayment. This fact is aside from the consideration that 
there is considerable doubt about whether any court would 
agree to hear a case involving a sovereign government. 241/ 
The subject of legal jurisdiction of a loan agreement 
is not unrelated to the issue of sovereign immunity. It also 
is a focal point of disputes between the borrow and the 
lender. 
Bankers, of course, prefer to have the legal jurisdiction 
over the loan contract in their home country or some other 
industrialized state. Thus, if a dispute is taken to court 
a bank can enjoy the familiarity of its country's legal 
environment. Sovereign governments, however, are usually 
loath to the idea of submitting to the courts of a foreign 
entity, for reasons which are obvious. Here again banks have 
prevailed in as much as it is almost a rule of thumb that an 
industrialized country, and particularly the home country of 
the lender or lead bank, be the legal site for adjudication. 242/ 
In the case of Peru, it is illegal for the government 
to submit to foreign courts. This is because Article 17 of 
Peru's 1933 Constitution states that all contracts between 
the state and foreign entities must be under Peruvian legal 
jurisdiction. 243/ However, in almost all the loan 
agreements with Peru in 1965-1976, the banks were able to 
insert clauses establishing the legal jurisdiction in their 
home country. To take into account Article 17, the 
jurisdictional statement is usually followed by a sentence 
such as this: "Only to the extent required by Article 17 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Peru will the banks submit 
to the laws and courts of Peru". 
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The last hedge by the banks, which appears to be 
obligatory for a legal contract, would seem to imply that 
Peru could be the ultimate jurisdictional setting for any 
dispute. But if this is so, why do the banks insist on 
establishing their home country as the juridical site? 
Again this type of clause would appear to serve more as a 
needless affront to the government than a real form of 
security to the banks. Also it probably would lead to 
confusion should a legal dispute actually arise. 
The whole issue of legal jurisdiction is worth 
reconsideration. After all the jurisdictional clause is of 
little use if a borrower really wishes to take an independent 
position on a dispute. Moreover, banks, being transnational, 
would appear to be in a much better position to adapt 
themselves to the legal environment of the borrowing country 
than vice-versa. And if a borrower should feel so strong 
about its position so as to distort the national juridical 
process in order to gain a favorable decision, it also is 
unlikely that it would accept a negative judgement from the 
courts of a foreign country. In the end it is the good faith 
of the government that secures a loan, so demanding legal 
jurisdiction that is alien to the borrower only may serve as 
ephemeral protection to the bank, and as lasting indignation, 
to the borrower. 
Despite the fact that there are serious reasons to 
question the utility of waivers of sovereign immunity and 
jurisdiction, one must appreciate the psychological comfort 
such clauses provide risk conscious bankers. If they were 
unable to have this security, bankers might become reticent 
to lend at all. Thus, it seems prudent to seek a compromise. 
Why not substitute the two clauses for some form of 
international arbitration should disputes arise? Indeed, a 
few European banks have adopted this measure and it might be 
worthwhile for other international banks to follow this 
practice as well. 
SUMMARY 
The preceeding analysis has graphically documented the 
substantial changes in the characteristics of commercial bank 
loans over the period 1965-1976. Not only was there a 
dramatic increase in the number of commercial creditors, but 
the terms of lending, types of loans and mechanisms for 
finance also underwent a marked transformation. The next 
chapter will focus on a specific aspect of this transformation: 




SYNDICATED CREDITS TO PERU 
Chapter V offered some brief analysis of the 
characteristics of syndicated loans during the 1970s. Given 
the importance of these credits - they accounted for nearly 
80 per cent of all bank finance to Peru in 1971-1976 - and 
their rather complicated structure, special attention is 
devoted to them here. The basic purpose of analysis is to 
go beyond the ordinary presentation of the syndicated loans 
and penetrate the credit as far as data permit in order to 
gain a more organic view of its properties. To achieve this 
the syndicated loan will be alternatively analysed from the 
angle of the lenders and the borrower. 
In the 1960s most commercial bank loans in the 
eurocurrency market pertained to individual banks and the 
amount of credit on any one transaction rarely exceeded 15 
million dollars. However, as demonstrated previously, in the 
case of Peru, when lending from home markets some banks had 
found advantages in joining together in multi-institutional 
agreements: more credit could extended to the borrower at 
less risk to the individual banks; there was one umbrella 
agreement for all parti'ipating institutions; greater 
leverage over the borrower, etc. In 1968 Bankers Trust 
extended the concept to the international market where it 
arranged a 100 million dollar euro-syndicated credit for the 
government of Austria. 244/ Then in 1970 Manufacturers 
Hanover headed a 200 million dollar syndicated credit to the 
government of Italy. This loan had all the trappings that 
have become associated with syndicated credits; a 5 year 
medium term maturity, a 0:75% per cent spread over LIBOR, 
and front-end fees of 0.5 per cent.245/ 
The 1970s saw the syndicated credit evolve into the 
dominant mechanism for the extension of international credit. 
As ever more banks forgedahead with the development of 
international portfolios, the magnitude of eurocredits 
exploded. It has been estimated that in the first half of 
the 1970s roughly 25 per cent of the value of funds provided 
in syndication was in the form of transactions of 500 million 
dollars or more. 246/  
As noted earlier, syndicated credits are arranged 
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by a lead bank which takes responsibility for negotiating 
with the borrower over the terms and conditions of a credit. 
Once an amount of credit is established and the lead bank 
feels that it has negotiated terms that are attractive enough 
to form a syndicate, it seeks bids from other banks to join 
in the operation. In order to inform banks - especially 
small-and medium-sized institutions with limited ability to 
assess international debtors - of the borrower's 
creditworthiness, the lead bank prepares a placement memorandum 
which details the borrower's creditworthiness, and the general 
terms and conditions of the loan. 
In order to facilitate the formation of a syndicate, 
the lead bank often offers some prospective participants the 
role of co-manager in the syndicate. This provides the 
prospective lenders greater incentive to join the operation 
and increase the value of their participation; not only is 
their voice in negotiations increased, but they gain 
publicity as an organizer of the credit; and, most importantly, 
they enjoy a share of the fees that, as shown in the previous 
chapter, have become common to the commercial loans of the 
1970s. The lead bank also might offer a share of the fees 
to ordinary participants. 
The monetary participation of the lead bank and other 
managers in the syndicated credit will vary according to the 
management style of the banks and the market's response to 
the offer of syndication. If the loan is over-subscribed, the 
lead bank and managers can reduce their participation in the 
credit to a minimum, if desired, leaving income generation 
basically to the risk free front-end fees that accompany the 
credit. On the other hand, if the syndication bid is 
undersubscribed, the lead bank and other managers must fill 
in the gap with a higher participation then originally 
anticipated, or declare the syndicate unrealizable, at least 
under the originally agreed terms and conditions. 247/ In a 
borrower's market such as that of the first half of the 1970s, 
the lead bank and managers might very well decide to increase 
their participation above the level originally planned in 
order to avoid the embarassment of a failure to organize a 
credit. Then the banks could contemplate selling their 
unwanted participation on secondary markets at a later date. 
However, this latter strategy, which is not infrequent, 
requires a lead bank to be of some size; a small bank would 
not be in a position to fill substancial gaps in sydication. 
The whole process of organization of a credit may 
require up to 3 months for a borrower of low status in 
international markets and as little as four weeks for a well 
known first-rate client. The sequence of events in the 
formation of a syndicated loan is described in table 14 of 
the statistical appendix. 248/ 
Once the agreement has been signed, it is the role of 
the agent bank to administer and enforce the contract. While 
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in theory the agent can be anyone of the banks in the 
syndicate, in practice the role usually has been assumed by 
the principal lead bank, thereby giving it rights to the 
special administrative fees. 249/ 
Finally, before entering into the specific case of 
Peru, it is important to re-emphasize that the syndicated 
credit was a key ingredient in the massive 
"transnationalization" of world banking in the Seventies. 
The mechanism of syndication facilitated the entry of many 
new banks that otherwise might have stayed away from 
international finance, and it gave incentive to big 
international banks to extend the scope of their lending 
activities. 
For small-and medium-sized banks that had little 
experience in international lending, the syndicate allowed 
them to extend foreign credit in amounts commensurate to their 
size and risk preference, e.g., as little as between 500 
thousand and a million dollars could be an acceptable 
contribution to a syndicated credit. These banks also could 
enjoy the security and prestige of lending side-by-side with 
the giant world banks that organize the syndicates and assume 
responsibility for evaluating the creditworthiness of the 
borrower. Moreover, the small/medium sized banks could gain 
international renown as they would appear in the one page 
advertisements ("tombstones") that are placed in financial 
media to publicize new syndicated loans. 250/ 
From the standpoint of large international banks, the 
organization of a syndicate provided them with an opportunity 
to appear to be satisfying their clients' financial needs, 
all while minimizing their individual credit risk. These 
banks also could gain the prestige and extra fee income 
generated by forming a syndicate. For a large bank that 
wanted to become a major international bank, organization of 
a syndicate was a particularly effective way to rise from 
obsecurity to international renown in a relatively short time. 
Thus, it is clear that the syndicated credit was 
attractive to banks of all sizes and made lending in 
international markets appear less uncertain. Also, by 
facilitating new entrants to international finance, it 
created an intense competitive environment in the first half 
of the Seventies that caused banks to begin lending to 
developing countries and also caused the terms of credit to 
improve markedly from the standpoint of the borrower. 
A. THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SYNDICATED LOANS TO PERU 
As evident from the previous chapter, syndicated loans 
appeared simultaneously with the process of general penetration 
of the Peruvian market by international commercial banks in 
1971/1972. The basic characteristics of syndicated credits 
appear in table 33. 
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As may be appreciated, the average size of syndicated 
credits for the period 1971-1976 amounted to 41 million 
dollars.251/ This contrasts with an average size of 5 million 
dollars on single bank loans in the same period. The average 
number of banks in each syndicated credit reached 15 and the 
average participation totaled only 2.8 million dollars. This 
latter figure is very illustrative of how banks minimized 
their individual risk on large transactions. Concerning the 
average size of the banks - weighted by the value of their 
participation - involved in syndication, it was rather large; 
the average size based on assets was equivalent to 27 on a 
world ranking of 1-300. 
Table 33 shows that 46 individual banks at least once 
played the role of agent or manager in a syndicated credit.252/ 
However, assuming the agent to be the principal lead 
bank in syndication, the role of organizer of these loans 
fell into the hands of only 22 banks, or a mere 13% of the 
institutions in the study. This has implications which will 
be dealt with in the chapter's subsection on lead banks. 
As for the size of the lead banks, they tended to be 
very large institutions. The average international rank of 
the agents was 18, while it was 15 for the managers. This 
would support a priori notions that a successful lead bank 
must generally enjoy the prestige and the broad international 
contacts that only large banks display. 
The agent and manager jointly accounted for slightly 
more than one-third of the credit in syndicated loans. 
Notably, the agent alone accounted for somewhat more than 
one-sixth of the credit. Managers, of which there may have 
been several in any one credit, accounted for 18% of the 
value of syndicated loans. Given many more managers than 
agents in transactions, each individual agent, (or principal 
lead bank), on average, obviously carried a relatively greater 
burden of loan commitment. 
With regard to the participating banks, 155 
institutions joined in a syndicated credit at least once. As 
would be expected, their average size is much smaller than 
the lead banks, equivalent to 41 on the scale of world 
rankings. And they accounted for the bulk of credit, bearing 
65% of the total value of syndicated loans. 
B. COST COMPARISONS BETWEEN SYNDICATED AND 
NON-SYNDICATED CREDIT 
For a borrower, syndicated credits clearly have an 
advantage over single bank loans with respect to the amount 
of resources that can be mobilized in any one transaction. 
Nevertheless, the question remains: how do syndicated credits 
compare with single bank credits in terms of cost? This can 
be determined by viewing the average terms on each type of 
credit presented in table 34. 
130 
Table 33 
PERU: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SYNDICATED LOANS, 1971-1976a/ 
1. GENERAL 
a) Percent of all credit mobilized via syndication 78.7 
b) Average size of syndicated credits (millions 
of dollars) 
	 41.2 
c) Average number of banks per syndicated credit 
	 15 
d) Average size of the banks (assets, equivalent 
international rank) b/ 
	 27 
e) Average participation of the banks (millions 
of dollars) 
	 2.8 
2. LEAD BANKS 
a) Number of banks acting as lead banks c/ 
	 46 
(- as agent) 	 (22) 
(- as managers) 
	 (35) 
b) Average size of lead banks (equivalent 
international rank) b/ 
	 17 
(of agent) 	 (18) 
(of managers) 
	 (15) 
c) Percent of syndicated credit extended by 
the lead banks 
	 35.1 
(by agent) 	 (16.8) 
(by managers) 
	 (18.3) 
3. PARTICIPATING BANKS 
a) Number of banks acting as participants in 
syndication 1 
	 155 
b) Average size of participating banks 
(equivalent international rank) b/ 
	 41 
c) Percent of syndicated credit extended by the 
participants 
	 64.9 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
a/ All syndicated credits. 
b/ On a scale of 1-300. See footnote c/ of table 20. 
c/ Each bank has been counted only once for each category of 
agent, manager, or participant. Also, a manager that acted 
as an agent for a syndicated credit has been counted only 
as an agent. Since a bank appearing in several credits 
could alternatively be a manager, agent, or participant, 
the total number of banks in the various categories 
exceeds the number of institutions in the study. 
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Table 34 
PERU: COMPARISON OF AVERAGE TERMS BETWEEN SYNDICATED 
CREDITS AND LOANS ADVANCED BY A SINGLE BANK a/ 
(Averages) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
1. Average spread over LIBOR (%) 
Syndicates 2.08 1.68 1.13 1.79 2.19 
Single credits 2.01 1.61 1.15 1.72 1.96 
2. Maturity (years) 
Syndicates 6.26 8.79 9.57 5.64 5.0 
Single credits 6.0 8.13 8.68 6.37 3.24 
3. Flat fees (%) 
Syndicates 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.95 1.42 
Single credits - 0.076 0.073 0.363 0.305 
4. Prepayment fees (%) 
Syndicates - 1.43 0.71 0.91 1.49 
Single credits 0.50 0.76 0.73 - 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
777erages are weighted by the amount authorized. Only 
for credits without guarantees of export credit agencies. 
The table reveals that syndicated credits generally 
has slightly higher LIBOR spreads, somewhat longer maturities 
and significantly higher fees and prepayment penalties 
compared with single bank loans. These differences are more 
or less what one would expect and reflect the different 
nature of the two credits. 
A syndicated credit is a rather impersonal transaction, 
as opposed to the very personal nature of a single bank loan. 
Thus in order to ensure that a syndicate is realized, a lead 
bank must sometimes place interest spreads at a level high 
enough to attract marginal participants who have little to 
gain from the transaction save income. This situation also 
explains the relatively higher fees/penalties on syndicated 
loans. In contrast, in a single bank loan the lender may 
have motivations that extend beyond income on the specific 
transaction e.g., image-making, support of a home country 
foreign supplier, etc. Also, fees can be lower because they 
do not have to be split among a number of institutions, as is 
the case of a syndicated loan. 
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Aside from a slightly higher interest rate and higher 
fees, the longer maturity on syndicated credits also probably 
is influenced by the nature of the two types of loans. In a 
single bank loan the lender cannot share the risk as it would 
do in the case of a syndicated credit. Also, a single bank 
credit can involve a commitment that is large relative to 
a commitment on a syndicated loan. (The average participation 
in a syndicate was 2.8 million dollars, while that for a 
single bank loan was 5 million dollars.) For a given 
interest rate, all this would incline single lenders towards 
shorter maturities than available on a syndicated credit. 
The generally more favorable interest rate, fees and 
penalties on a single bank loans might suggest a strategy 
designed to induce more banks to lend on their own. However, 
in the end syndicated credits would appear to offer more 
advantages to the borrower. The longer maturity on these 
transactions are very important to developing countries and 
could offset equally or more the disadvantages related to 
interest margins or fees. Moreover, syndicated loans - by 
virtue of their large size - probably are less taxing to the 
limited negotiating capacity of many borrowers and certainly 
present less of an administrative burden than the hundreds 
of individual credit agreements needed to substitute 
syndicated credit flows. 
C. THE LEADERS OF SYNDICATED CREDITS 
The key personality in a syndicated credit for a 
borrower is the lead bank. Its good will is rather important 
to the borrower's success in maintaining a link to 
international capital markets. The drawing power of a lead 
bank can determine the costs and conditions of credit. 
Moreover, the market's interpretation of the borrower can be 
influenced by the evaluation of the country that is commonly 
found in the placement memorandum prepared by the lead bank. 
Also, the lead bank most often administers a signed credit 
and thus is the institution with which the borrower must 
deal in the event of problems during the life of a loan 
agreement. 
Thus the lead bank adds another dimension to the role 
of commercial lending institutions in the Peruvian economy. 
It has been shown that some banks are important creditors to 
Peru. However, it is now clear that a bank may be even more 
important - without having lent to the government at all -
merely by acting as a major lead institution in syndication. 
As it turns out, however, many of Peru's important lenders 
also are important lead banks, making their leverage over the 
Peruvian economy that much more pronounced. 
A syndicated credit formally can have a number of lead 
banks. However, many managers in a syndicate often are 
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institutions with a secondary role in the organization of a 
credit and sometimes they are designated as a manager 
simply as an inducement to provide a larger participation. 
(A manager benefits from fees and publicity.) In those cases 
in which there is more than one managing bank in a credit, 
the principal lead bank usually is the manager that also is 
designated as the agent.253/ Thus, Table 35 presents Peru's 
principal lead banks under the assumption that they are the 
banks which have been agents of the syndicated loans. 254/ 
The banks are ranked as leaders of major, intermediate and 
minor importance according to the percentage of the total 
value of the syndicated loans mobilized by them. The table 
also shows the average participation of the lead bank in 
its own syndicates and the bank's position with respect to 
the top lead banks in world credit markets. 
Peru's top lead banks are Citicorp and Wells Fargo, 
both of which were classified in the previous chapter as 
major lenders to the government. By virtue of their top 
positions as lenders and mobilizers of credit on international 
credit markets for the government, these two banks stand out 
for their importance to Peru. 
Considerably behind Citicorp and Wells Fargo as lead 
banks to Peru are Manufacturers Hanover, Dresdner Bank and 
Bank of Tokyo. All three fall into an intermediate level of 
importance as mobilizers of credit. As lenders, the first 
bank was classified as a major institution in Chapter V, while 
the latter two were classified as of intermediate importance. 
One also finds a number of banks classified as minor 
mobilizers of international credit. Of this group, most were 
classified as lenders of intermediate importance to Peru. 
Chase Manhattan was, however, a major lender. 
Looking at the international rankings in the same 
table, one notes the direct relation between a bank's position 
as lead bank for Peru and its position in world markets 
vis-a-vis major world lead banks in 1975 and 1976. Citicorp 
was not only a top lead bank for Peru, but also for the world 
market. Wells Fargo also figured as a major world lead bank, 
but it rested far below Citicorp. Thus its role as a lead 
bank for Peru was more than proportional to its position on a 
world scale, suggesting special behavior with respect to this 
country. As will be demonstrated throughout the course of the 
study, this is just one of many indicators of a special 
relationship between Wells Fargo and Peru. 
With the exception of the Bank of Tokyo, lead banks 
of intermediate importance to Peru also were important lead 
banks on world markets. Among minor lead banks for Peru, four 
occupied the position of top lead banks in world syndication. 
Chase Manhattan stands out in this regard; it was a principal 
lead bank in world syndication, but only a minor lead bank 
for Peru. However, one should remember that Chase was the 
lead institution on the 200 million dollar syndicated credit 
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Table 35 
PERU: LEAD BALES GROUPED ACCORDING TO THEIR IMPORTANCE AS MOBILIZERS 
OF CREDIT, 1971-1976a/ 
Amount mobilized by bank 	 Percent participation 
as a percent of the total 
	 of bank in its own 
value of all syndicates b/ 
	 syndicates (average) 
International rank 
as lead bank in 
1975c/ 1976d/ 
Major agents 
1. 	 19 - 24 
Citicorp 10.7 1 1 
Wells Fargo 12.8 8 18 
2. 	 14 - 18.9 
Intermediate agents 
3. 	 9.0 - 	 13.9 
Manufacturers Hanover 23.6 6 7 
Dresdner Bank 16.4 5 4. 5 - 8.9 
Bank of Tokyo 15.5 
Minor agents 
5 
Chase Manhattan 74.0 4 3 
Bank of Nova Scotia 33.3 
Bankers Trust 33.3 8 
Banca Commerciale Italiana 50.0 
Morgan Guaranty Trust 11.8 3 4 
Crocker National Bank 10.0 
Lloyds Bank 40.0 10 
Swiss Bank Corporation 28.2 
National and Commercial 
Banking Group 17.3 
Credit Lyonnais 50.0 5 9 
Banque de L'Indochine et Suez 25.0 
Algemene Bank Nederland 50.0 
American Express 
International 20.0 
Compagnie Financiere de 
Paris et des Pays-Bas 50.0 
European American 
Bancorporation 10.0 
First Chicago Corporation 8.3 12 21 
Western American Bank Ltd. 16.3 
Source: CEPAL, on the IDEpeii of official data; ranking of lead bank is 
as follows: 
1975, the International Herald Tribune, November 1976; 
1976, Euromoney (April 1978). 
a/ All syndicated credits. Lead bank assumed to be the agent bank of 
each loan. 
b/ Total value of syndicatw5 for which the bank was agent divided by the 
total value of all syndicates to Peru. 
c/ Rank within the top 15 lead banks in world syndication. 
d/ Rank within the top 21 lead banks in world syndication. 
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for the privately-sponsored Cuajone copper mine, which does 
not figure in the data base of the study. If this credit 
were taken into account, Chase could then be considered a 
major lead bank of the country as well. It also is worthwhile 
to point that Lloyds Bank acted as a leader on a 23.5 million 
dollar credit to Cuajone. 
The last and most important conclusion about the major 
lead banks is that a relatively few of them were responsible 
for a disproportionate amount of mobilized credit. The five 
top lead banks accounted for more than three-quarters of the 
total value of mobilized credit. This makes for impressive 
dependence on a few key institutions for access to 
international capital and heavily conditions the earlier 
finding of Chapter V that showed a much greater degree of 
dispersion in the sources of funding in the 1970s as 
compared to the heavily concentrated sources of commercial 
funding of the 1960s. Indeed, while the concentration of 
commercial lenders fell dramatically in the Seventies, it was 
a manifestation of the increased possibilities for 
international lending that emerged because of the syndicated 
credit. And syndicated credits brought a new form of 
concentration of economic power, as evident by the handful of 
banks responsible for organizing Peru's international loans. 
This concentration of power, incidentally, also is present in 
international markets where a coterie of large banks dominate 
the mobilization of syndicated credit.255/ 
1. Lead banks grouped according to country of origin  
Table 36 breaks down agent and manager banks according 
to their country of origin. The number of lead banks for 
each country, the percentage of credit mobilized by each 
country group and the percentage of participation in syndication 
also is presented. 
It is evident that the dominant lead banks, both in 
terms of their number and the value of the mobilization of 
credit are U.S. institutions. No other country group approaches 
the U.S. in terms of its role in mobilizing international 
credit. The previous chapter demonstrated that U.S. banks 
were still dominant as lenders to the government, 
notwithstanding the notable dispersion in the geographical 
sources of funding in the period 1971-1976. However, it 
would appear from an examination of tables 20 and 36 that this 
dominance is even more important from the standpoint of 
leading syndicated credits. Moreover, if leadership is 
defined as being the agent bank - which usually is the lead 
bank - than the dependence on U.S. institutions is rather 
extraordinary, both from the standpoint of the number of 
lead institutions and the total value of their mobilizations. 
Thus another example of how an examination of the absolute 
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Table 36 
PERU: LEAD BANKS GROUPED ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1971-1976a/ 
Country of 
NO of lead 
banks b/ 
Percent of all syndicated Percent participation 
credit mobilized by 	 of leaders in their 
lead banks c/ 	 syndicated credit 
  












United States 14 9 13 76.0 68.8 29.1 27.2 15.3 34.9 
Japan 6 1 5 15.0 7.5 11.7 15.9 15.5 10.5 
Canada 5 1  5 18.6 1.7 16.9 16.7 33.3 15.0 
United Kingdom 3 2 2 14.9 1.0 13.9 10.1 23.7 9.1 
Germany 2 1 1 13.1 13.1 1.4 20.9 16.4 41.6 
France 3 3 1 6.4 1.2 5.2 13.3 42.7 6.6 
Italy 2 1 1 6.8 0.3 6.5 9.3 50.0 7.1 
Switzerland 2 1 1 4.4 2.7 1.7 22.4 28.2 13.3 
Other 3 1 2 13.3 1.1 12.1 7.5 50.0 3.5 
Consortium 6 2 4 12.3 0.8 11.6 8.9 12.8 8.6 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
7-----A71 syndicated credits. 
b/ A single bank is counted only once in the agent and in the manager columns. The 
total excludes repetition of a bank so that it can be less than the sum of the agent 3 
and manager columns. 
c/ Since several banks can appear in the same syndicate as managers along with an agent, 
there is double counting of mobilized credit. Therefore, the sum of all mobilization 
of all countries exceeds 100 percent of the total value of mobilized credit. 
d/ An agent that also acted as manager in a syndicate has been only counted as an 
agent. Percentage sums to less titan 100 because one syndicate did not have a 
formally designated agent. 
level of authorizations of individual banks seriously can 
understate the degree of dependence of the government on 
certain types of commercial institutions. 
2. Lead Banks Grouped According to Size  
A good deal of prestige and financial power could be 
an expected characteristic of lead banks. Table 37, which 
distributes lead banks according to size, confirms this with 
regard to Peru. Most lead banks, both in terms of their 
number and the total value of mobilized credit, ranked in the 
top 91 of world banking. Banks of smaller size were not of 
great significance as leaders in syndication, especially if 
leaders are viewed as the agent bank. 
Interestingly, the concentration of leaders in the 
largest banks would have been even greater if Wells Fargo had 
not played such an important role for Peru in this regard. 
As a 1LS. regional bank ranked as 69 (on a world scale in 
1975), Wells Fargo gave group 3 of banks a high profile in the 
total spectrum. 
3. Affinity Groups Among Lead Banks and Participants  
in Syndication  
It is interesting to consider the manner in which lead 
banks organized credits for Peru. One might suspect that 
lead institutions are more familiar with some banks than 
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Bankers Trust 
C.I.T. Financial Corp. 
Algemene Bank Nederland 
Amro Bank 
Bank of Tokyo  
Banque Commerciale Pour 
L'Europe Du Nord 
Tokai Bank 




Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank 
Kyowa Bank 
Nippon Credit Bank 




Hokkaido Takushoku Bank 
Industrial Bank of Japan 




100 	 bank of America 
100 	 Chase Manhattan Bank 
100 	 Bankers Trust 
100 	 Continental Illinois 
100 	 Manufacturers Hanover 
100 	 Philadelphia National Corp. 
100 	 Morgan Guaranty 
100 	 Wells Fargo 
100 	 Chemical Bank 






















Name of banks 
	
, 	 Frequency 
	
CountrylV 	 of partic 
ipation- 
(70 
Name of banks Country 
     
Wells Fargo (continued) 
Bank of Tokyo 
Midland Bank Group 
Associated Japanese Bank 
Tokai Bank 
Commerce Union Bank 
Kyowa Bank Limited 
First Pennsylvania Corp. 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank 
United International Bank 
Yasuda Trust and Banking 
American Express 
Banco do Brasil 




Swiss Bank Corporation 	 Switzerland 
100 	 Swiss Credit Corporation 	 Switzerland 	 33 
100 	 Union Bank of Switzerland 	 Switzerland 	 33 
100 	 Swiss Volksbank 	 Switzerland 	 33 
50 Manufacturers Hanover 	 United States 33 
67 	 Citicorp 	 United States 	 33 
67 	 Bankers Trust 	 United States 	 33 
67 	 Charter N.Y. Corporation 	 United States 	 33 
100 	 Royal Bank of Canada 	 Canada 	 33 
67 	 Wells Fargo 	 United States 	 50 
50 
66 
50 	 Banda Nazionale del Lavoro 	 Italy 	 50 
50 	 Toronto Dominion Bank 	
c 
50 	 Banda Commerciale Italiana 	 Italy 
100 	 Bayerishe Hypotheken and 
Wechselbank 	 Germany 
50 	 Banque Nationale de Paris 	 France 
50 	 Banco de Santander 	 Spain 
50 	 Banque de la Societe 
Financiere Europeene 
50 	 Deutsche Bank 	 Germany 
Credit Lyonnais 	 France 
100 	 Banco Commerciale Italians 	 Italy 
Wells Fargo 	 United States 
50 	 Western Bancorporation 	 United States 
66 	 Sanaa Commerciale Italiana 	 Italy 
33 	 Royal Bank of Canada 	 Canada 
66 	 Toronto Dominion Bank 	 Canada 
50 	 Lloyds Bank 	 United Kingdom 
50 	 Marine Midland Bank 	 United States 
50 	 Bancal Tristate 	 United States 
50 	 Long Term Credit Bank 	 Japan 
50 	 Banque Europeene de Tokyo 	 C 
83 	 Banque Commerciale Pour 
L'Europe Du Nord 	 Soviet Union 
33 	 Industrial National Corp. 	 United States 




50 	 C.I.T. Financial Corp. 	 United States 
66 	 Atlantic International Bank 	 C 
50 	 Canadian Imperial Bank 	 Canada 
50 	 Fidelcor 	 Unitea States 
66 	 Fuji Bank 	 Japan 
33 	 Italian International Bank 	 C 
50 	 Mitsui Bank 	 Japan 
33 	 Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Japan 
66 	 Sanwa Bank 
	
Japan 
66 	 Banco de Santander 	 Spain 
50 
	
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank 	 Japan 
33 	 Seafirst Corporation 	 United States 


















































Source:  ECLA, on the basis of official data 
a/ Agents are assumed to be lead banks of syndication. They were matched with banks that appeared more than one 
time with the agent in a syndicated credit. The frequency of appearance is merely the number of times a bank 
accompanied the agent in syndication divided by the number of syndicates headed by the agents. Results must 
be treated as tentative since the actual number of syndicates headed by each agent was relatively small. 
b/ The symbol C for the country of a bank indicates a consortium bank. 
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each leader. The identification of such groups around the 
experience of one borrower has its limitations. Not only are 
the number of observations for each lead bank limited, but a 
one country case can sustain only forced generalizations. 
Nevertheless, establishment of affinity groups is suggestive 
of the way certain lead banks operate on international 
capital markets. 
Table 38 presents data on the banks that participated 
more than once in syndicated credits arranged by Peru's lead 
(agent) banks. It also shows the frequency of participation, 
i.e., the number of appearances of participant divided by the 
number of syndicated credits arranged by the lead bank. A 
frequency of 50% or more is suggestive of a "working 
relationship" between the lead bank and certain participants. 
Three big New York money center banks in the table -
Manufacturers Hanover, Bankers Trust, Citicorp - display 
relatively few working relationships. This is undoubtedly a 
function of their enourmous drawing power in international 
markets which renders the development of many working 
relationships unnecessary for the successful formation of 
syndicates. However, it is noteworthy that many of the 
working relationships that they had were with other big 
New York banks, or other U.S. institutions such as Continental 
Illinois and First Chicago that fall into the big money center 
bank category and have much experience as international lenders. 
This is not surprising because U.S. money center banks have 
a tradition of strong operational links; recent U.S. government 
studies have shown these institutions to be closely connected 
through interlocking directorates and ownership of each other's 
stock.256/ 
Wells Fargo's affinity group illustrates how a smaller 
regional bank managed to become a major lead bank for Peru. 
Not having the drawing power of big money center banks, Wells 
Fargo had to develop a much wider array of working 
relationships to ensure syndication. Notably, the degree of 
geographic dispersion of these relationships is large with 
respect to the other big lead banks and there is an obvious 
attention to exploiting the special links between the U.S.'s 
West Coast and Japan. Another feature of Wells Fargo's 
affinity group is that like Wells Fargo, many of the banks 
were relative newcomers to the international scene in the 
first half of the 1970s. (In Chapter VII one will find that 
most of the affinity group also was willing to join Wells 
Fargo in undercutting market prices for loans to Peru.) In 
sum, it appears that in order to succeed as a lead bank, 
Wells Fargo had to "try harder" through innovation and the 
development of commercial relationships with a far reaching 
number of banks. 
The Bank of Tokyo - at the time a newcomer and not a 
giant in the world organization of syndicates - also appears 
to have relied relatively more on working relationships to 
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form syndicates. Moreover, its relationships were clannish 
in comparison with Wells Fargo as almost all the institutions 
are of Japanese origin. 
Finally, the Swiss Bank Corporation maintained a very 
strong working relationship with a few banks of the same 
national origin and Dresdner Bank -a giant in syndication-
showed a fair number of working relationships of relative 
international character. 
D. THE RELATIVE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF SYNDICATES 
In this last section on the syndicated credit, analysis 
will focus on the geographic character of the loan. Syndication 
of loans is symbolic of the internationalization of 
commercial bank activities. It might be asked how 
international are the syndicates? Table 39 shows, for the 
period 1972-1976, the percentage value of syndicated credit 
coming from banks of a country origin distinct from that of 
the lead bank. It is evident that in 1972-1975 between 40% 
and 50% of the syndicated credit came from "international" 
sources, giving loans a reasonably transnational flavor. 
Table 39 
PERU: RELATIVE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF SYNDICATED 
LOANS, 1972 - 1976 a/ 
(Averages) b/ 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Percentage value of 
syndicated credit 
derived from banks 
of a country origin 
distinct from that of 
the lead bank 	 50.2 46.9 42.3 49.5 17.3 
Source: CEPAL on the basis of official data. 
771 syndicated credits, guaranteed and 
unguaranteed. 
b/ Weighted by the value of the loans. 
However, in 1976 loans had little international character. 
The year 1976 was a special situation and reflects 
events when a country is on the verge of losing its 
creditworthiness (from the viewpoint of the banks). As noted 
in earlier chapters, this year Peru sought large refinance 
credits to stem the deterioration of its balance of payments 
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and meet debt service obligations. Given that the request 
was under conditions of economic duress, lead banks did not 
compete for the business; rather banks perceived the 
transaction as a bail out of the external accounts and therefore 
creditors organized a Steering Committes and banded together 
in national groups, - U.S., Canada, Japan, etc. - to form 
coordinated syndicates with roughly 400 million dollars in 
rescue finance.257/ As demonstrated in Chapter V, the terms 
and conditions of the credit were identical for all national 
groups, a further indication of the absence of competition in 
syndication. Research also revealed verbatim formulation of 
many clauses in the various loan agreements of the national 
groups. 
Thus, there is evidence to suggest that syndicates do 
enjoy a relative degree of international character when 
banks are actively competing for a client's business. But 
once a borrower loses, or is on the verge of losing, its 
creditworthiness, commercial banks appear to revert to a more 
clannish, or even collusive, behaviour. In the case of Peru, 
national groups were formed and committees coordinated 
negotiations in order to avoid individual and collective 
loses. Terms and conditions where identical within and among 
country groups. This collusive arrangement undoubtedly 
facilitated coordination among bankers in the development of 
a mutually acceptable agreement. The fact remains, however, 
that the competitive advantages of syndication were lost to 
the borrower when it could not maintain the confidence of its 
lead banks and other private creditors; indeed, the borrower 
had to negotiate against an enormous block of international 
banks which assumed a united position on the amounts, terms 
and conditions of credit.258/ Moreover, as will be shown 
later in the study, in this non-competitive environment 




THE DIFIWRENTIAL BEHAVIOR OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 
One of the conclusions that may be drawn form earlier 
analysis of bank lending to Peru is that behavior has not 
been homogeneous. It has become evident that some banks have 
lent considerably more resources to the government of Peru than 
others. It also has been seen that a bank's importance cannot 
be determined just by its level of authorizations; in the age 
of syndication certain basks play important roles as leaders 
which mobilize resources 
	 international capital markets. 
Moreover, lead banks have displayed different strategies with 
regard to the organization: of syndicated loans. 
Likewise, when barks are examined from the standpoint 
of national origin, there are perceived differences in 
behavior. In the case of Peru, U.S. banks have been the 
overwhelmingly dominant lender, with Japanese banks a distant 
second. U.S. banks also have stood out as the principal lead 
institutions in syndication, mobilizing the vast amount of 
credit. 
And when viewed from the standpoint of size, lending 
has clearly been dominated by very large institutions. It 
was shown in Chapter V that banks in the two largest ranges 
of asset size accounted for 78% and 58% of all lending in 
1965-1970 and 1971-1976, respectively. Lead banks in 
syndication also usually were very large institutions. Smaller 
institutions certainly played a much more important role in 
1971-1976 than in 1965-1970, but notwithstanding their large 
number, as a group they remained of secondary importance as 
both lenders and mobilizers of resources. 
For developing country governments it is important to 
be aware of the differences in the behavior of its lenders. 
General policies of some banks or groups of banks may be more 
favorable to the borrower's interests than the policies of 
other banks, taking into account, of course, that what is 
viewed as favorable may change over time according to the 
specific goals of the government and objective circumstances. 
When approaching banks for finance, knowledge of the lending 
strategies of institutions can help to elucidate the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of both parties in any given 
bargaining environment. For instance, if a country has a 
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project to finance, it may be wise to approach banks that 
have demonstrated a special interest in that type of loan. 
If a country wants to reduce the cost of its credit, it might 
want to approach a bank that has shown a tendency to undercut 
market trends. In order to negotiate a loan under conditions 
of economic duress, it may be wise to approach banks that 
have a special interest in the health of the borrower, 
because, for example, of an unusually large commitment to it, 
or other important business interests in the domestic economy. 
In order to ascertain the behavior of commercial banks, 
one must penetrate aggregate lending data. Up to now, any 
differences in the behavior of banks has come out implicity 
in analysis of material of broader concern. It is the task 
of this chapter to focus more explicitly on the "revealed" 
differences among banks. The term revealed is employed because 
analysis covers only ex-post data on lending to Peru. To 
safely generalize one would need data on more countries and 
detailed data on the global lending policies and attitudes of 
each bank in the study. Unfortunately, such an ideal research 
laboratory is unavailable for reasons already elaborated upon 
in Chapter I. Thus, this more crude approach of analyzing 
the ex post behavior of banks with respect to Peru. The 
results, of course, are necessarily tentative in nature and 
subject to further research. And as will become apparent 
during the course of the chapter, given the far less than 
perfect information on all the banks in the study, one is left 
on many occasions only to conjecture on the motivations 
underlying behavior. 
As for the material to be covered, four separate 
aspects of lending behavior are examined: (i) the individual 
relative commitments of lenders to Peru; (ii) the pricing 
strategies employed by the banks; (iii) risk preferences with 
respect to the type of loan extended, the economic sector 
supported, and the use of export credit guarantees; and 
(iv) the lending patterns of banks with branches or 
subsidiaries in Peru vis-a-vis all other banks. These 
individual areas of analysis have been selected on the basis 
of the availability of data and are not necessarily 
interrelated; therefore the respective sections of the chapter 
would be best viewed as being self contained. Nevertheless, 
where appropriate common threads of analysis are pointed out 
and the next chapter will attempt to draw some general 
conclusions from this and other analysis in Part II of the 
study. 
Finally, in the examination observations are made about 
individual banks as well as groups of commercial institutions. 
Frequently the terminology "aggressive" and "conservative" is 
employed to characterize lenders. These terms are not meant 
to impart a blanket assessment of the value of a bank (or banks) 
to the borrower. Each type of lender can have more or less 
favorable, or unfavorable, effects depending on the objectives 
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and characteristics of the borrower at any given moment in 
time. For example, to the extent that aggressive lenders 
introduce cheaper market terms, they have an apparent favorable 
effect from the standpoint of the borrower. On the other hand, 
if the willingness of aggressive lenders to finance any and 
all activities induces the borrower to become lax in its 
financial management, then conservative bankers may be the 
better source of finance for the borrower. Thus, one should 
interpret the classification of aggressive and conservative 
as basically neutral in tone, with positive or negative 
connotations being added only according to the particular 
circumstances of the borrower. 
A. THE RELATIVE COMMITMENTS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 
In table 18 of Chapter V one saw the relative 
importance of individual banks as lenders to the government 
of Peru in 1965-1970 and 1971-1976. However, the ranking of 
lenders was based on the total amount of gross authorizations 
and did not take into account the size of the individual 
lending institution. It therefore would be interesting to 
adjust total authorizations to the scale of the banks in order 
to detect the relative degree of commitment to Peru. This 
approach should reveal the extent to which individual banks 
have involved themselves in Peru and could be suggestive of 
marketing strategies. It also should be indicative of the 
leverage, if any, that Peru has over the banks. 
In order to adjust data, gross authorizations 259/ in 
the period 1965-1970 were taken as a percentage of the assets 
of the individual lending banks, using dollar asset figures 
for 1969. A similar exercise was carried out for the period 
1971-1976, with the exception that data on assets corresponded 
to the year 1975. In order to facilitate intra - as well as 
inter - period comparisons, coefficients were indexed. A 
coefficient of 0.5%, which happened to be the highest 
coefficient in the period 1965-1970, was taken as 100 and the 
rest of the data related to this base. Various ranges of the 
index were distinguished and classified as high, intermediate 
and low commitments. Lastly, banks were place according to 
how their coefficient corresponded with the various ranges 
of commitment. 260/  
Table 40 displays the results of the exercise. It is 
shown that some of the banks classified as major lenders in 
Chapter V for the period 1965-1970 also placed at the top of 
the scale of relative commitments for the same period. 
Bankers Trust, Continental Illinois and Manufacturers Hanover, 
all major lenders in terms of the value of their authorizations, 
also had the relatively most committed positions in Peru. The 
other major lenders - Citicorp, Chase Manhattan and Bank of 
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Table 40 
PERU: RELATIVE COMMITMENTS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS-TOTAL AUTHORIZATIONS 
AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL ASSETS, 1965-1970 AND 1971-19762/  
(100 = 0.499% of total assets) 
1965-1970 1971-1976 
Level of commitment International, Level of commitment§ 	 International, 
and names of bankstli rankofbank2/ and names of banker 	 rankofbank2/ 
High High 
100-80.0 > 668.9 
Bankers Trust 11 Libra Bank 301(c) 
Continental Illinois 22 Euro-Latin American Bank 301(c) 
Manufacturers Hanover 5 668.9-510 
Intermediate Atlantic International Bank 301( c) 
79.9-60.0 Asian and Euro American Bank 301(c) 
Bank of Nova Scotia 47 509.9-343 
Franklin National Bank 78 Banque Europeene de Tokyo 301(c) 
59.9-40.0 Associated Japanese Bank 301(c) 
Schroders Ltd. 197 342.9-175 
Charter New York Corporation 39 Iran Overseas Investment Bank 301(c) 
Citicorp 2 Western American Bank 501(c) 
First National Bank of Boston 59 Nippon European Bank 301(c) 
59.9-20.0 Japan International Bank 301(c) 
Chase Manhattan 3 Banque de la Societe Financiere 




National Detroit Corporation 57 174.9-100 
Crocker National Bank 48 Italian International Bank 301(c) 
Toronto Dominion Bank 54 Bancal Tri-state Corporation 199 
Low United International Bank 301(c) 
<20 Inter-Union Bank 301(c) 
Royal Bank of Canada 12 London and Continental Banks Ltd. 301(c) 
International Mexican Bank 501(c) 
Banca Commerciale 	 Italiana 25 
European Brazilian Bank 301(c) 
Morgan Guaranty Trust 6 American Express Int. Banking 223 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 14 Intermediate 
Philadelphia National Bank 94 99.9-60 
Lloyds Bank 33 Bank of Nova Scotia 53 
Western Bancorporation 8 Banque Commerciale Pour 
Bank of Tokyo 26 L'Europe Du Nord 195 
International Commercial Bank 301(c) 
Crocker National Bank 79 
Fidelcor 203 
Philadelphia National Bank 144 
Toronto Dominion Bank 66 
Grindlays Bank 154 
Manufacturers Hanover 16 
First Pennsylvania Corporation 106 
C.I.T. Financial Corporation 210 
Banque Canadienne National 130 
Banque Continentule Du Luxembourg 301(c) 
59.9-40  
Banque European de Credit 301(c) 
Bankers Trust 32 
Orion Bank 301(c) 
Continental Illinois Bank 30 
Franklin National Bank 
Citicorp 2 
Royal Bank of Canada 22 
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Table 40 (concluded) 
1965-1970 
	 1971-1976 
Level of commitment 
and names of banks1.21 
International, Level of commitment 
rank of bank_(  and names of banksli(  
International, 
rank of bank2/ 
Low 
59.9-20 
Bank of Montreal 45 
Anthony Gibbs 301 
Industrial National Corp. 260 
U.B.A.F. 301(c) 
Dresdner Bank 14 
Trade Development Bank 219 
Chase Manhattan 4 
Lloyds Bank 31 
First Chicago Corporation 35 
Bank of Tokyo 28 
Morgan Guaranty Trust 19 
Bank of America 1 
Shamut Corporation 248 
Nomura Securities d/ 
Cleveland Trust Corporation 151 
Midland and International Bank 301(c) 
Banco de Santander 112 
Long Term Credit Bank 44 
Centran Corporation 258 
Marine Midland Bank 77 
Banque Francaise Du Commerce 
Exterieur 174 
Chemical Bank 23 
Banque Worms 286 
Schroders Ltd. 301 
Security Pacific Corporation 54 
Deutsche Bank 6 
Western BanCorporation 39 
Fugi Bank 13 
Swiss Volksbank 143 
<20 
The Remainder of the Banks in 
the Study e/ 
Source: ECLA , on the basis of official data. 
a/ Exercise is on authorizations without a guarantee of an export credit agency. 
b/ Authorizations calculated as a percentage of bank assets. The asset size for the period 1965-1970 
is based on 1969 data presented in The Banker June 1970; asset size for 1971-1975 is based on 
1975 data presented in The Banker, June 197b. Where a bank did not rank in the top 300 of world 
banking, asset size was determined from 1975 balance sheet data of the Banker Research Unit's 
Who Owns What in World Banking, 1976. Other sources used to determine asset size were the Japan 
Company Handbook and The Times 1000. honks for which no asset data could he secured were excluded 
from the exercise (see footnote e/). 
b/ The ranks are based on the list of the top 300 in world banking prepared by The Banker. The ranks 
for 1965-1970 are based on 1969 asset size presented in The Banker, June 1970; the ranks for 
1971-1976 are based on asset size in 1975 as presented in The Banker, June 1976. Banks that did 
not figure in the top 300 are ranked no 301. The letter .c on parenthesis designates n 
consortium bank. 
c/ Not ranked in The Banker. d/ For the following 
	 excluded from the exercise: Banque de L'Union Europenne; Banque 
7 
 Internationale a Luxembourg; Balfour Williamson; Commerce Union Bank; La Salle National Bank; 
Rothchild Intercontinental Bank, Union Planters Bank; Banco Mexicano; Morgan Guaranty and 
Partners; Dow Banking Corporation; Algemene Bank Nederland; Comco International Bank; LTCB Asia 
Ltd.; Banque Arabe el Internationale D'Investissement; Trade Invest Bank and Trust Company; 
Banco Atlantico; Banco Nacional de Panama; Banco de Bogcr;; First National Bank of St. Louis; 
Bank Lev; Privatbank and Verwalturgesellschaft; Bankfur Gemeinwirtschaft; Industrial Multinational 
Investment Ltd.; and Liberal Bank. 
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America - were decidedly less committed, suggesting more 
conservative lending strategies with regard to Peru. Citicorp, 
which ranks in the highest group of major lenders, had a 
relative commitment that placed it only in the intermediate 
ranks of table 40. The relative commitments of Bank of 
America and Chase Manhattan also were significantly less than 
proportional to their positions as lenders based on the 
absolute level of authorizations. 
As for the intermediate lenders, Bank of Nova Scotia 
and Franklin National Bank stand out for their very 
significant level of relative commitment to Peru. It would 
appear, then, that in the Sixties these banks had a view on 
Peru that was somewhat more sanguine than many other lending 
institutions. 
The other aspect of the relative commitments in the 
period is that no bank's commitment to Peru exceeded 0.5% of 
total assets. It is clear, then that the absolute weight of 
Peru in the total portfolio was very low even for the most 
heavily committed lenders. This reflects the age old dictum 
of prudent banking that risk can be minimized through loan 
diversification. 
Turning to the second period, 1971-1976, one finds some 
striking changes. Most obvious is the fact that the scale 
of relative commitments by banks increased dramatically. 
Whereas 100 (equal to 0.5% of total assets) represented the 
top absolute level of relative commitment in 1965-1970, in 
1971-1976 twenty banks exceeded this mark, some by more than 
six times. 
One can appreciate from the table that almost all the 
banks that exceeded the base index of 100, and therefore at 
the very high end of the period's scale of relative commitments, 
were consortium banks. All the consortium banks ranked as 
minor lenders in terms of authorizations; nevertheless, gross 
loans, as limited as they were in absolute value, constituted 
a considerably higher percentage of total assets than for 
regular banks. This indicates a rather aggressive lending 
strategy. A possible explanation behind the phenomenon is 
that consortium banks are relatively small institutions that 
operate under the umbrella of their parent banks. The 
parents effectively absorb the risk of a consortium's lending, 
which is not very great in terms of the size of the parents. 
Thus, a consortium bank may commit itself to a borrower to a 
degree which otherwise might be deemed imprudent. And as will 
become evident shortly, consortium banks to some extent may 
have covered the higher risk through higher than average 
yields on their loans. 
Aside from the consortium banks, the only regular banks 
with indexes in excess of 100 were Wells Fargo, Bancal 
Tristate Corporation and American Express International. 
Wells Fargo is an unusual case. In Chapter V this 
bank classified as a major lender to Peru, its total 
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authorizations placing it within the group of top 5 lending 
institutions. The bank's relative commitment - the highest 
of any regular bank - far exceeds the relative commitment of 
any of the other major lenders in the period - Citicorp, 
Manufacturers Hanover, Bank of America and Chase Manhattan. 
Thus, Wells Fargo stands out as having a behavior that is very 
distinct from its companions in the major lending group. In 
terms of loans to Peru, Wells Fargo would appear to have had 
by far the most aggressive attitude of the major lenders. To 
achieve its business, the bank had to accept a much more 
extended position than any of the other major lenders. In 
fact, Wells Fargo's relative commitment was nearly three-times 
larger than the next most committed major lender - Manufacturers 
Hanover. 
It is no secret that Wells Fargo had special interest 
in Peru. In the early 1970s the bank became interested in 
expanding beyond its regional business in the West Coast of 
the United States and in developing an extensive international 
portfolio. Markets in the industrialized countries were 
heavily penetrated by the big, established international banks. 
The most attractive developing country borrowers such as 
Brazil and Mexico already were the center of vicious competition 
among the world's bankers. Thus the appeal of second and 
third line borrowers in developing areas. In 1972 Peru 
represented a potential market for new business because many 
factors, described earlier in Chapters III and IV, had made 
most of the big, established international banks reluctant 
to deal with the military government. Moreover, for Wells 
Fargo, Peru was logical terrain for a foray into the 
developing world; it had recently placed in a high executive 
post a well-known and prestigious Peruvian national who had 
been an important functionary in the Peruvian Central Bank 
during the BelarInde years. Using its special rapport with 
Peruvians, coupled with offers of substantial credit on terms 
which were favorable compared to that available from other 
institutions, Wells Fargo quickly captured a large share of 
the market. Pursuing similar policies up through 1974 (which 
will be described in greater detail later), the bank rose 
from zero start to become a major lender to the government of 
Peru and an important lender to other developing countries. 
As for the two other banks with relatively high 
commitments in Peru - American Express and Bancal Tristate 
Corporation - they were of intermediate importance in terms 
of the value of their authorizations. They too appear to have 
had a generally aggressive lending policy towards Peru. 
Tristate, like Wells Fargo, is a U.S. regional bank and loans 
to Peru constituted an easy way to enjoy the high profits 
generated by lending to developing countries. American 
Express International is a well-known late-comer that behaved 
aggressively in international markets. Again, lending to Peru 
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probably represented a relatively easy way to support its 
ambitions to become a major world lender. In the case of 
American Express, however, its high commitment might be more 
similar to that of a consortium bank than a regular bank, 
since American Express International Bank is only a subsidiary 
of the much larger financial conglomerate, American Express 
Corporation. 261/ 
Table 40 reveals that between 1965-1970 and 1971-1976 
a number of banks changed the level of their relative 
commitments to Peru. A rise in the relative commitment may 
have been in response to an explicit shift in the policy of a 
bank towards a more favorable attitude on the government. 
However, given the wide scale penetration of developing 
country markets by commercial banks during the first half of 
the 1970s, there is a strong likelihood that any increase in 
commitment is merely a reflection of a more general 
expansion of developing countries' share of bank portfolios. 
On the other hand, a greater suspicion may be attached to 
any significant fall in commitment level. In the aggressive 
lending environment of the Seventies, a reduction in a 
commitment to Peru would have required a conscious policy by 
the bank to counter general trends and restrain the growth 
of lending. This is turn could very well be indicative of a 
more conservative attitude on the part of the bank towards 
the military government. 
Chapter V demonstrated that two major lenders in 1965-
1970, Bankers Trust and Continental Illinois, fell to an 
intermediate level of importance in 1971-1976. It is 
evident from table 40 that they also experienced a rather 
sharp decline in their relative commitments to Peru between 
the two periods. This could indicate a change of attitude 
on Peru, involving a relatively more conservative policy with 
regard to lending to the government in the 1970s. Also, hidden 
in table 40 is a considerable fall in the level of the 
commitment of Manufacturers Hanover in 1971-1976. Thus, while 
in terms of absolute authorizations this bank held a position 
as a major lender to the government in both periods, in the 
Seventies it may have had a policy of relatively more 
restraint in lending. 
Interestingly, the other major lenders - Citicorp, Bank 
of America, Chase Manhattan - appear to have had fixed limits 
on their lending to Peru throughout the 12 years. While the 
volume of their lending increased substantially betWeen the 
two periods, their relative commitments remained basically 
unchanged. In other words, these banks provide no evidence 
of a special effort to expand the portion of their portfolio 
in Peru during the Seventies. Rather, their lending in 1971-
1976 would appear, on the basis of these limited data, to have 
been of a defensive character, designed to maintain Peru's 
share in their portfolio. 
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With regard to banks of intermediate importance as 
lenders in 1965-1970, the Charter New York Corporation, the 
First National Bank of Boston and the National Detroit 
Corporation, all experienced rather drastic reductions in their 
relative commitments in the 1970s. Again this is suggestive 
of a change in attitude towards lending to the government of 
Peru. 
Finally, a general observation that can be drawn from 
the data is that regular banks (as opposed to consortium banks) 
appear to have a very diversified portfolio in which Peru 
plays only a very minor part. In no case did gross 
authorizations exceed one percent of total assets; in fact, for 
all but three regular banks gross authorizations did not exceed 
0.5 per cent of total assets for the 12 years under study. 
It often has been claimed by officials in the centers 
that commercial banks have become "hostage" of developing 
country governments through their lending to them.262/ From 
this data the argument would appear to be a serious 
exageration. Peru was a major borrower (in 1975 it ranked as 
the seventh largest developing country borrower) and its positiai 
in the portfolio of the banks was relatively minor. True, a 
default by Peru might damage annual profits, put a severe pinch 
on reserves set aside to cover loan losses, and maybe even 
could threaten the viability of some smaller institutions. 
Because of both precedent and pain bankers clearly would want 
to avoid default. But in the end most could accept default as 
a realistic alternative to further lending especially taken 
into account the prospects of financial assistance from home 
government monetary authorities. 
Thus a default by a single borrower such as Peru would 
not be a threat to many banks and clearly would not represent 
any danger to the world financial system as a whole. On the 
other hand a default would have very serious consequences for 
Peru, unless it had adequate domestic support to pull out of 
the western capitalist community. Not only would it find most 
commercial and official credit cut off (due to cross-default 
clauses) and its purchases and sales abroad interferred with, 
but it also would face the prospects of repraisals from the 
home governments of the banks. Without massive political 
support at home all this would have disasterous effects on 
national social stability and development, thus making the 
-borrower go to great lengths to meet the demands of its bankers. 
The concept of hostage therefore seems inappropriate; 
indeed, on balance the banks clearly enjoy greater leverage 
over single borrowers. Only in the case of a superborrower 
such as Brazil or Mexico could a single borrower create real 
problems for the banks; and any problems that might arise 
would likely be specific to few overly-committed institutions 
rather than a threat to national financial systems. 263/ 
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B. BANK BEHAVIOR WITH REGARD TO THE PRICING OF LOANS 
In a simple framework, commercial bank lending to a 
developing country can be expressed by the following function: 
Lt = f (Et-1't' Pt) 
where L = lending to country i in period t; 
E = the level of exposure of the bank with country i in 
period t-1; 
C = the bank's view of the creditworthiness of country 
i in period t; 264/ 
P = the interest price of the loan taken in the broad 
sense to include interest spread and maturity. (The 
base interest rate is determined in the interbank 
market.) 
L in period t is then a negative function of E at the 
end of the previous lending period and a positive function of 
the current estimation of creditworthiness and the current 
price that the borrower will pay for credit. Since at any 
given time lending institutions would have different levels 
of E with Peru and different estimations of C, these differences 
could reflect themselves in either the volume of lending, the 
price of credit, or both. 
It already has been demonstrated that the volume of 
lending has differed among institutions. But the question 
remains: how have banks behaved with respect to the price 
of a loan? 
The advantage of generating disaggregated data is that 
some approximations can be made in this regard. And to the 
extent that one found that some banks consistently offered 
better or worse terms than the general market trend, this 
may be indicative of bank policy and therefore very useful 
information for a developing country borrower. 
Before preceeding to the examination, two caveats 
covering the scope and intent of the analysis are necessary. 
First, there is a limited number of years in which data 
can be observed. The periods 1965-1970 and 1971-1976 are 
very distinct ones for world banking and therefore must be 
viewed separately. Moreover, only in the second period was 
commercial bank lending dense enough to provide any potential 
for a meaningful analysis of differential behavior, and even 
then one is really limited to the extremely narrow 5-year 
period of 1972-1976. 
Second, while there is an adequate density of loans for 
the period 1972-1976, there is great dispersion among lending 
institutions,. This means that the number of banks for which 
there are observations in each year does not exceed 25, a 
rather small group considering that there are 167 lending 
banks for the period. Fortunately, the banks for which data 
permitted analysis represent mostly lenders of major and 
intermediate importance in terms of authorizations. 
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The above factors place severe limitations on what can 
be expected from the analysis. Nevertheless, examination of 
the data is suggestive of behavior and, additionally, 
complements information that may be generated in any future 
studies with similar objectives. It is these limiting 
conditions and goals thatunderpin the analysis in the section. 
1. Examination of Price Behavior 
a) The Testing Procedure  
In looking at the establishment of terms, two 
variables were considered: the spread over LIBOR and the total 
maturity of the loan. For each year a bank was assigned an 
annual average spread over LIBOR and an average total maturity. 
Similar annual averages were calculated for all banks in the 
study taken as a group, using these global averages as the 
indicator of market trends vis-a-vis Peru. Equally paired 
observations 265/ between a bank and the global average were 
organized covering the 5-year period 1972-1976. A two-tailed 
Student's t evaluation has made on the data to test the 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 0  : the average terms of the bank were the 
same as the market's terms. 
against 
Hypothesis 1 : the average terms of the bank were 
different from the market terms 
at a confidence level of 90%. 
As shown earlier, in the year 1976 Peru was on the 
verge of losing its creditworthiness; banks assumed a very 
cautious attitude on the country and lending became motivated 
more by the need to prevent default than to generate new 
business. Given the distinct lending environment for this 
year, a Student's t test was performed on equally paired 
observations for the period 1972-1975. This had the 
disadvantage of reducing the already low number of degrees of 
freedom from 4 to 3. But as a positive element, more banks 
could be incorporated into the evaluation. 
To complement the evaluation of the behavior of selected 
individual banks, a similar test procedure was applied to banks 
grouped according to their country of origin and asset size. 
The partial aggregation of data paralleled the similar 
exercises presented in Chapter V. Of course, these latter 
tests considered all banks in the study. 
b) The Results of the Tests  
The actual test results for all banks and groups of 
banks can be found in tables 16 - 21 of the statistical 
appendix. Only the significant findings are commented upon 
here. 
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The results of the tests seem to suggest that banks 
generally do not discriminate risk on the basis of price. 
Among the banks tested there was a general uniformity in 
interest spreads and maturities of the loans. Banks would 
appear, then, to find it difficult to deviate from the market's 
price of loans, presumably because of "competitive" 
pressures.266/ Under these circumstances the different 
levels of E and the different evaluations of C among the 
individual banks would reflect themselves not in the price 
of credit, but rather in the volume of lending, and perhaps 
in non-price aspects. Thus, in general, the volume of bank 
lending adjusted to the size of the institution presented in 
the previous section may be a reasonable approximation of how 
institutions perceived risk in Peru as embodied in 
considerations about exposure and creditworthiness. 
While there was a general uniformity of trends with 
regard to the pricing of loans, some significant deviations 
from market trends appeared in the analysis. These are worth 
reviewing. 
For the full 5-year period, 1972-1976, Manufacturers 
Hanover - a major lender to the government - displayed 
interest margins significantly higher than the market average. 
However, when adjusted to eliminate the difficult year of 
1976, the test provided for insignificant divergence from 
market trends. Thus evidence probably is not sufficiently 
strong to state that this bank charged higher than average 
spreads on its loans. 
Banque Commerciale pour L'Europe du Nord (Eurobank), an 
institution stationed in Paris, but owned by the USSR's State 
Bank and Foreign Trade Bank, showed for the adjusted period 
1972-1975 a significant tendency to charge interest margins 
above market averages. However, this bank - which was a minor 
lender to Peru - for the same period showed a tendency to 
extend longer than average maturities. The longer maturities 
may have offset the higher spread, making it difficult to 
suggest that the institution operated outside the market 
environment. 
Another institution, Bankers Trust - of intermediate 
importance as a lender - may have pursued a policy of 
extending loans with shorter than average maturities. Its 
divergence was significant at a 90% level of confidence for 
1972-1976 and even more significant for the adjusted period 
1972-1975. It also may be recalled that analysis in the 
previous section found that Bankers Trust perhaps restricted 
its exposure in Peru during the 1970s. Thus, the test results 
on its maturities provide further evidence of a cautious 
lending strategy with respect to Peru. 
The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank - a minor lender to the 
government - provided evidence of longer than average 
maturities on its credit. Divergence from market terms was 
significant in both the 5 and 4-year periods. 
154 
Wells Fargo, a major lender to the government, provided 
significant evidence of offering longer maturities than the 
market for the 5-year period 1972-1976. However, this 
hypothesis could not be sustained when data were adjusted to 
the more normal period 1972-1975. 
With respect to the tests on more aggregated data, few 
significant divergencies materialized. 
For the adjusted period 1972-1975 the third group of 
banks ranked ancording to size gave results sufficient to 
suspect that their interest margins were consistently higher 
than the market average. This group of banks incorporates 
institutions with international ranks between 47 and 91 on a 
scale of 1-300. In terms of their lending to Peru, these 
banks accounted for 19% of total authorizations. 
In the country groupings, the miscellaneous category 
"other" showed significant evidence of extended maturities 
in both the long and adjusted periods. This group accounted 
for 8% of the total lending to the government in the 1970s 
and mostly represents minor lenders that are from countries 
outside the mainstream of international finance (see the 
annexes for a list of the banks). 
c) The Role of Fees  
The previous analysis applied to interest margins and 
maturities; it excluded flat fees owing to data problems. In 
data collection there was no way of knowing in all cases the 
actual distribution of fees among the banks in syndicated 
credits. Thus fee earnings could not always be accurately 
assigned to individual institutions. This represents an 
unfortunate constraint because while fees are not reflective 
of the cost of credit for a bank, they do increase the yield 
of loans and therefore often must be a factor in the pricing 
equation. 
One way of approaching the problem would be to assume 
that fees were equally distributed among all institutions in 
a syndicated credit. This, of course, is far from an 
accurate representation of how fees are distributed in 
practice. However, in effect one would be testing the degree 
to which institutions associated themselves with loans 
carrying certain levels of fees rather than testing fee 
earnings per se. If an institution, or group of banks, 
persistently were associated with loans carrying fees higher 
than the market average, this could be indicative of a bank 
that had been earning, or was seeking to earn, greater than 
average income from fees. 
This rough and ready "guilt by association" technique 
was applied to the banks and Student t tests were performed 
in a fashion similar to that for interest margins 'and 
maturities. While by the nature of the tests not much 
confidence can be placed in their results, it is interesting 
to note that at the level of the individual institution 267/ 
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and for groups of banks there was a much greater degree of 
divergence from the market average than in the case of 
interest margins and maturities. This would suggest that 
non-interest prices such as fees may be less subject to 
market forces than their interest related counterparts and 
therefore used more liberally to counter exposure and risk 
considerations of individual institutions. 
The results of the tests are found in tables 22 - 24 of 
the statistical appendix. However, it would be unfair to draw 
even tentative conclusions about the behavior of individual 
institutions on the basis of such a rough statistical 
exercise and therefore no further specific analysis is merited 
here. However, it can be mentioned that results often were 
in line with a priori notions about bank behavior. For 
instance, data suggested that consortium banks pursued fees 
that were significantly higher than the market terms. And 
in the literature it is well known that consortium banks are 
especially geared to fee-earning activities. This no doubt 
reflects their limited capacity to extend interest bearing, 
loans, but it also must be remembered that earlier analysis 
demonstrated that these institutions had by far the highest 
relative commitments with Peru. Fees could then have been 
used to offset at least partially this higher apperant risk. 
Finally, since the test raises the suspicion that fees 
are indeed used to discriminate risk, greater efforts should 
be made to uncover these charges on bank loans. To date 
fees have remained a very secret part of credit transactions 
and therefore have not received the scrutiny that they 
evidently merit. 
2. Other Considerations about Pricing  
The statiscal tests examined above covered medium term 
periods and therefore hide any role that a bank may have had 
in the creation of inflection points in market trends. For 
instance, a bank may have had average terms in line with the 
market, but at some particular point in time it could have 
altered the market by pricing above or below prevailing terms, 
thereby inducing other banks to follow. This phenomenon is 
not easily subjected to testing; however, it may be located 
in the casual observation of data. Moreover, such 
observation is best done on syndicated credits which are 
large, generally gain much publicity, and therefore can have 
a psychological impact on the market. While the participation 
of many banks make a syndicate possible, focus will be placed 
on the lead banks which were behind the organization of the 
loan. 
In this context, two non-traditional lenders to Peru, 
Wells Fargo, and to a much lesser degree Dresdner Bank, 
stand out as especially important institutions. It appears 
that these banks - aside from the level of their 
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authorizations - played a critical role in Peru's gaining 
acceptance on international commercial bank markets and in 
the lowering the cost of credit. A few descriptive examples 
will make this apparent. 
In early 1972 Peru was a highly uncertain entity from 
the viewpoint of the banks. Nevertheless, as explained in 
Chapter IV, by this year some non-traditional commercial 
creditors from Japan, the U.S. West Coast and Europe began to 
break ranks with the international financial blockade that 
enjoyed the passive and, in some cases active, support of the 
established international commercial creditors of the Sixties. 
The government received significant amounts of new finance; 
however, terms were onerous with spreads of 2.25% over LIBOR 
and maturities in the range of 4.5 - 6.5 years. These terms 
were much more severe than those being paid by other 
developing countries borrowing from international commercial 
banks. However, later in the year Wells Fargo headed a 40 
million dollar loan for 7.5 years at 2% over LIBOR and 
Dresdner headed a 30 million dollar loan for 7 years at 1.75% 
over LIBOR. The Wells Fargo loan probably had the greatest 
impact on the market because, while the Dresdner Bank loan 
was for a project, which will be shown later to be a preferred 
form of finance for some banks, the Wells Fargo credit was 
for what could be considered a relatively less attractive 
refinance operation. Moreover, while there was a degree of 
geographic dispersion for the banks participating in both 
credits, Wells Fargo's loan incorporated 29 banks versus 14 
for Dresdner's (see table 41). The larger number of banks in 
the former loan surely provided for a greater psychological 
impact on the market. 
After the Wells Fargo and Dresdner credits in late 1972 
other lenders reacted defensively and moved to match terms; 
the market tugged back and forth between spreads of 1.75% and 
2% over LIBOR, with maturities ranging between 6.5 and 7 years. 
Then, in April 1973, Wells Fargo led a 100 million dollar 
loan involving 61 banks; although the spread of 2% did not 
break new ground, the maturity of 8 years for a loan of free 
disposition was the longest tenor yet received on a syndicated 
credit. Then in the same month Wells Fargo, alone, extended 
35 million dollars for refinance at 1.75% over LIBOR and the 
unprecedented maturity of 10 years. 268/ These two credits 
again altered the market as other banks reacted defensively 
to match terms; soon thereafter it became common for bank 
loans to carry a maturity of 9-10 years. 
1 57 
Table 41 
PERU: A COMPARISON OF SYNDICATED CREDITS HEADED BY 
WELLS FARGO AND DRESDNER BANK IN 1972 
Country of the 
participating 
banks 








Number of 	 Percentage 
participating 	 of 
	
banks a/ 	 credit b/ 
United States 8 38.8 - - 
Japan 8 23.7 5 30.0 
Canada 3 11.2 2 13.3 
United Kingdom 2 6.2 - - 
Germany - - 2 23.3 
Italy 3 7.5 1 10.0 
Switzerland - - 1 13.3 
Other 2 3.7 1 3.3 
Consortium 3 8.7 2 6.6 
Total 29 100.0 14 100.0 
Source: 	 CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
7TITcludes lead bank. 
b/ Does not sum properly due to rounding. 
Some slippage in the prevailing LIBOR spread occurred 
in September 1973 when a 24 bank syndicated credit headed 
by Manufacturers Hanover and Citicorp provided a 130 million 
dollar loan at a split interest margin averaging 1.6% over 
LIBOR. However, it again was Wells Fargo which led the next 
fundamental break in the market's treatment of Peru. In 
December this bank organized a 31 bank 80 million dollar 
loan at 10 years and a spread of only 1.25% over LIBOR. 
In early 1974 Morgan Guaranty Trust, until now a bank 
with obviously a very restrained attitude on the government, 
headed the famous 76 million dollar credit associated with 
the Greene Accord. It carried an unusually low spread of 
only 1% over LIBOR. Although the credit clearly was of a 
political nature, its economic significance, its relatively 
low price, and the fact that it was headed by one of the most 
conservative banks in the industry, made for a large 
psychological impact on the market.2b9/ Major loans 
followed with 10 year maturities and spreads as low as 1.13% 
over LIBOR. Subsequent lending by Wells Fargo and Dresdner 
Bank heavily supported the trends towards a lowering of 
interest margins. 
In 1975 there was a general rise in spreads and a 
shortening of maturities. However, it is difficult to 
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pinpoint which banks may have led or resisted the trend 
because the overall market conditions were highly unstable 
and mere access to credit, let alone cost, was a real 
preocupation. 
Thus, from the above, one gains an idea of how banks 
can create inflection points in the market's terms of credit. 
One also obtains more evidence of the special character of 
Wells Fargo's participation in Peru's external finance. It 
certainly did lead more favorable pricing trends in the market 
and occasionally with the help of Dresdner Bank also was 
important in augmenting the volume of credit. It may be added, 
that as lead banks, Crocker National Bank and the Bank of 
Tokyo often reinforced trends created by Wells Fargo. 
Before closing this section, brief mention should be 
made of several other actors which were important in 
influencing the market's attitude on Peru in the 1972-1974 
period. It may be recalled from Chapter VI that in forming 
syndicates, Wells Fargo placed heavy reliance on Japanese 
banks, which contributed approximately one-third of the funds 
raised in syndication by this bank. Dresdner, Crocker National, 
and.Bank of Tokyo also received heavy support from Japanese 
banks in forming syndicates. Thus Japanese institutions 
clearly were an important factor in the favorable turns in 
the market's attitude towards Peru. In the case of Wells 
Fargo and Crocker National, U.S. banks, particularly medium-
and small-sized regional institutions also were responsible 
for a large volume of the credit raised in syndication. 
Therefore, these institutions too should be considered as 
key factors promoting the favorable changes in market trends. 
C. RISK PREFERENCES WITH RESPECT TO THE NATURE OF LENDING 
In a series of subsections that follow, analysis will 
focus on other non-price aspects of risk behavior of the 
banks. 
In the first of two major subsections analysis will 
cover the revealed preferences of banks for certain types of 
loans and for lending to certain economic sectors, as 
embodied in the actual extension of credit to the government. 
Using a criteria outlined below, an attempt is made to 
classify preferences as demonstrating either aggressive or 
conservative strategies. 
The second major subsection focuses on another aspect 
of lending: the degree to which banks attempted to avoid 
risk by securing guarantees from home country export credit 
agencies. A heavy reliance on such guarantees is indicative 
of a conservative strategy towards Peru, while the opposite 
situation is indicative of a relatively more bold posture. 
In most instances, the study's data base was not dense 
enough to support an analysis of the full 12-year period. 
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Thus, the time frame covered here is only 1971-1976. Also, 
data often were not adequate to support an analysis at the 
institutional level, so accomodation had to be made for a 
greater degree of aggregation. The principal forms of 
aggregation are banks grouped according to their country of 
origin and asset size. 
1. Preferences for Types of Loans and Economic-sectors 
As argued earlier, a bank's risk perception and lending 
strategy may be revealed by its relative commitments to Peru, 
and to a limited extent, by its pricing of loans. But it is 
also possible that bank attitudes may be revealed by the 
types of loans and sectors for which credit is extended. In 
broaching this subject there are crucial assumptions which 
should be made explicit. 
Banking can be viewed as having traditions and practices. 
Traditions are what bankers prefer to do and practice is what 
they actually do. The traditions incorporate the conservative 
dictums of prudent banking and they represent a more cautious 
approach to lending. Many institutions attempt with varying 
degrees of success to remain within the confines of tradition. 
However, some banks may operate outside of tradition, either 
temporarily for reasons of penetrating markets, or more 
permanently because of some special insight into the 
shortcomings of traditional practice. 
For the purposes of the statistical exercises that will 
be presented below, the reader should bear in mind the 
followign observation made by Aronson which aptly summarizes 
a tradition, or preferred behavior, of the banking community: 
Banks prefer lending for cash-flow generating projects 
which will allow borrowers to meet their obligations. 
They prefer not to finance consumption and infraestructure, 
are uneasy about financing payments deficits, and would 
rather not refinance previous loans. 270/ 
Thus, even though commercial banks have a sovereign 
government guarantee, they may not be necessarily indifferent 
about the types of loans they extend and the economic activities 
they support. Banks cast in a traditional mold may pursue 
the banking dictum just cited above and attempt to maximize 
security by concentrating credit in loans and activities that 
customarly have been perceived as bearing less risk. In this 
regard a bank following such a practice can be deemed to be 
conservative. On the other hand, some banks for any number 
of reasons can ignore the traditional dictum, viewing it as 
nonsense or not in its immediate interests. This latter type 
of institution can be considered aggressive vis-A-vis the 
world banking community. 
Using a criterion and technique outlined below, banks, 
relative to each other, are placed in a typology of conservative 
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and aggressive lenders based first on the types of loans 
that they have extended to Peru and then based on the types 
of economic sectors in which they have knowingly lent 
resources. This is followed by an overall evaluation that 
presents a consolidated typology based on the two aspects 
of lending behavior. 
Before commencing the analysis it is worth reiterating 
that the terms aggressive and conservative are not meant to 
impart a value judgement about the worth of certain banks 
to a borrower. The value of being aggressive or conservative 
depends on timing and circumstances. Aggressive banks may 
be willing to act in a way which reflects the immediate 
interests of the borrower, but this can be a permissive 
influence on an undisciplined borrower just as it can be a 
boon to a sophisticated borrower. Conservative banks 
concentrating in project finance can be very favorable to a 
borrower wishing to finance a fixed investment. The mere 
point of the exercise is to show that there is indeed 
heterogeneous behavior; it is up to the borrower to use the 
assigned behavior to its best advantage. 
a) Preferences for Certain Types of Loans  
In this subsection, the preferences of banks with respect 
to the types of loans extended are examined. This assumes 
that there were risk considerations over and above the fact 
that loans carried a sovereign government guarantee; that 
there was a perception of further reduction in risk through 
careful selection of the types of loans in which one became 
involved. 
For instance, some bankers may consider project loans 
as a relatively more safe form of finance because such credits 
are tied to a precise activity in which there is an economic 
return to cover repayment that can be evaluated on an ex-ante  
basis. Moreover, project loans might be considered to carry 
a built-in discipline because the use of resources is tied 
to project proposals and project implementation also may 
benefit from the expertise of an established private foreign 
or local supplier or contractor. (If a supplier also is a 
major client of the lending bank, this constitutes an 
additional incentive to lend). 
	 Characteristics similar to 
project lending also are found in the finance of capital goods 
imports. 
On the side of more risk can be found loans of free 
disposition and refinance credits. The most risky loan would 
be that of free disposition since a bank has no ex-ante  
guarantee that the resources will be employed wisely and generE,J:e 
returns sufficient to finance repayment. With regard to 
refinance credits, although it has been shown that they made 
up the bulk of bank lending, bankers at least profess not to 
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be eager suppliers of such finance, in part because of a 
belief in the primacy of repayment schedules. 271/ The greater 
risk involved in refinance is that a bank extends (perhaps 
reluctantly) a previous commitment to a borrower, sometimes 
under conditions of economic duress and on terms that from 
the bank's perspective can be less than commensurate to the 
risk involved (in other words non-commercial). 
Given the fungibility of money, it certainly is 
debatable whether economic circumstances merit the above 
distinctions in loans; nevertheless, these considerations 
are often perceived as real relative risks by some banks. 
And if institutions display a tendency to favor one type of 
a loan over another, this could be indicative of a lending 
strategy towards Peru, and even may be indicative of broader-
based management strategies. For instance, if a bank were to 
have a relatively high percentage of its total lending in 
credits of free disposition and refinance - types of credit 
that usually are very attractive to borrowers - this may be 
indicative of an aggressive lending strategy. A more 
conservative strategy would be suggested by a bank that 
tended to have a relatively higher percentage of its loans in 
project or capital goods finance. It is under these 
assumptions that the following analysis is pursued. 
(i) Preferences of banks when grouped according to country of  
origin  
Table 42 displays how banks, grouped according to their 
country of origin, distributed lending, relative to each other, 
among the various types of loans in the period 1971-1976. The 
data presented are standardized variables of the deviation 
from the unweighted mean distribution for all the country 
groups in the table.272/ Of interest here are the more 
extreme relative deviations for loans classified as capital 
goods, projects, refinance, and free disposition. Loans for 
"other imports" were of negligible significance in total 
lending. Credits for nationalizations also are not of direct 
concern because they represent a separate dimension -
solidarity with home country investors and governments - that 
is not per se linked to global lending strategies. 
Examining first loans viewed as of a more risky nature, 
one sees that consortium banks, Italian banks, and German 
banks had the greatest relative inclination to refinance. The 
relatively least receptive appears to be Swiss banks, 273/ 
and perhaps banks in the category of "other". With regard to 
what is possibly the most risky of loans - credit of free 
disposition - one finds that the Japanese banks stand out for 
having by far the greatest relative participation in this area. 
Meanwhile, German and to a much lesser degree, Swiss and 
British banks, appear to have had been the relatively least 
inclined to enter into this type of loan. 
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Table 42 
PERU: APPARENT PREFERENCES FOR TYPES OF LOANS BY BANKS 
GROUPED ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1971-1976 a/ 






Other Refinance 	 Free 	 Projects National- imports 	 disposition 	 zation i Other 
United 
States 33.3 0.8 66.7 -107.4 14.3 200.0 
Japan -41.7 
-38.1 173.6 -30.5 -38.9 100.0 
Canada 20.8 38.1 44.8 -31.6 -38.9 150.0 
United 
kingdom 279.2 11.1 
-65.5 49.5 -38.9 -75.0 
Germany 
-66.7 69.0 -211.5 193.7 -38.9 -75.0 
France 
-66.7 28.6 43.7 
-13.7 -38.9 -75.0 
Italy 
-66.7 33.3 63.2 -76.8 -38.9 -75.0 
Switzerland -66.7 -254.0 -75.9 -118.9 296.0 -75.0 




-16.7 -64.3 11.5 153.7 
-38.9 -75.0 
Source: 
 Derived from data in Table 25 of the statistical appendix. 
a/ Exclades loans with guarantees of export credit agencies. 
b/ z _ X -  X 
 where X is the percentage of all authorizations by a country 
group in a given loan classification; 
X is the unweighted average of all loans by all country gro-,:ps in a 
giver loan classification and S is the standard deviation of R. 
Project loans, deemed to perhaps carry a perception of 
greater security, (and carry benefits related to support of 
corporate clients' exports) were relatively most pursued by 
German and "other" banks. British banks, which also were the 
relatively most involved in capital goods finance, appear to 
have pursued this more secure route as well. The relatively 
most uninvolved in project finance were Swiss and United 
States banks. 
What tentative conclusions can be drawn from this 
particular set of data? Since one is dealing in standardized 
variables, a net balance of aggressive and conservative lending 
can be developed. This is done in table 43 where the 
standardized variables of each country group are added together 
according to whether they reflect aggressive of conservative 
strategies. The net impact is determined by changing the 
sign of the conservative score and adding it to the aggressive 
score. A positive balance suggests a strategy of aggressive 
lending and a negative score suggests a conservative strategy. 
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As can be seen, Italian and Japanese banks appear as the 
relatively most inclined to extend risky forms of credit and 
therefore could be classified as having been rather aggressive. 
The most conservative lenders turn out to be the British, 
German and "other" banks. In between the extremes are other 
groups of banks with less notable evidence of aggressive or 
conservative strategies. 
ii) Preferences of banks when grouped according to sim 
A similar exercise was carried out on the banks grouped 
according to their size. Tables 44 and 45 provide the 
standarized variables and net balances of aggressive and 
conservative lending, respectively. As shown, there is no 
obvious functional relationship between the size and the 
aggressiveness of lending, at least according to the ranges 
of assets set forth in the table. But it is interesting to 
note that the three groups of banks with the smallest assets 
had relatively high scores with regard to the degree of 
aggressiveness of lending. Some might have expected just the 
opposite; that smaller institutions would have been inclined 
towards securer forms of lending. Momentarily a reason will 
be suggested for this behavior. 
Table 43 
PERU: EVALUATION OF PREFERENCES FOR TYPES OF LOANS 
BY BANKS GROUPED ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 
1971-1976 
Aggressive a/Conservative b/Balance c/ 
(1) (2) (3) 
United States 67.5 -74.1 141.6 
Japan 135.5 
-72.2 207.7 
Canada 82.9 -10.8 93.7 
United Kingdom -54.4 328.7 -383.1 
Germany -142.5 127.0 -269.5 
France 72.3 -53.0 125.3 
Italy 146.5 -143.5 290.0 




-52.8 137.0 -189.8 
Source: 
	 Table 42. 
77E17 of standardized variables for loans of free 
disposition and refinance. 
b/ Sum of standardized variables for project and capital 
goods finance. 
c/ Sum of the columns for aggressive and conservative 
lending after inverting the sign of the latter. A 
positive score is indicative of an aggressive posture 




PERU: APPARENT PREFERENCES FOR TYPES OF LOANS rc BANNS 
GROUPED ACCORDING TO SIZE, 1971-19768,  







Types of loans 
Imports 	 Other 
K goods 	 imports Refinance 
Free 
disposition Projects  
National-
ization Other 
1) 65 789 - 32 895 1- 10 100.0 90.4 
-41.7 -73.5 -54.9 -87.5 
2) 32 894 - 16 448 11- 46 163.6 
-71.1 45.8 -16.3 54.9 - 
3)16447- 
	
8 224 47- 91 81.8 77.1 -27.1 
-134.7 3.9 50.0 
4) 8 223 - 	 4 112 92-147 
-90.9 
-113.3 -133.3 89.8 227.5 112.5 
5) 4 111 - 
	 2 056 148-263 -90.9 
-57.8 -75.0 185.7 25.5 200.0 
6) 2 055 - 	 1 654 264-800 
-90.9 157.8 -20.8 -108.2 -100.0 -87.5 
7) <1 634 )300 48.2 31.3 6.1 -100.0 -87.5 
8) Unknown 
-90.9 
-134.9 225.0 51.0 -768 
-87.5 
Source: Table 26 of the statistical appendix. 
a/ Excludes loans with guarantees of export credit agencies. 
t/ 2.!4! where X is the percentage of all authorizations by banks of a size range in a given loan 
classification: X is the unweigbted average of all loans by all size groups in a given loan classification and 
S is the standard deviation of X. 
c/ Asset range is based on dollar figures for '975 as found in The Banker, June 1976. See footnotes a and b in 
table 22. 
b) 	 Preferences for economic sectors  
Just as an apparent propensity for certain types of 
loans may suggest bank strategies, so can the selection of 
economic sectors in which to lend. With the exception of 
freely disposable loans and general purpose refinance credits, 
banks know in advance the specific destination of funds when 
they decide to enter into a credit agreement. Banks, of 
course, could be perfectly indifferent as to where the country 
will employ the resources, especially given a government 
guarantee. However, it is known that some bankers believe 
that security is enhanced by approving credits for activities 
that hold possibilities for generation of repayment of the 
loan. In this case, a bank may avoid lending for activities 
which clearly cannot service commercial debt. 
Following this line of thought, productive economic 
activities (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc.) would 
generally offer the strongest support for repayment. In most 
instances these activities are commercial in nature and best 
able to support commercial repayment terms. 
Considerably more risk could be perceived in loans to 
basic economic sectors (water, sewerage, power, transport, 
etc.) because these activities often are not self-financing 
(this was certainly true for Peru) and therefore the capacity 
to repay loans must come from outside the sector itself. Also 
from the standpoint of risk, it may be even less attractive 
to lend to social service sectors. This is because social 
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services are rarely profitable from the standpoint of short 
term private rates of return, and payouts (social or otherwise) 
generally are a very long term proposition. Thus, for 
repayment commercial banks clearly must look to financial 
flows generated from sectors other than those in which the 
loan has been placed. 
One suspects that some banks, in an attempt to enhance 
perceived security, may pursue what could be termed a 
relatively cautious lending strategy by favoring directly 
productive sectors over basic economic and social service 
sectors. For an individual bank, this might be considered 
prudent policy. However, from the standpoint of the borrower 
loans for basic economic and social infrastructure could be 
viewed as desireable and necessary because of the paucity of 
long term finance available from official development 
institutions for these activities. 274/ Consequently, it is 
of interest to determine what types of banks were most 
prepared to finance basic economic and social infrastructure. 
i) 	 Preferences of banks when grouped according to country  
of origin  
Table 46 displays data similar to that of the previous 
section which help to highlight the apparent relative 
preferences of banks when grouped according to country of 
origin. It is shown that the institutions relatively most 
committed to the safer productive economic sectors were British 
Table 45 
PERU: EVALUATION OF PREFERENCES FOR TYPES OF LOANS BY BANKS 











Group 1 1- 10 48.7 26.5 22.2 
Group 2 11- 46 -25.3 147.3 -172.6 
Group 3 47- 91 50.0 -52.9 102.9 
Group 4 92-147 -246.6 -1.1 -245.5 
Group 5 148-263 -132.8 94.8 -227.6 
Group 6 264-300 137.0 -199.1 336.1 
Group 7 >300 79.5 6.1 73.4 
Group 8 90.1 -39.9 130.0 
Source: 	 Table 44. 
a/ Sum of standardized variables for loans of free disposition and refinance. 
b/ Sum of standardized variables for project and capital goods finance. 
c/ Sum of the columns for aggressive and conservative lending, after inverting the sign of 
the column on conservative lending. A positive score is indicative of an aggressive 
posture and a negative score a conservative posture. 
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and French banks. In the more risky basic economic and social 
service sectors, "other banks" were by far the most heavily 
committed in relative terms. 
Table 47 present the balance of conservative and 
aggressive strategies. "Other" banks stand out for their 
relatively greater willingness to lend to basic economic and 
social service sectors. German, Japanese, and consortium 
banks also pursued relatively aggressive strategies in this 
regard. On the other hand, French and Canadian banks had the 
most conservative scores. 
ii) 	 Preferences of banks when grouped according to size  
When the subject is viewed from the standpoint of the 
size of the banks, no clearcut functional relationship is 
displayed (see tables 48 and 49). There is, however, a 
notable concentration of conservative strategies in group 4 
and group 6 of the banks. Also, it is interesting that the 
group of smallest banks (7) had the most significant 
aggressive score. 
c) 	 Overall Evaluation  
Taking into account the two aspects of lending and 
combining the results provides an overall typology of behavior. 
It is still convenient to view separately banks grouped 
according to country of origin and size. 
i) 	 Banks when grouped according to country of origin  
Table 50 presents a summary typology of the nature of 
lending based on types of loans and support of economic 
sectors. The relatively most aggressive lenders were Japanese 
banks. Somewhat behind these institutions were Italian and 
consortium banks, followed by "other" banks and U.S. 
institutions. The relatively most conservative lenders were 
British banks. Considerably behind the British banks in terms 
of conservativeness were German and Swiss banks. Following 
them were Canadian and French lending institutions, both of 
which had marginally conservative scores. 
The lending behavior of consortium banks provides 
further support to the notion that they were very aggressive 
lenders to Peru. As demonstrated earlier in the chapter, they 
had the heaviest relative commitment to Peru, although this 
risk may have been compensated somewhat by higher than average 
fees on loans. In addition to the relatively heavy commitment, 
they are shown here to have had one of the boldest lending 
strategies. The strategy undoubtedly was influenced by what 
was determined earlier to be the umbrella security provided 
by the parents of the consortium banks. Another reason for 
the relatively more bold style could be size. Owing to their 
small size, consortium banks cannot extend loans in absolutely 
large amounts. Therefore, in the formation of syndicates they 
may be marginalized from more attractive (and over subscribed) 
loans by banks prepared to take on a relatively large 
participation. Thus, consortium banks, in order to expand 
their portfolios, may have found it necessary to have a higher 
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Table 47 
PERU: EVALUATION OF SECTORAL PRPFVENCES-FY BANKS GROLED 
ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1971-1976 







United States -96.4 -96.4 
Japan 3.6 -63.8 67.4 
Canada -103.6 20.7 -124.3 
United Kingdom 79.5 144.0 -64.5 
Germany 56.3 -30.2 86.5 
France 63.4 219.0 -155.6 
Italy -73.2 -19.8 -53.4  
Switzerland -111.6 -113.8 2.2 
Consortium -33.9 -86.2 52.3 
Other 227.0 -69.8 286.8 
Source: 	 Table 46. 
a/ Standardized variables for lending to basic economic and social sectors. 
b/ Standardized variables for lending to directly productive sectors. 
c/ Sum of standardized variables for columns of aggressive and conservative lending, 
after inverting the sign of the latter. A net positive balance suggests an 
aggressive posture, while a net negative balance suggests a conservative posture. 
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Table 4e 
PERU: APPARENT SECTORAL PREFERENCES OF BANKS 
GROUPED ACCORDING TO SIZE, 1971..19763   
(Standardized deviations about the global meaa)b/ 
Asset size (millions of dollars) c/ 
Sectors 
65 789- 32 894- 16 447- 8 223- 	 4 111- 	
2 055- (1 634 
32 895 	 16 448 	 8 224 	 4 112 	 2 056 	 1 634 
Unknown 
(1) 	 (2) 	 (3) 	 (4) 	 (5) 	 (6) 	 (7) 	 (8) 
Directly productive d/ 
	
-25.9 	 -59.5 	 -88.8 	 112.1 	 -41.4 	 203.5 	 -112.1 	 11.4 
Basic economic and social 
	
-9.9 	 -41.6 	 -24.8 	 -5.9 	 115.8 	 -218.8 	 101.0 	 81.2 
Basic economic e/ 
	
(-41.1) 	 (-4.1) 	 )27.4) 	 (13.7) 	 (80.8) (-237.0) 	 (116.4) 	 (41.1) 
Social f/ 
	
(50.0) 	 (-97.5) (-112.5" 	 (-40.0) 	 (145.0) (-120.0) 	 (42.5) 	 (130.0) 
Unclassified g/ 	 44.8 	 126.4 	 149.4 	 -143.6 	 -80.5 	 -18.4 	 31.0 	 -109.2 
Source: Derived from data in table 28 in the statistical appendix. 
a/ Excludes loans with guarantees of export credit agencies. Also, only accounts for credits where both 
borrower and lender had ex ante agreement on the destination of credit. 
b/ z.x-R 	 here X 	 the porenetod,c oF all a,th ,not'ans b:, harks of a a se rang, in o given ,sectoral 
olkosification; X is the unweixhted avera. of all loans by All sce groups is a given sectoral 
classification and S is che standard devedtior on X. 
ci,Assetlenlea is based on dollar f0dures for '975 as found in The Banker, June '976 	 See footnotes a and 
and b of table 72. 
dj Goods production, manufacturing, agriculture, mining, etc. 
e/ Water, sani tation, power. transportation, etc. 
kl Health, edscaton, etc. 
g/ Loans that went to a number of undesignated sectors. These are basically general refinance credits. 
Table 49 
PERU: EVALUATION OF SECTORAL PREFERENCES OF BANKS 
GROUPED ACCORDING TO SIZE, 1971-1976 
Aggressive 	 Conservative 	 Balance 
World rank 	 a/ 
	
b/ 	 c/ 
range 











1 	 10 	
-9.9 	 -25.9 	 16.0 
	
11 - 46 	 -41.6 	 -59.5 	 17.9 
	
47 - 91 	 -24.8 	 -88.8 	 64.0 
	
92 - 147 	
-5.9 
	
112.1 	 -118.0 
	
148 - 263 	 115.8 	 -41.4 	 157.2 
	
264 - 3oo 	 -218.8 	 203.5 	 -422.3 







Source: Table 48. 
a/ Standardized variables for the basic economic and social sectors. 
b/ Sim of the stanch rdized variables for the directly productive sectors. 
c/ Sum of the cell= s for aggressive and conservative lending, inverting the sign of the latter. A 




PERU: SUMMARY EVALUATION OF BANK PREFERENCES FOR TYPES 
OF LOANSANDECONOMIC SECTORS, 1971-1976 
(Net standardized scores)i 
Banks 
Banks grouped according to 






United States 141.6 -96.4 45.2 
Japan 207.7 67.4 275.1 
Canada 93.7 -124.3 -30.6 
United Kingd6m 
-
383.1 -64.5 -447.6 
Germany -269.5 86.5 -183.0 
France 125.3 -155.6 -30.3 
Italy 290.0 -53.4 236.6 
Switzerland -144.3 2.2 -142.1 
Consortium 135.0 52.3 187.3 
Other -189.8 286.8 97.0 






Group 1 22.2 16.0 38.2 
Group 2 -172.6 17.9 -154.7 
Group 3 102.9 64.0 166.9 
Group 4 -245.5 -118.0 -363.5 
Group 5 -227.6 157.2 -70.4 
Group 6 336.1 -422.3 -86.2 
Group 7 73.4 213.1 286.5 
Group 8 130.0 70.8 200.8 
Source: Table 43, 45, 47, 49. 
of Net balance of conservative and aggressive aspects of lending, evaluating type of credit extended 
and the sectoral destination of credit. A positive score is indicative of aggressive lending and 
a negative score is indicative of conservative lending. 
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perceived risk. In this types of credits lead banks may 
have been more receptive to small credits that help to 
successfully syndicate the loan. 275/ 
The relatively aggressive performance of Japanese banks 
is not a surprise; as latecomers to international lending, they 
have been known for their aggressive strategies 276/ and these 
data on Peru, plus findings in the previous section, merely 
confirm the impression. Italian banks generally are not 
discussed in the same light as Japanse banks, but the nature 
of their lending to Peru suggests that perhaps they should be 
characterized as bold lenders for this period. The fact that 
U.S. banks received an aggressive score can be attributed in 
part to the behavior of newcomers to the international scene 
such as the regional institutions and a few very large 
international banks that did not display traditional 
preferences for loans and sectors. 
"Other" banks obtained a significant score on the 
aggressive side of the ledger, basically because they tended 
to have a relatively high incidence of lending in more risky 
basic economic and social service sectors. As demonstrated 
in section II of the chapter, they extended longer than 
average maturities. Thus, these banks were bold lenders in 
ways which may be of interest to developing country borrowers. 
The motivation for such behavior could be a variant of that 
suggested for consortium banks; while showing a preference for 
safer project lending, their marginal position in international 
financial flows forced them to display a greater willingness 
to enter into basic economic and social service sectors for 
which bidding for loans may have been less keen. 
ii) 	 Banks grouped according to size  
With regard to the largest banks (grouped 1-3) groups 1 
and 3 had substantial aggressive scores. All the intermediate-
sized banks (groups 4-6), on the other hand, tallied net 
conservative scores. And, finally, the smallest banks, groups 
7 and 8 (assuming 8 is basically smaller institutions), 
achieved net aggressive scores. 
Earlier in the chapter, group 3 banks were found to 
have charged a significantly higher than average LIBOR spread 
on their loans. This may have effectively counterbalanced 
much of the greater perceived risk assumed on the nature of 
their loans, leaving only the very largest banks (group 1) with 
clear evidence of an aggressive strategy. And this 
aggressiveness, which is by no means overwhelming in terms of 
the net score, probably is a function of a risk perception 
conditioned by their enormous size and long experience in 
international lending. 
As to the rather aggressive scores of smaller banks, 
one suspects that the explanation is similar to that given 
above for consortia and "other" banks; indeed, these two 
groups of institutions are, to a large degree, located in 
groups 7 and 8. 
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2. Preference for Home Country Export Credit Guarantees  
Up to now analysis has been on lending in which the 
banks have assumed the full risk of credit. However, most 
home countries of commercial banks have agencies which 
guarantee loans that support the home country's exports. The 
material in Chapter V showed that loans carrying such guarantees 
had terms that were more favorable than unguaranteed commercial 
credits. This stands to reason because a bank, by obtaining 
such a guarantee, in effect avoids risk on the guaranteed part 
of its credit. In order to acquire such a guarantee, a bank 
must be willing to finance the purchase of the home country's 
services, and the export credit agency must have a sufficiently 
favorable attitude towards the borrowing country to assume the 
risk. 
Banks which were exceptionally risk conscious in their 
lending to Peru could have limited their exposure in absolute 
terms and where possible have oriented finance towards loans 
with home country guarantees. A bank that had a propensity 
to pursue such a strategy would have a conservative view on 
Peru, and perhaps a cautious attitude to developing country 
governments in general. 
Table 29 of the statistical appendix lists the banks 
that lent under export credit guarantees. The banks for 
which guarantees made up a significant part of total lending 
were classified in Chapter V as lenders of intermediate or 
minor importance to Peru; no major lender took heavy recourse 
to such guarantees. 
When these banks are grouped according to country of 
origin (table 51), the institutions that had the relatively 
greatest reliance on external home country guarantees were 
British, French, and "other" banks. Other country groups 
appear to have taken little or no recourse to such facilities. 
It already has been shown that British and French banks 
pursued a relatively conservative lending strategy on the 
loans for which they assumed the full risk. The fact that they 
also were the most inclined to seak support from home country 
export credit agencies provides further support to the notion 
that they were cautious lenders. The other conservative 
lenders, the Swiss and the Germans 277/, did not, on 
appearance, make much use of such guarantees. Of the banks 
classified beforehand as aggressive in their lending policy 
only "other" banks made extensive use of export credit 
guarantees. While this adds a conservative dimension to "other" 
banks, it lends further support to the aggressive posture 
attributed to the remaining banks.278/ 
A priori grounds would suggest that reliance on 
guarantees may be a function of size (i.e., the smaller the 
bank the more likely it would be to seek the security of an 
export credit guarantee). Data on guarantees (see table 52) 
provided some limited support to this thesis as the degree of 
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Table 51 
PERU: LOANS WITH A GUARANTEE OF AN EXPORT CREDIT AGENCY GROUPED ACCORDING 




of country group as a 
percent of guaranteed 
credits of all banks 
Guaranteed,credits 
as a percent of 
all credits granted 
by banks in the 
country group 
United States 8.5 1.4 
Japan 
Canada 
United Kingdom 26.1 39.0 
Germany 
France 26.4 59.6 
Italy 0.1 0.5 
Switzerlane. 1.0 3,7 
Other 37.9 49.2 
Consortium 
All banks in the study 100.0 9.7 
Sources CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Represents .cans where it was possible to detect a guarantee. It is important to note 
that a borrower may not always be aware of the presence of a guarantee and this 
could cause the above data to understate protected credits. 
reliance on guarantees was less marked for very large banks 
(groups 1-3) than smaller banks. However, beyond this the 
relationship is not clear as one group of intermediate-sized 
banks displayed a reliance on guaranteed credits that was more 
than double that of some smaller banks. So, again, there is 
additional evidence that intermediate sized banks may be 
relatively more cautious than their smaller rivals. 
Finally, unlike the country groupings, when banks are 
examined from the standpoint of size, there is no evidence 
of an outstanding reliance on export credit guarantees by any 
single group of banks. 
D. THE LENDING BEHAVIOR OF BANKS WITH BRANCHES, SUBSIDIARIES 
AND AFFILIATES IN PERU 
On a priori grounds one could consider that international 
banks with direct interests in Peru, e.g. a branch bank or 
subsidiary, would behave somewhat differently towards 
government loans than banks which had ties to Peru only 
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through international loan flows. There are a number of 
reasons why this may be so. 
First, a bank with, say, a branch in Lima, would have 
capital in Peru itself; in 1970 branches had a minimum capital 
requirement of $60.000.000 soles (about 1.5 million dollars279/ 
In addition, there would be accumulated assets from business 
with private firms in Peru; indeed, business with local foreign 
and, secondarily, national firms probably were the principal 
motivation for the initial establishment of a branch. Thus, 
an international bank in this situation may have relatively 
greater interest in cultivating the good will of the national 
government, because its policies could affect the operations 
of the branch bank. This may manifest itself in a relatively 
high profile in external (and internal) lending to the 
government, as well as a greater propensity to develop an 
image of a "good citizen" through the extension of highly 
visible finance (e.g., the support of projects of a social 
character on relatively favorable terms). 
A second reason for special behavior, which is in fact 
a variant of the first, is that an unhealthy Peruvian economy 
may be adverse to the bank's branch operations. For instance, 
a foreign exchange crisis could mean that the branch and its 
clients would have trouble servicing their foreign lines of 
credit; thus the parent could be interested in helping the 
government maintain the country's balance of payments afloat. 
Consequently, such a bank might be more inclined to extend 
balance of payments finance, even in times of extreme 
economic duress. 
Table 52 
PERU: LOANS WITH A GUARANTEE OF AN EXPORT CREDIT AGENCY ACCORDING 
TO THE SIZE OF THE LENDING BANK. 1971-19762/ 
Asset range b/ 





of size group as a 
percent of guranteed 
credits of all banks 
Guaranteed credits 
as a percent of 
all credits granted 
by banks in the 
size group 
1) 65 78g — 52 885 I — 	 10 9.2 5.1 
2) 32 894 — 16 448 11 — 	 46 31.2 7.4 
3) 16 447 — 	 8.224 47 — 	 91 16.5 8.7 
4) 8 223 	 4 112 92 — 147 22.5 28.4 
5) 4 111 — 	 2 056 148 — 263 9.1 12.8 
6) 2 055 — 	 1 634 264 — 300 1.8 25.6 
7) <1 634 >3D0 5.5 10.5 
8) Unknown • • • 4.2 15.5 
All tanks in the study • • • 100.0 9.7 
Source: CEPAL, on tie basis of official data. 
a/ See footnote a of table 5". 
b/ Asset range base( on 1975 data in The Banker , June 1976. See footnotes a and b of table 22. 
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A third reason why these types of banks may behave in 
a special fashion is that the presence of a branch or affiliate 
would provide a familiarity with Peru unavailable to banks 
without offices in the country. Direct familiarity with the 
local, economy and public officials could make for a perception 
of risk that was different from a bank that had to rely on 
secondary information and sporadic "on-site" visits to the 
country for the formulation of its attitude on Peru. 
Finally, special behavior may be induced by government 
decree. In the case of Peru, this latter factor was relevant. 
In a '1970 law for foreign branch banks the government decreed 
that branches (or their parents) had to provide the government 
with a foreign currency line of credit of no less than double 
their assigned capital. The line had to be over and above 
regular lending and on terms suitable to the government. At 
the same time, foreign branches at the end of each quarter had 
to extend another foreign currency line of credit to state 
banks in an amount equal to the increment in the branch's 
'deposits. The interest rates on such lines could not exceed 
the parent bank's prime rate. 280/ 
It is with these considerations that the following 
analysis on banks with operations in Peru is undertaken. 
1. The Banks with Interests in Peru: Importance as lenders 
Table 53 presents a list of international banks with 
branches or subsidiaries/affiliates in Lima; the date of 
establishment the Peruvian operation: the importance of the 
international banks as lenders to Peru; their relative 
commitments; and importance as leaders in syndicated credits 
to the government. 
The most established foreign branch bank in Peru 
pertains to Citicorp, which has had an office in Lima since 
1920. Lloyds Bank also has had a long relationship with Peru. 
On the other hand, Bank of America and Bank of Tokyo are 
relative newcomers, with their offices opening in the mid-1960s. 
Two European banks, Banca Commerciales Italiana (through 
SUDAMERIS) and Credit Lyonnais had subidiaries in Peru until 
the banking reform laws, when their participation in the 
subsidiaries was reduced to below 20% (although management 
remained decidedly oriented towards the old parents). 
The table also displays 3 banks which had operations 
in Peru prior to 1971. As noted in Chapter 3, Chase Manhattan 
bought majority control of a local bank in 1965. It was 
nationalized in 1970, but on terms highly favorable to Chase. 
Prior to 1966, Chemical Bank's relationship with Peru 
basically was limited to lines of credit to local banks; 
however, in 1965-1967 it became a major shareholder in Banco 
International. The purchase proved to be unwise because it 
generated resentment, was a key factor behind a mid-1968 law 
calling for "Peruvianization" of banks, and terminated in 
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nationalization in 1970 under the revised banking reform 
laws. 281/ Lastly, the Royal Bank of Canada, which had the 
second oldest foreign branch in Lima, closed its office at the 
Table 53 
PERU: 	 BANKS WITH BRANCHES, COUSIDIARIES OR AFFILIATES IN PERU AND THEIR 
IMPORTANCE AS LENDERS TO THE GOVERNMENT, 1965-1970 AND 1971-1976 
Date of 
Name 	 establishment 
I.. 
	
•Kane as a 
i• 	 :r to Peru— 
Relative comT%t- Importance 











Citicorp 1920 Major Major Inter- 	 Inter- 
mediate mediate 
Major Major 
Lloyds Bank 1936 Inter- 
mediate 
Low 	 Low Inter- 
mediate 
Minor 
Bank of Tokyo r Inter- 
mediate 












ltaliana d/ Inter- 
mediate 
Low 	 Low Minor Minor 
Credit Lyonnais e/ Inter- 
mediate 
- 	
Low Minor Minor 
Banks with firms 
in Peru nntil 1970 
Chase Manhattan f/ 1 	 -1965 Major Low 	 Low Inter- 
mediate 
Minor 
Chemical Conk L:7 1966-1967 inter- 
mediate 
- 	 Low Inter- 
mediate 
Royal Bank of 
Canada h/ 1920's M,er Inter- 
medXate 




Source: CEPAig on the basis 0* olfXcial data. 
a/ 	 on gross authorizations. in each period as presented in Chapter 5. 
b/ •••• • : on gross authorization scaled to size as presented in Chapter 7. 
1 1.3.• a on data on syndicated ,% :its as presented in Chapter 6. 
d/ Major foreign owner of Banco a• %edit°. Before banking reform laws this 
institution, through its affil. • to Sudameris, owned 62% of the local bank's stock. 
This was reduced to less than 
	 under the banking reform laws. 
e/ Had a large holding in the Bax: • de Lima. As a result of the banking reform laws 
its share was reduced to less. Ulan 20%. 
f/ R A%ht 51% of Eanco Continentol. Was nationalized in 1970 by the government under 
banking reform laws. 
fx/ 	 major shareholder in 2o.i% Internacional. Bought out by the government in 
• under the banking reform lows. 
h/ Close- its branch in the latt,in half of the 1960's. 
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end of the 1960s, presumably due in part to the controvery 
over "Peruvianization" of the local banks. 
Of all the banks with direct interests in Peru, Citicorp 
stands out for its importance. It was a major lender to Peru 
throughout the 12 years; it was a major lead bank and agent 
in syndicated credits, and its relative commitment to Peru 
was of an intermediate level. The bank of next importance 
is Bank of America followed by Bank of Tokyo and Lloyds Bank. 
Of distinctly less importance are the two banks with 
subsidiaries/affiliates in Lima. 
2. Did Direct Interest in Peru Affect the Behavior of the  
Banks? 
It is difficult to establish a causal relationship 
between operations in Lima and a bank's behavior as an 
international lender to the government. Nevertheless, some 
observations can be made in this regard. 
a) 	 The volume of lending.  
Analysis demonstrated earlier that banks appear to 
discriminate among borrowers through the volume of credit 
rather than through the pricing of loans. It is of value to 
explore whether the presence of a branch or affiliate in Lima 
caused a bank to lend more to Peru than it might have in the 
absence of such a direct relationship. The question is 
somewhat problematical without complete information on a 
bank's portfolio and management strategy. Thus, the reader 
should bear in mind that what follows is necessarily more 
conjecture than fact. 
It seems of significance that banks with branches in 
Lima had generally greater importance as lenders than banks 
with subsidiaries and affilliates. The stakes in branches 
and financial benefits derived from their activities 
presumably are greater in the former than in the latter. 
Nonetheless the question as to whether or not volume was 
unusual for the bank; and whether or not behavior was 
attributable to its direct relationship with the local 
economy, remains. 
The fact that Citicorp was a major lender and a major 
lead bank per se reveals no special behavior towards Peru. 
Citibank is the second largest banking institution in the 
world; it is known to be perhaps the most "transnational" 
commercial bank in the world; it has been a rather persistent 
lender to LDCs, particularly in Latin America; and it has 
been ranked at the top of major lead banks in world 
syndication.282/ Thus, its dominant position in Peru - a 
country that was generally acceptable to the market after 
1971 - may merely reflect the bank's overall position in world 
finance.283/ The only hint of a special relationship with 
Peru is that its relative commitment is of an intermediate 
level as compared to the other banks in the study. Citibank is 
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known to pursue a policy of relatively greater diversification 
(low relative commitment), consistent with its bold global 
lending strategy. 284/ However, its level of relative 
commitment was higher than any other bank with direct 
interests in Lima; indeed table 40 demonstrates that it was 
higher than almost all other superbanks lending to Peru. Thus, 
one could suspect that Citibank may have had a relatively 
heaVier commitment to Peru vis-a-vis its overall portfolio 
in developing countries. This conclusion would even seem 
logical given that the Lima branch is one of the oldest in 
the Citicorp network, giving Peru the distinction of being 
one of the bank's most familiar developing country clients. 
On the basis of volume, one cannot find a relatively 
more favorable attitude on the part of Bank of America. 
Although it is a major lender to Peru, this may be merely 
a function of its enormous size (NQ1 in the world) and 
dedication to international lending. Its intermediate position 
as a lead bank actually suggests a conservative attitude 
towards Peru because on a world scale Bank of America has 
been ranked near the very top of lead banks in syndication.285/ 
Also, its low level of relative commitment may be indicative 
of a conservative attitude since this bank - which has a low 
risk, low yield management policy - is known for less 
diversification than many other banks.286/ Thus if Peru had 
merited special attention by the bank, one would have 
expected a somewhat higher relative commitment. 
Owing to the fact that the study contains less 
supportive information for the Bank of Tokyo and Lloyds Bank, 
evaluations are in this case even more tenuous. Nevertheless, 
both banks are large (NQs 28 and 31, respectively) in world 
terms, but not sufficiently large to render as unduly low 
their position as lenders of intermediate importance. This 
is even more true given that Latin America, and Peru in 
particular, have not been oriented towards England or Japan 
(although the latter had recently grown in importance) in the 
post-war period. The intermediate position of Bank of Tokyo 
as a lead bank is not inconsistent with its world position 
in this regard. The intermediate position of Lloyds Bank, 
however, may be relatively lower than expected given that it 
has ranked in the top 10 lead banks of world syndication.287/ 
The above factors, coupled with the low level of relative 
commitments for both banks, on the surface would not lend 
support to the thesis of a special behavior towards Peru. 
As for the two banks with affiliates in Peru, their 
role as lenders and lead banks are not exceptional, and their 
relative commitments are low. Credit Lyonnais would seem to 
have had the least committed position of the two, given that 
it was the seventh largest bank in the world (1975) and has 
been in the top 10 lead banks of world syndication.288/ 	 It 
could be argued, however, that without the affiliates in Lima 
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their presence as lenders would have been even less 
significant. 
It would be interesting to explore whether or not the 
change in government policies in general, and towards local 
banks in particular, after 1968 affected the lending behavior 
of foreign banks with operations in Lima. Overall it would 
appear that there was no adverse effect after the initial 
breaking of the financial blockade in 1972. 
With regard to banks currently possessing operations 
in Lima, their importance as lenders to Peru either remained 
the same or increased between 1965-1970 and 1971-1976. And 
only in the case of Bank of America did relative commitments 
fall; however, this was relative to other banks as the 
absolute level of commitment was roughly the same in the two 
periods. 
In this context it may be more revealing to view the 
reaction of banks that had to close their operations in Peru 
as a result of the policy to Peruvianize the local financial 
market. It can be seen in Table 52 that there were no 
apparent adverse impacts on lending to the government; indeed, 
Chemical Bank and Royal Bank of Canada actually became more 
important lenders in 1971-1976, and even increased their 
relative commitment to the government. 
Notwithstanding the above, there is reason to believe 
that at least Chemical Bank had a relatively strong reaction 
to the military government's policies in general, and to the 
nationalization of its subsidiary in particular. While most 
major international banks had returned to lending to the 
government by 1972, and most certainly by 1973, Chemical 
Bank, number 23 in the world in terms of size (1975) was 
conspicuous by its absence. It did not extend any significant 
medium term credit to the government until the first half of 
1974. Moreover, on this occasion it entered the market in a 
very symbolic way by participating in the syndicated credit 
associated with the Greene Accord, which, of course, marked 
the formal establishment of peace between U.S. political-
commercial interests and the government of Peru. This 
observation coincides also with information from industry 
sources which claimed that for many years high ranking 
Chemical Bank officials were openly bearish on the military 
government of Peru. 
b) 	 Terms of Lending  
All the banks with operations in Lima, except Credit 
Lyonnais, figured in the Student's tests on average terms 
that appeared earlier in the chapter. It may be recalled 
that in general little significant deviation was found from 
market trends. However, an extremely rough statistical 
technique did hint that Bank of America possibly had a 
tendency to price flat fees under the prevailing market terms 
(see table 22 of the statistical appendix). However, aside 
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from the weakness of the test methodology itself, it is 
doubtful that this consitutes special behavior towards Peru. 
It is know to be an institution with a low risk, low yield 
strategy on lending. 289/ Therefore the lower fee structure 
may indicate a general management strategy of not placing 
emphasis on increasing yields through aggressive fee 
placements. 
With regard to creating favorable inflection points 
in market trends, only the Bank of Tokyo falls into this 
category. As witnessed earlier, in the first half of the 
Seventies it played a role in the lowering of spreads and 
the lengthening of maturities on government loans. However, 
this is probably more reflective of the general"strategies 
of Japanese banks in the period than any special behavior 
towards Peru. 
Another aspect of pricing which was not examined 
earlier, but would be of concern here, is the degree to which 
banks extended fixed interest rate loans. It has been shown 
that fixed interest rate loans pass the risk of inflation 
to the lending institution, while variable rates force a 
borrower to bear such risk. It is possible that a bank with 
direct operations in Lima might have been more inclined to 
extend fixed interest rate loans to the government in order 
gain favor and thus protect its local business. 
Table 54 displays the distribution of loans for banks 
with operations in Lima according to fixed or variable (LIBOR 
and prime spreads) interest rates. 
In 1965-1970 a number of banks extended a greater 
proportion of their lending in fixed-interest rates than was 
the norm, as measured by the average for all banks in the 
period. Bank of Tokyo and Banca Commerciale Italiana extended 
all their loans with fixed rates. However, both banks lent 
a relatively small amount of resources in the period, making 
it difficult to conclusively attribute to them a special 
strategy involving fixed interest rate loans to the government. 
The only other bank to extend an unusually high proportion 
of fixed interest rate credits was Bank of America. This 
may have been due to general policy since the bank is know 
within the industry to be more inclined than most to extend 
fixed interest loans. 290/ However, given that it was 
attempting in the mid-71770s to open a branch in Lima, there 
is a greater likelihood that the high percentage is directly 
linked to prospective business operations in Peru. Indeed, 
all the fixed interest credit was extended in 1965, a year 
in which the bank's application for a branch was being 
considered by the government. 
Turning to 1971-1976, in this period there is little 
support for the thesis that banks with operations in Lima 
might have been more inclined for reasons of public relations 
to extend fixed interest rate loans. Only one bank -Bank of 
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Table 54 
PERU: DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS ACCORDING TO WHETHER PRICED WITH FIXED INTEREST 
RATE, LIBOR SPREAD OR PRIME RATE SPREAD FOR FOREIGN BANKS WITH OPERATIONS 




	 1971-1976  
Fixed Libor Prime Total-a/Fixed Libor Prime 
Totala/ 
	
rate spread spread 
	
rate spread spread 
With branches in  
Lima 
Bank of America 	 30.2 
	 - 	 69.8 	 100.0 	 0.9 	 97.5 	 1.6 	 100.0 
Citicorp 	 12.5 - 87.5 100.0 - 98.8 1.2 100.0 
Bank of Tokyo 	 100.0 
	 - 	 - 	 100.0 20.3 	 76.0 	 3.7 	 100.0 
Lloyds Bank 	 - 	 100.0 	 - 	 170.0 	 - 	 94.7 	 5.3 	 100.0 
With subsidiaries/ 
affiliates in Lima  
Banca Commerciale 
Italiana 
	 100.0 - - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 
Credit Lyonnais 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 100.0 	 - 	 100.0 
	 - 	 100.0 
With operations in  
Lima until 1970  
Chase Manhattan 	 14.5 
	
- 	 85.5 	 100.0 	 2.5 	 97.5 	 - 	 100.0 
Chemical Bank 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 100.0 	 - 	 100.0 	 - 	 100.0 
Royal Bank of 
Canada 	 - 	
- 100.0 100.0 - 83.0 17.0 100.0 
All banks in the  
study 	 15.8 3.4 80.8 100.0 1.3 94.1 	 3.5 100.0  
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
;77717Y sum to less than 100 due to the presence of interest rates distinct 
from those cited in the table. 
Tokyo- had an unusually high percentage of fixed interest 
credits. Without more information on this institution's 
global strategy, however, it is difficult to determine whether 
or not such behavior was due to either special interests in 
Lima or its generalized policy of aggressive lending to 
developing countries. 
The relatively low percentage of fixed interest credits 
extended by Bank of America could be viewed with some surprise. 
As mentioned above, it has the reputation of extending a 
greater percentage of fixed interest credits than the industry 
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average; however, this is not reflected in its loans to the 
government of Peru, even though one might have expected some 
consideration given a branch operation in Lima. This may be 
another indication of a relatively conservative stance 
towards Peru during the period 1971-1976. 
c) 	 The nature of loans  
A final point concerning banks with operations in 
Lima is whether or not the nature of the parent's external 
lending was in any way conditioned by their direct 
relationship with Peru. Again, without complete information 
on a parent bank's portfolio and management strategy any 
determination in this area is necessarily inconclusive. 
However, there is some indication that patterns of lending 
were determined by broader considerations than those 
underlying loans by banks without a direct operational link 
to the country. 
It was presumed that parent banks might show a tendency 
to extend, to more than a usual degree, infrastructural 
project loans owing to their high public visibility. Also, 
loans of free disposition were thought to be another type of 
loan that these banks might have been more inclined to offer 
because of the favorable impression it could make on 
government authorities. As far as sectors are concerned, one 
might have expected the parents to have been relatively more 
committed to economic and social infrastructure, again for 
reasons of creating a good image. 
Although some of the banks with offices in Lima did 
have lending operations with one or more of these 
charac.teristics, the data did no reveal any conclusive 
tendencies in this regard. Only the Bank of Tokyo 
approximated the defined behavior. However, there were 
specific instances in which the type of lending undertaken 
clearly was related to image and concern about local 
operations. Three examples are provided below. 
One clear case of a loan to the government that was 
a direct link to a foothold in the local market involves 
Bank of America. In 1965 it had an application pending for 
a new branch in Lima. In support of its application the 
parent bank approved a "showcase" loan, i.e., a highly visible 
credit that under normal circumstances probably would not 
have been attractive to a lender, particularly in the 
generally conservative environment of the 1960s. The loan 
was a large 10 million dollar credit to the Municipality of 
Lima for the improvement of the city's road system. The 
money carried a fixed interest rate of 6.5% for 6 1/2 years. 
Such a credit clearly had its risks, notwithstanding the 
presence of a guarantee by the central government. Basically 
the dollar resources were to cover the costs of a project 
that had the capacity to generate neither foreign nor local 
resources for repayment. 
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Another example of where local operations induced 
foreign currency credit to the government was in 1972. In 
that year parents of all foreign branches in Lima extended 
credits for 1-1i 	 million dollars each for the import of 
cattle. The terms were very favorable for the period, ranging 
from 1.5% over a prime rate to 1.125% over LIBOR, with 
maturities ranging from 5 to 9 years. Both the terms of the 
credit and its destination would not indicate an attractive 
venture for the banks. However, the banks clearly had motives 
external to the loan itself: (i) the credit was formally 
conditioned by the continued existence of branches in Lima 
and (ii) the value of the loan could be counted towards the 
minimum capital requirements of the branches. 
The last example involves the finance of the 
transandean oil pipeline. As will be shown in Chapter IX, 
the government initially encountered some resistence in the 
finance of the project. However, in the final loan package 
Citicorp, Lloyds Bank and Banca Comercial Italiana (through 
Sudameris) were present as important lenders in the venture. 
These are three examples of the parents' foreign 
currency lending being influenced by concern for business 
operations in the local economy. It is possible that with 
more complete information on the banks' decision making 
process more evidence of this nature could be uncovered. 
Unfortunately, the paucity of published data on the specific 
activities of the banks is a reality confronting any study 
of this sort. 
The above analysis of the foreign currency lending of 
banks with business entities in Lima, as sketchy as it may 
be, leads one to believe that some banks did, in varying 
ways, alter the general pattern of their behavior vis-a-vis  
government loans to accomodate broader considerations than 
found in banks without a direct link to the country. But 
the evidence is far less than conclusive. This may mean 
that banks are more likely to accomodate their interests 
in the local market through the local currency lending by 
their branch or subsidiary to the public sector; only limited 
image making for the government in terms of the access to, 
and cost of, foreign credits seem to be manifest in the 
behavior of parent banks with branches or affiliates in the 
country. Actually, this type of strategy would make sense 
from the standpoint of the banks since local currency loans 
to the government would be subject to less risk than those 
in convertible currencies. 
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Chapter VIII 
REVIEW OF PART II 
The preceeding three chapters on bank lending to Peru 
have had the two-fold purpose of: i) documenting the 
changing characteristics of commercial bank loans over the 
12-year period; and ii) demonstrating that commercial banks 
are not a homogeneous group; that individual institutions 
behave differently and therefore merit more discriminating 
analysis than heretofore available. The broad scope of the 
prior analysis makes a review desirable. Although by its 
very nature the material is difficult to synthesize, the 
purpose of this review chapter is to highlight the major 
findings of Part II of the study. 
1. The Characteristic of Bank Loans  
With respect to the basic characteristics of lending 
over the 12 years, radical changes were found in the amount, 
sources, mechanisms and terms of credit. 
Prior to 1970 the government's access to commercial 
bank credit was restricted and conditional, the tenor of 
credit averaged only 5 years, loans were concentrated in 
refinance operations and most of the credit was funded out 
of the U.S. financial market by just six large U.S. institutions. 
In the first half of the 1970s, however, one found a massive 
transformation in relations with commercial banks. Not only 
did the period witness a phenomenal increase in the volume 
of credit flows, but lending came from many new sources. The 
number of commercial lenders rose from 27 to 167; and while 
U.S. banks still accounted for the majority of credit, 
important lending came from Japanese, European and Canadian 
institutions. The nominal base cost of credit increased with 
respect to the 1960s because loans were generally priced on 
the LIBOR (as opposed to the lower domestic prime rate 
employed in the Sixties) and because banks introduced many 
new fees to their credits. However, the higher cost structure 
was offset, at least in part, by longer maturities, which 
averaged 7 years for 1971-1976, but on occasions extended as 
long as 10 years. In the 1970s the banks also were determined 
to have diversified the type of loans they were willing to 
extend: although refinance loans remained the most common 
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transaction, loans of free disposition and for projects took 
on a very significant profile. And importantly, banks -in 
solidarity with home country TNCs and governments- were found 
to have extended a large volume of credit to help the 
government finance payments of compensation to foreign firms 
nationalized in the reform of foreign capital. While the 
terms of refinance, free disposition, project and capital goods 
import loans were all broadly similar to the global averages 
for credit, this was not the case for nationalization loans, 
which displayed significantly more lenient terms on account 
of the political character of this type of transaction. 
An expanding eurocurrency market and the emergence 
of syndicated credits were discovered to be two important 
factors underlying the transformation of lending in the 1970s. 
The growing access of banks of all sizes to the unregulated 
eurocurrency pools in sites such as London and Luxembourg 
permitted easy funding of loans for newcomers to international 
finance. Meanwhile, the syndicated credit -which accounted 
for 80% of the value of Peru's loans- permitted banks to 
tailor loan volume to their size and risk preference; it also 
allowed banks inexperienced in international finance to 
"hang onto the coattails" of the bigger, internationally 
established banks which performed credit evaluation, 
organized the syndicates and assumed responsibility for 
enforcement of the loan agreement. Meanwhile, these lead 
banks could pass the cost of their services onto the borrower 
through the introduction of frotn-end fees and other charges. 
Banks were found to have extended longer maturities on 
syndicated credits than single bank loans, but this was 
offset equally or more by higher interest rates, higher flat 
fees and higher prepayment penalties. Nevertheless, the 
longer maturity, coupled with the reduced administrative costs 
of large volume loans, probably made the syndicated credit a 
more beneficial transaction for Peru. 
Lastly, analysis resulted in pinpointing some potential 
drawbacks to the syndicated credit of the 1970s. One 
important one was that the vast majority of credit was 
mobilized by just 5 major lead banks, offsetting at least in 
part the favorable effects of the notable numerical and 
geographical dispersion in the direct sources of commercial 
credit that occurred in the period. In other words, Peru 
appeared dependent on a very small club of banks for access 
to the world syndicated credit market. A second problem is 
associated with the competitiveness of syndication. Data 
showed that through most of 1970s individual loans had a 
significant degree of competitive international character; 
however, as soon as Peru displayed economic weakness in 1976 
the banks joined together into regional groups and negotiated 
as a block through a single Steering Committee. Syndicated 
loans lost their international and competitive character and 
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the banks insisted on identical terms and conditions for 
loans from each regional entity. While a Steering Committee 
and regionally based syndication facilitated coordination 
among the banks in a situation unconducive to new credit 
extension, this does not hide the fact that the new 
arrangement of 1976 was collusive in nature and further eroded 
the bargaining position of a borrower already weakened by 
economic difficulties. 
2. The Heterogeneous Behavior of the Banks  
The three previous chapters provided ample evidence 
that banks behaved differently in many important ways. 
In the 1960s commercial lending was dominated by a 
handful of big international U.S. banks and this provided 
for a relatively homogeneous environment. However, with the 
entrance of many new lenders in the 1970s bank behavior 
gained a multifarious appearance. 
The newcomers to international finance displayed an 
aggressive posture with respect to loans to the government 
They extended large amounts of unprotected credit without 
conditions. They also were likely to extend loans of free 
disposition and general refinance because such untied credit 
was a quick and easy way for the government to borrow and 
thereby unable the banks to build up a market position in 
Peru. Furthermore, for similar reasons these institutions 
were inclined to finance sectors of basic infrastructure and 
social services, traditionally unattractive activities for 
many banks. Finally, aggressive lenders continuously 
undercut the prevailing market terms for loans to Peru, thereby 
helping to steadily reduce interest margins and lengthen 
maturities. 
Facing the newcomers, the traditionally international 
banks of the 1960s reacted differently. In 1969-1971 all 
these lenders were very reserved and heavily conditioned 
their finance to Peru, either because of concern about Peru's 
economic situation, or because of formal cooperation in the 
financial blockade against the government. However, beginning 
in 1972 many of them began to lend in a defensive fashion in 
order to protect their market position. They matched the 
amounts, terms and few conditions that characterized loans 
granted by the aggressive new lenders. Other established 
international lenders -still piqued by the military 
government's policies- openly resisted trends to varying 
degrees; some maintained a reluctant presence in the Peruvian 
market, while others simply avoided the market altogether. It 
was not until the Greene Accord, in 1974, that most of these 
holdouts fully entered the Peruvian market. 
Empirical work demonstrated that Peru represented a 
relatively minor part of each bank's total portfolio; the 
principal of risk diversification was sufficiently manifest 
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to believe that a default by Peru would not threaten the 
viability of any institution. However, within this context, 
there were notable relative differences in the level of 
exposure of the banks in Peru. In the 1970s many of the 
aggressive lenders had the highest relative commitments to 
Peru. Some of the large traditionally international lenders 
of the 1960s showed little variation in their relative 
commitment over the 12 years, reflecting the defensive nature 
of their lending behavior in the 1970s. The restricted 
behavior of other traditional lenders reflected itself in a 
significant decline in the relative commitment between the 
1960s and the 1970s. 
Other empirical tests showed that over time individual 
commercial banks generally could not significantly deviate 
from the market's price of loans; in other words there was 
-with a few exceptions- general uniformity in the interest 
margins and maturities of credit. This suggested that the 
differential risk assessment of individual banks was undertaken 
through the volume of credit and non-price conditions. 291/ 
Individual banks also were found not to be indifferent 
about the types of loans they extended or the economic sectors 
for which they provided support. Some banks followed a 
traditional pattern of lending, preferring the perceived 
security of loans for projects and capital goods imports and 
preferring to support commercially productive sectors. Other 
banks displayed a more bold strategy, directing their credit 
to the traditionally less attractive loans of refinance and 
of free disposition, and also showing a relatively greater 
propensity to finance basic social and economic infrastructure. 
In many cases this latter strategy was pursued by the 
aggressive newcomers of the 1970s. In some instances the 
big, traditionally international banks also pursued a similar 
strategy out of indifference to the type of loan or economic 
sector and/or out of a desire to match the offers of the 
newcomers for competitive reasons. 
Data also demonstrated that some banks' risk preference 
induced them to cover a high percentage of their loans with 
guarantees of export credit agencies. Alternatively, other 
banks showed little interest in such protection. 
With regard to syndicated loans, lead banks 
demonstrated far less than a uniform strategy in organizing 
credit. The newcomers to international lending gained 
mandates to lead syndicates through offers to undercut the 
prevailing market trends for credit. They also established 
working relationships with a wide variety of other newcomers 
that were disposed to join in syndication with the lead bank 
and to price cut as well. Working relationships manifested 
themselves in relatively large clusters of banks that 
repeatedly participated in syndicates led by the newcomers. 
The big, traditionally international banks, in contrast, 
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displayed little interest in price cutting and only had a 
reduced number of working relationships, which interestingly 
involved other big, internationally established banks. 
Another finding was that banks with branches in Peru 
occasionally altered the pattern of their foreign currency 
loans to the government out of consideration for local 
business interests. However, the altered pattern was far 
from conclusive, raising the suspicion that "protective" 
lending -if it exists at all- is done by the local operation 
itself and in local currency. Thus, substantial benefits in 
terms of foreign currency loans to the government do not 
appear to have been derived from the presence of a foreign 
branch bank in the local economy. 
Finally, in the economy crisis of 1976 all banks were 
found to have taken a conservative attitude on the government. 
However, the detailed treatment of the 1976 refinance credits 
in Chapter X will reveal that within a restricted environment 
some banks behaved in a more flexible fashion than others. 
The above review has traced at a general level the 
major findings with regard to the differential behavior of 
commercial banks. Now the purpose will be to focus on 
similar findings but at a more institutional level. 292/ 
Among the aggressive newcomers of. the 1970s, Wells 
Fargo clearly stood out as an important institution. It rose 
from nowhere to become a major lender to the government and 
one of the most important lead banks in syndication. Its 
relative commitment also was the highest of any regular bank. 
Wells Fargo captured a large piece of the Peruvian market 
through the aggressive pricing of its loans and the ability 
to organize syndicates with internationally inexperienced 
banks that were similarly disposed to undercut the market 
price for loans to Peru. Other important aggressive lenders 
of the early 1970s were the Bank of Tokyo, Dresdner Bank, 
Crocker National, Bancal Tristate Corporation and American 
Express International, all of which displayed lending behavior 
similar to Wells Fargo. 
A number of banks showed openly restrictive behavior 
towards the government. In this group there is Chemical Bank 
and First Chicago which stayed away from Peru until the Greene 
Accord of 1974. Morgan Guaranty was a very cautious lender, 
moderating its position only in 1974 when it led the syndicated 
credit that grew out of the Greene Accord. Bankers Trust 
displayed a conservative attitude in a number of ways; it 
slipped from a major lender in the 1960s to an intermediate 
level in the 1970s; its level of relative commitment underwent 
significant decline; and it was one of the few banks that 
showed significant deviation from the market's price of loans 
to Peru -in the direction of shorter than average maturities. 
Continental Illinois also appears to have been less than_ 
sanguine about the military government, as reflected in a 
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decline in its relative commitment between the 1960s and the 
1970s. For similar reasons the Charter New York Corp., First 
National Bank of Boston and the National Detroit Corp. all 
appear to have behaved more conservatively in the 1970s with 
respect to loans to the government. 
Other banks could be classified as having had 
conservative strategies on the basis of export credit 
guarantees covering a high percentage of their credit. These 
institutions included Schroders, Credit Lyonnais, National 
and Commercial Banking Group, Banque de l'Indochine et de 
Suez, Banque Worms, Amro Bank, Banque Francais du Commerce 
Exterieur and Algemene Bank Nederland, to name just some. 
The established international banks of the 1960s that 
reacted defensively to the newcomers, more or less following 
trends created by them up until 1975, were Citicorp, Bank of 
America, Bank of Nova Scotia and Manufacturers Hanover Trust. 
This group would vacillate between aggressiveness and 
conservativeness depending on what was required to defend 
market positions. 
When banks are viewed from the standpoint of national 
origin, the aggressive lenders of the 1970s were Japanese 
banks, U.S. regional banks, Italian banks and consortia. 
These banks freely extended credit and heavily participated 
in price cutting in order to gain a market position. Also, 
they had a high propensity to extend loans of refinance and 
of free disposition and/or to support social and economic 
infrastructure. 
More conservative behavior was found in British, French, 
German and Swiss institutions. These banks showed a 
relatively greater inclination to channel loans into the 
traditionally more secure project and capital goods loans 
and/or loans supporting directly productive economic sectors. 
British and French institutions also had a high propensity 
to secure their credits with guarantees of home country export 
credit agencies. 
Lastly, when viewed from the standpoint of size, there 
was no overwhelming evidence of heterogeneous behavior. Large 
banks, however, were determined to have dominated the 
organization of syndicated credits for Peru. Data also 
suggested that intermediate sized banks pursued more 
conservative lending strategies than their very large and 
smaller counterparts. The explanation behind this was that 
large banks, by virtue of their size and international 
experience could assume risks that other banks might want 
to avoid. Meanwhile, smaller banks had to assume a relatively 




THE IMPACT OF COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS ON THE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY OF PERU 

Chapter IX 
COMMERCIAL BANKS' IMPACT ON PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 
When reviewing the impact of commercial bank lending 
on Peru, an obvious area of analysis is the impact on 
project development. Project loans, of course, are a direct 
link to real activity in the economy and involve investments 
which have both present and future implications for growth 
and development. In the case of Peru, project loans carried 
more than usual importance given the state's drive after 
1968 to expand its role in the productive sectors of the 
economy. Chapter V analysed project loans from the standpoint 
of the banks; this subsection will focus on how commercial 
bank project finance supported the government's development 
program. 
A. GENERAL 
Analysis in Chapter V demonstrated that projects 
accounted for 5% and 15% of total unguaranteed lending by 
commercial banks in 1965-1970 and 1971-1976, respectively. 
If project loans with guarantees of export credit agencies 
are included there is a significant change only in the latter 
period, in which projects' participation in total lending 
rises to slightly more than one-fifth. 
One obvious question about bank support of project 
development concerns the destination of resources. Table 55 
provides a distribution of bank project lending among 
different sectors for 1965-1970 and 1971-1976. The table 
also presents a distribution of major government projects 
among the same sectors for the period 1968-1975. Since the 
state's investment program did not begin in earnest until 
the 1970s, there probably is a considerable degree of 
congruence between data for 1968-1975 and the 
distribution of bank lending in 1971-1976. 
Remembering that bank lending for projects in absolute 
terms was relatively small in 1965-1970, it is shown that 
about three-fourths of all loans went for transport; and 
this, incidentally, also represents a priority area of public 
investment in the period in question. 293/ Projects related 
to energy were a distant second in terms of importance, and 
mostly involved hydroelectric power systems. 
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Table 55 
PERU, DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL BANK PROJECT LOANS ACCORDING 
TO SECTOR, 1965-1970 AND 1971-197e/ 
(Percent of total) 
Distribution of project loans 
extended by commercial banks 
Distribution of all 
major public sector 
projects!! 
1965-1970 1971-1925 1968-1975 
Agriculture 3.0 3.2 17.7 
Fishing 1.7 
Mining 11.8 6.4 
Manufacturing 6.0 20.5 15.8 
Energy 10.2 46.5 45.3 
(oil)c/ (—) (43.6) (26.2) 
Water sanitation 4.8 5.8 3.5 
Transport 73.8 0.1 7.0 
Communications 2.3 2.6 
Services 12.2 0.1 
(health) (12.2) (—) 
(education) (—) 
Other 
Total 100 WO Mk 
Sourcess Bank loans: CEPAL, on the basis of official date; public sector projeots: derived from data 
in the Ministry of Finance, La Situaci6n Econ6mica—Finintiera del Pais,  
12 February 1976, table 9. 
a/ Credits with and without guarantees of export credit agencies. 
b/ Major projects only; accounts for about 40% of the value of all public sector investment for the 
period, incorporating both local and foreign costs. 
c/ Includes oil pipeline. 
It can be appreciated from table 55 that in the 
Seventies energy projects were of very high priority to the 
government, accounting for 45% of the total value of major 
projects. Within the rubric of energy, the development of 
Peru's oil resources stands out as it absorbed more than one-
half of the resources allocated in this area (the remainder 
basically involved hydroelectric power). It also is shown 
that within the various sectors of project development, 
commercial banks channeled 44% of their loans to oil-related 
projects. Thus commercial banks clearly lent a more than 
proportional amount of their resources to this national 
endeavor. 
After energy, the second most important area of public 
sector projects was agriculture. Investments involved large 
and costly irrigation systems in Chira-Piura, Majes and 
Tinajones. These were designed to improve farming 
productivity and develop population centers in certain coastal 
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regions. Banks, however, did not become very involved in the 
investments as only 3% of commercial bank project lending 
flowed to this type of activity. 
The next most important sector for government projects 
is manufacturing, which accounted for 16% of the value of 
major state investments. As mentioned in Chapter III, the 
government fostered investments in productive activities 
previously dominated by private (and especially foreign 
private) capital. Thus state activities in this sector are 
perhaps one of the better manifestations of the reorientation 
of government development policy after 1968; and banks 
dedicated more than 20% of their lending to manufacturing 
ventures, making it the second most important area of bank 
finance for projects. 
Another area of importance for bank project lending 
was mining, into which roughly 12% of the loans flowed. In 
terms of the government's major projects, mining accounted 
for 6% of the total value of investments. The high priority 
copper projects Cerro Verde I and II dominated activities in 
this area. 
Also cf significance was health services. It too 
accounted for 12% of bank project finance. The projects 
mostly involved construction of hospitals. The relatively 
high profile of commercial banks in this type of finance is 
contrasted with the fact that ventures in health services may 
be considered wholly uncommercial in nature. 
Thus, overall, the data would suggest that the banks 
provided substantial direct support to the government's 
investment program. With the exception of agriculture and 
hydroelectric power, bank finance flowed to projects of clear 
national priority. In relative terms, a considerable amount 
of finance even went to social services which are not usually 
considered to be an attractive area for commercial banks. 
B. EXAMINING THE ROLE OF BANKS IN PROJECT FINANCE 
In reviewing the nature of commercial bank support 
of projects, no mention has been made of the precise role of 
these institutions in the financing of investment programs. 
Did the banks fund entire projects or did they play some other 
role in overall finance? 
Traditionally bankers have viewed their loans in 
projects as a way to "complement institutional and export 
agency credits and augment domestic financing of construction 
costs" 294/ In other words, bank loans are considered as 
one of many "layers" of financing derived from a number of 
private and official sources. Bankers also do not see their 
loans as providing long term support and therefore they 
expect to be repaid before other lenders. 295/ 
Thus, banks claim not to be major financiers of a 
project, but rather one element in a larger overall resource 
package. Unfortunately, there has been little empirical 
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evidence to support this view, or any other for that matter, 
leaving quite vague the precise role of these institutions 
in the direct investment activities of developing countries. 
Thus, in the course of this study research was undertaken to 
construct a more complete picture of how Peruvian projects 
were financed from abroad. Of interest was the role of banks 
vis-a-vis 'other financial institutions with respect to both 
the amounts and terms of lending, and the relation of all 
institutions to suppliers. Information of this type on a 
selected number of public sector projects, of varying degrees 
of size and importance, is presented in table 30 of the 
statistical appendix. 
A summary of the relative importance of banks in the 
13 selected projects is presented in table 56. Their 
participation varied greatly from a low of 1% of total 
foreign finance to a high of 100% of total finance. However, 
if one considers credits guaranteed by home country export 
credit agencies to be in fact government loans, then the 
aforementioned observation that commercial banks are only one 
layer of a multi-layered financial package appears to be 
accurate. Leaving aside very small projects, the only project 
Table 56 
PERU; RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF BANKS AS FOREIGN FINANCIERS OF 
SELECTED PUBLIC SECTOR PROJECTS, 19724977 
Total value 
of foreign 	 Distribution of loans (%) 
Projects loans' (millions of 	 Commercial banks Suppliers, Government, Multilateral Other Total dollars or 	 Guaran- 	 Unguaran- 
equivalent) 	 teed 	 teed 4/ il Total 
NO 
	
1 2.8 	 100 100 
Ng 	 2 2.8 	 64.3 64.3 14.3 21.4 100 
NO 
	 3 1.2 	 100 100 - 100 
ND 	 4 3.8 	 34.2 34.2 65.8 - 100 
NO 
	 5 42.0 	 30.9) 	 ., 31.9 53.1 15.0 100 
NO 6 29.5 	 40.5 	 13.0 25.8 74.2 100 
NO 	 7 742.11/ 	 1.6 	 22.3. 23.9 30.7 344c/ 2.8 8.5 100 
NO 
	 8 28.6 	 36.4 	 18.2 54.6 3.1 42.3 100 
W 9 3.2 	 84.4 	 15.6 100 100 
NQ 10 72.3 
	 30.0 	 40.4 70.4 29.6 100 
NO 11 26.5 
	
TOO 	 - 1oo . 100 
Ng 12 271.14 
	
...; 	 .B.2 '1.0 98.8 100 
Ng 13 • 73.90. 	 A.7. 	 6.1 6.8- 87.8 5.4 100 
Source: Table 30 of the statistical appendix., 
a/ Guaranteed credits are those with the suport of home country export credit agencies. 
1/ Excludes loans for ji0.6 million and 59 million 0 Marks. 
c/ Includes loan with unidentified participation of suppliers. 
d/ Excludes a bilateral loan for 5 million Finnish marks. 
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in which banks had a very large unsecured participation was 
NQ10 -the Cerro Verde copper mine- and this amounted to 
approximately 40% of the total foreign resource package. 
Otherwise, commercial bank participation was a fifth or less, 
with the remainder covered by some combination of foreign 
suppliers, governments, multilateral agencies, etc. 
The observation that banks are merely medium term 
suppliers of project finance already has been confirmed in 
Chapter V; as shown in table 29 unguaranteed project loans 
contained an average maturity of only 6.9 years in the period 
1971-1976. When guaranteed bank credits are incorporated, 
the average maturity rises to only slightly above 7 years. 
A casual examination of table 30 of the statistical appendix, 
however, might suggest that the effect of the relatively 
short bank maturities was assuaged by longer maturities on 
suppliers' credits and official loans. This undoubtedly is 
true in the case of some projects. However, as shown in 
figure 3 of Chapter IV, in the 1970s only multilateral 
agencies consistently offered maturities that were very much 
longer than those of commercial bank credits; and these 
latter agencies had the absolute value of their credit to 
Peru limited by political and institutional constraints. 
Thus overall, one suspects that projects with the 
participation of commercial banks had a less of a layered 
appearance with respect to maturities than they did with 
respect to the amounts financed by individual institutions. 
Although a more detailed study on project loans would be 
required in order to arrive at firm conclusions in this area, 
one can be concerned about the fact that average maturities 
on projects displayed a more of a medium than long term 
character. This has adverse implications for broad-based 
project development and servicing of the foreign debt because 
the process of development is normally associated with 
activities that involve, for numerous reasons, long gestation 
periods. 
C. THE OIL PIPELINE 
Before closing the chapter on project development, it 
is worthwhile to examine the role of banks in the transandean 
oil pipeline, which marked one of the most important projects, 
and surely the most costly one, programmed by the government. 
The transandean pipeline clearly was of the highest 
national priority. From the very outset of the 1970s 
expectations of considerable reserves of petroleum in the 
Amazon offered prospects of Peru covering its growing oil 
deficit and of generating abundant export revenue. This in 
turn would permit Peru to finance its economic development 
program and cover external obligations. The problem was how 
to bring the crude to market. 
One alternative would have been to barge the petroleum 
down the Amazon River through Brazil to the East Coast. The 
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petroleum,could then be sold to Brazil or exported to third 
markets, using a fraction of these export receipts to purchase 
foreign petroleum for the domestic consumption that coastal 
land and offshore wells could not satisfy. The attraction of 
such a strategy was its relatively minimal cost. However, 
aside from important geopolitical considerations, the plan 
was deemed impractical because of the changing water levels 
on jungle tributaries, which could have inhibited a steady 
volume of shipments via river barge. Thus, authorities 
discarded this option at an early stage in favor of the more 
costly oil pipeline. 
The government moved ahead quickly with the program. 
By early 1973 it already had commissioned and received a 
feasibility study recommending a 850 kilometer pipeline 
between the jungle and the Bayover port on the North Coast of 
Peru. The pipeline would have a nominal capacity of 200,000 
barrels a day, which could be sharply increased through the 
installation of additional pumping capacity. The initial 
cost estimate totalled 350 million dollars and the 
construction would take about 2 years. 
Moving ahead so quickly with the project clearly 
represented a calculated risk since at the time there was no 
firm idea about the magnitude of the reserves in the jungle. 
But as related in Chapter III, the initial jungle probes 
proved extremely encouraging, generating a state of euphoria 
in the public sector that place considerable momentum behind 
the project. 
By early 1974 negotiations for the finance of the oil 
pipeline were fully underway. However, the government 
encountered a less than enthusiastic reception. Costs had 
escalated sharply (to over 500 million dollars) and some 
doubted the quality of reports filed by 2 independent oil 
consultants confirming proven reserves in the jungle 
sufficient to justify the massive pipeline venture. Even 
after the Greene Accord Peruvian authorities were politely 
turned away from many sources of finance, including those of 
a bilateral and multilateral type.296/ However, through 
tenacity, innovation, and the tapping of many different 
institutions, the pipeline obtained finance; indeed, the 
project eventually became oversubscribed. Ultimately, the 
government raised nearly 800 million dollars in foreign credit 
for the rapidly escalating costs of the project; in effect, 
the foreign loans on this one project were equivalent to 
roughly one-fifth of the public sector's foreign debt at the 
end of 1976. 
Table 30 in the appendix displays the myraid of foreign 
loans secured to cover foreign and domestic costs of the 
project. It can be seen that the largest part of the finance 
came from the Japanese Government, which was especially 
concerned about securing petroleum. The problem of the 
debatable level of reserves was unimportant to Japan; it 
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planned to have claim on an assured portion of the crude 
coming through the pipeline as part of the agreement for 
repayment of the loans. 297/ Thus, for this lender, whether 
or not total reserves were sufficient to justify the pipeline 
was irrelevant; the only matter of importance was that it 
could confirm the existence of enough oil for sale to repay 
the credit. 
From the standpoint of the study, it is notable that 
an important source of funds was private commercial banks, 
which extended over 150 million dollars in unprotected credits, 
equivalent to approximately one-fifth of the total financial 
package. 
The two syndicated credits by Wells Fargo represent 
rather unique transactions. Apparently in an attempt to fill 
a financial gap, authorities approached the Government of Iran 
for special assistance. Iran agreed, but on the condition 
that commercial banks would act as intermediaries for the 
credit. Thus the Iranian government deposited 100 million 
dollars in an array of banks which in turn Wells Fargo 
organized into two separate syndicates. The basic 
characteristics of the two syndicates are found in table 57. 
In the two general credits Wells Fargo committed very 
little of its own resources, while enjoying the benefits of 
agent and management fees. With regard to the participants, 
the greate& contributions came from Japanese and "other" banks. 
This latter group is interesting because it constitutes a 
signigicant number of banks not in the mainstream of 
international finance (e.g., Banco Urquijo, Banco Atlantico, 
Bank Melli Iran, to mention a few). Reflecting the fact that 
the Iranian resources passed through commercial intermediaries, 
the interest rate was steep at 1.75 points over the LIBOR. 
The only real condition for the project loan involved reports 
from two independent firms of petroleum consultants confirming 
the existence of sufficient oil to justify the pipeline. 
Dresdner Bank headed the other major syndicated credit. 
It involved four institutions, but as shown in table 57, for 
practical purpose it represented a two bank credit involving 
Dresdner and Deutsche Bank. The resources were earmarked 
for the purchase of pipes from a German supplier after the 
government discovered that the materials could not be 
produced in Peru as had been originally planned. The terms 
of the credit were by no means easy, with an interest spread 
of 2.0% over LIBOR and a short maturity of 5 years. 
Referring to table 30 of the appendix one finds the 
other banks with unsecured transactions to be Citicorp and 
Crocker National Bank, the former, of course, having a branch 
facility in Lima. 
Clearly, then, banks played a key role in the finance 
of the pipeline, a project of high national priority. In 
particular, the loans are another example of the importance 
of Wells Fargo, Dresdner, Citibank and Crocker National Bank 
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to the government of Peru. The fact that little support for 
the project could be secured from official lenders underlies 
the flexibility of commercial banks and the key role they 
played in the national development program. However, there 
clearly was a cost for this flexibility, as manifest in the 
relatively high interest spreads and short maturities of the 
credit. Also, the costs proved to be more burdensome than 
anticipated since petroleum output fell short of expectations, 
causing the pipeline to operate, at least in its initial years, 
at only half of rated capacity. 
Table 57 
PERU: MAJOR COMMERCIAL BANK SYNDICATES FOR FINANCE OF THE TRANSANEAN 






N9  3 
1. General 




2. Number of banks 
3. Avg. Int. Rank of banks a/ 








Wells Fargo b/ 
(2.0%) 
50.0 	 24.4 




1.0% 	 0.5% 
18 	 4 
27 	 14 
Wells Fargo b/ Dresdner 
(2.0%) 	 Bank b/ 
5. Managers (names and percentage 
of credit extended) 
Iran Overseas 
Investment 
Long Term Credit 




Bank c/ (12.0%) (41.8%) 




6. Participants (percentage 
of credit extended) 
United States 13.0% 14.0% 
Japan 38.0% 
Canada 4.0% 4.0% 
United Kingdom 22.0% 10.0% 





Other 30.0% 12.0% 8.2% 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data; footnote (c) is from the Banker 
Research Unit, Who Owns What in World Banking 1977-1978, London, 1977. 
a/ On a scale of 1-300 in world banking for the year 1975. See footnote c/of 
table 20. 
b/ Also manager. 
c/ A consortium bank owned jointly by: Barclays Bank (6.25%); Bank Melli Iran 
(25%); Bank of America (6.25%); Bank of Tokyo (6.25%); Deutsche Bank (6.25%); 
Industrial Bank of Japan (6.25%); Industrial and Mining Development Bank of 
Iran (25.0%); Manufacturers Hanover (6.25%); Midland Bank Ltd. (6.25%); and 
Societe General, Paris (6.25%). 
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Chapter X 
COMMERCIAL BATIK CONDITIONALITY: HOW IT EVOLVED OVER 
1565 - '1976 
When bankers extend credit to governments they 
naturally seek Irotection against losses. One can perceive 
two general forms of financial security.298/ 
One type is direct financial security. This is done 
by requiring collateral from a borrower, e.g., holding in 
escrow a part of the receipts of a state enterprise, or even 
seeking a pledge of part of a country's gold reserves. 
Other forms of financial security are indirect in the 
sense that they focus on the general repayment capacity of the 
government. One type of indirect security which has become 
almost standard in loan contracts is a pledge from the 
government to provide its "full faith and credit" to a 
transaction. This is a global guarantee that a sovereign 
state will ensure repayment, even if an individual public 
sector entity proves incapable of servicing a loan. Banks 
can further increase indirect security by adding positive or 
negative covenants directed to the individual borrower or the 
state. These latter convenants often are not specific to the 
credit itself but rather influence policy parameters that in 
fact affect the state's general capacity to service debt. 
Indirect financial security that places restrictions 
on policy parameters can be termed as political-economic 
conditionality. Conditionality of this nature is especially 
disagreeable to government officials because it represents 
an effective interference in domestic policies. For this 
reason most governments attempt to avoid such conditionality 
and will submit to it only under duress and only when there 
are no acceptable alternatives. 
Direct security arrangements such as collateral may be 
viewed as commercial conditionality. This can be more 
palatable to governments because it has a rather limited 
impact on global decision-making. In some instances, 
commercial conditionality may even be viewed with favor by 
central government authorities when it is placed on 
financially weak state entities; by escrowing resources, 
greater discipline is placed on the borrower, thereby reducing 
pressure on the central government which must service the 
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credit in the event that the resources are not available for 
repayment of the loan. Nevertheless, many government 
borrowers probably would prefer to avoid collateral 
arrangements in as much as they reduce the manuverability 
of national financial assets. 
As far as general guarantees are concerned, they are 
surely the most attractive from the standpoint of the 
borrower. When decentralized agencies are the borrower of 
record, many governments attempt to limit the guarantee to 
the agency itself. However, in most instances bankers insist 
upon and receive a general guarantee of the Republic. 
This chapter is basically concerned with political-
economic conditionality imposed by commercial banks. Clearly, 
it has an impact on the direction of an economy. However, 
when dealing with governments, there often is a fine line 
between political-economic conditionality and commercial 
conditionality, with many gray areas where the two overlap. 
Analysis therefore also will point out cases of collateral 
arrangements. Thus the following analysis consists of an 
examination of protective conditions that place restraint 
on the actions of state borrowers. The analysis will be 
selective, focusing on those forms of conditionality that are 
perceived to have been the most influential on government 
actions. And for the sake of convenience, the review will 
follow a format involving three separate periods; 1965-1971, 
1972-1975, and 1976. 
A. CONDITIONALITY: ITS APPLICATION DURING THE 
PERIOD 1965 - 1971 
The 1960s could be characterized as a period in which 
bankers were highly conditional lenders to the government of 
Peru (and probably developing country governments in general). 
In addition to requiring general government guarantees, 
conditionality of a commercial and cf a political-economic 
nature was most common. Commercial conditionality appeared 
most often on loans to decentralized government agencies, 
while political-economic conditionality became commonplace 
when loans to the central government obviously had the purpose 
of aiding very weak fiscal and balance of payments situations. 
1. Commercial Conditionality  
With respect to commercial conditionality, it 
frequently appeared in the Sixties, especially on loans to 
entities other than the central government. This type of 
conditionality always was in addition to a guarantee from the 
Republic of Peru. While it would be impractical to analyse 
every case of commercial conditionality individually, setting 
forth a couple of examples illustrates how this type of 
protection was employed in the period. 
One interesting case involved a local government, which 
received the backing of a central government guarantee. The 
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local entity had to secure a large foreign loan with its tax 
receipts. The arrangement required it to deposit in a special 
account at a local bank all receipts from a property tax 
until a balance accumulated to the extent of 1 1/2 times the 
value of the next interest and amortization quota. If tax 
receipts proved insufficient to generate the required 
balance, additional funds would be taken from the public works 
budget of the government. And if this proved inadequate, 
the central government had to deposit funds sufficient to 
meet the required balance. The central government also had 
to guarantee access to dollars for repayment. 
The second example of commercial conditionality 
involves a 5 million dollar loan to a state steel enterprise. 
The lending bank required the corporation to apply to 
repayment of the loan the unencumbered part of U.S. dollar 
royalty payments paid to it by Marcona Mines for exploitation 
of local iron ore deposits. The Central Bank had to hold 
these royalty payments in a special account and in amounts 
sufficient to meet annual interest and amortization payments. 
The significance of arrangements of this sort is that 
banks successfully managed to immobilize national assets to 
secure repayment of debt. The degree to which this type of 
conditionality proved onerous to Peru would depend on the 
circumstances of the borrower and the philosophical tone of 
authorities. However, objectively speaking, the security 
appears to have been ineffective in maintaining scheduled 
repayment and therefore was perhaps an unnecessary complication 
in credit agreements. Notwithstanding such precautions, 
secured credits failed to escape the need for repeated 
refinance, suggesting that in the end the real source of 
repayment was the general capacity of the government to 
service foreign debt and not collateral measures. 
2. Political-economic conditionality  
Political-economic conditionality on commercial bank 
loans began to appear in 1967, which more of less coincides 
with the open deterioration of the internal and external 
economic accounts. Prior to this year, the only tinge of this 
type of conditionality involved a rather common requirement 
found in loan agreements that Peru be a member of the IMF. 
But then again, prior to this year bank lending to the 
government was very modest. Between 1965-1966 banks extended 
only one loan of a large magnitude -40 million dollars- and 
most of the resources went to refinance an earlier credit 
of 1964. 
The intensity with which conditionality was applied 
was progressive. 
The conditionality of 1967 appeared on a relatively 
large general purpose loan extended by a group of banks to 
the central government. At the time of the bank loan Peru 
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had been negociating 	 — the IMF for a new 42.5 million 
dollar standb:/ agreement for the August 1967-1968 period. 
In general terms the banks conditioned their loan to Peru by 
the need to reach an e' "cement with ,he IMF and stipulated 
that Peru "use its can efforts" to comply with the terms and 
conditions of such a .-3andb, y aocord. Under the general 
framework of tying the loan to the IMF standby credit, some 
of the more specific requirements incibuded that: 
(i) the governmen t limit to a "maximum extent" the 
forei7r, boIch,rin of the Thntral Ball and state 
-cranks for the t:,-r7s of budget or balance of 
baymerlta a:svisance; 
(1J) new loaro -otron u3--: PY cnar7 commercial 
fransactions- bave a nileimum maturity of 5 years, 
with 2 years Frace: and 
(iii) indebtedness of the Centrdl Bank and state banks 
wivb a matarity of losoc tnan 5 years be limited 
go not more tnan 100 mi'Lan dollars at an:: time 
outs andihr 	 veal __:g INF credits and increases 
,es cA' fl -r- ,lit • ,-) rneeh seasonal requirements 
of rroducttuc arUvitipE). 
The banks also required the p_co. velcnmen-C: to provide them 
with copie c of the 17:2  strndby agreement and country reports. 
A copy of the nFreement of a M mi-11-ion dollar loan under 
negotiation sale I,,b'JD also had to be delivered to the banks. 
If Peru did not successfully ne7otiate a loan with the IMF, 
or its acrdons made it it eligilele to receive IMF support, the 
banks had the optic:. 	 becone or call the loan. 
How did the co•:ciercial banks' conditionality compare 
with the PLC I  regime: 1,cfltie the scope of the conditionality 
applied by the :mind w .°, much broader than that demanded by 
the banks, 	 ;_tc^e:lino to note that there were nearly 
identical rc - r.c 	 ,s with respect to conditions on debt 
contraction- 	 , to the Fund's requirements Peru had 
to limit puLic 	 orrowing abroad to loans with a 
maturity of at .! 	 years ,arld in the case of suppliers' 
credits, to loans with 5 	 ak of at least 10 years. And 
the banks' limit on borrowing; mirrored the Fund's restriction 
of 100 million dollars for outstanding loans with maturities 
of less than 5 years. Thus the hanks clearly followed the 
Fund's lead in establishing conditions on their credit. 
In 1968 political-economic conditionality on commercial 
bank loans became more generalized. By then the government 
wanted to refinance all the debt it possibly could. 
Authorities carried oct this policy in conjunction with 
negotiations for a new 75 million dollar standby agreement 
with the IMF for a "1-year period beginning in late August 1968. 
Moreover, since the banks g;enevally refused to go beyond 5 
years on their refinance -leaving the early Seventies with 




did 	 : 
j.y.rir 07 - 
v  
45 far ap tcie 
bank credits Is poii;P‘er ,n,  
01'1 new 'Heci_ wiLc 
government also sought o. - tandby agreetnent" with banks that 
would permit -it to di 	 credit 
from the -52.;1F. 	 , 	 Pe tore the chnc. • in 
government in O• t. poor 	 I 	 reached aon sent, 
providing for 1;:65 	 -cm 	 1h Amenoi.can 	 '•,f. and 
$25 million from :Y.', Eurcc 	 back:: , that 	 down 
through June 	 But 	 cred 	 never came to frcLor 
as the governmeni-,nd n. -aw upon tlie funds. 299/ 
If tc 
	 ir. -practically -1_1 --- p-cal 
cred.it,p 	 1 9P''. 	 icc7i 
	
onii ipe 	 .:1;1 	 ar a by 
credit &rd. 	 " 	 'cc; b;;., 	 • br: 
commer 	 bar1;,Tp. 	 -i 	 • 1111::: 
of the cc 	 • 	 • . 	 c the 
ruler noLend. Lo 
	











. tine n7c..;vernmeii_c Pse its 
. 	 • 
ted that 
• -1.- cF 	 calander 
• no. 	 eopric,•nlent 
. 
 
v-Joe 	 Pen., ' exports 
em • Par ): 
ece -i. - p periodic roiport,s rom the 
the 	 ' eYterna.1 t. 
eemep 	 ;;_- ormneroial 
t 	 stopped the (.]ontraction 
no;i: iries 




By doing this they operated under the IMF umbrella, yet could 
avoid direct responsibility for the measures themselves. 
Also, the banks displayed foresight as they established their 
own debt limits in the event of the expiration of the standby 
agreements. 
Up to mid-1969 the banks could benefit from the buffer 
of the IMF accords. Bat by this time the August 1968 IMF 
standby agreement had expired and the government had decided 
not to seek a new standby credit. Thus bankers were 
consequently more or less on their own in handling Peru's debt 
service problems. Fortunately for them, the fiscal and 
balance of payments measures taken in 1968, coupled with the 
follow up stabilization efforts of the new government, helped 
to considerably assuage financial difficulties. 
Notwithstanding the expired IMF accord, the commercial 
banks continued to refinance and restructure upcoming payments 
due to them, perhaps because of the threat of non-payment if 
refinance agreements were not forthcoming. What is of 
interest here is that bankers continued to apply their own 
conditionality to the credits. 
Efforts to restructure and refinance debt in 1969-1970 
met with success. However, banks, working together, placed 
precise limits on the contraction of debt with maturities in 
excess of 18 months for the period 1970-1975. The 
construction of the limits contrasted with the earlier 
practice that mirrored the IMF guideliness; instead of 
placing ceilings on outstanding indebtedness, the banks 
established annual limits on aggregate payments of interest 
and principal on foreign debt related to loans with maturities 
of 18 months or more. (Unfortunately, it proved difficult to 
establish the magnitude of the limits themselves). As to 
loans with a maturity of less than 18 months, no limits were 
established, except with regard to the Banco de la Nacion, 
for which lines of credit were restricted. In addition, Peru 
had to remain a member of the IMF; provide the banks with 
copies of the country reports from international organizations; 
and ensure that all terms of bank refinance agreements did 
not favor one institution over the other. 
In 1971 Peru's traditional banks once again agreed to 
restructure and refinance payments. In doing so they amended 
their earlier conditionality. Again debt limits focused on 
service payments rather than on outstanding indebtedness. 
The period of restriction was 1972-1976 and the limits placed 
at 220 million dollars per annum for the first two years and 
200 million dollars per annum thereafter. Limits did no 
apply to short term lines of credit to the state development 
banks, but the Banco de la Nacion had an absolute limit on 
its lines of short term credit. In addition to 
the above, the banks required Peru to maintain "a substantial" 
portion of its reserves on deposit at their officies. 
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There is no doubt that this conditionality was severe. 
By returning to the table on debt service in Chapter III, one 
may appreciate that Peru at this time already approached the 
established limits, making significant new debt contraction 
dependent on very long grace periods that would allow the 
government to postpone service payments until after the 
restricted period. However, such long periods of grace were 
uncommon, meaning that the conditionality effectively placed 
absolute constraints on the government's foreign debt 
contraction. The severity and importance of the restrictions 
can be better appreciated if one remembers that the government 
had plans to embark on a massive investment program which 
involved a need for external support. 
What the above demonstrates is that up through 1971 
the banks displayed boldness in the establishment of 
political-economic conditionality that affected the 
management of the Peruvian economy. When the IMF monitored 
standby arrangements, the commercial banks cleverly came 
under the Fund's wing and established formal links between 
their loans and the IMF credits. And maintenance of the 
commercial credit agreements was dependent upon satisfactory 
compliance with the Fund's program. Frequently the banks 
established their own debt limits, which resembled those 
stipulated by the IMF. 
Interestingly, the commercial banks persisted in 
applying conditionality even when the Fund's protection was 
not available to them. This clearly represented a more 
risky venture. However, evidence suggests that traditional 
commercial lenders were up to the challenge as their loans 
placed severe short and medium term limitations on the 
government's ability to contract foreign debt. This in turn 
placed a a clear restraint on the government's plan to pursue 
an ambitious development program. 
B. CONDITIONALITY: ITS DISAPPEARANCE IN 1972 - 1975 
Peru entered 1972 holding successful refinance accords 
with its bankers. However, there was conditionality attached 
to these agreements and this restrained government policy-
making ability, especially with respect to debt contraction 
for the investment program. Authorities had little choice 
but to heed these conditions; with the principal sources of 
bilateral and multilateral loans cutoff as a result of a 
financial boycott, Peru's traditional bankers represented the 
only real potential source of new finance. Thus, while the 
government negotiated toughly with the banks, it decided to 
accept their conditions and comply with their requirements, 
hoping that somehow the banks would become more flexible and 
provide new finance for the development program. 
As things turned cut, the structural changes in world 
banking, analyzed in Chapter II, now had made developing 
countries ever more attractive clients for commercial banks. 
207 
In 1972, aided by the publicity over petroleum in the Amazon, 
Peru began to enjoy some of the fruits of the changes in the 
world financial market. 
As revealed in earlier chapters, prior to 1972 a 
handful of traditional lenders dominated Peru's bank loans. 
In contrast, by 1972 many new lenders had a willingness to 
extend credit to the government. These banks -e.g., U.S. 
regional banks, Japanese banks, etc.- were relative newcomers 
to international finance and actively sought to expand their 
portfolios abroad. As a reflection of their interest in 
penetrating new markets, they offered finance to Peru with 
no conditions whatsoever. As more banks attempted to enter 
Peru, competition necessarily increased. By late 1972 and 
into 1973 there were sufficient offers of unconditional. credit 
for Peru to break the hold of its traditional banks by 
liquidating in full their earlier loans laden with 
conditionality. The liquidation of the agreements unshackled 
government policy with respect to debt contraction. Moreover, 
most traditional lenders, in order to y...rotect their market 
position, followed trends sand provided unconditional finance 
as well. 010,/ 
With the wave of bank 1 n,ie o leveloydng countries 
in the 1970s, not only was politi, ::1- .. .o 'c conditionality 
abandoned, but so too was coeme-,e-: 	 )nditior.ality. Banks, 
in order gain th 	 for nd general e fa- 
government guar.,9nt 	 be ajeq;Aate sebnrity. The nature of 
finance was of little import. r a ank felt inclined to 
seek commercial security, or question the use of funds, it 
faced the prospects of ether instutirs pnoviding no-
questions-asked finance, thereby 1:ndercutting the banks' 
competitive position with the goverment. Thus, in the 1970s 
banks usually- paid little a4 tent- ier. to the use of funds or 
special security 	 ts; 	 only condition for finance 
was the sovereign govereent. guarale, the 	 c.2 4 which. 
many banks were unwillil.g OT' unable io assess. 301/ A good 
example of the relative freedom from conditionality involves 
the finance of the oil bipelire. DeEpdte a generally more 
conservative lending environment ir. the international market 
in 1975, the only requirement Lhat the banks made for support 
of the project con two studies on proven petroleum reserves 
in the jungle. This contrasts with official lenders and 
suppliers from Japan 'el-]'cle secured 	 b-v 
clalms ep 	 petrnleeff: 
The feedom from con-.:1! 
a sharp break with the past. 	 t. 	 -t. he early 
commercial. bailk5 unquestir--. 	 e:3 the Peruvian eccomy, 
even in the face of cempr,-•ens 	 _e ins en foreign capital 
and severe strn:.-tueel 	 pelje finance and the 
balance of payments. 	 e 	 e 3ed Pe.-r. with 
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unprecedented opportuni -s for national self-determination. 
Moreover, the banks' ex. . me flexibility (some have said 
irresponsibility) duri:. . 	 period contrasted sharply with 
the traditionally condi vial finance of official institutions. 
Unfortunately, the bank: vithdrew their carte blanche in 1976. 
One factor behind the ,-'nage in attitude was external to Peru, 
i.e., the banks by now 	 become very cautious lenders to 
developing countries. * important bank failures in mid 
and late 1974 raised se-. uLs doubts about the viability of 
the then current manage-0.t. practices in international banking. 
in addition:, pudic oft- als, especially in the U.S., had 
been strongly cniticizin.. banks for having imprudently lent 
to developing countries, Reflecting the tense environment, 
many of the so-called h 	 omers to international lending 
withdrew from Jctive 110: _cipation in the market, giving the 
big, traditionally intr- ational banks increased leverage 
over the patenns of 	 lending. The other important 
factor behind the char4s : attitude was intrinsic tc Peru. 
The strnctural wennesr,- in the Peruvian economy had been 
progressively 3' encJA 	 over =.11e years and. so had the 
requirements for exterc. 	 support. With much less brilliant 
prospects for -etrolenn 	 the ;;angle, and Peru's financial 
requirements accelerate . the eodntry's private creditors 
panicked. Peru could ne anger count on its bankers for 
unconditional finance. 
Even with he Eas tic package of corrective measures 
that Peruvian a9.tnoriU 	 introduced in January 1976, it 
soon became apearent tnH, further steps would have to be 
taken. . large balanc--. - payments gap developed and the 
banks had been display]:- little interest in extending new 
loans at the same pace . in previous years. Something had 
to be done. 
After informal ec ',acts with the IMF early in 1976, 
the government dismiss- he possibilities of a standby 
agreement. 303/ In li0a •aith. the experience of many 
developing countries, e-:_omit officials -even though of a 
more conservative bent 	 n those of the Velasco regime- 
found the IMF prescript 	 excessively harsh and 
overbearing. 304/ The 	 remedy undoubtedly implied huge 
social costs; and aside_tom this, as Stallings points out, 305/ 
the government was polin ally insecure and feared the 
reaction of the public 	 the sharp economic deflation 
prescribed by the Fund, -c well as the reaction of 
personalities within t.?, ,7overnment that were linked to the 
former Velasco regime a 	 which since 1969 had pursued policies 
designed to avoid all f 	 s of conditional IMF finance. 
Seeking needed 	 nce, in the Spring (North American) 
of 1976 Peruvian officia 	 made informal contacts with U.S. 
banks in New York. 	 tl efforts focussed on U.S. banks 
not only because ...)f th• 	 stataL as the government's main 
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creditor but also because U.S. banks were leaders of the 
international market and their blessing was needed for any 
assistance from the world banking community. Manufacturers 
Hanover Trust, which had long and close relations with both 
the private and public sectors of Peru, organized a meeting 
with several large U.S. banks. Others participating in the 
meeting were Bank of America, Citicorp, Wells Fargo, Chase 
Manhattan and Morgan Guaranty, all -with the exception of 
Morgan- classified earlier as major lenders to the government 
in the 1970s. 
Authorities informed the bankers that without loans 
of some 350 to 400 million dollars Peru would be unable to 
meet its obligations. The bankers were not very enthusistic 
about the request, especially when they found out that Peru 
refused to undergo an IMF stabilization program. In the 
meetings the Peruvians confronted a general reluctances among 
the bankers to extend new credit without IMF supervision of 
the economy. 
During the course of events, the government prepared 
its own stabilization program. Whether the program arose at 
the initiative of the Peruvians, or as a response to the 
demands of the banks for Peru to "get its house in order" has 
been a matter of debate. But causal factors would be 
difficult to untangle. Peru faced a growing external gap 
that clearly required comprehensive policy measures. 
Something had to be done regardless of the opinions of bankers. 
Moreover, a government formulated stabilization program 
represented a logical bargaining tool to help convince 
creditors to provide financial support in the absence of a 
program with the IMF. 
Authorities initiated their stabilization program in 
mid-year. The basic measures taken are reproduced in 
Appendix 5. As indicated, the measures included a 44% 
devaluation, cutbacks in fiscal expenditures, new taxes, 
adjustment of interest rates, etc. Generally speaking the 
program was very comprehensive. But whether or not the 
terms and conditions of the program compared to an IMF accord 
is difficult to determine; indeed it is problematical since 
agreements of this type are the outcome of bilateral 
negotiations. What is important is that the Peruvian program 
was presented to the banks as being equivalent to the 
traditional IMF adjustment policies. 
Both during the preparation and implementation of the 
national stabilization program the U.S. banks remained highly 
reluctant to extend loans without the buffer provided by 
the IMF. Peru was not the only one of their developing 
country borrowers encountering problems and the banks feared 
that attending to Peru's request would set a bad precedent. 
Also the banks worried about the political implications of 
providing direct support to the government's program. Then 
there was a problem of how to evaluate the program and what to 
do if it failed. 
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Notwithstanding these general reservations, as 
negotiations proceeded U.S. banks split into two camps. 
One group of major banks -notably headed by Citicorp-
became advocates of a financial package for Peru. Aside from 
wanting to refinance the loans to keep the balance of 
payments afloat, these banks also saw the credit as a way of 
keeping the new political regime afloat; its more conservative 
posture apparently had greater appeal to the banks than the 
policies of the Velasco government. 306/ These banks also 
felt that the precedent of the bank loan was better than the 
precedent of a default, which could trigger similar behavior 
in other developing countries. 307/ 
Another group of major banks took the position of 
adversaries and showed little interest in monitoring a 
stabilization program without IMF supervision. In this 
group were Morgan Guaranty, Continental Illinois and Bankers 
Trust, all of which were shown in Part ;I of the study to 
have had a less than enthusiastic attitude on the military 
government even in the best of times. The latter two banks 
even refused to participate in the Steering Committee set up 
by the banks to organize negotiations between U.S. creditors 
and Peru. 308,' 
The adversaries, while not wanting to participate in 
a joint credit, did offer the Peruvians short rollovers of 
the upcoming payments due to them. However, the Peruvian 
authorities rejected this proposal as inconsistent with their 
medium term stabilization program. Thus, the adversaries 
encountered a dilemma. The advocates had expresed an 
unwillingness to cover the adversaries claims on Peru; to do 
so would effectively have been a subsidy for this latter 
group of banks. Clearly, then, if the adversaries rejected 
participation in a general refinance credit the whole rescue 
mission would have to be aborted. This in turn would ensure 
default. Thus these considerations, coupled with strong peer 
pressure, brought most major adversaries into the fold. 309/ 
With most important U.S. creditors more or less in 
agreement in principal to support the Peruvian program, in 
July other banks were incorporated into the negotiations. In 
order to coordinate the bankers position a Steering Committee 
was organized. Citibank represented the U.S. banks, Dresdner 
Bank the Europeans, Bank of Nova Scotia the Canadians and 
Bank of Tokyo headed the Japanese Banks. Swiss Bank 
coordinated Swiss creditors, who negotiated outside the 
global agreement. 
The negotiations focussed on whether or not all the 
banks should provide finance for the stabilization program 
in the absence of the IMF, and, if so, what would be the 
modus operandi and how would the banks evaluate the program. 
At issue was the distribution of credit among the banks as 
well as the terms and conditions. 
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With regard to the distribution of the refinance 
credits, it was envisioned that it would be as follows: the 
United States, $240 million; Europe $120 million; and Canada 
and Japan $50 million each. The actual distribution more or 
less followed this pattern, except that the U.S. share was 
less than anticipated ($210 million). The conditions of the 
credit were to be extremely harsh: an interest margin of 
2.25% over LIBOR; flat fees of 1.5% and a short 5 year 
maturity with 2 ears of grace. 
After arriving at a general consensus to go ahead 
without the IMF one of the major difficulties in the 
negotiations was how the banks would evaluate the government's 
stabilization program, which, of course, represented the 
justification for the credit. One problem confronting many 
banks -especially those not in a position to professionally 
evaluate a stabilization program- involved the implications 
of private banks monitoring a sovereign government's economic 
program. However, the big banks, which obviously could 
evaluate an economic program, were prepared to assume this 
responsibility and they overrode the concern of the smaller 
banks. Once it was decided that the banks should evaluate 
the program, a plan evolved in which the government would 
voluntarily give periodic reports to the banks on the progress 
of the stabilization program and provide them with data that 
would facilitate their own evaluation of events. 
As far as what to do if the program did not, in the 
view of the banks, proceed satisfactorily, the following 
unusual procedure was worked out. Loans would be made in two 
equal traunches, termed A and B. The banks would disburse 
commitment A immediately upon a formal agreement. The B 
commitment would be disbursed not before January 31, 1977. 
In order to secure the second traunche the banks would have 
to (i) receive a cony of the confidential 1976 IMF country 
report on Peru and (ii) banks making-up at least 75% of the 
aggregate commitment had to express a willingness to make 
available the B disbursement. It is the second condition that 
constitutes the key to the agreement; it implied that the 
willingness of the banks to extend the second traunche would 
depend upon their opinion of the success of the stabilization 
program. 
There was at least one other important element to the 
agreement: settlement of disputes with some transnational 
corporations -Marcona Mines and the Southern Peru Copper 
Corporation. 
The former corporation had a long history of iron ore 
mining operations in Peru. In 1975 the Velasco government 
had expropriated its assets and declared that the action 
would involve no compensation. A conflict ensued, as Marcona, 
with considerable success, contrived a world boycott of 
Peruvian iron ore shipments. 
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In the case of Southern Peru Copper Corp., the problem 
stemmed from a dispute in the interpretation of tax 
arrangements in the mining agreement. 
The commercial banks made it clear that they wanted 
the disputes settled. Oh the philosophical level banks have 
expressed that the mode oF treatment of foreign investment is 
a key element in their evaluation of a country's 
creditworthiness. 310/ ..-sst on a more practical plane, many of 
the banks in the negotiat:on had close relations with the 
affected firms and they j:d not want to support the government 
while these problems wen l dnresolved 311/ indeed. the 
corporations own creditworthiness may have been affected by 
the outcome of the dispt)tc. 
During the course 	 negotiations for the refinance 
credits the government o Peru reached settlements with the 
aforementioned corporatH: 	 Formally the settlements were 
not a condition for the seinance credit; indeed the actual 
credit agreements made 
resolution. But there 
about the matter blaped 
quick settlement. Cleah s  
regard to supporting the 
much more difficult to e• 
not been diffused. So 
the resolution of the es,s 
condition. for the 1976 
again that commercial 
how was Peru ,affected 
In the case of his: 
underway for a long tim,  
The corporation's home 
pressing hard for a set 
compensation. 312/ This 
organization or a boyco' 
Both this bressure and 
Peru made a settlement i 
undoubtedly speeded up  
was more favorable to ti_ 
would have preferred. 
covered by the new refin 
ended Marcona's boycott 
to support the 
In the 	 of  
cation of the disputes or their 
p doubt that the banks open concern 
•ssure on the Peruvians to reach a 
the division among the banks with 
sabilization program would have been 
ecome if the investment disputes had 
m implicit, if not explicit, sense 
Triation and tax issues was a 
Mance credit, demonstrating once 
s and TNCs operate in tandem. But 
Sese conditions? 
:Pa, intense negotiations had been 
per the subject of compensation. 
utry government the U.S.) had been 
-sent and prodding Peru for 
on top of the foreign company's 
igainst Peruvian iron ore exports. 
we conservative political tone in 
ely in any case. The banks 
process and maybe the settlement 
xpropriated corporation than some 
he other hand the compensation was 
e credits. Also, a settlement 
iron ore exports, which would help 
n program. 
ern Peru, the banks :t e 3ded by 
Chase t°"iars}_latteaJ h:Jmandh,, hat Peru arrive at a decision on 
the tax matter ,nj pro' 
	 a credit to the Corporation for 
any back taxes 	 mig'n •rise. Authorities, wishing to see 
Cuajone's copper export,- •  stream for the stabilization 
program, quickly arrive,: •-ni an estimate of back taxes of 
$50 million and accepted 
	 yment over time. 
The above were 
	 nrincnol controversial elements of 
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conditionality. Others, such as waiver of sovereign immunity, 
cross default clauses, membership in the IMF, etc., were rather 
standard conditions that appeared in most other credit 
agreements. 
D. A SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CONDITIONALITY 
(liven the scope of this section on conditionality, it 
is worthwhile to end the analysis with some summary 
observations. 
It has been seen that conditionality turned full circle 
over the 12-year period. Banks began and ended their lending 
under circumstances of heavy conditionality. This is an 
important consideration because when commercial banks imposed 
conditionality on Peru in 1976 a world-wide uproar developed 
over the banks intervention in public policy. The reaction 
was as if banks had never done this before. Memories are short 
and surely minds were fixed on the brief period of 
unconditional lending of 1972-1975. But in fact commercial 
banks rediscovered their interventionist practices of the 
1960s. 
It is true that it was unusual for commercial banks to 
extend a large credit without the IMF overseeing the economy. 
However, in the case of Peru, this had already been done in 
1969-1971 when, as shown previously, the banks extended large 
refinance credits with conditionality to the government even 
though authorities had avoided a standby agreement with the 
IMF. The new twist, however, was that private commercial banks 
took it upon themselves to monitor and evaluate the performance 
of a sovereign government's macro-economic policy. Unlike the 
past, conditionality was not placed on a specific policy 
paramater such as external debt contraction, but rather 
involved the entire economy. In other words, they assumed the 
role of the IMF. 
From the standpoint of Peru, a stabilization program 
with the banks could have made sense. The bankers were by far 
its major creditor. In contrast to bank finance, IMF standby 
credits were a pittance. Why go through the distasteful 
exercise of an IMF program when more resources and perhaps less 
rigorous conditionality could be acquired from the banks? 
And from the standpoint of the commercial banks it 
could have appeared sensible too. When lending for general 
refinance (balance of payments assistance), it is clear that 
the capacity for repayment is largely embodied in government 
economic policy. And since bank finance now dwarfed all 
official sources of funding to developing countries, these 
institutions had de facto leverage over economic policy in 
much of the Third World. The fact that banks had been 
entertaining ideas along this line is suggested in the 
following commentary by one major international bank in early 
1976: 
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"... It is incumber on banks to improve further their 
competence in appraising borrowing countries' economic 
and financial poi 	 es. The Fund (IMF) generally will 
be involved only 	 the critical cases where the 
necessity for internal adjustment is clearcut. But, 
in the less-than-ctical cases, bank credit decisions 
also involve a judFement on the way an economy is 
managed and on the .rospects for the balance of 
payments. In dec -cliag whether to extend credits, and 
in setting the ter; ,  and conditions for loans, banks 
can influence the 	 tore and timing of borrowing 
countries' policic 	 This is a heavy responsibility, 
and admittedly on, hich is difficult to carry out, 
particularly in t:c, face of competitive pressures. 
However, from the .ewpoint of the borrower, the 
discipline of tli(r 	 i-ketplace can have an important 
bearing on wheLhe, c.)und economic and financial policies 
are taken on a tj 	 v basis". 3W 
Of course, when 	 :tinted with a concrete case in which 
this philosophy co,:ld be 	 .:)lied in the extreme the banks 
understandably hesitate. out in the end the objective 
conditions of their pow.. 	 d leverage prevailed. 
As it turned out, 	 e banks were more 'vulnerable than 
they fib thought. Thir'S .:Y•ties became outraged by the 
prospects of commercial 	 . ks monitoring the affairs of a 
sovereign state, even il 	 voluntarily agreed to by the 
borrower. As private coiritrcial institutions banks clearly 
were open to charges of 	 flicts of interest e.g., 
foreknowledge of a count h . 3 exchange rate policy, credit and 
interest rate policy, etc, all could lead to questionable 
profit-making. Suspicions about the banks' role in the 
settlement of the investment disputes also added to the 
controversy. And represehting a final blow, as a result of 
internal resistance, Pert, could not live up to its end of the 
bargain and the national stabilization program faltered. 
Commercial lenders pound themselves in a "no win" 
situation. 314/ Their prisate capital base made them sensitive 
to adverse public opinion, Their private capital orientation 
also gave them limited staing power, i.e., they could not 
support the Peruvian econoy while it vacillated in the 
process of gaining domestIc support for needed economic 
adjustments. Thus, the bankers withdrew to more familiar 
terrain; they told authorities that no more finance would be 
available until Peru reanhod a standby accord with the IMF. 
As for Peru, it was abandoned by its private creditors. 
The succeeding period involved numerous clashes with the banks 
and with the IMF as Peru attempted to find its way between 
the requirements of national political-economic policy and 
the demands of it foreign_ creditors. 
Finally, all the 	 - ,re reveals that the often heard 
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observation that commercial banks -unlike official 
institutions- are "standoffish and remote" and therefore 
provide developing country borrowers with a great deal of 
national autonomy is not wholly accurate. 315/ Under the 
unusual historical circumstances of the expansionary and 
competitive period of world banking in the early 1970s 
finance did approximate a remote, arm's length market. But 
the recent history of Peru has shown that banks can and do 
intervene in public policy, especially in moments of national 
economic (and political) weakness. This is an important 
consideration since developing countries are especially prone 
to economic difficulties due to their sensitive domestic-
socio-economic milieu; the structural transformations 
intrinsic to development; and volatile external markets. 
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Chapter XI 
A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF BANK LENDING ON PERU 
Up to now analysis has focused on very specific 
aspects of the impact of bank lending on Peru. What is 
required is a more global evaluation of the effects of 
commercial banks on the Peruvian economy. Since it is 
virtually impossible to empirically isolate the impact 
commercial bank loans from the other financial, real and 
political activities of the economy, any general evaluation 
of this sort must have a more than usual degree of normative 
content. Thus, a similar examination undertaken by an 
individual with another perspective could generate very 
different findings. No absolute truths are posited here; the 
reader must ultimately judge the following arguments on their 
merits and derive his/her own conclusions. For the 
convenience of exposition, the matter will be approached by 
viewing both the positive and negative aspects of the banks' 
participation in the economy. The analysis will begin with 
the positive side. 
A. BANK LENDING TO PERU: ITS POSITIVE ASPECTS 
There are undoubtedly many positive elements in the 
banks' involvement in the economy. An attempt is made below 
to highlight some of those which were very important to the 
country. 
1. Breaking the Grip of the Financial Blockades 
When the military government entered into power in 
1968 it found a very hostile external environment, as 
manifest in the financial blockade initiated by official and 
private sources of external finance. (And it must be 
remembered that the prior civilian government also encountered 
problems, albeit of more modest proportions, from official 
lenders). During 1969-1971 Peru's external finance was  
severely prejudiced by the reserved attitude of foreign 
financiers. The country's balance of payments remained afloat 
in partbecause of some extraordinary factors: favourable 
export prices, virtual stagnation of import volume, and a 
special law in 1970 that successfully repatriated capital 
held abroad by residents. 
Commercial banks, and more specifically the newcomers 
to international lending, played a key role in the breaking of 
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the blockade. Prior to 1972 few banks would lend to Peru. 
The country's traditional bankers, whether because of objective 
economic circumstances or because of tacit co-operation with 
the blockade, limited credit to highly conditioned refinance 
operations. But when the new non-traditional banks began 
lending to Peru .in 1972 this started a process, similar to a 
bandwagon effect, in which ever more commercial institutions 
-including many of the country's traditional bankers which 
reacted in a defensive manner- became disposed to lend to the 
government. As lending built up, so did the government's 
maneuverability and international prestige. By 1973 it 
became evident to the perpetrators of the blockade that their 
policy was increasingly unproductive. This led to the Greene 
Accord and the formal termination of the blockade, under 
conditions that were relatively favourable to Peru. 
The banks' willingness to lend to Peru undoubtedly had 
something to do with internal factors such as the discovery 
of oil in the Amazon and the appearance of an improved balance 
of payments due to some conjunctural circumstances. However, 
this was only a part, and a small part, of the changed 
attitude of the banks. As argued throughout this study, much 
could be attributed to historical timing; changes in the 
eurocurrency market itself caused banks to seek out new 
clients in order to absorb liquidity and facilitate a 
seemingly insatiable desire to expand abroad. The extreme 
competitive pressures to expand assets promoted a global as 
opposed to a national psychology; banks no longer went abroad 
only to serve the interests of their home country TNCs, but in 
the interest of internationalization for its own sake and the 
profits derived from such policies. In this context, most banks 
were willing to overlook Peru's treatment of foreign firms and 
eagerly provided "no-questions-asked" finance to the government 
up until 1976. This represented a sharp break with the past 
whereby commercial banks conditioned loans bya country's attitude 
on private capital in general and foreign capital in particular. 
These historical circumstances had great implications 
for Peru (and other developing countries). Had the government 
faced a financial blockade of similar proportions in the 1950s 
or 1960s there would have been a greater likelihood of its 
domestic policies (especially the investment programme) having 
been aborted by external pressures. In these years private 
non-financial firms (via direct investments and supplier 
credits) and official bilateral and multilateral agencies 
provided most of the finance, and all these sources 
traditionally had close political links with each other. (Big 
international banks, of course, also were in this group, but 
at the time they did not heavily participate in the medium 
term finance of developing countries). In the case of Peru 
the links among the various external financiers could have 
been activated very easily because of the severe geographic 
concentration of the country's external economic relations. 
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Thus, any attempt to reorder foreign capital's role in 
the economy, at least on a scale similar to that which was 
actually realized, could have been very costly to the country 
and perhaps not even feasible without extreme political 
cohesion at home. 
Thus, in 1972-1975 finance from banks was abundant 
and independent of pressures from the industrialized 
countries' governments and TNCs. This produced an 
unprecedented plurality in developing countries' external 
finance. In turn, opportunities for national self-determina-
tion were enhanced. There is no better example of the changed 
environment than Peru where banks effectively gave important 
support to a model based on state intervention in productive 
activities and reform of the traditional prerogatives of 
private capital. 
2. The Capacity to Import  
After 1971 banks were the principal factor behind a 
growing capacity to import goods and services from abroad. 
This to some extent was evident in Chapter III; as 
demonstrated in table 5 and again in table 11, imports of 
goods and services constituted a sharply rising percentage of 
product, while exports constituted a sharply falling percentage 
of product. This prolonged trend, of course, proved feasible 
only because of external finance, which in the period in 
question was dominated by transactions between commercial 
banks and the government. 
The impact of the banks on the capacity to import can 
be more clearly seen through formal analysis of the key 
elements behind the abilit7 to purchase abroad. This type 
of analysis follows using constant 1970 US dollars. 
Making a determination about the banks' role in the 
capacity to import involves a degree of inference because 
of data limitations. While this study has generated 
information on the net flows of loans from banks, it is not 
derived from official balance-of-payments data and therefore 
is not necessarily consistent with such data. Moreover, 
official balance-of-payments data do not provide a detailed 
breakdown of financial flows, so that there is no way in 
which to single banks out from total finance; nor is there 
a way to distinguish bank flows to the public sector. However, 
Chapter IV pointed out that banks dominated lending in the 
period 1972-1976, so that any movement of loan flows in the 
balance of payments for these years would mostly be 
attributable to them. It also is known that the public sector 
was the principal foreign borrower in the country.' On this 
basis the capacity to import may be reviewed. 
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Figure 7 graphs the evolution, in real terms, of the 
purchasing power of Peru's exports and capacity to import 
over the period 1960-1976. 316/ 
The graph makes clear that there was a long run 
tendency of a rising capacity to import. However, it is 
striking that up until 1973 Peru's capacity to import was 
almost entirely dependent on earnings from export; indeed, 
except in 1965-1967, the net contribution of external 
financial flows was negative or marginal, subtracting from, 
or adding very little to, the country's capacity to import 
goods and services. However, after 1972 a notable change in 
relationships occured. Exports provided no increment in 
capacity; indeed the 1970 peak in the purchasing power of 
exports never was regained and earnings from this source 
stagnated throughout the 1970s. However, strong stimulus 
was provided by external financial flows and capacity to 
import actually rose dramatically between 1972 and 1974; by 
the latter year the country's ability to purchase abroad, in 
real terms, was nearly 50% higher than the peak level achieved 
in 1970. Although the capacity to import declined sharply 
in 1975-1976, net financial flows still provided a very 
positive contribution and helped to assuage the effects of a 
dramatic decline in the purchasing power of Peru's exports. 
(In real terms, the purchasing power of exports in 1976 was 
below the level recorded in 1968.) 
It is no coincidence that the noticeable rise in 
capacity to import in the 1970s, and the overwhelming 
importance of external financial flows in this increase, 
corresponded to a period when commercial banks were most 
involved in the Peruvian economy. Indeed, as shown in 
table 58, loans for which commercial banks were largely 
responsible, accounted for almost all the positive 
contribution derived from financial flows. Moreover, 
focusing on total financial flows only understates the full 
contribution of non-compensatory loans because a significant 
part of the inflow was offset by an outflow on errors and 
omissions and national assets, designated as "other" financial 
flows in the table. 317/ 
The table also demonstrates that the purchasing 
power of exports underwent practically no growth in 
1971-1976, as compared to the previous sexenium. Thus, loans 
were almost the sole factor behind the 28% rise in the 
average capacity to import. And even more importantly, 
ceteris paribus, if there had not been the dramatic increase 
in loan flows, the ability to import would have actually 
declined with respect to 1965-1970. 
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Figure 7 
PERU: PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS AND CAPACITY TO 
IMPORT, 1960 - 1976a 
Millions of dollars 
	
(Millions of 1970 dollars) 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
aPurchasing power of exports is export volume adjusted by the terms of trade. 
Capacity to import is purchasing power of exports + net financial flows, the 
latter being defined as net non-compensatory capital flows less net factor 
payments and amortization of compensatory loans. 
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Tale 
PERU: EVOLUTION OF CAPACITY TO IMPORT, 1960.1976 
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Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Exports adjusted for the effects of the terms of trade. Includes nos-requited transfers. 
b/ Deflated by import price indexes. 
c/ Net direct foreign investment leSs profit remittances. 
J Gross non—compensatory short, medium and long term loans less amortization and interest payments. 
e/ Net of donations, SDRs, and amortization of oOmpensatory loans. 
f/ Net movement of assets of residents and errors and omissions. 
Figure 8 provides more information on how non-
compensatory loans evolved. It is seen that in both net and 
gross terms loans rose in dramatic proportions from 1972. By 
1975 the net contribution of credits was, in real terms, three 
and one-half times as large as the previous peak flow 
achieved in 1967. The figure also shows that after '1973 
interest payments accumulated rapidly, absorbing considerabl;i 
greater amounts of new disbursements of loan capital. 
Nevertheless, the transfers via loan capital were of 
considerable magnitude throughout the period. 
It is evident from the above that without the massive 
influx of loan capital in general, and bank capital in 
particular, during the 1970s Peru would not have realized an 
unprecedented growth of import volume, which averaged nearly 
16% per annum during 1972-1975 (see figure 9). Neither 
prices nor volume were up to this task, as manifest in the 
near stagnant purchasing power of the country's exports. 1:,  
left nearly the full burden of growth on foreign capital. Thus, 
commercial bank loans helped to break what otherwise most 
certainly would have been a very debilitating external 
bottleneck. 
3. Impact on Domestic Demand  
The growth of imports facilitated by bank loans 
during the period 1972-1975 had a very significant impact on 
the evolution of the domestic economy. This is evident from 
table 59. 
During 1972 to 1975 there was a substantial increment 
in the growth of domestic demand with respect to the first 
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Figure 8 
PERU: BALANCE OF NET DISBURSEMENTS OF NON-COMPENSATOPY I (;) A.' ,6 
AND INTEREST PAYMENTS, 1960 1976 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
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3 years of the military government. The 8.8% rate of growth 
experienced in 1972-1975 was more than one-fifth higher 
the rate recorded in 1969-1971. The contributions of the 
public sector to this performance is particularly noteworthy, 
especially with regard to fixed investment. 
The reliance of domestic demand expansion on imports 
is, of course, mirrored in the difference between the rate 
of expansion of domestic demand and the growth of domestic 
product. It can be appreciated from the table that while the 
growth rate of domestic demand rose by more than 20% between 
1969-1971 and 1972-1975, the rate of expansion of product 
actually slipped by some 10%. Thus the gap between the 
expansion of demand and product rose from 1.1 percentage 
points in the former period to 3.2 percentage points in the 
latter. 318/ In as much as import growth gained heavy support 
from external loans, there is no better indication than this 
of the importance of external finance (and banks) in the 
overall performance of the domestic economy. 
A further idea of the impact of bank finance on 
domestic demand can be given by viewing Peru's performance 
against that of the rest of Latin America. 
Table 60 provides data on the growth of domestic 
demand and gross domestic product during the period 1972-1975. 
Table 59 
PERU: GROWTH OF DOMESTIC DEMAND AND PRODUCT, 1969-1971 AND 1972-1975a/ 
(Average annual rates of growth) 
1969-1971 1972-1975 
1) Total private sector 6.3 8.0 
Consumption 6.7 7.8 
Fixed investment 3.1 10.2 




Consumption 5.8 7.6 
Fixed investment 18.4 22.5 
3) Domestic demand 7.3 8.8 
4) Gross domestic product 6.2 5.6 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Based on market prices in 1970 Soles. 
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Table 60 
PERU: GROWTH OF DOMESTIC DEMAND AND PRODUCT IN COMPARISON
WITH LATIN AMERICA, 1972-1975!/ 
(Average annual rates of growth) 
 




Consumption 	 6.9 
Investment 	 13.9 
Domestic demand 	 8.1 
Gross domestic product 
 
6.5 
Source: CEPAL. on the basis of official data. 
a/ Based on market prices in 1970 U.S. dollars. 
(Since the original data for table 60 are in US dollars, rates 
of growth are not comparable to those in table 59). The data 
confirm that Peru enjoyed a markedly higher dependence on 
imports than the rest of Latin America with regard to the 
sustaining the growth of domestic demand and product. Overall, 
the differential between growth of domestic product and 
domestic demand -which reflects reliance on imports- was 2.5 
percentage points for Peru and only 0.5 percentage points for 
Latin America. 	 And, of course, in the case of Peru, bank 
finance was a major factor underpinning growth of imported 
goods and services. 
The growth of domestic demand that was facilitated by 
imports of course had concrete benefits for the economy, for 
instance, in 1972-1975 there was a very marked rise in 
employment and a fall in underemployment and unemployment with 
respect to 1969-1971. Also, it is significant to note that 
real wages rose very rapidly between the two periods. (See 
table 61), these are goodsigns of enhanced well being during 
a period of bank involvement in the economy. 
Whether or not these clear immediate benefits in the 
macro sense were reasonably well distributed among the members 
of the population is an interesting matter, but it is beyond 
the scope of the study to take the investigation into this 
type of difficult terrain. 319/ 
4. Impact on Public Finance  
Earlier chapters showed that bank lending to Peru had 
a primordial impact on the country's fiscal budget. 
During the fiscal crisis of 1966-1968, commercial banks 
extended timely loans to the financially strapped central 
government. Some of the loans were medium term general purpose 
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credits, others were foi icfinance of prior cbligat 
an important unquantifiable part involved short term 
finance designed to tide t-ne government over until it could. 
mobilize more domestic resources. 
While bank finance in 1966-1968 proved decisive at 
the margin, and therefore fficire important for its timeliness 
than for its sheer volume., in 1972-1975 it played a pervasive 
role. Banks continuous 	 efinanced upcoming debt service 
payments of the governme, freeing resources for the 
investment programme. The provided a large amount of free14 
disposable funds which 	 government could use to accumulate 
reserves or employ as it w shed. And, although banks were not 
overwhelmingly involved 
	 project finance, it has been shover 
that they financed very 
	 h priority national ventures, the 
most notable being the- 	 sandean oil pipeline (and, 	 the 
private sector, the Cuajw, copper mine). 
It is difficult tc., efine empirically the weight of 
bank loans in the total i ance of the government's experd 
programme because fiscal 
	 ta do not provide a sufficient 
degree of disaggregation, However, as in the analis of- tfne: 
capacity to import, the ce of banks can be inferred from 
Table 
PERU: EMPLOYMENT, MEREMPLOYMENT',IINEMPLOYMENT Ah REAL 
WAGES, 1969.1971 AND 1972.1975 
Average 
1969-1971 1972.1975 
Perc,nLat_of labor force 
Employment 49.5 
Underemployment 45.5 42.4 
Unemployment 5.0 J. 
Total 100 100 
index 1970 = 100 
Real wages of workers 
(index 	 in 1970 soles) 98.6 110.4 
Sources Employment: Schydlowsky and Wicht, table 10. p. 42; Real wages: CEPAL, on the basis 
of official data. 
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other data. In this case, one may examine the portion of 
expenditures financed externally and safely assume that, at 
least for 1972-1975, the banks had a high profile in total 
flows. Also, bank finance would have been significant, but 
not necessarily dominant, in 1966-1968. 
Table 62 displays data on the central government budget 
for some selected periods. It is seen that external financial 
flows were very important relative to internal sources of 
finance in 1966-1968 and 1972-1975; in both periods they 
covered roughly 50% of the budget deficit. Of course, while 
banks had a role in foreign finance in the former period, 
they clearly dominated external finance in the latter. 
Moreover, in this latter period the budget deficit to be 
financed was absolutely most significant, exceeding one-fifth 
of total expenditures. Thus banks would appear to have had 
a considerable weight in central government finance during 
1972-1975. 320/ 
Another manner of examining the importance of banks 
in government finance during 1972-1975 is to consider growth 
rates of revenue and expenditure. Using data in table 4 of 
chapter III, one can appreciate that, initiating with a 
deficit in 1971, expenditure (excluding amortization) rose by 
an average of 24% per annum in the period, while central 
government income rose by less (21% per annum). As just seen, 
more than half of the ensuing deficits were financed 
externally, in a period when commercial banks extended most 
of the country's foreign credit. Consequently, one may 
conclude that banks constituted a very important factor in 
public finance during the early 1970s. 
5. Freedom from IMF Surveillance  
An aspect similar to the one mentioned above involves 
the role of banks and the IMF. Chapters III and IV 
demonstrated that the government in power during the 1960s 
had to submit to IMF scrutiny. This traditionally has not 
been looked upon with favour by authorities because IMF 
standby agreements are viewed by many to be excessively harsh, 
and even counterproductive, to national development objectives. 
However, Peru, as well as other developing countries with 
external problems, usually could not avoid the IMF because 
it represented the only major source of general balance-of-
payments assistance; moreover, when there were obvious 
balance-of-payments problems in a country, other sources of 
finance, both private and official, usually tied their 
resources to a successful completion of IMF requirements. 
The IMF standby accord of 1968-1969 must have been 
particularly irksome to the military government, which pursued 
a nationalistic political and economic programme. However, 
given the state of the external accounts, the government had 
little choice other than to continue the standby programme 
agreed to by the previous government. The boom in export 
prices in 1970, coupled with a brief recovery of export 
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Table 62 
PERU: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL DEFICIT AND ITS FINANCE, 
1966-1968; 1969-1971; 1972.1975; AND 1976 
Average 1976 
1966-1968 19694971 1972-1975 
Fiscal deficit (billions of soles) a/ 4.8 3e9 17.4 48.4 
Deficit as percentage of expenditure a/ 16.3 9.5 21.4 30.3 
Finance of the deficit (net) 
Percentage externally financed 47.2 18.0 51.8 32.2 
Percentage internally financed 52.8 82.0 48.2 67.8 
Total finance percentage 100 100 100 100 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Excludes amortization of the public debt. 
volume, provided a sufficient boost to the balance of 
payments to permit the government to forego renewing the IMF 
agreement that expired in mid-1969. However, given the 
evolution of the purchasing power of exports in succeeding 
years, coupled with the burden of substantial debt service 
payments, the government may very well have had to exercise 
discipline in order to avoid returning to the IMF for 
assistance. But as it was, a wave of non-traditional lenders 
began approaching Peru in the 1970s with unconditional 
finance. This provided the necessary boost to the external 
accounts, not only facilitating rapid growth of imports, but 
also a massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. 
As shown earlier, by 1976 the banks had become less 
favourably disposed towards Peru, while simultaneously 
there was a severe deterioration of most internal and external 
economic indicators. Facing a severe balance-of-payments 
disequilibrium the banks became decidedly more cautious 
about further extension of credit to the country; they also 
encouraged authorities, for the first time in many years, to 
undergo IMF scrutiny. However, the government, for political 
reasons, preferred to avoid the IMF and therefore it 
negotiated intensely with the banks for a large 400 million 
dollar refinance credit that would not be tied to an IMF 
standby agreement. As has been seen the banks finally agreed 
to the Peruvian proposal, thus once again permitting the 
government to avoid the disagreeble scrutiny of the Fund. 
However, the bank credit was not free of costs or conditions. 
Moreover, the epilogue provided in the last chapter will 
reveal that avoidance of the Fund only was temporary as the 
following year relations with the banks underwent serious 
deterioration, leaving the government no choice but to agree 
to an IMF standby accord in late 1977. 
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B. THE NEGATIVE SIDE 
The above analysis has touched on what might be 
considered some of the positive aspects of commercial bankers' 
i.nvolement in the Peruvian economy. This will. be  
,.o , e66alap,.ed. by whet nay be considered. the less propitious 
uricts, 
•flid Abundant Commercial Bank  Finance Lull Economic 
f-dithot2:es into a False Sense of Security? 
P.,alysie has demenstrai.ed That bank finance allowed tiLe 
,?overnabont the Luxury at rap.tdly growing imports, on top on 
deteriorating, export base. This also helped to 
expansion of domestic demand considerably in ea-cos.' 
• :7 a lomestj,0 product. Cu the fiscal side, the 
wovo)nmeoJ„ '-as able to silwitanecusly expand. ,Tery rapidly it 
'...17-201,_ and investment in 1912-1975 (and in 1965-1967) 
1,Tith marked erosion of tax pressure. But the 
r.)6 	 LHP- 	 by ilnanee may have been a mixed 
help bu-., wonder to what degree the abundant 
bara funds in 1)72-1975 lulled Peruvian 
irto a. false sense of security, postponing until 
te, late a thre the needed adjustments in external and 
eoonomic parameters, thereby making the devastating 
• orisib of 1976 (anCi later) inevitable and, more severe 
decessaDy,, Of course, attempting to answer such a 
•.es,-Hod p'..7.ts one an highly normative terrain where there is 
no clear empirical evidence. Also observations in this regard 
can take advantage of hindsight. But the question is an 
jrterestin,c,  one that merits exploration. 
a' iu Ci.lapter ITT, the new F;overnment took over jn 
;-'3 •rr— •a were severe i.nterni. ci ,' external economic 
1.(led by some of the measures adopted in the last, 
p'exir.yus .!:evernment (under Emergency Law 17044) 




a rather orthodox :rxmetar 
pcy, a'• e;T'd by faA,=able export- prices, the 
	
m a -":,r extern 	 acooants once again became respectable, 
rflatricp. fell bac* to tolerable levelez]. But 
a7 displayed in table 6o, these adjustments were 
accompanied by considerable growth in domestic demand; in 
t.1 !a only lexresing feature of the economy was the 
- 	 of private fixed investment. Reflecting 
mc affectE of rather oboyant demand, the period witnessed. 
increase5 Ii. employiRent and a lowering of the rate 
• -s 




tlflo rest:ained behaviour of i'6-art, 
y, tfvelc sT.all difference between the 
rates of growth of product and domestic demand. Thus, even 
though handicapped by an unresponsive foreign financial 
community, the government, through discipline and deep resolve, 
proved capable of mobilizing domestic resources to achieve 
respectable rates of growth. And it must be remembered that 
growth was accompanied by comprehensive structural reforms. 
Undoubtedly the growth rates of 1969-1971 reflect an 
element of catch up. But this was not necessarily an 
overwhelming factor. Table 63 shows that from 1966 through 
1971 domestic product expanded steadily; so did consumption. 
The only area in the economy in which a clear element of 
catch up appeared was in fixed investment, which did not reach 
the previous (and somewhat extraordinary) peak level of 1966 
until the year 1971. Of course, it is likely that any serious 
expansion of investment after 1971 would have placed greater 
demands on the external sector than it did in the immediately 
preceeding years. Therefore either exports earnings, external 
finance, or some combination of the two would have had to 
expand; and as it turned ant the full burden was placed on 
external finance. This in itself carried implicit costs and 
dangers. Additionally, external finance may have exceeded the 
real capacity of the nation to effectively absorb it for 
purposes of development, fostering inefficient deployment 
of resources, inflation and severe external disequilibrium. 
Table 63 
PERU: EVOLUTION OF EXPENDITURES ON GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
1966-1971 
(Index based on 1970 Soles with 1966=100) 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Private consumption 100 102.5 103.5 109.9 120.6 125.5 
Public consumption 100 105.5 111.3 114.1 123.7 131.7 
Fixed investment 100 92.5 78.7 80.9 90.1 99.2 
Domestic demand 100 101.8 97.6 102.7 112.4 120.5 
Exports 100 101.5 112.8 108.1 112.9 103.1 
Imports 100 102.5 89.3 87.5 92.3 92.5 
Gross domestic 
product 100 101.6 102.3 106.8 116.5 122.5 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
The economy began to display signs of problems in late 
1972, precisely when access to bank finance began to take 
place. This is evident from the data presented in tables 59 
and 60 on the evolution of domestic demand and product. 
Since a detailed analysis of the macroeconomics of the 
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situation already has been prepared elsewhere by CEPAL,321/ 
it is best to focus here on some specific institutional 
factors behind the economic trends. 
Chapter III pointed out that the Peruvian public sector 
was relatively inexperienced. Expansion of the public sector 
in the 1960s was on a very small base, reflecting the national 
tradition of liberal economics. But the reform government 
of the late 1960s enormously expanded its presence in the 
economy in a mere three years (1969-1971). When it began to 
implement its investment programme it found foreign finance 
readily available. Thus in programming investments, 
authorities were not constrained by considerations of foreign 
exchange availability. A young, ambitious, highly motivated, 
but inexperienced bureaucracy took advantage of the situation 
and implemented a massive multisectoral capital intensive 
development programme that had a high reliance on imports. 
One problem, pointed out in the aforementioned CEPAL 
study, was that most of the projects had a long gestation 
period, with payouts not coming on stream until 1977 or later. 
This was particularly true for export oriented projects such 
as those in mining. But perhaps the eagerness of banks to 
support the external sector provided an illusion of security 
which gave authorities little need to consider spacing out 
projects to ensure an adequate mix of short, medium and long 
term payouts. 
Moreover, the abundance of finance gave little incentive 
to authorities to adjust economic parameters so as to screen 
imports and fully exploit existing export capacity 
(notwithstanding the loss of the anchovy). Bank finance 
supported an overvalued exchange rate that stifled the 
incentive to export. The overvalued exchange rate also made 
it easier for the private sector to overimport, whether 
because of speculation or a desire to pursue investments that 
would stave off worker control of their industries. 322/ But 
by the same token, it proved easier to import food than 
produce it. Finally, the overvalued rate also provided greater 
incentive to accept bankers overtures with regard to credit. 
The abundance of external finance also could have 
contributed to a lax attitude on fiscal matters. As long as 
there was easy access to external credit, it proved politically 
much easier to borrow abroad than to tax at home. When a 
significant part of the growth of government consumption and 
investment was covered by foreign credit, everyone could enjoy 
the benefits with little immediate cost. To pursue the same 
massive expansion via greater taxation would have been less 
feasible, as expenditures undoubtedly would have met resistence 
by those who had to finance them. And the resistence to 
increased tax pressure would have disciplined expenditures and 
required an ordering of priorities and attention to import 
content. As it was bankers facilitated an economic environment 
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where all was possible with little domestic discipline, at 
least for awhile. 
Had Peru's international bankers been willing to provide 
unconditional finance ad infinitum an external economic 
nirvana could have been created. But by 1976 bankers clearly 
had changed their attitude towards Peru, and to a lesser 
extent towards developing countries in general. Suddenly, 
bankers abandoned their carefree attitude on loans to 
developing countries; they rediscovered "prudent" lending 
practices and once again became preoccupied with economic 
policy. Peru's declining international reserves distressed 
the world's bankers. The more reticent bankers became about 
new loans to the government, and the more severe the terms of 
their credit, the more transparent became the veil of finance, 
showing behind it a structurally weak economy. Peru's 
creditors panicked and this made new finance difficult to 
attain. 
At the same time, Peru found itself very vulnerable and 
in a poor position to defend itself. The country's export 
coefficient had slumped to half of its 1965 level and nearly 
a third of earnings was absorbed by foreign debt service. The 
strategy of long term development of export capacity meant that 
new exports would come on stream only gradually beginning in 
1977. And the development of oil exports took on a much 
longer term character than had been originally anticipated. 
Meanwhile, over 40% of the country's imports were underpinned 
by external finance in 1976 (current account deficit divided 
by imports), compared to practically no dependence in 1969-
1971. Moreover, since imports were structured around 
intermediate and capital goods, any sharp reductions in 
purchases would severely damage output and employment. In a 
country in which large and politically influential groups had 
become accustomed to fast rising levels of consumption, and 
much larger groups were at the margin of existence, any attempt 
at rapid adjustment implied tremendous social costs and thus 
strong internal resistence. 
Thus, evidence suggestes that the temporary period of 
buoyant commercial bank finance to developing countries in the 
early 1970s lulled authorities into a position of severe 
vulnerability vis-a-vis the banks and foreign finance in 
general. This was in direct contradiction to the government's 
initially stated intention (see Chapter III) to rely basically 
on internal resources for development. Ironically, while 
Peru successfully reduced dependence on TNCs and official 
lenders, it traded this dependence for another more 
complicated type involving foreign commercial banks. Whether 
one form of dependence is less negative than the other would 
be an interesting matter to study. But one thing is clear: 
a reduction of foreign dependence was a major goal of 
government policy and this objective appears to have been 
undermined by an excessively permissive world banking community. 
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2. Commercial Banks: an Ephemeral Source of  
Development Finance  
Private commercial banks entered into external finance 
en masse in the early 1970s, effectively displacing official 
institutions as the principal source of development finance 
for developing countries. If events are viewed from the 
perspective of developing countries and the requirements of 
broad-based socioeconomic development, this displacement 
should have been accompanied by a responsibility to accomodate 
borrowers in good times and bad. Moreover, from the same 
perspective one would have expected the banks to have 
anticipated that lending to developing countries would 
obviously be qualitatively different than lending to TNCs and 
industrialized country governments; the former are poor and 
exceptionally prone to bad times because of an unstable 
external economic environment and a delicate domestic 
socioeconomic structure. In the case of Peru, the issue of 
responsibility becomes all the more manifest when the 
commercial banks' participation in Peru's economic problems is 
taken into account. 
Commercial banks displayed an almost unlimited 
willingness to lend resources to the government up through 
1975, despite the fact that there was evidence of potential 
difficulties as early as late 1972. The policy initiated in 
1968 involving a fixed exchange rate without compensation for 
inflation had obvious consequences for growth of exports and 
imports. The composition of imports, which banks helped to 
finance, was fully known by all. By 1973 the country's export 
coefficient was already 40% less than 1968, and, of course, 
continued to decline thereafter. The large accumulation of 
reserves that occurred from 1972 onwards - making Peru appear 
very liquid - occurred simultaneously with a sharply 
expanding current account deficit, meaning that growth of 
reserves only reflected borrowing from abroad, not the dynamic 
generation of real income. 
To the extent that bankers were unaware of, or oblivious 
to, the underlying economic trends, then their own management 
of lending to Peru would have to be considered sloppy and 
reckless. If bankers were fully cognizant of the trends from 
the beginning, then they too must have been awaiting the 
results of the payout on the long term investments in mining, 
petroleum, etc. But whether banks lent due to overzealousness, 
or on the basis of the calculated risks of future export 
earnings, their tacit or explicit support of government 
policies prior to 1976 would lead one to expect that ideally 
they would have borne the consequences of their decisions 
and have helped Peru overcome its difficulties without grave 
social costs. As it was the banks quickly abandoned the 
authorities, leaving Peru to fend for itself. 
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It might be objected that the abandonment of Peru 
resulted from the fact that the authorities' management of the 
crisis did not instill the confidence neeeded for bankers to 
ride out the storm. Undoubtedly Peru did not live up to its 
end of the bargain with regard to the stabilization effort. 
But banks were not dealing with a rich country borrower or a 
TNC. The difficulties in adjustment stemmed from Peru's 
underdevelopment and the momentum found in the economic 
policies that the bankers unquestionably supported with 
abundant finance. To put a break on past trends, no less 
reverse them, clearly would be a long and arduous process, 
involving not only changes in policy, but important 
psychological, political and social adjustments as well. 
Hesitation, resistance and numerous outright failures at 
correction could be anticipated, as could a desire to pursue 
adjustment gradually so as to avoid harsh social costs in an 
economy suffering from severe poverty (even in the best of 
times).323/ But private bankers were not prepared to assume 
the responsibilities that a dominant role in development 
finance would seem to demand. Private creditors showed little 
tenacity; when their initial willingness to support adjustment 
(on very lucrative terms) resulted in failure, they quickly 
withdrew their support of the economy, giving Peru no 
alternative but to submit to the IMF. 
Hence, one may conclude that commercial banks have a low 
threshold for absorbing the problems encountered by developing 
countries. While the "going was good", the banks were eagerly 
present, making the going even better. When the economics of 
the country turned sour, their staying power depended on the 
government quickly taking hard decisions that would squeeze 
foreign exchange out of the economy for payment of debt; 
decisions that also would be socially very costly and probably 
confront severe domestic resistence. As soon as it became 
apparent that the mixture of politics and economics was not yet 
ripe for harsh adjustment the bankers lost confidence in Peru. 
Thus banks clearly were not able to satisfy one of the 
basic requirements of development finance, i.e., a stable 
source of resources able to weather the periodic internal and 
external difficulties that can be expected in the development 
process. It is true that Peru's problems were unusually 
severe and its commitment to adjustment half-hearted, but it is 
also true that bankers had given open-ended support to the 
policies that generated the problems, making them partially 
responsible for ensuing difficulties. It will be argued in 
Chapter XII that the banks' behaviour fell short of the needs 
of development finance basically because of weaknesses 
intrinsic to the institution of commercial banking itself. 
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3. The Unstable and Short Maturity Structure of 
Commercial Bank Credit  
It was shown in Chapter II that developing countries of 
the 19th and early 20th Century often had access to foreign 
capital with very long maturities, 40, 50 and even up to 99 
years. Much of the resources originated from institutional 
lenders and went into capital intensive projects with long 
payouts (railroads, canals, roads, etc.). While this type of 
finance had its cycles, the great crash of 1929 more or less put 
an end to this type of finance, Institutions and commercial 
banks withdxew from developing areas, concentrating their 
finance in the safer industrialized countries. 
In the postwar period official institutions constituted 
developing countries' main source of finance and fortunately 
their loans had relatively long maturities, 25 years or more 
being common. But the expansion of official finance got bogged 
down by: (i) a lack of commitment on the part of rich countries 
to provide adequate support to these institutions; (ii) a 
general mechanism which tied finance to projects (and did not 
cover certain economic sectors), thereby slowing down 
disbursements; and (iii) conditionality and/or red tape of 
varying degrees which often made finance unattractive to 
developing country governments. 
While the expansion of official finance was hampered by 
the above factors, once commercial banks decided to lend to 
developing countries they were totally unrestrained; liquidity 
in the eurocurrency market was expanding at phenomenal rates 
and the market itself was totally unregulated, It is no 
surprise, then, that commercial banks filled the financial 
vacuum and effectively displaced official lenders as the main 
source of finance for developing countries, 
One of the consequences of the shift in the sources of 
finance was that developing countries, including Peru, became 
subject to commercial and floating interest rates, as opposed 
to the fixed and concessionary rates of official lenders (and 
sometimes foreign suppliers). This presented developing 
countries such as Peru with a challenge, but not necessarily an 
insurmountable one. Loans had to be carefully used to ensure 
that returns on the resources matched their casts, And the 
costs, after discounting inflation, usually were not outrageous; 
indeed, in 1973-1975 the real cost of credit for Peru may have 
been marginal. 324/ Thus, rather than absolute cost, the real 
challenge is in the variability of the interest rate; sharp 
fluctuations make it difficult to programme costs and therefore 
marginally profitable ventures could suddenly become 
unprofitable. 
More serious than the variability of the interest rates 
is the short maturity of commercial credit. Peru's commercial 
loans for the whole period 1971-1976 averaged only 7 years. 
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These are very short maturities suitable only for the most 
commercial of ventures. In contrast, a broad-based development 
programme incorporates activities which necessarily have long 
gestation periods. On the commercial side, many projects 
involve infant industries that may have payouts that are much 
more stretched out than identical activities in industrialized 
countries. This is aside from prolongation of payouts due to 
mistakes and unforeseen events, such as falls in export prices. 
On the social side, infrastructure for social development may 
payout sometimes only over a whole generation. 
Clearly, then, commercial bank maturities are not 
symmetrical to the income flow of a broad-based development 
programme. This places clear obstacles in the path of 
development. There are, of course, many ways for policy 
makers to confront the dilemma. However, in order to 
illustrate the gravity of the problem, matters can be 
simplified into two basic options for a country that is 
considerably indebted to commercial banks. The two options 
are 
(i) formulate growth on a narrowly based development 
programme that focuses on quick payouts and high 
private rates of return, leaving social development 
at the margin today and relying on a "trickle down" 
effect to satisfy these needs in the longer run; or 
(ii) seek a balanced broad-based development strategy, 
mixing commercial and social ventures, hoping that 
banks will fill the maturity gap through refinance 
operations. 
The first route would be attractive to conservative 
economic managers, but experience has shown that the "trickle 
down" strategy often has only postponed indefinitely social 
reforms and reasonably equitable income distribution; by the 
same token, it has simultaneously been associated with the 
exclusion of broad segments of society from participation in 
political processes. The second option on the other hand, 
would appear to open more hope for real and immediate 
socioeconomic development, but unfortunately it is likely to 
prove to be full of pitfalls for borrowers, making them 
inclined to move progressively in the direction of option 1. 
This latter phenomenon is elaborated upon below. 
It is evident from Chapter V that banks do refinance, 
and often, making option two theoretically feasible. But 
refinance is a terribly awkward way to accomodate the long 
gestation period of broad-based development programmes. 
Because of the short maturities, borrowers must regularly 
undergo the scrutiny of their bankers in order to realize 
successful refinance. They then become vulnerable to the 
changing attitudes of bankers and the volatile conditions on 
international capital markets. If refinance needs develop 
during a borrower's market - such as 1972-1974 - the results 
can be attractive with low margins and relatively long 
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maturities (for commercial finance). But if a borrower 
happens to approach its bankers during a lender's market - such 
as 1975-1977 - the results can be discouraging and 
counterproductive. Aside from very high interest margins, 325/ 
maturities contract to only the briefest tenor. 326/ This 
causes interest payments to bulge and distorts the maturity 
profile, generating more requirements for refinance and 
complicating debt management. In this type of environment debt 
service can appear more burdensome and bankers can become 
nervous, further aggravating the trends. Under these 
circumstances, in order to maintain the confidence of bankers, 
government authorities may make a decisive shift to 
conservative economic management that places socially-oriented 
(basic needs) programmes - which weigh heavily on the balance 
of payments 327/ - at the margin of policy. 
When a country under economic duress seeks to refinance 
in a lender's market the results can be disasterous for 
development programmes. Peru is a case in point. In 1976, 
with clear external difficulties that were structural in 
nature and that could not be remedied quickly, banks offered to 
refinance only one year of Peru's debt service and on a very 
short maturity of 5 years, with only 2 years grace. This 
"short leash" maturity provided little debt relief and ensured 
that payments would pop up quickly again to cause problems. 
Moreover, the short maturities were acccimpaniedby a very 
burdensome spread (2.25%) and unusually costly fees (1.5% 
flat). These rather harsh terms came when bankers were still 
formally supporting the government's stabilization efforts. 
When this support was withdrawn in 1977, refinance maturities 
became ridiculously short, sometimes as brief as several 
months. On top of all the uncertainty with regard to 
refinance, bankers, seeing Peru's vulnerability, also became 
involved in the government's economic policy and even began 
to protect the interests of their TNC clients. The lack of 
finance and commercial bank scrutiny forced the government to 
cut back its development programme and, perversely, halt 
projects (like Cerro Verde II and oil exploration) that would 
have aided its export capacity. Social expenditures were 
slashed and development came to a halt while authorities 
rushed back and forth between their bankers and the IMF trying 
to reach an agreement. 
It should be made clear that the behaviour of creditors 
could have appeared rational from the short term viewpoint of 
individual commercial banks. The year-by-year and month-by-
month refinance on tight maturities reduced perceived risks 
and gave commercial bankers leverage over economic policy 
making, which was the real source of repayment. Had they 
adopted a multi-year rescheduling to smooth out debt service 
payments - as ideally they should have - this leverage would 
have been lost and perceived risk increased. Also, a 
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rescheduling would spot the financial statements of the banks. 
Meanwhile high interest margins and fees on the loans to Peru 
covered the perceived higher risk of lending under 
circumstances of economic duress. And as far as the impact 
of bankers' policy on the country's development programme is 
concerned, this was at best of secondary importance. 
Commercial banks are not development institutions; their main 
concern was profit generation and protection of depositors 
and shareholders by ensuring that authorities squeezed enough 
foreign exchange from the economy to service the debt. 
4. Final Considerations  
It is clear from the above that bank finance of Peru's 
development has been a double-edged sword. Benefits there 
were, but these were offset equally or more by liabilities. 
The basic problem with commercial bank dominance of the 
country's development finance lies in the observation just 
made above: commercial banks, as their name implies, are not 
development institutions. The next and last substantive 








SOME CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw some conclusions 
about commercial bank lending on the basis of the study of the 
Peruvian experience. Firm conclusions are of course difficult 
to formulate because of the uncertainties of generalizing 
from a one-country case and because retrospective analysis of 
the type performed here can be eclipsed by the fast changing 
events in world banking. Nonetheless, in the absence of more 
precise analysis of the experience of other borrowers, there 
are at least two reasons to suspect that general lessons and 
tentative policy conclusions are indeed to be drawn from this 
in-debth study. Firstly, a significant number of the symptoms 
of the Peruvian case are seemingly apparent in a number of 
other developing countries (e.g., Jamaica, Bolivia, Zaire, 
maybe Nicaragua) that have borrowed from banks; furthermore as 
debt piles up in the Third World and domestic political regimes 
evolve towards more democratic processes the aforementioned 
list could very well expand, even perhaps incorporating some 
of the so-called successful developing country borrowers. 
Secondly, while banks undoubtedly have learned from past errors 
and will attempt to adjust lending accordingly, much of their 
behavior is induced by their private-commercial institutional 
makeup and therefore there is little reason to expect radical 
alteration of their behavior in the medium term. Thus, with a 
forewarning of caution the following paragraphs will posit 
some general conclusions and recommendations. 
The study, particularly Chapters X and XI, raises 
serious questions about the dominant role of commercial banks 
in the external finance of developing countries. It has been 
found that the maturities that banks offered on their loans, 
even under the best of circumstances, were very short 
relative to the long gestation period of many activities 
related to broad-based socio-economic development. Nor was 
refinance shown to be an adequate way to overcome the short 
maturity spectrum. In the case of Peru banks also have 
displayed highly erratic lending patterns both in terms of the 
amount of credit available and its costs and conditions. When 
banks were in an expansive mood in the early 1970s they 
aggressively extended no-questions-asked finance to the 
government. Facing seemingly unlimited external finance, an 
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inexperienced public sector found that it could make a dash 
for development while avoiding timely (and politically 
disagreeable) adjustments in economic policy; indeed, the 
bankers' loans perversely masked underlying structural and 
policy weaknesses in the economy to such a degree that many 
banks themselves apparently did not anticipate the ensuing 
problems. Only when financial imbalances became grossly 
exaggerated did the bankers react. Then, when authorities 
attempted to adjust the economy, the banks limited their 
loans to the refinance of prior debt on extremely harsh terms, 
a response which served as a mere stopgap measure rather than 
real relief from debt service. Moreover, the banks were 
shown to intervene in the domestic affairs of Peru and to 
protect the interests of their TNC clients at the moments of 
the borrower's greatest vulnerability. As soon as it became 
apparent that the adjustment process could not be effected 
rapidly because of internal resistance to the social and 
political costs required to squeeze out foreign exchange for 
debt service, the bankers panicked and refused to extend any 
credit unless Peru deflated its economy according to the IMF 
prescription. Thus, banks provided evidence that they are 
not designed for the economic dislocation and uncertainties 
that often arise in developing countries, particularly in 
periods of economic crisis. 328/ Indeed, employing a popular 
joke of the period of financial crisis in the 1930s, bank 
loans to Peru have appeared as "an umbrella which a man is 
allowed to borrow as long as the weather is fine but which 
he has to return the moment it starts raining".329/ 
The underlying problem appears to be that commercial 
banks are not development institutions and their private, 
commercial time and risk preferences make it difficult, if 
not impossible, for them to accomodate the broad socio-economic 
goals of development, which are long term in nature and 
based on social rates of return. There are several factors 
which seem to seriously restrict the behavior of commercial 
banks. 
First, they are profit-oriented institutions which 
operate on the basis of private rates of return. They may 
internalize social rates of return on their lending only to 
the extent that the latter enhances the former; moreover, the 
gestation period for such a feedback process tends to be long 
term in nature. 
Second, the great mass of bankers' resources come from 
call or short term time deposits. 330/ This places limits 
on the degree to which banks can prudently mismatch 
maturities, i.e., lend long on short funds. Thus, the nature 
of the resources base gives these institutions only a short 
to medium term time horizon with regard to lending. 
Third, as bankers will readily admit, they have a 
special concern for minimizing risk. This orientation is 
partly a function of tradition, but also reflects the reality 
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that banks operate with other people's money and must ensure 
the safety of deposits if access to resources is to be 
maintained. This leads to a conservative view of life where 
"caution and prudence" are usually the watchwords for lending 
operations. When viewing prospective loans to developing 
countries, bankers naturally are primarily interested in the 
prospects for repayment. It is not surprising then that short 
term liquidity indicators (as opposed to development 
indicators) dominate creditworthiness criteria; 331/ good 
management is synonymous with assurance of liquidity to 
service debts, even if this means deflation of the local 
economy to free foreign exchange. 
If banks depart from the conservative mold dictated by 
institutional constraints -as in the brief period of the early 
1970s- the institutional contradictions and the criticism 
from regulatory authorities build up, forcing them to 
rediscover so-called prudent banking practices. In these 
circumstances lending conditions contract and borrowing 
countries face a very difficult external environment, often 
with severe setbacks to development; banks, in contrast, 
appear to lose nothing as their short rollover credits 
ensure repayment and profits. 
The Peruvian experience suggests that commercial bank 
finance has many characteristics which are asymmetrical to 
the requirements of development. While ideally suited as 
intermediaries of short term funds for trade and working 
capital (a function banks have had for centuries), there is 
evidence that they find it difficult to satisfy the 
requirements of long term development finance and that their 
time and risk preferences make them not a very reliable source 
of finance for structural balance of payments problems. It 
would seem, then, that commercial banks are not an adequate 
substitute for long term official finance and access to 
private bond markets. And in the case of developing countries 
such as Peru where public policy suffered from inexperience 
and/or severe domestic pressures for economic growth cum 
social reform, banks clearly acted as an extremely poor 
substitute. Peru has suffered the consequences and 
undoubtedly others will too. One would think that the 
international community should be seeking alternatives to the 
present system of bank dominated external finance, which has 
evolved in an ad-hoc fashion and which appears to function in 
a manner that leaves unfullfilled many of the basic 
requirements of development finance. 
Unfortunately, while there is evidence to suggest that 
commercial banks -for reasons which are not completely their 
own- are excessively enmeshed in the overall finance of 
developing countries, there is an unfortunate intellectual 
and political inertia in the industrialized countries with 
respect to seeking alternativesto bank finance, especially 
when programs may involve greater contributions to multilateral 
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agencies, which would appear to be the most suitable source 
of development finance. 332' Thus, in the hard world of 
political reality it must be assumed that baring a collapse 
of world finance, commercial banks will continue for the 
immediate future to be a major source of development finance 
for upper income developing countries such as those of Latin 
America. How then to make the best of an inadequate 
international financial system for development? 
The immediate goal should be to assuage the sharper 
edges of bank lending behavior. The scope of change is 
limited by the fact that many problems are intrinsic to the 
institution of private commercial banking itself. Also, 
change is handicapped by the fact that there are hundreds of 
banks operating internationally, with no control over their 
liquidity or behavior. Nevertheless, some action may be 
taken to alleviate the situation without violating the 
boundaries of prudent banking. 
As a general rule commercial banks could take greater 
care to operate in areas where they are institutionally most 
comfortable in the long run and therefore reduce the 
possibilities of radical alteration of behavior that is 
disruptive to market stability and the development of 
developing country borrowers. 
In this spirit, banks could consider concentrating 
their lending in traditional areas of competence, i.e., short 
term working capital or medium term commercial investment 
finance. Moreover, banks could avoid lending to commercial 
ventures merely on the basis of a government guarantee; rather, 
it might be advisable to coldly evaluate ventures on commercial 
(and not political) grounds with a view to assessing the real 
repayment prospects of the venture itself. In other words, 
banks should cease to treat governments as if they had some 
type of fail safe repayment mechanism; lending for commercial 
ventures should conform to some standards of commercial 
viability. 
Following the above prescription, commercial banks 
could avoid direct balance of payments finance when problems 
clearly are associated with socio-economic structure as 
opposed to short term illiquidity. Experience has shown that 
banks are incapable of absorbing the political-economic shocks 
that, as argued earlier, are frequently an unfortunate reality 
accompanying the adjustment process in developing countries; 
they also are not suited to be involved in public 
macroeconomic policy making. So why enter terrain that 
ultimately may require a quick and disruptive retreat? Of 
course, it would be feasible for banks to avoid direct 
balance of payments support only if countries became more 
comfortable with the IMF and if more financial resources 
could be disbursed from multilateral development agencies. 
Thus it would be wise for the IMF to once and for all moderate 
its conditionality and adopt a pluralistic and longer term 
246 
methodology for tackling the adjustment problem; 333/ also, 
much more medium term program lending from the World Bank and 
IDB would be needed if banks are to avoid direct balance of 
payments finance. 
Commercial banks, of course, will frequently be asked 
to refinance their loans, which is indirect balance of 
payments support. Refinance should be considered a natural 
way to assuage repayment difficulties and borrowers undergoing 
adjustment should not be burdened with punitive terms, i.e., 
much higher than average interest margins and fees, and 
shorter than average maturities. It must be remembered that 
the real capacity of almost all borrowers to meet their debt 
service hinges on the refinance and rollover process; since 
most developing countries run heavy deficits on current 
transactions debt is almost always repaid with new debt. Thus, 
to weigh a yeakned borrower down with high interest margins 
new fees and short maturities actually may increase the 
risk of non-payment rather than reduce it. In the case where 
a developing country faces internal structural difficulties 
and bunched maturities banks could cease to be reluctant to 
enter into rescheduling agreements. A medium term 
restructuring of principal should be viewed as a routine way 
to provide relief for economic development and reduce risks 
of non-payment. If interest payments are kept current, as 
they should be, banks would encounter extra bookkeeping work, 
but not necessarily losses of income. 
Commercial banks also could take a broader view on the 
pre-payment/refinance strategies of developing country 
borrowers, and keep to a minimum the penalties and other 
restrictions related to such activities. This is not to 
imply that prepayment or refinance is a "right" of the 
borrower. Such strategies are undoubtedly troublesome to a 
bank; not only does it lose a profitable loan, but it also 
receives unwanted liquidity, unless the bank itself 
participates in the new credit. Moreover, banks cannot call 
for ex post adjustment of the terms of an old loan when 
market conditions shift in their favor. Nevertheless, we have 
a situation in which what appears to be rational action on 
the part of an individual bank could be detrimental to all 
concerned in the aggregate. This is because a developing 
country borrower which can trade in old loans for more 
favorable terms can assuage the effects of the constantly 
changing terms on credit markets and therefore is a better 
overall credit risk and generally has increased capacity to 
assume new debt from the banks. 
There are three other specific areas where banks could 
alter their behavior: 
i) One is that banks might seek more long term funds 
so as to reduce their dependency on short term deposits and 
thereby prudently lengthen maturities. Some banks such as 
Citicorp have already attempted to do this, but hopefully the 
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strategy will become more intensive and generalized in the 
world banking community. 334/ 
ii) Banks might reconsider the need to act as world 
policemen for TNCs. When TNCs invest in a country (and banks 
help them) all parties take calculated risks based on the 
returns to capital. Thus lending to a developing country 
government must be viewed as a separate business transaction 
and should not be linked to the fortunes of a locally-based 
TNC. In the early 1970s banks showed that there does not 
have to be a connection between a government's treatment of 
foreign investment and successful business relations between 
them and a government. So why renew the ancient practice of 
fronting for TNCs? 
iii) Banks could avoid offending the sensibilities of 
developing countries borrower through demands to waive 
sovereign immunity and local jurisdiction over loan 
agreements. As an alternative to the traditional practice, 
one could envision greater employment of international 
arbitration as a way to satisfy a bank's requirements for 
security and a government's desire to avoid an alien country's 
legal system. 
Another major area of change would be to bring 
commercial lending out into the open. Lenders (and sometimes 
borrowers) behave in ways which shroud transactions in 
secrecy. This ultimately benefits the banks which can 
"fragment" markets to their advantage with respect to the 
establishment of the terms and conditions of credit. A more 
perfect flow of information on the details of loan 
transactions by individual banks can only enhance the 
bargaining position of developing countries. It must be 
remembered that this study has found that commercial banks 
did not act as a homogeneous group; rather in many important 
ways they displayed distinct modes of behavior (see second 
half of Chapter VIII). In the bargaining environment it is 
important for developing country borrowers to be aware of 
these distinctions so that they can tailor their interface 
with commercial institutions in ways which are supportive of 
national development objectives. However, there is little 
institutional analysis available on the behavior of specific 
lenders and their loan agreements, making it difficult for 
new borrowers to map out ex ante strategies for negotiations 
with individual institutions. Under present circumstances 
only with a long accumulation of experience can borrowers 
begin to differentiate the behavior of banks; however, the 
"learning by doing" mode can be difficult and full of 
unnecessary and costly pitfalls. Moreover, resulting 
evaluations of the banks can be more informal than systematic. 
To overcome these problems, researchers must make a 
greater effort to analyse the institutional behavior of 
commercial lending. As long as banks remain reticent about 
revealing the exact nature of their interface with developing 
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countries, the most productive way to go about this would 
seem to be detailed case studies such as this one, which, 
in a cumulative way, would reveal ever more about the 
lending behavior of specific institutions. Indeed, an 
international organization such as the U.N. Centre on 
Transnational Corporations, the World Bank or a new World 
Debt Organization under trio control of developing countries 
could set up a reporting system whereby borrowers would 
provide detailed qualitative and quantitative information 
on credit agreements with commercial banks. Using these data 
the organization in turn could systematically analyse the 
the evolving behavior of individual banks both with regard 
to individual borrowers and groups of borrowers. The findings 
could be disseminated to governments participating in the 
system, providing a view on banks that would be more extensive 
than that available to any single borrower. 335/ Such an 
arrangement would allow countries to effectively interchange 
views and experiences concerning specific lenders 
and permit them to adjust their negotiations with creditors 
accordingly. The interchange of information among borrowers 
about banks also would counterbalance the advantages of 
bankers who are gaining ever better access to official 
information about countries. 336/ 
Of course, initially there may be resistance to such 
a system since some borrowers can be very protective about 
data concerning their activities with commercial banks. Thus 
work will have to be done to overcome this problem. The 
advantages of such a system will have to be demonstrated to 
developing countries and confidentiality on individual 
transactions will have to be ensured. Notwithstanding these 
obstacles, a dialogue with developing country governments on 
this matter should be undertaken as soon as possible. 
The last major conclusion of the study is that an 
unregulated international banking system appears to 
experience periodic supply-led expansion, requiring borrowers 
to show restraint in the face of bankers overtures. In the 
early 1970s world liquidity and an unregulated eurocurrency 
market fostered clear supply-led expansion of lending. After 
a brief period of retrenchment in 1975-1977, banks once again, 
under pressures of liquidity, began actively soliciting clients 
in developing countries. Since banks sometimes can show 
little self-restraint, then borrowers must be prepared to do 
so. This suggests that (i) countries must pursue disciplined 
economic programs; (ii) they must carefully control their 
interference with foreign finance in general and commercial 
finance in particular, and (iii) foreign finance must be 
viewed only as a complement to a vigorous national effort to 
generate savings for development. Moreover, when foreign 
resources are used, care should be taken to ensure that the 
nature of deployment is consistent with the cost and 
maturities of the credit. Restraint and sagacious deployment 
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of resources is particularly important for small and medium 
sized economies where offers of commercial credit can easily 
exceed the real capacity of the economy to match commercial 




Of course the story of Peru and its commercial bankers 
did not end in 1976. The drama intensified in succeeding 
years and the purpose of this chapter is to provide a very 
brief update of the country's interface with its commercial 
creditors. 337/ 
A. THE FIRST STABILIZATION EFFORT FAILS 
The full scale stabilization program instituted in 
mid-1976 proved to be short lived. By the beginning of 1977 
it became apparent that the goals of the program could not 
be realized owing to, among other things, strong internal 
resistence to cutbacks in government expenditures. Peru's 
private creditors, now very frightened, forced the country 
to negotiate with the IMF. However, "the IMF's persistence 
in quantitative targets practically unrealizable in a brief 
period and the profound fears of the government concerning 
public reaction impeded the materialization of an 
agreement". 338/ 
B. A SECOND ATTEMPT AT STABILIZATION 
Around mid-year, again under pressure from its private 
creditors to meet the requirements of the IMF, the government 
attempted to introduce new austerity measures. However, 
resistence to price increases of popular goods, falls in real 
wages, etc. was so strong that it provoked the quick demise 
of a recently installed economic minister. The succeeding 
economic team attempted to moderate the program through a 
slight downward adjustment in prices of some key goods. 339/ 
Facing a severe foreign exchange crunch, and the general 
refusal of the banks to finance without the IMF, the government 
desperately arranged swaps with central banks of friendly 
countries in Latin America and with locally domiciled 
foreign firms. 340/ But the foreign exchange situation proved 
so acute that the government felt that it had no alternative 
but to renew negotiations with the IMF. Hanging over the 
heads of officials was the fact that without the "green light" 
of the Fund the banks would refuse to extend any credit, other 
than perhaps last minute rollovers to avoid formal default. 
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After the introduction of austerity measures to 
display its "goodwill" to the Fund, authorities reopened 
negotiations and an agreement was finally reached with the 
IMF in the last quarter of '1977 for second and third credit 
trauches. The targets of the program were very severe, implied 
a high social cost, and to many they appeared totally 
impossible to realize. 341/ The banks remained very cautious, 
restricting lines of credit to local banks and remaining 
non-committal to the government's efforts for new finance. 
At the insistence of the banks, the government sought and 
eventually received rescheduling of its debt with the Soviet 
Union. 342/ 
In the beginning of 1978 the banks realized that new 
loans (equivalent to perhaps 260 million dollars) would have 
to be extended if default was to be avoided and creditors 
studied formulas to this effect. Many of the U.S. creditors 
favored directly tying any new loans to IMF draw-downs in 
the on-going standby agreement, while many European 
institutions did not enjoy the political implications of 
such a close working relationship and were inclined to 
extend a credit with or without the IMF. 343/ By this time 
Citicorp had resigned as head of the Steering Committee, being 
replaced by Manufacturers Hanover. Until a formula could be 
reached, short monthly rollover credits would be provided to 
stave off the default that neither Peru nor the banks wanted. 
In early 1978 an IMF team visited Peru to evaluate the 
stabilization program. It found that the government failed 
to meet the standby targets and questioned the local 
accounting methods that stated to the contrary. 344/ One of 
the more publicized aspects of this latter accusation was a 
credit extended by Dresdner Bank at the very end of December 
1977 
-to build international reserves up to the end of year 
target levels- followed by repayment in the first week of 
January 1978. 
The Fund indicated that the next disbursement of the 
standby agreement could not be effected because of Peru's 
failure to meet target arrangements. The banks -strongly 
pushed by U.S. institutions- formally abandoned negotiations 
for new credit. The crisis environment deepened, complicated 
by continuous strikes and demonstrations against the expanding 
austerity measures. 
The government faced severe difficulties. The private 
sector expressed increasing hostility over the continuing 
shortages of foreign exchange and the tight rein foreign 
commercial bankers maintained on foreign lines of credit. 345/ 
The prospects were that by mid-May all liquid reserves would 
be exhausted. So the government had little choice but to 
begin organizing a new austerity program to present to the 
Fund, which by now was being characterized as "uncompromising 
and anachronistic". 
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Government authorities continued their intensive 
efforts to prevent default. There was talk of an effort to 
arrange a Paris Club rescheduling, but immediate efforts 
centered on avoiding default on commercial debt. While banks 
such as Dresdner and Nova Scotia stood in favor of going 
ahead with a 260 million refinance credit IMF or no, the U.S. 
institutions -the principal creditors- rejected this proposal 
outright. Citicorp even went so far as to threaten to right 
off its Peru exposure rather than extend credit without the 
IMF. 346/ Meanwhile, Japanese banks tended to follow trends, 
which clearly were led by the hard-line U.S. institutions. 
Thus, without a new standby agreement, the most Peru could 
expect would be very short term rollover credits that would 
evade technical default, but that in no way would provide 
relief from the financial crisis. 
C. THE THIRD ATTEMPT AT STABILIZATION 
In late May 1978 a newly installed economic team 
introduced austerity measures. Street riots followed and 
marshall law had to be introduced. Meanwhile, authorities 
rushed around the globe seeking loans to bolster the almost 
depleted international foreign exchange reserves. Numerous 
swaps and loans were successfully arranged with friendly 
governments and negotiations with commercial bankers resulted 
in a 45-90 day rollover credit as a bridge to an eventual 
settlement with the IMF. 
In the middle of this environment a scandal broke out 
with one of Peru's major creditors -Chase Manhattan Bank. It 
had headed a large syndicate to the Cuajone copper project 
and it now wanted to establish legal control over the mine's 
foreign exchange earnings, which were held by the Peruvian 
Central Bank. Chase reportedly threatened that further 
cooperation from Chase and other banks around the world 
would be dependent upon Peru's acceptance of Chase's 
viewpoint on the legal issue. 347/ Peruvian authorities 
strongly rejected the implications of the bank's actions and 
public criticism at both home and abroad made Chase back down 
from its original stance. 
The government finally entered again into negotiations 
with the Fund. This time it demanded targets which were 
feasible. Meanwhile, the IMF, now more sensitive to growing 
world wide criticism about its overly rigid stabilization 
policies, took a somewhat more flexible posture. A mutually 
acceptable agreement was reached. 
Armed with the IMF accord, authorities called a Paris 
Club meeting late in the year to reschedule its official debt. 
It successfully obtained relief on 90% of the payments 
falling due in 1979 and 1980. Effectively the payments would 
be stretched out over seven years. 
After the Paris Club accord, Peru then approached its 
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major private bankers. The agreement reached involved the 
following arrangements: 348/ 
a) 185 million dollars which had been rolled over for 
6 months in June 1978 would be paid as scheduled in 
January 1979. 
b) Half of the 185 million dollars due in January would 
be refinanced in a new one-year loan with a 1.75% 
spread over LIBOR. 
c) Ninety percent of payments due in 1979 and 1980 
-aproximately 360 million dollars each year- would 
be refinanced in separate loans. Payments in 1979 
would be rolled over until early 1980 and then 
converted into a 7 year loan at 1.875% over LIBOR. 
Payments in 1980 would be rolled over until early 
1981 and converted into a new 6 year loan at an 
interest rate to be determined before authorization 
of the credit. 
The commercial bank relief was qualitatively different 
than that provided by official lenders. While the 
rescheduling agreement effectively provided a committed 
2-year restructuring of payments, the banks' refinance credits 
were a year-by-year relief operation. This strategy would 
give the commercial institutions extra leverage over 
government policy as there effectively would be a multi-
staged (as opposed to one) approval process for relief. 
D. SOME SIGNS OF RECOVERY 
The year 1979 opened with an uncertain outlook. With 
the refinance accord of late 1978 Peru received its first 
relief in payments to the banks since 1976. However, the 
pressure of amortization was assuagatfor only two years, 
leaving prospects for another bulge in payments as early as 
1981. Aside from the uncertainty surrounding the obviously 
stop-gap nature of the assistance provided by the banks (as 
well as official lenders), the pell-mell direction of events 
in the post-1975 economic crisis proved very costly to an 
already poor economy. As Peru raced back and forth between 
its private bankers and the IMF in order to reconcile national 
objectives with the demands of foreign creditors, it suffered 
sharp and unaffordable setbacks in its economic development. 
Not only were crucial projects halted or cutback (e.g. Cerro 
Verde II and exploration for jungle petroleum), but there 
were sharp falls in per capita income (see table 64). Wages 
and salaries underwent serious deterioration and formal 
unemployment rose to alarming heights. Domestic unrest over 
prolonged austerity measures continued to be manifest. 
Meanwhile, after 6 years of continuing price increases by 
OPEC, international economic recession and stagflation, the 
world community had yet to develop the needed alternative 
to commercial banks for the transfer of resources from 
surplus to deficit countries. 
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Notwithstanding the problematical outlook at the 
outset of 1979, events during the course of the year provided 
signs of financial recovery. Early estimates showed a nearly 
80% growth of export receipts with respect to 1978, thus 
aiding the country's ability to service debt and facilitating 
a rebuilding of foreign exchange reserves. Rising commodity 
prices in general and oil prices in particular were the key 
to this performance. However, volume also made some 
contribution. PETROPERU and Occidental had managed to 
progressively boost jungle petroleum output up to roughly 
140.000 barrels a day; this coupled with domestic demand 
management policies generated a sizeable exportable surplus 
that could take advantage of lucrative world oil prices. 
Peruvian industry, facing depressed internal demand and aided 
by a favorable exchange rate, also began to look abroad for 
sales. The flow of foreign exchange became so strong that 
authorities began, to liberate imports in 1979 and towards 
year-end a decision was rade to forego a significant part 
of the refinancing agreed to by private creditors the year 
before. Peru also appeared on the verge of entering another 
credit cycle, as banks once again began to renew the flow of 
medium term credit to the country. In light of events one 
can only hope that in the decade of the 80s both Peru and its 
private commercial bankers remember the lessons of the past. 
PERU: SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1976-1978 
(Rates of growth) 
1976 1977 1978 
Gross domestic product (1970 dollars) 3.0 -1.2 ..1.8 
Gross domestic product per capita 0.2 -3.9 -4.5 
Unemployment (percentage) 8.4 9.4 9.8 
Real wages 2/ 16.6 -23.5 -9.0 
Real salaries ti -1.3 -23.7 -14.1 
Source: CEPAL, Economic Sur....;L„w/  of Latin America 1978, Santiago, Chile. 
2/ Blue collar. 
J White cellar. 
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155/ See BCR (1976) p. 47. 
156/ PETROPERU, Memoria 1975, pp. 23 and 45. Fernando 
SanchezAlcwierahas commented to the author that to some extent Peru 
might have fallen victim to the global oil strategies of the 
petroleum companies. The jungle operations were undoubtedly 
expensive -especially for the smaller sized firms in Peru-
and once it became clear that there were no "easy" strikes, 
the firms quickly moved their limited capital to more 
promising areas, even though there was commercial oil 
available. This argument appears attractive when one 
considers that Occidental later found commercial deposits 
in sites abandoned by the other companies. 
157/ See MEF (1976). 
757/ .PETROPERU, Memoria 1976, pp. 23, 26 and 43. 
159/ Index B was also calculated by using a purchasing 
parity index, but the trends were not unsimilar to the index 
in the table which uses a nominal exchange rate. 
160/ See Amat y Leen, graph 16, p. 54. 
777/ Throughout the 12-year period real interest rates 
on basic savings instruments were negative. See Galbis. 
162/ Source: field research. 
77/ Ugarteche (1979), Chapter 5. 
164/ Ibid., pp. 7-10 and Chapter 5. 
77/ Fitzgerald, p. 89. 
166/ Ibid. 
777/ Ibid. 
168/ Ibid., p. 85. 
77/ TAuthor's translation) Ugarteche (1979), p. 48. 
170/ Ibid., p. 49. The "pressures" that Fitzgerald 
and Ugarteche make reference to appear to have been a 
manifestation of a general military "command" structure in 
economic policy making that saw Ministers override otherwise 
reasonable advice from civilian "tecnicos". See Ugarteche 
(forthcoming). 
171/ See new policy guidelines set out in DL 22149 in 
Ugarteche (1979), p. 12. 
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172/ The charges of excess profits apparently were 
correct. See Thorp and Bertram, pp. 214-215. 
173/ See Thorp and Bertram, p. 219. 
777/ The officially sponsored export program apparently 
was not very effective. See Schydlowsky and Wicht, p. 96. 
Thorp (Nov. 1978, p. 8) shows that in the period 1970-76 
manufactured exports never exceeded 8% of all exports. 
175/ Some have attributed overfishing as a factor 
behind the loss of the anchovy. 
176/ See debt tables in Actualidad Econ6mica, 
October 1979, p. 12. 
177/ Kuczynski, p. 95. Teresa Hayter has argued that 
the excessively cautious project appraisal of official agencies 
actually "drove" the activist Belaunde government to 
commercial sources. It desperately needed finance to fulfill 
its campaign promise to open up the interior of Peru and 
bring marginalized elements of the population into the 
domestic economy. Commercial lenders, not particularly 
concerned about the use of credit, were the only sources 
available to the government. See Hayter, pp. 143-149. 
178/ A good account of how the freeze evolved is 
found in Levinson & De Onis, pp. 146-156. 
179/ Ibid., pp. 151-153. 
180/ Pinelo, p. 132. 
181/ Ibid., pp. 132-133. Also see Kuczynski, pp. 156-
160 and Levinson and De Onis, pp. 154-155. Ugarteche 
(forthcoming) also claims that disputes over fishing rights 
in 1967 caused the U.S. government to freeze U.S. Export-
ImTor'- Bank credit as well. 
',82/ See Kuczynski, p. 58. Banks also undoubtedly 
were owners of commercial paper related to suppliers credits 
that had been discounted on secondary markets. 
183/ The loan was originally signed in late 1964 and 
then amended in early 1965. The credit, for the purpose of 
this study, has been classified a 1964 loan and therefore is 
not part of the data base that is used for analysis in later 
chapters. However, the loan was refinanced in 1966 and this 
does appear in the data base. 
184/ See Kuczynski, p. 100 and Hayter, p. 144. 
77/ Levinson and De Onis, p. 144. 
7-87/ The quote is the author's translation and is 
taken from a speech given by the President of Peru to the 
assembly at the 12th Annual Meeting of Governors of the IDB 
in Lima, Peru during May 1971. See IDB (1971), pp. 22-29. 
187/ See U.S. Treasury, p. 283. 
188/ Ibid., pp. 173-174. 
77/ This latter point is made in Fitzgerald, p. 68. 
190/ A guarantee of 1.4 million dollars was given for 
a complementary private credit. 
191/ The strategy was an explicit part of the 1971-
1975  economic plan. See INP, p. 47. 
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192/ The U.S.'s share of trade also declined markedly. 
Exports to the U.S. fell from 34% of the total in 1965 to 24% 
in 1976. Imports over the same period fell from 40% to 35%. 
193/ Chapters V, VI and VII provide data on the role 
of specific banks in the penetration of Peru as well as on 
the evolution of the terms and conditions of credit. Also 
see bank profiles in the appendices. 
194/ This observation is the result of field research 
in Peru. 
195/ See Martin. 
777/ The source of this figure is CEPAL. At 1970 
prices per capita income in 1974 was roughly 600 dollars. 
See CEPAL, Economic Survey for Latin America, 1977. 
197/ See BID table 42. 
198/ Includes short term obligations. See Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Company, September 1976, p. 11. 
199/ The amounts corresponding to the groups for 1971-
1976 are Targer than for 1965-1970 due to the greater volume 
of lending in the former period, but in relative terms the 
scales for the two periods are aproximately equal. The 
authorizations themselves include credits with guarantees 
of export credit agencies; however, where elimination of these 
"guaranteed" credits would change the group in which a bank 
is positioned, this indicated in a footnote to table 18. The 
reader is warned that great caution is merited with regard 
to the classification of credit into guaranteed and 
unguaranteed loans. In some cases a borrower may not have 
been aware of the presence of an external guarantee on a 
commercial bank credit and therefore in such a case no 
record would have been maintained to this effect. Another 
problem peculiar to the period 1965-1970 is that debt 
contraction and record keeping were exceptionally haphazard, 
generating the possibility that contemporary archival systems 
have only incomplete information on guarantees. 
200/ See Kuczynski, p. 257/. 
201/ Up through 1976 U.S. banks had generally 
dominated lending to non-oil exporting developing countries. 
One estimate has placed their participation in lending to this 
group at roughly two-thirds of the total value of loans. See 
Wionczek, p. 184. 
202/ Another factor behind the dominance of U.S. 
banks in this early period is that in the Sixties these 
institutions were easily the most experienced overseas lenders. 
They also tended to have a very large resource base; of the 
top 11 banks (ranked by assets) in world banking in 1969, 8 
had their headquarters in the U.S. See The Ban-er, June 1970, 
p. 601. 
203/ The international rankings for each range of 
assets are different for the two periods because the 
independent variable is dollar asset size and thus the number 
264 
of banks corresponding to any given range of assets varies 
according to the growth rates of the banks over the period. 
204/ Obviously in practice someone had to initiate 
contacts with other banks. In the case of several sizeable 
multibank loans in support of the fiscal budget it appears 
that Manufacturers Hanover Trust played this role. 
Incidentally, to the extent that Manufacturers was the main 
organizer of these credits, this would distinguish it from 
the other major lenders of the period and perhaps give it 
the title of being Peru's single most important creditor in 
the latter half of the 1960s. 
205/ For a good review of the role of the agent and 
the lead banks in loan syndication, see Miossi. Also see 
Bee. 
206/ For reasons of exposition, interest rates and 
maturities are treated separately. The reader should bear 
in mind, however, that there can be trade offs between the 
interest rate and the length of a maturity on a given 
financial package. 
207/ It was not possible in all cases to establish 
the precise type of prime rate employed by the banks; however, 
information was available for a majority of the credits and 
suggests that the basic benchmark was the U.S. prime rate. 
208/ As was pointed out in Chapter IV, Peru at this 
time was considered reasonably creditworthy by the banks, 
although in 1967-1968 they obviously were having second 
thoughts about their evaluation of risks. 
209/ One may be curious about how the floor/ceiling 
mechanism affected the borrower in practice. This is 
difficult to determine because, as will be shown later in the 
chapter, most loans were continuously refinanced so that 
credit agreements rarely lived out their original term. 
Nevertheless, some indication is provided by reference to 
the memorandum items in table 23 and data in figure 4. Here 
it is evident that the floor interest rate of 6 3/4% and 7% 
did not really prejudice the borrower because the prime rate 
never reached a level where an overall rate (prime plus 
spread) was less than the minimum established by the credit 
agreements. On the other hand, credits that bore the ceiling 
of 8 3/4% could have been favorable to the borrower since in 
1968-1970 the prime rate reached levels whereby a 1.75% 
spread would have generated costs in excess of the maximum 
established rate. The very results of the floor-ceiling 
rate arrangements contributed to its demise after 1970. For 
such practices to survive there had to be prospects of 
relative world price stability. But with world inflation 
accelerating, a floor interest rate had no practical benefits 
for a lender. On the other hand, in an environment of rising 
world pr.ces, a ceiling rate on a medium term credit could 
only be highly prejudicial to a lender. Thus banks found it 
convenient to rely solely on a pure floating rate. 
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210/ See Sanchez Aguilar, p. 171. 
211/ The regulation was the Voluntary Foreign Credit 
Restraint Program initiated in 1965. For details of the 
program see Aronson (1977) Chapter IV. 
212/ This is because of the severe asymmetry of 
information; while this study has generated rather 
comprehensive data on Peru's borrowing from commercial banks, 
similar data on other countries is rather sparse. Moreover, 
any comparison of Peru with data of other countries could 
suffer from discrepancies associated with methodology. 
213/ See Devlin (first half of 1978), p. 77. 
77/ In the early 1970s U.S. banks accounted for 
roughly half of Mexico's liabilities with commercial banks; 
furthermore, these institutions had an almost unlimited 
willingness to lend to the country (see Sanchez Aguilar, 
pp. 174 and 262). As for the reason for this attitude, 
Aronson (1977, P. 175) has pointed out that: "American 
lenders also are attracted by Mexico's contiguous border with 
the United States. Most creditors feel that the U.S. 
government is so involved with Mexico's economy that it 
would aid the Mexican government and U.S. lenders if disaster 
struck". 
215/ To quote a public commentary of one of the 
world's largest commercial banks: "In this regard, Brazil's 
delay in internal adjustment has come as a disappointment. 
There, the growth in aggregate demand, the reemergence of the 
fiscal deficit, and the acceleration of inflation (estimated 
at 40-50% for this year) have been inconsistent with the 
clear necessity for a current account adjustment". See Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Co., (October 1976), pp. 3-4. 
216/ See CEPAL, Estudio EconOmico de America Latina  
1975, p. 132. 
217/ One can see that Brazil consistently had longer 
maturities than Mexico, which was one reason for the former 
country's higher interest margins. In the difficult 
environment of 1975-1976 Brazil made explicit a policy to pay 
higher interest rates to achieve more volume and longer 
maturities. 
218/ While for reasons of exposition fees are 
analysed separately from interest rates and maturities, the 
reader should bear in mind that these charges can trade off 
with interest rates and maturities on a given financial 
package. 
219/ In a few loans to Peru banks actually prohibited 
prepayment. 
220/ In cases where penalties were scaled according 
to the year of prepayment, averages have been taken by 
weighting with the number of years in which a particular rate 
prevailed. Of course, the presence of scaling makes averages 
understate the effective cost of prepayment penalties in the 
earlier years of a loan and overstate it for the later years. 
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221/ See Lewis, p. 60. 
222/ These banks joined together in multibank 
agreements. Several other U.S. banks variously tagged onto 
this core group of commercial banks to extend credit in 
lesser amounts. Of these secondary lenders, the most 
important was the Charter New York Corporation (Irving Trust) 
which provided 5 million dollars in a free disposition loan 
of 1967. 
223/ Kuczynski, p. 165. 
T77/ Kuczynski provides some insight into the attitude 
of the banks just prior to signing of the agreement: "At 
2 p.m. on July 31, a Monday, the Ambassador of Peru to the 
United States sat in the beautiful office of the former 
Chairman of the Board of the Manufacturers' Hanover Trust 
Company, then at 44 Wall Street, waiting to sign the U.S.$40 
million loan agreed to by the banks ten days before. The 
banks representatives were gathered in the board room next 
door, supposedly finishing last-minute details in the loan 
agreement. But the week-end new3from Peru had come in the 
morning, and some of the banks were now hesitant. Not only 
had the President been unable to make his annual state of 
the nation message, but there had been a new development in 
the International Petroleum Company case as the Peruvian 
Congress had declared the subsoil claimed by IPC at La Brea 
y Paridas to be the property of the state. The possible 
attitude of Standard Oil of New Jersey, the owner of IPC, 
was obviously important to the banks, which were depositories 
of large Standard Oil funds. Some discussion followed with 
the Peruvian delegation, but the loan agreement had been 
negotiated two weeks before and could not be changed in Peru, 
where it had been approved by the Controller General. Finally 
at 4.45 p.m., as some of the bankers began to fear that they 
would miss their trains home, the loan documents were signed" 
Ibid., pp. 167-168. 
225/ Bank of American, Bankers Trust, Chemical Bank, 
Continental Illinois, First National Bank of Chicago, Franklin 
National Bank, First Pennsylvania Banking, Crocker National 
Bank, Fidelity Bank. 
226/ As already mentioned in Chapter III, the 
principal negociator for the U.S., James Greene, was at that 
time a high ranking official at Manufactures Hanover Trust. 
It is significant that his bank did not participate in the 
76 million dollar credit. 
227/ Other banks were Credit Suisse, Union Bank of 
Switzerland, Swiss Volksbank Bank Lev, and Privatbank 
Verwaltungsgesellschaft. 
228/ The Swiss later made this 10 million dollars a 
part of their contribution to a general refinance accord 
arranged with international banks that year. 
229/ The credits for the fishing industry have a 
somewhat different character than the other nationalization 
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credits. At the time of nationalization, the industry was 
heavily indebted both at home and abroad, suggesting that 
the banks, while ostensibly facilitating the government's 
purchase of nationalized assets, were, to some extent, simply 
refinancing obligations due to them by the former private 
sector entities. All together, 86% of commercial bank credits 
directed towards the nationalization of the fishing industry 
was from U.S. institutions. This is consistent with the fact 
that prior to 1972 U.S. banks were the dominant commercial 
lenders to Peru and that U.S. firms were by far the most 
important foreign investors in the industry (see footnote 137). 
230/ An official of one commercial bank has expressed 
this point of view as follows: "It goes without saying that 
refinancing is undertaken by most banks...only very 
reluctantly and only for customers with whom... (they) have 
excellent long term relationships". See Benny, p. 57. 
231/ Banks believe that rescheduling of their credit 
would cause a borrower to lose its creditworthiness. See 
Friedman, p. 69. 
232/ See Lewis, pp. 65-66. 
233/ Initially refinance of suppliers' credits was 
heavily concentrated on obligations of Sogesa, the state 
steel enterprise. In the early and mid-1960s Sogesa 
underwent an ambitious expansion program in which Ferrostaal 
A.G. Essen was the main contractor. Sogesa, financially 
weak, negotiated postponement or reduction of the debt 
payments to Ferrostaal and in 1965-1967 many of the upcoming 
payments to Ferrostaal were financed by American, Canadian, 
and German banks, with a guarantee provided by the central 
government. For details on the Sogesa expansion program 
and the role of Ferrostaal see the Memoria for 1964 and 1965 
of Sogesa. 
234/ The Swiss negotiated outside the general 
agreement with the other international banks. For 
methodological reasons this credit has been considered a 1977 
transaction and therefore is outside the scope of the present 
study. 
235/ For information on the various offshore centers 
consult the Banker Research Unit. Also see Doggart and 
Gorostiaga. 
236/ For instance, a Brussels branch of a bank sells 
foreign exchange to a Bahamas' branch at a loss and then 
the Bahamas' branch resells the exchange back to Brussels at 
a profit. All the transactions are internal to the bank, so 
no real profit or loss is realized. But the tax effects can 
be considerable. The Brussels' branch records a loss, which 
is convenient for a country with a high marginal tax rate. 
Meanwhile, profits are recorded in the Bahamas where there 
are no income taxes at all. 
237/ For a full descriptive example of how U.S. banks 
use tax havens to their advantage, see Lissakers, pp. 18-21. 
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238/ Different national banks tend to prefer different 
centers. For data on how various national groups of banks 
used offshore centers, see table 12 of the statistical 
appendix. 
239/ For U.S. banks London became an essential 
element in the funding of loans because the Voluntary Foreign 
Credit Restraint Program placed absolute limits on foreign 
lending from home offices. See Aronson (1977), Chapter IV. 
240/ Harfield, p. 86. 
241/ See Sandeman, p. 77. 
2727 An exception is Colombia, which has successfully 
demanded that "the loan agreement will be subject to 
Colombian jurisdiction". See Ensor, p. 98. 
243/ See Ugarteche (1979), p. 15. 
244/ Financial Times. 
77/ Ibid. 
246/ Ibid. 
247/ If a lead bank has guaranteed "a fully 
underwritten loan" it would have no choice but to fill the 
gaps in syndication. On the other hand, if it promised to 
use only "best efforts", then it has the option to raise its 
participation or terminate the syndicate. 
248/ For a more elaborate description of the process 
see Bee and/or Miossi. 
249/ See Miossi, p. 16. 
250/ Much like non-financial corporations banks have 
a nose for marketing. The position of a bank on a tombstone 
can be a subject of much debate as lenders seek to have their 
names located in the most distinguishable areas of a page. 
251/ The largest single transaction was the 210 
million dollar refinance credit extended by U.S. banks in 1976. 
252/ Note that an agent also generally is a manager 
of a syndicated credit. Throughout this chapter an agent 
which also is a manager has been counted exclusively as an 
agent. This stems from the fact that the methodology 
employed in the chapter assumes the agent to be the principal 
lead bank in syndication. 
253/ See Miossi,p. 16. 
57/ Those interested in a list of Peru's lead banks 
which incorporates all managers should consult table 15 of 
the statistical appendix. 
255/ Perhaps 50 international banks manage the bulk 
of world liquidity. And within this group there is a 
considerable degree of concentration of power. In 1975 the 
top 5 (Citicorp, Bank of America, Manufacturers Hanover, 
Morgan Guaranty and Chase) of the top 15 lead banks in 
eurocredit syndication accounted for 67% of the credit 
mobilization. See International Herald Tribune. In 1977, of 
the top 50 lead banks in syndication, the top 10 were 
responsible for nearly 60% of all credit mobilization. See 
Euromoney. 
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256/ See U.S. Senate (1974 and 1978). 
257/ The negotiations behind the 1976 refinance 
credits and the role of various banks in the transactions are 
analysed in Chapter X. 
258/ Of course, in arriving at a united position there 
was discussion and debate among the banks. The process of 
quid pro quo is analysed in Chapter X. 
259/ One must remember that gross authorizations of a 
bank do not necessarily reflect outstanding commitments. 
260/ It is important to point out the limitations of 
the data. First, coefficients may possibly contain an 
element of overstatement because loans are based on gross 
and not net commitments. Also, data are for original 
commitments and account could not be taken of whether or not 
a bank subsequently sold its paper in secondary markets. 
Second, there is an important element of understatement 
because short term credits and bank loans for national defense 
purposes are excluded. On balance it is difficult to 
determine precisely what the net effect of factors one and 
two have on the absolute and relative values of the 
coefficients. The reader should bear these points in mind 
when using the data. 
261/ In 1975 the assets of American Express 
International were valued at 2.6 billion dollars, while the 
parent American Express Corporation had assets close to 
9 billion dollars. 
262/ See Lissakers, p. 58. 
7-5/ Bankers do not even see the two superborrowers 
as a threat, unless they were to default simultaneously, 
which is a highly unlikely event (see Watson, p. 50). Hardy 
(p. 191) has pointed out, however, that a default by Brazil 
might be very damaging to Citicorp. 
264/ Creditworthiness is a catchall term used to 
express a bank's assessment of default risk. Generally 
speaking, a bank's view of creditworthiness is heavily 
weighted by indicators of a country's external liquidity, i.e., 
exports, international reserves, etc., and the policies that 
determine their performance. For more information on how 
banks assess creditworthiness see Goodman, Asian Finance, 
Brackenridge, Anderson, and Wolfe. 
265/ The equal pairing of observations is necessitated 
by the fact that lending terms are affected by time, i.e., 
the market environment shows considerable year-to-year flux. 
266/ Kapur, in aggregated inter-country comparisons, 
found that banks did not use price to discriminate among 
developing country borrowers for similar reasons. It is left 
to future research to determine the exact nature of the 
competition, i.e., perfect, oligopolistic, etc. 
267/ Of all the tests, those on individual institutions 
may be the most revealing indicator of fee earning behavior 
because many of the banks were managers in syndication. 
270 
Moreover, since fees were distributed equally, averages 
should understate earnings of many of these banks so that 
significantly higher than average earnings would have a 
greater likilihood of relevancy. 
268/ The terms on this credit conflict with the 
reporting of the World Bank's Borrowing in International  
Capital Markets, which sets the maturity at 7 years. 
269/ With the loan most of the remaining holdouts 
among the traditionally established international banks -e.g. 
Chemical Bank and First Chicago- began to lend to the 
government. 
270/ See Aronson (1977), p. 177. 
271/ See Devlin (1979), pp. 80-81. 
272/ The standardized variable is Z = x-x where x 
represents the percentage of a country's loans in a given 
loan category, x the unweighted mean for all countries in the 
loan category and s the standard deviation of x. 
273/ Data understate somewhat Switzerland's refinance 
credits because the study's sample does not take account of 
Swiss participation in the general refinance agreement of 1976. 
274/ As noted in previous chapters, on a world scale 
there was no real growLh of official finance in the years 
1965-1975. For Peru the problem was compounded by the 
financial blockade contrived by the U.S. 
275/ Another consideration is that consortium banks 
can enter into the more controversial loans that parent banks 
may not want to have their names directly associated with. 
276/ See Wellons (1977), p. 24. 
277/ Germany has E3 reputation for using guarantees, 
but the borrower's data did not reflect this. 
278/ It should be noted that U.S. banks had only a 
limited opportunity to secure their loans with export credit 
guarantees because from i°68 to mid-1974 the U.S. Export-
Import Bank had its doors closed to business with the 
Government of Peru. 
279/ See D.L. 18?51 in Ley de Bancos. 
280/ Ibid. 
281/ Chemical Bank decided to buy into Banco 
Internacional because of its interest in "going international" 
and because participation was a convenient way to resolve the 
failing Peruvian bank's arrears to Chemical. However, the 
purchase was ill-timed and inept. As pointed out by 
Kuczynski, problems arose because the purchase was planned 
precisely at the time when "there was a growing political 
feeling against foreign control of banks. Still, Chemical 
went ahead, but without adequately informing the Peruvian 
authorities until after the event. In the small setting of 
Lima, this omission caused resentment". The purchase was the 
straw that broke the camel's back and provided the necessary 
political support for the civilian government to introduce 
(under emergency Law 17044 of June 1968) in August 1968 a law 
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calling for "Peruvianization" of local banks. The original 
law called for 66% national ownership (see Kuczynski, pp. 239-
243). The military government later raised minimum national 
ownership to 75% in November 1968 and finally to 80% in 1971. 
282/ The observations on Citicorp are drawn from 
Wellons8978) and Citicorp's annual reports. In 1975 and 
1976 Citicorp was the number one lead bank in world 
syndication. See Chapter VI. 
283/ Of course, if the bank's loans to Peru led market 
trends, or enhanced the market's receptiveness towards Peru, 
this could be an indication of special behavior stemming from 
the familiarity generated by a local branch bank. There is, 
however, no indication that Citicorp led market attitudes on 
Peru. 
284/ See Wellons (1978). 
77757 In 1975-1976 it ranked NO2 behind Citicorp. 
See International Herald Tribune. 
286/ See Wellons (1978). 
777/ In 1975 Lloyds Bank ranked number 10; Bank of 
Tokyo did not rank among the top lead banks. See Chapter VI. 
288/ Ibid. 
289/ See Wellons (1978). 
290/ See Wellons (1978). 
291/ There was evidence that fees may have played a 
role in risk discrimination; however, it may be recalled that 
data limitations prevented a precise evaluation of this 
phenomenon. 
292/ Also see the profiles of selected banks in the 
appendices. 
293/ See Kuczynski, p. 52. 
77/ See Canal, tenth page. 
295/ Ibid. 
777/ The prospective availability of U.S. Export- 
Import Bank finance for the pipeline undoubtedly encouraged 
Peruvian authorities to sign the Greene Accord. However, the 
hoped for support never materialized. 
297/ The loan was secured by sales of the crude to 
Japan. The controversial book by Ortiz de Zevallos Roedel 
has published the loan contracts and petroleum purchase 
agreements with Japan. 
298/ Legal forms of security already have been 
discussed in the last section of Chapter V. 
299/ See Kuczynski, p. 257. 
300/ It could be argued that an improved economic 
situation made conditionality unnecessary. But how improved 
was the situation? Better overall economic indicators to 
some extent were a reflection of prices on international 
markets and increased bank lending itself. The underlying 
structural problems of the balance of payments (low export 
coefficient) and public finance remained unresolved and 
actually intensified in the 1970s. 
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301/ See Cummings. 
302/ My analysis has greatly benefitted from 
conversations with Carlos Santistevan. The interpretation 
presented here is my own, however, and is not necessarily 
in concordance with the opinions of Mr. Santistevan. 
303/ See Ugarteche (forthcoming) 
7/ For one of the more severe critiques of the IMF 
see Payer. 
305/ See Stallings, pp. 23-24. 
77/ See Stallings, p. 24. 
307/ Ibid. 
308/ Ibid., p. 25. The members of the U.S. Steering 
Committee were Citicorp, Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, 
Manufacturers Hanover, Morgan Guaranty, and Wells Fargo, with 
Citicorp heading the group. 
309/ In the end some adversaries just simply refused 
to participate. Notably, many of the banks appear to have 
been the aggressive lendem of the 1970s, which turned 
reactively conservative in the face of economic difficulties 
in Peru and the Third World in 1975 (e.g. Crocker National 
Bank and Bancal Tristate). In the end the negative block of 
banks was sufficiently small to permit the U.S. banks to 
declare their support of the financial package. 
310/ See Friedman, p. 53. 
311/ See Wellons (1976), p. 74. It should be pointed 
out that some banks had considerable investments in the 
Southern Peru Copper Corp. In 1973 Chase Manhattan Bank led 
a 200 million dollar syndicated credit for the Cuajone project. 
In addition to Chase, other powerful banks such as Citicorp, 
Morgan Guaranty, Bankers Trust and Chemical Bank participated 
in the credit. Meanwhile, in 1975 Lloyds Bank headed a 
23.5 million dollar syndicated to the Corporation which 
involved big banks such as First National Bank of Chicago, 
Midland Bank, and Barclays Bank, all of which were involved 
in Peru's 1976 negotiations for a refinance credit. 
Source: the published tombstones for the respective 
syndicated credits. 
312/ It should be mentioned that a high level 
government official of the U.S. State Department was an 
ex-president of Marcona. 
313/ Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., May 1976, p. 9. 
777/ Of course, the banks did not lose either, as Peru 
kept its debt service current. 
315/ See Diaz Alejandro, pp. 188-197. 
TT/ The concept of capacity to import used here 
corresponds to CEPAL's traditional definition, i.e., the amount 
of goods and services that can be purchased with the annual 
net inflow of foreign exchange resources, excluding, however, 
inflows of resources under the heading of compensatory capital. 
Thus, capacity to import can be expressed as Z = X + EF where 
Z is capacity to import, X is the purchasing power of exports 
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and EF is the net flow of financial resources, exclusive of 
inflows of compensatory capital. For the sake of clarification, 
EF = (AI-AO-Fa) - (CO+Fc) + (N+Fn) + E, where AI represents 
foreign autonomous capital inflows; A0, foreign autonomous capital 
outflows; Fa, factor payments on autonomous capital; CO, 
outflows of foreign compensatory capital; Fc, factor payments 
on foreign compensatory capital; N, net movement of assets 
held by residents of Peru; FN, factor receipts on national 
assets; and E, the net errors and omissions entry of the 
balance of payments. Note: national assets include 
government transactions, thus there is an element of double 
counting in the data. 
317/ Errors and omissions of the balance of payments 
have been assumed to be basically unregistered capital flows. 
318/ A major revision of Peru's national accounts 
data suggests that the Central Bank series which is employed 
here, overstates growth of domestic demand and product. 
However, in both the new and old series the gap between the 
two components are approximately equally as large. (See 
methodological notes in appendix). 
319/ At least one study has suggested that most of 
the benefits of the policies of the reform government 
accumulated in the urban sector and in middle income groups 
in the formal labour market. The rural sector and informal 
labour market were, according to the study, relatively less 
affected. See Couriel. 
320/ These data exclude state enterprises. However, 
public firms are linked to the central government budget 
through transfers on the capital account. Also, data in 
table 8 of Chapter III suggest that external finance, and 
therefore banks, were important in the finance of state 
enterprises during the 1970s. 
321/ See CEPAL (forthcoming) 
322/ See Schydlowsky and Wicht, p. 56. 
323/ See Couriel. 
77/ Taking the average of the annual average 6-month 
eurodollar rates plus Peru's average interest spread for the 
period 1973-1975 suggests a cost, grosso modo, of 10,9% for 
credit. Over this same period consumer prices in the 
industrialized countries rose by roughly 10%. 
225/ In 1975-1977 LDCs commonly encountered spreads 
of 2% or more. 
326/ In 1975, 75% of all eurocurrency credits to LDCs 
had maturities of 6 years or less. See World Bank, Supplement, 
EC-181, August 1976. 
327/ As Streeten has pointed out, when the structure 
of demand and production is not geared to satisfaction of 
basic needs, any policies in this direction will generate 
balance of payments and inflationary pressures over the 
medium term (see Streeten, p. 105). Bankers will be 
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unimpressed if gains in employment and social well-being 
are at the expense of short/medium term economic growth and 
balance of payments/liquidity performances. 
328/ In theory the economic crisis could have been 
quickly overcome (and of course avoided altogether) through 
timely economic policy measures. However, in the real world 
economic criteria are often overridden by more immediate social 
and political considerations. In poor countries -especially 
those with a significant degree of political participation-
these latter forces can be very strong. Thus, while economic 
discipline is to be encouraged, recurrent and prolonged 
economic crises are an unfortunate reality which we all must 
confront. 
329/ Nurske (1953), p. 135. 
330/ For example, in 1976, 61 per cent of Citicorp's 
total deposits had an average maturity of only 90 days. See 
Hardy, p. 192. 
331/ See Anderson; Asia Finance; Brackenridge; Goodman; 
and Wolfe. 
332/ In a separate article (Devlin 1979) I have 
analysed the problems of commercial bank finance and have 
offered suggestions on how more resources may be channelled 
through multilateral agencies and private bond markets 
-determined to be the proper sources of development finance. 
333/ See the Sidney Dell report (United Nations 1979) 
for some excellent suggestions on how the Fund could bring 
itself into line with the development objectives of the Third 
World. 
334/ In many cases there are legal restrictions to 
long term funding by commercial banks. Thus, national 
regulatory authorities might want to reconsider their policies 
in this area. 
335/ In the case of Peru the World Bank's tabulation 
of publicized eurocurrency credits provided only a partial 
view of transactions with commercial banks. The data also 
provided only limited information on a syndicate, the 
conditions of the agreement, and the specific role of each 
bank in the operation. 
336/ See Ruding, 
337/ For a detailed account of the economic 
stabilization efforts in 1977 and 1978 see Cabrera. Also see 
Ugarteche (forthcoming). 
338/ Cabrera, p. 53 (author's translation). 
339/ Ibid., p. 54. 
340/ See Moreyra, p. 95. 
77/ For details of the program see Cabrera, pp. 55-60 
and Moreyra, p. 95. 
342/ U.S. banks feared that unless there was a 
rescheduling, any new loans by them would appear as indirect 
payment of Soviet debt. See Andean Report (February 1978), 
pp. 22-23. 
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343/ Ibid., p. 22. 
344/ Ibid., p. 23. 
74-5/ Field work indicated that many local bankers were 
impressed by Manufacturers Hanover's behavior during the 
crisis. It apparently stood out for its flexible and 
reasonable approach to the approval of foreign exchange lines 
of credit. 
346/ See Andean Report (April 1978), p. 63. 
77/ See Andean Report (May 1978), p. 84 and Latin  
American Economic Report (May 1978), p. 154. Chase later 
denied these reports. 
348/ Sources are the Central Bank of Peru (1979) 




METHODOLOGICAL NOTES ON DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 1/ 
Since the study entered virgin territory, CEPAL 
prepared a project manual before initiating field research. 
The manual, entitled Project Manual and Methodological  
Guidelines for a Study on the Role of Transnational Banks in  
the External Finance of Peru, 2/ provided the objectives and 
hypotheses underlying the study, predesigned data sheets to 
be filled out during the process of data collection, and 
tentative modes of processing and analysis of the data. The 
manual made clear that the methodology was designed to better 
understand phenomena as related to both lender and borrower. 
Thus the study's shifting focus between the banks and the 
Peruvian public sector. 
Field research was undertaken and the public sector 
combed for data covering the 12-year period 1965-1976. While 
seeking aggregated data for medium- and long-term financial 
flows to the public sector from all sources, the most 
disaggregated data possible were sought on individual 
commercial bank term loans, using table format 21 of the 
aforementioned Project Manual as the guide for its collection. 
The goal was to collect comprehensive data on every individual 
commercial loan to the public sector, but purposely excluding 
credits related to national defense. This basic goal was 
realized and field research generated a comprehensive data 
base. However, not having perfect information, and given 
the disperse nature of the Peruvian public sector, no 
guarantee can be made that the data are a perfect image of the 
defined universe. But if they are not identical to the 
universe, they are certainly a very close approximation of it. 
After collecting d-,ta on individual bank loans 
information was cross-chteed for consistency and accuracy. 
Profiles were then develcf,ed on individual commercial lenders, 
incorporating all the comprehensive information from table 
format 21 of the Manual. Once profiles were prepared, 
analysis was performed on individual banks, data permitting. 
Data also were rebuilt into new forms of aggregation which 
shed light in varying degrees of generality on lending 
behaviour and its impact on the borrower. 
The results of the process of disaggregation and 
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deliberate reaggregation provided a new and unusually 
comprehensive view of bank lending to a developing country. 
The results of this and other analysis are found throughout 
the study. 
Some specific aspects of the methodology  
There are some other specific aspects of the 
methodology which should be brought to the reader's attention. 
They are follows: 
(a) subsidiaries of banks were incorporated into the 
parent where ownership was more than 50%; 3/ 
(b) when loans were syndicated credits, the syndicate 
itself was broken down with relevant information being 
placed into the profiles of the respective banks; 
(c) non-dollar loans were converted into United 
States dollars at the rates of exchange prevailing at the 
time of authorization; 4/ 
(d) split interest rates were averaged, weighted by 
the number of years (or alternatively the amounts) on which 
each rate prevailed; 
(e) fees and penalties that changed value over the 
life of the loan were averaged in a way similar to (d); and 
(f) in reaggregation, quantifiable terms and 
conditions of the loans were weighted by the value of 
individual credits. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the national 
accounts data employed in the paper pertain to the series 
published by the Central Bank of Peru. Subsequent to the 
preparation of data for the study, the INP published another 
national account series. 5/ The Central Bank series has 
been maintained here, however, because there is confusion 
about which set of data is "official": the Central Bank 
series has continued to be published in Peru as well as in 
the IMF International Financial Statistics and the data 
enjoys active use by professionals in the country. In any 
event, it was the Central Bank data that guided decisions of 
government authorities and bankers during the time frame of 
analysis in the study. 
Footnotes 
1/ Complementary information appears in Chapter 1. 
2/ See Devlin, (1980). 
3/ The one exception was Sud-Ameris which is an 
Italian-French bank. The bank was consolidated into Banca 
Commerciales Italiana even though the latter has somewhat less 
than 50% ownership. This is because the bank reputedly has 
heavily influenced Sud-Ameris' behaviour vis-a-vis Peru. 
4/ The borrower's definition of authorizations has 
been employed. It was found that in some cases the borrower's 
date of authorization of a loan could be as much as three 
months after a commercial bank's date of authorization. 
5/ See INP (1979). 
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Appendix 2 
NAMES OF BANKS IN THE STUDY 
United States 
American Express International Banking Corporation 
Bancal Tri-State Corporation 
Bank America Corporation 
Bankers Trust Corporation.  
Centran Corporation 
C.I.T. Financial Corporation 
Citicorp 
Citizens and Southern National Bank 
Cleveland Trust Corporation 
Commerce Union Bank 
Continental Illinois Corporation 
Crocker National Corporation 
Charter New York Corporation 
Chase Manhattan Corporation 
Chemical New York Corporation 
Fidelcor Incorporated 
First Bank System Incorporated 
First Chicago Corporation 
First National Bank of Boston 
First National Bank of St. Louis 
First National State Corporation 
First Pennsylvania Corporation 
Franklin National Bank (went bankrupt in 1974) 
Girard Company 
Harris Bank Corporation Incorporated 
Hartford National Corporation 
Industrial National Corporation 
La Salle National Bank of Chicago 
Manufacturers Hanover Corporation 
Marine Midland Bank Incorporated 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. 
National Detroit Corporation 
Northern States Bancorporation 
Rainier Bancorporation 
Republic of Texas Corporation 
Seafirst Corporation 
Security Pacific Corporation 
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Shawmut Corporation 
Union Planters National Bank 
Wells Fargo and Co. 
Western Bancorporation 
Japan  
Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd. 1/ 
Bank of Tokyo Ltd. 
Bank of Yokohama 
Banque Eropeenne de Tokyo S.A. 1/ 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Ltd. 
Daiwa Bank Ltd. 
Fuji Bank Ltd. 
Hokkaido Takushaku Bank 
Hokuriku Bank 
Industrial Bank of Japan Ltd. 
Japan International Bank Ltd. 
Kyowa Bank Ltd. 
Long Term Credit Bank of Japan 
Mitsubishi Bank Ltd. 
Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Corporation 
Mitsui Bank Ltd. 
Mitsui Trust & Banking Corporation 
Nippon Credit Bank Ltd. 
Nomura Securities Company Ltd. 
Saitama Bank Ltd. 
Sanwa Bank Ltd. 
Sumitomo Bank 
Taiyo Kobe Bank Ltd. 
Tokai Bank Ltd. 
Toyo Trust & Banking Co. Ltd. 
Yasuda Trust & Banking Co. 
Canada 
Bank of Montreal 
Bank of Nova Scotia 
Banque Canadienne Nationale 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
Royal Bank of Canada 
Toronto Dominion Bank 
United Kingdom  
Antony Gibbs & Sons Ltd. 
Balfour & Williamson 
Barclays Bank Ltd. 
Grindlays Bank Ltd. 
Hambros Bank Ltd. 
Industrial Multinational Investment Ltd. 
Lloyds Bank Ltd. 
Midland Bank Group 
National & Commercial Banking Group Ltd. 
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National Westminster Bank Ltd. 
Schroders Ltd. 
Germany  
Allgemeine Deutsche Credit Anstalt A.G. 
Bank Fur Gemeinwirtschaft A.G. 
Bankhaus Hermann Lampe K.G. 
Bayerische Hypotheken and Wechselbank 
Berliner Handels-und-Frankfurter Bank 
Commerzbank A.G. 
D.G. Bank Deutsche Genosseschaftsbank 
Deutsche Bank 
Dresdner Bank 
Norddeutsche Landesbank Gironzentrale 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Gironzentrale 
France  
Banque De l'Indochine et de Suez 
Banque Francais du Commerce Exterieur 
Banque Nationale de Paris 
Banque Worms 
Compagnie Financiere de Paris et des Pays-Bas 




Banca Commerciale Italiana Ltd. 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
Banco Ambrosiano 
Banco di Roma 
Banco Nazionale dell'Agricoltura 
Credito Italiano 
Euramerica International Bank Ltd. 
Italian International Bank Ltd. 2/ 
Switzerland  
Bank Lev A.G. 
Dow Banking Corporation 
Privatbank & Werwaltungsgesellschaft 
Swiss Bank Corporation 
Swiss Credit Bank 
Swiss Wolksbank 
Union Bank of Switzerland 
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Consortium  
Asian & Euro-American Merchant Bank Ltd. (Singapore) 
Atlantic International Bank Ltd. (United Kingdom) 
Banque Arabe et Internationale d'Investissement (Franc() 
Banque Continentale du Luxembourg (Luxembourg) 
Banque de la Societe Financiere Europeenne (France) 
Banque de l'Union Europeenne (France) 
Banque Europeenne de Credit S.A. (Belgium) 
Euro Latin American Bank Ltd. (United Kingdom) 
European American Bankcorperation (United States) 
European Brazilian Bank Ltd. (United Kingdom) 
Inter-Union Banque (France) 
International Commercial Bank Ltd. (United Kingdom) 
International Mexican Bank Ltd. (United Kingdom) 
Iran Overseas Investment Bank (United Kingdom) 
Krediet Bank N.V. (Belgium) 
Libra Bank Ltd. (United Kingdom) 
London and Continental Bankers Ltd. (United Kingdom) 
Midland & International Banks Ltd. (United Kingdom) 
Morgan Guaranty & Partners Ltd. (Singapore) 
Nippon European Bank S.A. (Belgium) 
Orion Bank Ltd. (United Kingdom) 
UBAF Bank Ltd. (United Kingdom) 
United International Bank (United Kingdom) 
Western American Bank Ltd. (United Kingdom) 
Other locations  
Algemene Bank Nederland N.V. (Holland) 
Amsterdam Rotterdam Bank (Holland) 
Banco Atlantic° (Spain) 
Banco de Bogota (Colombia) 
Banco de Santander (Spain) 
Banco do Brasil (Brazil) 
Banco Hispano-Americano (Spain) 
Banco Melli (Iran) 
Banco Mexicano S.A. (Mexico) 
Banco Nacional de Panama (Panama) 
Banco Popular Espanol (Spain) 
Banco Urquijo (Spain) 
Banque de Bruxelles Lambert (Belgium) 
Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord (USSR) 
Banque Internationale a Luxembourg (Luxembourg) 
Comco International Bank (Luxembourg) 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait (Kuwait) 
Liberal Bank (Beirut) 
L.T.C.B. Asia Ltd. (Hong Kong) 
Osterreichische Landerbank A.G. (Austria) 
Skandivaviska Enskilda Banken (Sweden) 
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Trade Development Bank Holding S.A. (Luxembourg) 
Trade Invest Bank % Trust Co. (Bahamas) 
Unclassified 
Guaranty & Credit 
Pan American Credit Corporation 
Rothchild Intercontinental Bank Ltd. 
Wellington Overseas 
Footnotes 
1/ Wholly Japanese consortium bank. 





1 Peru: A selected list of Nationalizations/Peruvianizations 
of foreign firms, 1968-1975. 
2 Peru: Flows of external resources from official sources, 
1965-1976. 
3 Peru: Average interest rates on credit authorized by 
official institutions, 1965-1976. 
4 Peru: Average grace period on credit authorized by 
official institutions, 1965-1976. 
5 Peru: Average amortization period on credit authorized 
by official institutions, 1965-1976. 
6 Peru: Flow of supplier credits, by country of origin, 
1965-1976. 
7 Peru: Average interest costs of authorized supplier 
credits, 1965-1976. 
8 Peru: Average grace period on authorized supplier credits, 
1965-1976. 
9 Peru: Average amortization period on authorized supplier 
credits, 1965-1976. 
10 Peru: Commercial bank lending according to amounts 
authorized, 1965-1970. 
11 Peru: Commercial bank lending according to amounts 
authorized, 1971-1976. 
12 Peru: Booking of loans according to country of origin of 
the banks, 1971-1976. 
13 Peru: Booking of loans according to the asset size of the 
banks, 1971-1976. 
14 Peru: Steps for organization of a syndicated credit. 
15 Peru: Lead banks according to their importance as 
mobilizers of credit, 1971-1976. 
16 Peru: Results of t tests on annual average libor spread 
of loans of selected banks vs. annual average libor 
spread on loans of all banks in the study. 
17 Peru: The results of t tests on annual average libor 
spread of loans of banks grouped according to 
country of origin ves. annual average libor spread 
on all loans of all banks in the study. 
18 Peru: Results of t tests on annual average libor spread 
of loans of banks grouped according to asset size 
vs. annual average libor spread of all loans of all 
banks in the study. 
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19 Peru: Results of t tests on annual average maturity of 
loans of selected banks vs. annual average 
maturity on loans of all banks in the study. 
20 Peru: Results of t tests on annual average maturity of 
loans of banks grouped according to country of 
origin vs. annual average maturity of all loans 
of all banks in the study. 
21 Peru: Results of t tests on annual average maturity of 
loans of banks grouped according to asset size 
vs. annual average maturity on all loans of all 
banks in the study. 
22 Peru: Results of t tests on annual average cost of flat 
fees on all loans of selected banks vs. annual 
average cost of flat fees on all loans of all 
banks in the study. 
23 Peru: Results of t tests on annual average cost of flat 
fees of all loans of banks grouped according to 
country of origin vs. annual average cost of flat 
fees on all loans of all banks in the study. 
24 Peru: Results of t tests on annual average cost of flat 
fees of loans of banks grouped according to asset 
size vs. annual average cost of flat fees on loans 
of all banks in the study. 
25 Peru: Breakdown of loans according to type and country 
of origin of lending banks, 1971-1976. 
26 Peru: Breakdown of loans according to type and the asset 
size of lending banks, 1971-1976. 
27 Peru: Breakdown of loans according to economic sector 
and the country of origin of lending banks, 
1971-1976. 
28 Peru: Breakdown of loans according to economic sectors 
and the size of lending banks, 1971-1976. 
29 Peru: Banks extending credit with guarantees of home 
country export credit agencies, 1971-1976. 
30 Peru: A list of selected projects with participation of 
foreign commercial banks, 1972-1976. 
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PERIM AVERAGE INTEREST RATM ON CREDIT AUTHORIZED 8Y CITIGIAL 155:autrons, 1965-1976 
(Percentages) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
A. Multilateral finance 5.54 3.2D 3.47 5.47 2.25 4.98 2.59 5.00 6.36 6.94 4.58 7.08 
1. Development finance 
1.1 IBM 5.50 6.00 7.25 7.25 7.25 8.56 
1.2 IBD 6.00 2.65 3.47 3.47 2.25 3.43 2.59 3.00 3.97 6.68 2.00 5.05 
1.3 Andean Deve-
lopment Corp. - 7.67 7.94  - 
2. Compensatory 
finance 
2.1 D 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.30 
2.2 Other 
Bilateral finance 2.88 3.35 4.37 5.82 5.14 7.29 6.71 4.31 4.69 6.22 5.09 3.15 
1. United States 2.65 3.09 3.63 2.12 6.00 6.e8 2.95 5.71 7.29 10.28 7.33 
1.1 Eximbenk - 6.00 6.00 - 690 - - - 8.40 
1.2 AID 1.80 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 
1.3 Coloodity 
credit corp. 6.13 6.13 6.13 10.40 10.20 9.00 
1.4 Other 5.00 5.00 - 8.00 - - 7.07 10.00 8.00 
2. Western Europe 
2.1 Frames 5.00 - 8.78 - 3.50 - 3.85 - 
2.2 United Kingdom 6.50 8.00 - 6.03 3.00 2.94 
2.3 Germeny 3.00 6.17 - - 2.00 - 4.58 2.00 
2.4 Netherlands 6.50 - - 6.50 6.50 4.47 6.30 2.50 6.31 
2.5 Spain 7.50 - 8.00 - 7.00 7.50 - - 
2.6 Other 8.50 8.00 - 9.00 2.00 8.50 1.61 5.16 
5. Japan 5.50 3.50 6.35 
4. Centrally planned 
economies 
4.1 Union of Soviet 
Socialist Remt. 
lies 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.02 
4.2 Hungary 6.00 2.83 6.00 3.67 6.00 
4.3 Other 7.34 8.75 2.00 0.04 
5. Canada 5.14 6.82 6.38 7.25 6.85 7.63 6.97 8.37 
6. Other 6.06 6.62 6.39 6.83 7.81 
Total 4.69  3.23 4.09 5.03 3.17 5.95 5.62 4.24 5.23 6.28 5.02 4.32 
Source! CEPAL on the basis of date supplied by the MEF. 
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Table 4 
PERU: AVERAGE GRACE PERIOD ON CREDIT AUTHORIZED BY OFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS, 1965-1976 
(Years) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
A. Multilateral finance 4.79 3.66 3.23 3.75 4.00 7.79 4.50 4.50 7.37 5.35 5.65 4.83 
1. Development finance 
1.1 IBRD 5.12 5.00 - - - 10.00 - - 7.69 5.0 - 3.86 
1.2 IBD 2.00 3.40 3.23 3.75 4.00 6.28 4.50 4.50 6.52 5.63 7.50 6.17 
1.3 Andean Development 
Corp. _ _ _ _ _ _ - 2.98 3.24 
2. Compensatory 
finance 
2.1 IMF - - _ _ _ - 
2.2 Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - 
B. Bilateral finance 7.44 7.30 6.26 3.84 1.34 2.31 1.98 3.78 3.92 4.09 1.97 2.05 
1. United States 7.31 7.55 6.87 10.00 - 3.50 2.50 3.83 0.93 3.93 1.42 3.72 
1.1 Eximbank - 1.33 2.00 -- 3.50 
- 
3.64 
1.2 AID 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 - - 10.00 10.00 - 10.00 - 10.00 
1.3 Commodity Credit 
Corp. - - - - 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.4 Other _ _ _ _ 3.00 - - 0.91 2.00 2.00 
2. Western Europe 
2.1 France - - - 2.50 - 2.00 - - 1.00 - 2.76 - 
2.2 United Kingdom - 4.00 - 4.00 - 7.00 - 5.50 3.75 4.55 
2.3 Germany 7.50 - 3.00 - - - 10.50 - 5.73 10.00 
2.4 Netherlands - - 4.00 - - - 3.50 3.59 5.24 4.50 8.00 5.96 
2.5 Spain - - 2.00 - 2.00 - 2.00 - 5.50 
2.6 Other - - 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 - 5.00 - 5.50 9.06 5.30 
3. Japan _ _ _ _ _ - 5.00 7.00 4.50 - - 
4. Centrally planned 
economies 
4.1 Union of Soviet 
Socialist Repub-
lics - _ _ _ _ - - 1.50 1.50 1.49 1.32 
4.2 Hungary - _ _ _ _ 2.00 0.95 0.50 - 0.66 - 
4.3 Other - _ _ _ - 2.00 1.00 - - 0.50 5.90 
5. Canada - - - 0.85 1.42 1.00 3.00 2.10 3.78 3.09 1.57 
6. Other _ _ _ 3.39 0.67 0.87 - 2.76 2.18 - 
Total 5.63  4.48 5.33 3.81 2.57 5.50 2.65 3.82 4.98 4.20 2.46 2.88 
Source: CEPAL on the basis of data supplied by the MEF. 
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Table 5 
PERU: AVERAGE AMORTIZATION PERIOD ON CREDIT AUTHORIZED BY OFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS 
(Years) 
1965 '966 '967 '968 1969 1970 0971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
A. Multilateral finance 15.73 22.40 19.,94 '7.45 26.00 20.75 18.82 15.50 14.86 17.56 15.43 17.01 
Development finance 
.1 IBRD 16.41 20.00 - - 20.00 - 13.48 20.00 - 18.29 
'.2 IDB 10.00 22.88 '9.94 '7.45 26.00 21.26 '8.82 15.50 18.57 16.24 22.50 '5.25 
1.3 Andean Develop- 
ment Corp. 5.98 6.22 
2. Compensatory finance 
2.1 IMF - 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 - - - 4.00 
2.2 Other - - - - - - - - - 
B. Bilateral finance 17.92 22.77 18.49 9.21 8.37 5.22 9.84 11.59 9.91 9.26 7.64 10.85  
United States 23.29 23.46 21.41 30.00 - 3.50 '3.81 10.82 2.03 12.00 3.47 8.86 
1.1 Eximbank - 6.17 8.00 3.50 - - 3.09 
,.2 AID 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 - 30.00 30.00 - 30.00 - 30.00 
1.3 Commodity Credit 
Corp. - 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
1.4 Other 5.00 5.00 - 22.00 - 2.50 6.59 5.50 5.50 
2. Wstern Europe 
2.1 France 
- 3.50 - 3.97 - - 13.00 - 15.30 - 
2.2 United Kingdom 14.00 - 14.00 - 25.00 - 9.50 20.50 20.09 
2.3 Germany '5.00 - 6.04 - - 19.50 - 15.06 20.00 
2.4 Netherlands - 12.00 
- - 12.00 13.6 14.91 '5.50 22.00 15.87 
2.5 Spain 4.00 - 5.00 - 1.50 9.50 - - 
2.6 Other - 1.00 4.00 '4.50 4.00 - 24.50 - 9.50 19.22 8.45 
3. Japan 13.52 18.00 9.50 
4. Centrally planned 
economies 
4.1 Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics - - - - 10.00 10.00 9.92 11.30 
4.2 Hungary 6.50 10.26 6.50 - 7.75 3.50 
4.3 Other - - 8.00 3.00 - 11.67 9.04 
5. Canada - 6.54 3.83 2.00 9.00 6.11 6.63 10.46 2.61 
6. Other - - - 8.90 4.65 1.70 - 7.28 0.87 
Total 16.43 22.49 18.93 11.97 46.53 14.25 12.20 11.81 11.43 10.01 8.68 12.67 
Source: CEPAL on the basis of data supplied by the NSF. 
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PERU: AWESACE INTEREST COSTS OF AUTHORIZED SUPPLIER CREDITS, 1965-1976 
(Percentages) 
'965 '966 '967 '968 	 '989 1970 197' 1972 '973 1974 1975 1976 
Supplier credits 
7.24 5.92 9.0f 6.80 	 - 6.00 - 7.78 7.22 6.'4 9.00 - 1. United States 
2. Western Europe 
2.1 Germany - 7.24 9.82 	 6.53 6.67 - 6.92 8.00 7.66 8.6.0 8.70 
2.2 United tingdo 6.00 - 6.00 5.28 6.97 4.74 7.53 5.00 7.74 8.90 8.48 
2.3 Spain - 5.49 6.00 - 	 8.00 7.00 7.00 8.00 6.50 9.85 9.85 - 
2.4 France 6.19 8.50 6.50 - 	 6.77 6.85 7.53 7.50 7.t0 - 8.85 
2.5 Finland - 6.00 8.32 - 	 - - - - 8.00 - 
,_.6 Sweden - - - - - - 7.96 - 8.07 
2.7 It•148 - 6.54 655 - 	 6.52 9.25 - 7.00 3.59 1.98 9.25 7.00 
2.8 Other 7.10 7.51 8.90 - 	 8.43 5.46 7.75 7.40 7.68 8.70 10.05 9.22 
3. Japan 7.00 8.20 - - - 7.75 - - - 7.50 
4. Centrally planned 
economies 
4.1 Yugoslavia - - 
4.2 Union of Soviet 
Socialist Repub-
lics - - 	 - _ _ 3.00 3.00 4.49 4.50 
4.3 Other - - 	 - - 7.02 - 11.00 - 
Canada - 	 7.90 7.90 - 7.90 - - 
6. Mexico - - 	 - - - _ 8.68 
7. Other - 9.00 6.00 - 	 - 7.00 7.00 7.08 7.00 4.06 8.64 
.0D11 6.85  6.28 6.67 	 7.05 6,94 6.5' 7.27 4.82 6.11 6,94 
Source: CEPAL on the basis of data supplied by , NSF. 
Table 8 
PERU1 AVERAGE GRACE PERIOD ON AUTRORIZED SUPPLIER CREDITS 
(Years) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Supplier credits 
0.99 1.22 1.00 2.62 - 5.50 1.00 1.99 5.19 0.37 1.73 - 1. United States 
2. Western Europe 
2.1 Germany 0.77 
- 
1.32 0.96 0.99 0.09 - 1.23 0.72 1.42 0.39 0.10 
2.2 United Kingdom 0.50 - 1.06 1.67 0.95 - 0.94 2.00 1.76 0.50 1.62 
2.3 Spain 1.26 2.00 0,50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 - 
2.4 France 0.30 0.50 2.12 - 0.66 2.00 0.54 1.00 1.37 1.34 0.37 
2.5 Finland - 0.91 - - - 3.00 - 
2.1 Sweden - - - - 0.50 - 2.43 
2.7 Italy 4.33 3.00 1.46 2.00 - 1.47 1.67 1.79 0.83 
2.8 Other 0.58 - 0.43 0.54 2.00 0.76 1.78 1.37 1.04 1.00 
3. Japan 2.00 1.94 2.00 0.50 2.79 0°50 1.00 
4. Centrally planned 
economies 
4.1 Yugoslavia 5.00 1.00 MO 4.56 - 
4.2 Union of Soviet 
Socialist Repub-
lics 1.00 1.00 - 0.50 
4.3 Others 2.48 2.50 - 
5. Canada 0.50 - 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 - 
6. Mexico 2.17 
7. Other 1.00 0.50 0.50 3.00 0.89 2.50 1.98 0.92 
Total 1.01  2.87 1.97 2.22 0.99 0.52 3.69 2.08 1.58 2.64 1.41 1.67 
Sources SEPAL on the basis of data supplied by the REF. 
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Table 9 
PERU. AVEPAGE AIVRTIZATION PERIOD 07i AUTHORIZED SIPPLIER CREDTTS 
(Years) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Supplier credits 
2.78 5.21 5.35 6.53 - 3.50 2.00 4.02 3.02 1.24 4.85 - 1. United States 
2. Western Europe 
2.1 Germany 7.77 4.11 4.53 3.61 5.66 - 3.82 6.50 3.76 1.14 4.58 
2.2 United Kingdom 3.50 - 4.00 4.50 4.9) 2.93 3.70 4.00 4.50 4.24 4.50 4.50 
2.5 Spain 
- 9.87 3.00 - 4.50 4.00 4.5) 4.50 2.50 4.50 4.50 - 
2.4 France 6.22 4.50 6.24 - 5.58 4.65 4.46 5.00 5.73 5.61 - 5.31 




- - 7.30 
2.7 Italy 10.79 9.84 8.76 8.00 5.65 11.77 2.81 5.00 3.73 
2.8 Other 7.00 6.58 4.76 - 1.58 3.56 7.00 2.15 7.22 5.99 6.72 4.36 
3. Japan 6.00 5.91 - 8.00 2.53 - 9.04 0.50 - 1.50 
4. Centrally planned 
aconomies 
4.1 Yugoslavia 9.50 3.50 2.50 10.75 - 
4.2 Union of Soviet 
Socialist RoPut. 
lies 8.76 6.55 4.52 4.50 
4.3 Other 9.41 - 0.50 
5. Canada 4.50 - 10.00 8.00 - 1.00 - 
6. Mexico 6.05 
7. Other 1.00 5.00 4.50 8.00 3.32 8.00 5.50 7.44 
Total 6.26 10.0) 12.16 6.24  7.74 5.67 8.19 6.37 9.58 7.42 5.45 5.38 
Sour.. CEPAL on the basis of data supplied by the MEFa 
Table 10 
PERU: CCHIERCIAL BANK LENDING ACCORDING TO AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED, 1965-19702/ 





15-24.9 	 25-34.9 	 35-44.9 	 45-54.9 
Guaranty and Nat. Detroit Bank of Nova 
	 Bank of America Chase 
	 Citibank 
Credit 	 Corporation Scotia 	 Manhattan 
Schroders 
	 Charter N.Y. 	 Continental 	 Bankers Trust 
Corporation 	 Illinois 
Philadelphia 1st National 	 Manufacturers 
National Bank Boston 	 Hanover 
Western Bank Crocker 
Corporation National 
B.Commerciale Franklin 














Bank of Tokyo 





Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 



















PERU: BOOKING OF LOANS ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF THE MAYS, 1971-1976 
(Percentages)  
United 
Booking 	 Japan 	 Canada States 
	
United 
Kingdom Germany France Italy 
Switx- 
eriand Consortium Other 
Headquarters 	 32.9 	 25.1 74.7 93.7 23.0 98.4 14.1 30.0 84.8 73.5 
London 	 13.1 	 37.6 13.3 4.3 4.4 63.4 1.3 6.1 
Bahamas 	 37.3 	 0.2 2.3 1.5 5.5 - 1.0 0.3 
Panama 	 5.2 - 0.7 11.0 5.2 
Cayma. 	 Isles 	 4.1 - 3.0 
Paris 24.3 1.5 
New York 	 3.3 ..7 0.7 15.4 1.8 
Luxembourg 	 2.1 - 64.7 - 6.6 2.5 
Switzerland 	 0.4 0.7 12.1 - 
Other 	 3.5 11.0 1.3 1.8 
Unspecified 	 5.1 	 29.9 7.6 3.3 7.3 1.6 2.2 11.6 4.3 
Total 	 100.0 	 100.0  100. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Table 13 
PERU; BOOKING OF LOANS ACCORDING TO THE ASSET SIZE OF THE BANKS, 1971-1976 
(Percentages) 
Booking 















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Headquarters 46.8 35.4 46.6 61.2 73.4 78.3 34.3 
London 2.6 17.8 19.4 18.0 6.1 3.5 
Bahamas 24.5 21.4 16.4 4.2 6.7 - 5.2 
Panama 5.8 4.0 0.5 1.2 5.2 
Cayman Isles 6.4 0.6 3.7 0.6 
Paris 1.2 - 0.6 
New Korb 2.1 0.9 
Luxembourg 6.1 6.1 7.9 5.3 
Switzerland 0.7 0.6 
Other 0.5 1.6 0.9 
Unspecified 7.3 9.1 5.6 8.4 19.9 13.0 1.7 
Total 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: 	 CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
of Assets based on data for 1975 from The Banker,  June 1976. 
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Table14 
STEPS FOR ORGANIZATION OF A SYNDICATED CREDIT 
1. Mandate issued to lead manager. 
2. Invitations sent to other banks to join management group. 
3. Draft loan agreement and syndication memorandum submitted 
to borrower. 
4. Revisions to syndication memorandum to be agreed to by 
borrower. 
5. Response required from banks to join management group. 
6. Formal fully-underwritten offer, telex sent to the 
borrower. 
7. Borrower approves final proof of syndication memorandum. 
8. Borrower gives comments on loan agreement. 
9. Borrower advises lead manager of its acceptance of the 
underwritten offer. 
10. Telexes sent to pre-selected group of banks to be invited 
to participate. 
11. Marked-up copy of draft loan agreement submitted to the 
management group. 
12. Revised draft loan agreement sent to banks invited to 
participate. 
13. Final allocation of participations made. 
14. Last date for comments on loan agreement from 
participating banks. 
15. All proposed revisions to loan agreement advised to 
borrower. 
16. Final draft loan agreement sent to participants and to 
borrower. 
17. Earliest date for signing loan agreement. 
Source: Financial Times,"Syndicated Loans", World Banking 
Survey, May 21, 1979. 
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Table 15 
PERU: LEAD BANKS ACCORDING TO THEIR IMPORTANCE AS MOBILIZERS OF CREDIT, 1971-1976Y 
Amount mobilized by lead bank as percent 
	 Percent participation of lead bank 
of total value of all syndicates b/ 
	 in its own syndicates (average)  
Major lead bank  
1. 27 - 34 




2. 20 - 26.9 
Manufacturers Hanover 	 10.7 
-3. Intermediate lead banks 13-19.9  
Bank of America 	 10.2 
Toronto Dominion Bank 	 5.1 
4. 7 - 12.9 
Chase Manhattan Bank 	 18.6 
Bank of Nova Scotia 
	
13.2 
Bankers Trust 	 10.1 
Continental Illinois 	 6.0 
Philadelphia National Corporation 	 3.3 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. 	 10.0 
Bank of Tokyo 	 15.5 
Royal Bank of Canada 	 3.3 
Lloyds Bank 	 10.2 
Dresdner Bank 	 10.4 
Bank of Montreal 	 3.3 
Chemical Bank 	 3.3 
First Chicago Corp. 	 6.6 
Banco Nacional de Banana; 	 3.3 
Minor lead banks 
5. <7 
Banca Commerciale Italiana 	 50.0 
Crocker National Bank 	 15.1 
Swiss Bank Corporation 	 28.2 
Union Bank of Switzerland 	 13.3 
Marine Midland Bank 	 8.3 
National Commercial Banking Group 	 17.3 
Banca Nezionale de Lavoro 	 7.1 
Long Term Credit Bank of Japan 	 12.0 
Tokai Bank 	 1.9 
Credit Lyonnais 	 12.5 
Banque de L'Indochine et de Suez 	 25.0 
Libra Bank 	 6.5 
Fuji Bank 	 8.7 
Mitsui Bank 	 8.3 
Algemene Bank Nederland 	 50.0 
American Express 	 20.0 
Mitsubishi Bank 	 7.5 
Deutsche Bank 	 41.6 
Grindlay's Bank 	 8.3 
Campagnie Financiere de Paris Et des Fays-Bas 	 50.0 
European American Bank 	 10.0 
Banque Canadienne Nationale 	 8.3 
Western American Bank 	 16.6 
Iran Overseas Investment Bank 	 2.5 
Banque Europeene de Credit 	 8.3 
EuroLatin American Bank 	 5.4 
Banco Popular EspaEol 	 4.1 
Source: 	 SODA, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Lead banks are managers and co-managers. 
b/ The amount mobilized by a bank is the total value of the syndicates for which it was a lead bank. Since 
a syndicate can have several lead banks, the sum of the percentages of all banks exceeds 100. 
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Table 16 
PERU: RESULTS OF t TEST ON ANNUAL AVERAGE LIBOR SPREAD OF LOANS OF SELECTED BANKS VS. Al3MAL 
AVERAGE LIBOR SPREAD ON LOANS OF ALL BANNS IN TIE STUDY a/ 
(Paired observations) 
Bank 	 Country 	 k 	 = N-1 
0972-1976 4 
'. Chase Manhattan United States .0762 0.0062 0.'817 
2. CitiJorp United States 1.1041 0.0428 0.0870 
3. Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 0.7840 0.01'0 0.3140 
4. Bankers Trust United States 0.0789 0.1340 
5. Continental Illinois United States 
-0.5500 -0.0372 0.1510 
6. Manufacturers Hanover United States 2.400* 0.0752 0.0681 
7. Banta Commerciale Italiana Italy 0.5550 0.1010 0.1471 
8. Morgan Guaranty Trust United States 0.4212 0.0242 0.1285 
9. Bank of Tokyo Japan -0..85 
-0.0'42 0.2139 
10. Royal Bank of Canada Canada -0.'784 -0.0'08 0.1353 
1'. Toronto Dominion Bank Canada 0.6700 0.0212 0.0703 
12. Lloyds Bank Ltd. Uni-ed Kingdom -0.6740 
-0.0720 0.2388 
13. Wells Fargo United States '.14:6 0.0334 0.0650 
14. Fugi Bank ltd. Japan -0.4479 -0.0150 0.0749 
15. Sanwa Bank Japan 
-0.8944 -0.0688 0.'7'0 
16. Banco de Santander Spain 0.0332 0.0014 0.0947 
'7. Det-Ichi Kangyo Bank Japan 0.4837 0.0692 0.3199 
1972-'975 3 
Chase Manhattan. United States -0.1249 -,.1280 0.2042 
2. Citicorp United States 0.7645 0.0380 0.0994 
3. Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 1.0717 0.'733 0.3233 
4. Bankers Trust United States 1.0069 0.0780 0.1549 
5. Continental Illinois United States -0.4180 
-0.0365 0.1746 
6. Manufacturers Hanover United States 1.8'09 0.07'0 0.0784 
7. Banta Commerciale Italiana Italy '.2484 0.'058 0.1694 
8. Morgan Guaranty Trust United States 0.'358 0.0098 0.1436 
9. Crocker National Bank United States -0.7720 
-0.0735 0.'904 
10. Bank of Tokyo Japan 
-3.0383 0.2390 
'1. R - yal Hank of Canada Canada 
-0.0130 0.'562 
12. Toronto Dominion Bank Canada 0. 0.00:0 0.0711 
13. Lloyds Bank Ltd. United Kingdom -0.,K. 	 • -0.'103 0.2548 
'4. Banque Commerciale pour L'Europe du Nord Soviet Union 2. 	 •4. 0.0258 0.0'95 
15. Wells Fargo United States 0.62'7 0.0213 0.0484 
06. Libra Bank Ltd. United Kingdom -0.84 -0.0203 0.1T0 
'7. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Canada -0.755 -0.0653 0.'705 
'8. Fidelcor United States -0.8394 
-0.0528 0.1257 
"9. Fugi Bank Ltd. Japan ..1.316' 
-0.0393 0.0596 
20. Sanwa Bank Ltd. Japan -1.7403 -0.'065 0.'7-7  
21. Banco de Santander Spain -0.3926 -0.0186 0.0955 
22. Dei-Ichi Kangyo Bank Japan 0.3574 0.0E60 0.3693 
Source. CEPAL, cn the basis of official data. 
Note. 	 t = Student's 8 statistic. 
3 = Mean of the differences between paired values, x and y, where x is the annual average spread on the loans 
of each bank and y is the annual average spread on loans of all banks in the study. 
= Standard deviation of the differences between the paired values, x and y, at N-' degrees of freedom. 
= Degrees of freedom. 
a/ 	 Annual averages are the mean spreads weighted by the value of the loans authorized. The average spreads for 
each bank were paired with the global annual averages for all banks. Exercise was carried out only on credits 
that had no guarantee of an ezport credit agency. 
Significant at 90%. 
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Table 17 
PERU: RESULTS OFtTEST ON ANNUAL AVERAGE LIBOR SPREAD OF LOANS OF BANKS 
GROUPED ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN VS ANNUAL AVERAGE LIBOR 
SPREAD ON ALL LOANS OF ALL BANKS IN THE STUDY!! 
(Paired observations) 
Country of banks Gp = N-1 
1972-1976 4 
United States 1.2280 0.0332 0.0605 
Japan -0.5467 .0.2680 0.1096 
Canada 0.2706 0.0080 0.0661 
United Kingdom .0.1413 -o.00e0 0.1266 
Germany .0.4453 -0.0360 0.1808 
France 0.1503 0.0160 0.2381 
Italy 1.2255 0.0480 0.0876 
Switzerland b/ - - - 
Other -0.5058 .0.0140 0.6189 
Consortium -0.2818 .0.0120 0.0952 
1972-1975 3 
United States 1.2780 0.0340 0.0594 
Japan -0.9852 -0.0525 0.1066 
Canada 0.8006 0.0250 0.0625 
United Kingdom -0.4009 -0.0275 0.1372 
Germany -026672 -0.0650 0.1949 
France 0.9099 0.0125 0.2746 
Italy 0.8081 0.0400 0.0990 
Switzerland b/ - - - 
Other -0.8817 -0.0275 0.6238 
Consortium -0.3703 .0.0200 0.1080 
Source: CEEKL, on the basis of official data. 
Note: 	 t . Student's t statistic. 
Mean cf the differences between paired values, x and y, where x is the annual average spread on 
the loans for banks in each country group and y is annual average spread for all banks in the 
study. 
Gi3 	 Standard deviation of the differences between the paired values at N.1 degrees of freedom. 
0 	 Degrees of freedom. 
a/ Annual averages are mean spreads weighted by the value of the loans authorized. The average spreads for each 
country group were paired with the global annual averages for all banks. Exercise was carried out on loans 
that had no guarantee of an export credit agency. 




PERU: RESULTS OF t. TEST ON ANNUAL AVERAGE LIBOR SPREAD OF LOINS OF RANKS 
GROUPED ACCORDING TO ASSET SIZE VS. ANNUAL AVERAGE LIBOR 
SPREAD OF ALL LOINS ON ALL BANKS IN THE STUDY./ 
(Paired observations) 
Asset range 




4 = 4-1 
1972.1976 4 
1) 65.789 - 32.895 1 - 	 10 0.5194 0.022 0.9471 
2) 32.894 - 16.448 11 - 	 46 -0.9810 -0.0160 0.0365 
3) 16.447 - 	 8.224 47 - 	 91 0.7027 0.0200 0.0636 
4) 8.223 - 	 4.112 92 - 147 1.0392 0.0520 0.1119 
5) 4.111 - 	 2.056 148 - 263 0.7049 0.0220 0.0698 
6) 2.055 - 	 1.634/ 264 - 3)0 - - 
7) < 1.634 > 	 300 -0.5209 -0.0180 0.0773 
1972-1975 3 
1) 65.789 - 32.895 1 - 	 10 0.2781 0.0150 0.1079 
2) 32.894 .. 16.448 11 - 	 46 
-0.9798 -0.0200 0.0408 
3) 16.447 - 	 8.224 47 - 	 91 2.5627• 0.0450 0.0319 
4) 8.223 - 	 4.112 92 - 147 1.3943 0.0775 0.1112 
5) 4.111 - 	 2.056 148 - 263 0.2689 0.0100 0.0744 
6) 2.055 - 	 1.634ci 264 - 300 
- 
7) < 	 1.634 > 300 -0.7171 -0.0300 0.0837 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
t = Student's t statistic. 
= Mean cf the differences between paired values, x and y, when x is the annual average libor spread 
for banks in each asset range and y is the annual average LIBOR spread for all banks in the study. 
= Standard deviation of the differences between the paired values at 3..1 degrees of freedom. 
0 = Degrees of freedom. 
a/ The annual averages are mean spreads weighted by the value of the loans authorized. The average spreads for 
each asset group were paired with the global annual average for all banks. The exercise was carried out only 
on loans that had no guarantee of an export credit agency. 
J The rankings are on a scale from 1-300 for the corresponding asset range. The rankings are 
sheet date for 1975 as presented in The Banker, June 1976. 
ci Insufficient degrees of freedom to perform test. 
• Significant at 50$. 
Note: 
based on balance 
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Table 19 
PERU: RESULTS OF t TEST ON ANNUAL AVERAGE MATURITY OF LOANS OF SELECTED 
BANKS vs. ANNUAL AVERAGE MATURITY ON LOANS OF ALL BANKS IN THE STUDY2i 
(Paired observations) 




1) Chase Manhattan 	 United States 	
1972-1976 
-1.0710 	 -1.0572 	 2.2083 










0.0126 	 0.6373 
4) Bank of Nova Scotia 
	 Canada 	 -0.2160 	 0.9908 
5) Bankers Trust 	 United States 	 -0.6460 	 0.5690 
6) Continental Illinois 	 United States 	 0.4492 	 0.0976 	 0.4858 
7) Manufacturers Hanover 	 United States 	 0.4451  
	
0.1198 	 0.6018 
8) Banca Commerciale Italiana Italy 	 -0.0088 -0.0354 0.5543 
9) Morgan Guaranty Trust 	 United States 	 0.2915 	 0.1098 	 0.8423  
10) Bank of Tokyo 	 Japan 
	
-0.5059 -0 
11) Royal Bank of Canada 
	
Canada 	 1.3051 
	
.2226 	 0.9838 
0.2752  0.4715 
12) Toronto Dominion Bank 	 Canada 	 -0.9585 	 -0.4718 	
10.15°3°963 13) Lloyds Bank Ltd. 	 United Kingdom 	 1.8690 	 0.4508 
14) Long Term Credit Bank 	 Japan 	 -0.4430 	 -0.5570 	 2.8130 
15) Wells Fargo 	 United States 	 2.1450* 	 0.5176 	
0.5417 16) Canadian Imperial Bank 	 United States 	 0.2747 	 0.1882 	 1  
17) Fuji Bank Ltd. 	 Japan 	 1.2265 	 0.4780 	 0.8715 
18) Sanwa Bank 	 Japan 	 0.5042 
19) Banco de Santander 	 Spain 	 0.2481 	
0.2886 	
1..Z(51- 




1) Chase Manhattan Bank 	 United States 	 -1.1228 -1.3618 	 2.4256 




3) Citicorp 	 United States 	 0.4650 












0.5358 6) Continental Illinois 	 United States 
7) Manufacturers Hanover 	 United States 	
10.2 
8) Banca Commerciale Italiana Italy 	 -0.5150 -0.1622 





10) Crocker National 	 -0.5438 
1.1087 11) Bank of Tokyo 	
United States 
-0.5746 	 -0.3185 Japan 




13) Toronto Dominion Bank 	 Canada 
14) Lloyds Bank Ltd. 	 United Ki 	 om 	 0.5240 




16) Banque Commerciale Pour 
30:6586 L'Europe Du Nord 	 Soviet Union 	 0.4028 
17) Wells Fargo 	 United States 	 2.094*  
	
0.6068 	 0.5785 
2.0770 18) Libra Bank Ltd. 	 United Kingdom 	 0.5410 	 0.5209 
19) CIT Financial Corporation 	 United States 	 -0.4557 	 -0.6740  





-..-. = -4°0= 21) Fidelcor 	 United States 
1.1311 
1.4757 
22) Fuji Bank Ltd. 	 0.5573 
0.3205 23) Sanwa Bank 	
Japan 
24) Banco de Santander 
	
Japan 
Spain 	 °O.= 0.1503 
10.= 5.1094* 25) Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank 	 Japan 	 0.9970 
Source: 	 ECLA, on the basis of official date. 
Note: 	 t = t statistic. 
L. Mean of the differences between the paired values, x and y, where x is the annual average 
maturity on loans of an individual bank and y is the global annual average maturity on loans 
of all banks in the study. 
Standard deviation of the differences between the paired values x and y at N-1 degrees of 
freedom. 
0 = Degrees of freedom. 
a/ Annual averages are the mean maturities weighted by the value of loans carrying a specific maturity.The 
averages for each bank were paired with the global annual average for all banks. Exercise was carried 
out only on loans that had no guarantee of an export credit agency. 
* Significant at 90%. 
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Table 20 
PERU: RESULTS OF t TEST ON ANNUAL AVERAGE MATURITY OF LOANS 
OF BANKS GROUPED ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGINS vs. ANNUAL 
AVERAGE MATURITY OF ALL LOANS OF ALL BANKS IN THE STUDY./ 
(Paired observations) 
Country of banks d A 	 0 = N-1 
1972-1976 
	 4 
United States 	 -1.3475 
	
-0.054 	 0.0896 
Japan 	 0.8821 	 0.300 	 0.7605 
Canada 	 -0.3009 	 -o.004 	 0.2974 
United Kingdom 	 0.0119 	 0.002 	 0.3760 
Germany 
	
0.8431 	 0.242 	 0.6418 
France 	 -0.5015 
	
-0.220 	 0.9810 
Italy 	 -0.4625 	 -0.142 	 0.6866 
Switzerland b/ 	 - 	 - 	 - 
Other 
	 5.1588* 	 0.392 	 0.1699 
Consortium 	 0.0215 
	




United States 	 -0.8926 	 -0.0450 	 0.1008 
Japan 
	
0.7671 	 0.3350 	 0.8735 
Canada 
	
0.1808 	 0.0300 	 0.3319 





Germany 	 0.7102 	 0.2625 
	 0.7393 
France 	 -0.6412 	 -0.3475 	 1.0839 
Italy 	 -0.5661 	 -0.2175 
	
0.7684 
Switzerland b/ 	 - 	 - 	 - 
Other 	 7.1003* 	 0.4500 	 0.1268 
Consortium 	 -0.0910 	 -0.0325 
	
0.7141 
Source: 	 ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
Note: 
	 t = t statistic. 
= Mean of the differences between paired values, x and y, where x is the 
annual average maturity for banks in each country group and y is the annual 
average maturity for all banks. 
dl = Standard deviation of the differences between the paired values of N-1 de-
grees of freedom. 
0 = Degrees of freedom. 
a/ The annual average are mean maturities weighted by the value of the loan carrying the 
- specific maturity. The averages for each country group were paired with the global 
annual averages for all banks. Exercise was carried out only on loans that had no 
guarantee of an export credit agency. 
b/ Banks from this country did not provide a sufficient number of degrees of freedom. 
T Significant at 90%. 
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Table 21 
PERU: RESULTS OF t TEST ON ANN1WL AVERAGE MATURITY OF LOANS AF BANKS GROUPED ACCORDING it 
ASSET SUE VS. ANNUAL AVERAGE MATURITY ON ALL LOANS OF ALL HANKS TN THE STUD Y2/ 
(Paired observations) 
Asset range 




Cp 	 0 = N-1 
1972-1976 
1) 65 789 - 32 895 1 - 	 10 0.1624 0.0280 0.3856 
2) 32 894 - 16 448 11 .. 	 46 -0.5293 -0.0340 0.1436 
3) 16 447 - 	 8 224 47 - 	 91 .,0.4804 -0.0420 0.1955 
4) 8.223 - 	 4 112 92 - 147 -1.6440 -0.2320 0.3156 
5) 4 111 - 	 2 056 148 - 263 0.6730 0.1260 0.4187 
6) 2055- 	 1 634 264 .. 300c/ - - 
7) (1 634 > 366 0.7657 0.1520 0.4439 
1972-1975 3 
1) 65 789 - 32 895 1 - 	 16 0.3242 0.0700 0.4318 
2) 32 894 - 16 448 11 - 	 46 .1.5173 -0.0825 0.1087 
3) 16 447 - 	 8 224 47 - 	 91 0.4016 0.07,5 0.1370 
4) 8 223 - 	 4 112 92 .. 147 -1.6344 -0.2800 0.3426 
5) 4 111 - 	 2 056 148 - 263c/ 0.4866 0.1175 0.4829 
6) 2 055 - 	 1 634 264 - 300 .. - 
7) 41 634 ) 300 0.5854 0.1500 0.5125 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Note: 
	
t a t statistic. 
Mean of the differences between paired values, x and y, where x is the annual average maturity 
for banks in each asset range and y is annual average maturity on loans of all banks in the study. 
Standard deviation of the differences between the paired values at N-1 degrees of freedom. 
Degrees of freedom. 
a/ The annual averages are mean maturities weighted by the value of the loan carrying the specific maturity. 
The averages for each asset group were paired with the global annual average of all banks. The exercise was 
carried out only on loans that had no guarantee of an export'credit agency. 
b/ The rankings are on a scale from 1-300 for the corresponding asset range. The rankings are based on balance 
sheet date for 1975 as presented in The Banker, June 1976. 
c/ Insufficient degrees of freedom. 
* Significant at 90%. 
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Table 22 
PERU: RESULTS OF t TEST ON ANNUAL AVERAGE COST OF FLAT FEES ON ALL LOANS OF SELECTED BANKS 
VS. ANNUAL AVERAGE COST OF FLAT FEES ON ALL LOANS OF ALL BANKS IN THE STUDY!! 
(Paired observations) 
Name of bank Country g din 	 0 = 1, L1 
1) Bank of America 
2) Citicorp 
3) Bank of Nova Scotia 
5) Bankers Trust 
5) Continental Illinois 
6) Manufacturers Hanover 
7) qughammerciale 
8) Morgan Guaranty Trust 
9) Bank of Tokyo 
10) Royal Bank of Canada 
11) Toronto Dominion Bank 
12) Lloyds 	 Bank Ltd. 
13) Long Term Credit Bank 
1%) Wells Fargo 
15) Canadian Imperial Bank 
16) Fugi Bank Ltd. 
17) Sanwa Bank Ltd 
18) Banco de Santander 
19) Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank 
1) Bank of America 
2) Citicorp 
3) Bank of Nova Scotia 
4) Bankers Trust 
5) Continental Illinois 
6) Manufacturers Hanover 
7) Banea Commerciale 
Italiana 
CO Morgan Guaranty Trust 
9) Crocker National Bank 
10) Bank of Tokyo 
11) Royal Bank of Canada 
12) Toronto Dominion Bank 
13) Lloyds 	 Bank Ltd 
14) Long Term Credit Bank 
15) Mgg4o 	 eggille Pour 
16) Wells Fargo 
17) Libra Bank 
18) CIT Financial 
Corporaetion 
19) CIATILaireireIrleiperial Bank 
20) Fidelcor 
21) Fugi Bank Ltd 
22) Sanwa Bank 
23) Banco de Santander 














































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Note: 	 t = t statistic. 
g = Mean of the differences between paired values, x and y, where x is the annual average cost of 
flat fees on all loans of a bank and y is the global annual average cost of flat fees on all 
loans of all banks. 
. Standard deviation of the differences between the paired values at N.1 degrees of freedom. 
0 • Degrees of freedom. 
1 Annual averages are the mean cost of flat fees on all loans weighted by the value of the loans. The annual 
averages for each bank were paired with the annual average of all banks. Exercise was carried out only on 
loans without a guarantee of an export credit agency. Note that in syndicated credits fees were distributed 
equally among all banks. 
• Significant at 90%. 
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Table 23 
PERU: RESULTS OF T TEST ON ANNUAL AVERAGE COST OF FLAT FEES OF ALL LOANS OF 
BANKS GROUPED ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN VS. ANNUAL AVERAGE COST OF 
FLAT FEES ON ALL LOANS OF ALL BANKS IN THE STUD& 
(Paired observations) 
 
Country of banks CQ . N-1 
1972-1976 4 
United States -0.5502 -0.0184 0.0748 
Japan 2.1937* 0.0940 0.0958 
Canada -6.4713 .0.0460 0.2183 
United Kingdom 0.8883 0.0692 0.1742 
C_%.ermany 2.1698 0.0172 0.2265 
France 0.7004 0.1658 0.5293 
Italy 1.8090 0.0118 0.1461 
Switzerland b/ - - 
Other 3.1501* 0.1812 0.1286 
Consortium 5.0929* 0,1410 0.0619 
1972-1975 3 
United States -2.1633 -0.0473 0.0437 
Japan 1.8487 0.0590 0.0638 
Canada 2.1979 0.0500 0.0455 
United Kingdom 0.1089 0.0065 0.1194 
Germany -0.7609 -0.06201 0.1630 
France 0.6214 0.1890 0.6083 
Italy 1.6283 0.0593 0.0728' 
Switzerland b/ - - 
Other 2.3430 0.1715 0.1464 
Consortium 3.9381* 0.1408 0.0715 
Sources CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Note: 
	 t 
	 t statistic. 
Mean of the differences between paired values, x and y, where x is the annual average 
cost of flat fees on all loans of banks in each country group and y is the annual 
average cost of flat fees on all loans of all banks. 




Degrees of freedom. 
a/ Annual averages are the mean cost of flat fees on all loans weighted by the value of the loans. 
The annual averages for each group of banks were paired with the annual average cost of fees on 
all loans of all banks. Exercise was carried out only on loans without a guarantee of an export 
credit agency. Note that in the case of syndicated credits, fees were distributed equally among 
all banks. 
b/ Banks from this country did not provide a sufficient number of degrees of freedom. 
* Significant at 90%. 
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Table 24 
PERUt RESULTS OF t TEST ON ANNUAL AVERAGE COST OF FLAT FEES OF LOANS OF 
BANKS GROUPED ACCORDING TO ASSET SIZE VS. ANNUAL AVERAGE COST OF 
FLAT FEES ON LOANS OF ALL BANKS IN THE STUD& 
(Paired observations) 
Asset range 






1) 65 789 	 32 895 1 - 	 10 -0.2261 -0.0110 0.1088 
2) 32 894 - 16 448 11 ,- 	 46 -0.3095 -0.0038 0.0275 
3) 16 447 - 	 8,224 47 - 	 91 -0.9691 -0.0412 0.7990 
4) 8 223 - 	 4 112 92 - 147 -0.8146 -0.0412 0.1131 
5) 4 111 - 	 2 056 148 - 263 2,6878• 0.1160 0.0965 
6) 2 055 - 	 1 6340/ 264 .. 300 - - 
7) < 1 634 ) 300 5,6116*  0.1380 0.0548 
1972-1975 3 
1) 65 789 - 32 895 1 - 	 10 .0.8482 -0.0415 0.0978 
2) 32 894 - 16 448 11 .. 	 46 
-0.7032 -0.0098 0.0277 
3) 16 447 - 	 8 224 47- 	 91 -0.2648 -0.0103 0.0774 
4) 8 223 - 	 4 112 92 - 147 0.2993 0.0065 0.0434 
5) 4 111 - 	 2 056c/ 148 - 263 -1.9360 0.0978 0.1010 
6) 2 055 - 	 1 634 264 - 300 - - 
7) < 	 1 634 )300 4.8363* 0.1230 0.0509 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Notes 	
-
t t statistic. 
 A = Mean of the differences between paired values, x and y, where x is the annual average cost of 
fees on all loans of banks in each asset range and y is the annual average cost of flat fees 
on all loans of all banks. 
. Standard deviation of the differences between the paired values at N..1 degrees of freedom. 
0 	 Degrees of freedom. 
a0 The annual averages are the mean cost of flat fees weighted by the value of the loan. The annual averages 
for each group of banks were paired with the annual average cost of fees on 011 loans of all banks. The exercise 
was carried out only on loans that had no guarantee of an export credit agency. Note that in the case of 
syndicated credits foes ware distributed equally among all banks. 
b/ The rankings are on a scale from 1-300 for the corresponding asset range. The rankings are based on balance 
sheet data for 1975 as presented in The Banker, June 1976. 
Insufficient degrees of freedom. 
• Significant at 90%. 
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Table 25 
PERU: BREAKDOWN OF LOANS ACCORDING TO TYPE AND COUNTRY ORIGIN OF LENDING BANKS, 1971-197e/ 
(Percent) 
Import 
Other 	 Free 







United States 	 2.4 	 0.2 	 48.4 	 29.9 	 8.7 9.3 1.1 100.0 
Japan 	 0.6 	 43.5 	 39.2 	 16.0 0.7 100.0 
Canada 	 2.1 	 53.1 	 28.0 	 15.9 0.9 100.0 
United Kingdom 	 8.3 	 49.7 	 18.4 	 23.6 100.0 
Germany 	 57.4 	 5.7 	 37.3 100.0 
France 	 51.9 	 27.9 	 20.2 100.0 
Italy 	 58.8 	 29.6 	 11.6 100.0 
Switzerland 	 16.3 	 17.5 	 7.6 58.6 100.0 
Consortium 	 1.3 	 64.4 	 19.7 	 14.6 100.0 
Other 	 1.2 	 40.2 	 25.1 	 33.5 100.0 
Memorandum items 
Unweighted average 	 1.6 	 48.3 	 24.1 	 18.9 6.8 0.3 100.0 
Standard deviation 	 2.4 	 12.6 	 8.7 	 9.5 17.5 0.4 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Excludes loans with guarantees of export credit agencies. 
if Loans which could not be classified into any other category. 
Table 26 
PERU: BREAKDOWN OF LOANS ACCORDING TO TYPE AND THE ASSET srzE OF LENDING BANKS, 1971..1976g 
(Percent) 
World rank 	 Import 	 Free 
Asset range 	 Other 	 National. 




1) 65 789 - 32 895 1 - 	 10 2.1 0.5 56.9 25.8 12.4 2.3 - 000.0 
2) 32 894 - 16 448 11 - 	 46 2.8 43.5 30.0 15.2 7.9 0.7 100.0 
3) 16 447 - 	 8 224 47 - 	 91 1.9 55.8 26.5 9.4 5.3 1.1 100.0 
4) 8 223 - 	 4 112 92 .- 147 40.0 21.4 20.4 16.7 1.6 100.0 
5) 4 III - 	 2 056 148 - 263 44.6 24.2 25.1 3.8 2.3 100.0 
6) 2 055 - 	 1 634 264 - 300 62.5 26.8 10.7 100.0 
7) (1 634 >300 1.0 53.4 29.3 16.3 .. 100.0 
8) Unknown b/ 38.2 38.6 18.5 4.7 100.0 
Memorandum items 
Unyeighted average 1.0 49.4 27.8 16.0 5.1 0.7 100.0 
Standard deviation 1.1 - 8.3 4.8 4.9 5.1 0.8 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Excludes loans with guarantees of export credit agencies. 
if Banks where no data were available on asset size. 
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Table 27 
PERU: BREAKDGVN OF LOANS ACCORDING TO ECONOMIC SECTOR AND THE COUNTRY 





















productive b/ 13.2 5.8 15.6 29.9 9.7 38.6 10.9 3.2 5.1 13.2 11.6 
Basic economic 
and 
social sectors 	 12.8 24.0 12.0 32.5 29.9 30.7 15.4 11.1 19.8 47.9 (23.6) (11.2) 
(Basiceconomi44.3) (22.7) (7.1) (32.5) (29.9) (27.4) (15.4) (11.1) (11.2) (36.8) (20.2) (10.4) 
(Social)=1/ (4.5) (1.3) (4.9) (3.3) (-) (-) (8.6) (11.1) (3.4) (3.8) 
Unclassified 74.0 70.2 72.4 37.6 60.4 30.7 73.6 88.9 77.0 47.0 63.2 17.9 
Total loans  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Excludes loans with guarantees of export credit agencies; also, only accounts for loans where there was 
ex ante agreement between borrower and lender on the destination of the credit. 
b/ Agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc. 
c/ Power, rater, sanitation , transport, etc. 
d/ Health, education, etc. 
ey Loans that resit to a number of undesignated sectors. These are basically general refinance credits. 
Table 28 
PERU: BFEAKDOWN OF LOANS ACCORDING TO ECONOMIC SECTORS AND THE SIZE 
OF LENDING BANKS, 1971-1976a/ 
(Percent) 
Sectors 


















deviation (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Directly 
productive 0/ 15.4 11.5 8.1 31.4 13.6 42.0 5.4 19.6 18.4 11.6 
Basic economic 
and social sectors 	 21.1 17.9 19.6 21.5 33.8 32.3 30.3 22.1 10.1 
(Basic economic0(14.3) (17.0) (19.3) (18.3) (23.2) (-) (25.8) (20.3) (17.3) (7.3) 
(Social) e/ (6.8) (0.9) (0.3) (3.2) (10.6) (-) (6.5) (10.0) (4.8) (4.0) 
Unclassified f/ 63.5 70.6 72.6 47.1 52.6 58.0 62.3 50.1 59.6 8.7 
Total loans 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Excludes loans with guarantees of export credit agencies; also, only accounts for loans where there was an ex ante 
agreement between borrower and lender on the destination of the credit. 
b/ As=ntsbased on data for 1975 as found in The Banker, June 1976. 
c/ Agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc. 
d/ Power, water, sanitation, transport , etc. 
e/ Health, education, etc. 
f/ Loans that went to a number of undesignated sectors. These are basically general refinance credits. 
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Table 29 
PERU: BANKS EXTENDING CREDIT WITH GUARANTEES OF HOPE COUNTRY 




of the bank as a 
percent of all 
guaranteed credits 
Guaranteed credits 
of the bank as a 
percent of all credits 
of the bank 
Schroders Ltd. 5.6 88.8 
Manufacturers 	 Hanover 5.1 11.0 
Philadelphia National Bank 2.5 27.8 
Western Bancorporation 0.3 2.9 
Banca Commerciale Italiana 0.1 1.1 
Crocker National Bank 0.6 3.0 
Lloyds 	 Bank Ltd. 1.3 6.8 
Swiss Bank Corporation 1.0 13.4 
National and Commercial Banking Group 15.9 93.9 
Credit Lyonnais 6.4 51.0 
Banque Francaise Do Commerce Exterieur 9.1 81.7 
Banque de L' Indochina at de Suez 4.0 72.1 
Algemene Bank Nederland 4.5 100.0 
Amrc Bank 10.8 100.0 
Balfour and Williamson 0.5 25.2 
Banco do Brasil 18.8 71.6 
Compagnie Financiere de Paris et des Pays-Bas 5.2 75.4 
Banco Mexicans 3.7 100.0 
Banque Worms 1.8 63.7 
Barclays Bank 2.9 43.6 
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PROFILES ON SELECTED BANKS LENDING TO PERU 
The study has made observation on certain banks. This 
annex will attempt to consolidate in a brief way the findings 
on some of the institutions. Much of the terminology 
reflects that used in the body of the text. It should be 
made explicit that some aspects of the profile are 
subjective evaluations based on observed behaviour with Peru 
and do not in any way pretend to be of an empirical nature. 
1. Citicorp, U.S.A. Has had a branch in Lima since 1920. 
A major lender in the 1960s and 1970s as well as a major 
lead bank in syndication. While there is no indication that 
Citicorp undercut market terms with regard to the price of 
loans, it clearly was a sophisticated bank willing to take 
greater risks than many other big, traditionally 
international institutions. 	 In the 1970s, Citicorp had a 
relative commitment in Peru that was of an intermediate level 
vis-a-vis all other banks; however, it was considerably higher 
than most other established international banks that had 
been lending to the government. Moreover, Citicorp actively 
participated in the traditionally less preferred areas of 
finance such as refinance, free disposition and loans for 
infrastructure. It made little use of export credit 
guarantees. And importantly, it provided finance for the 
transandean oil pipeline, a project of very high national 
priority. When negotiations began in 1976 for refinance 
relief without the presence of the IMF, Citicorp took a 
positive position and headed the Steering Committee of the 
co-ordinating institutions. When the Bank's plans to 
monitor the economy failed in 1977, Citicorp refused to head 
any further Steering Committees and its position in 
negotiations hardened somewhat. However, it continued to be 
relatively flexible in on-going negotiations and was 
classified as having had a "soft" negotiating position among 
the major commercial lenders. In sum, while not excessively 
aggressive, Citicorp has been a very important creditor with 
a generally flexible attitude (within a commercial context) 
in extending credits and resolving problems involving Peru. 
Citicorp was a creditor to the Cuajone project. 
2. Wells Fargo, U.S.A. Not significantly present as a 
lender in the 1960s, but probably the key commercial actor of 
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the 1970s. In this latter period, Wells Fargo arose from 
nowhere to become a major lender and a major lead bank in 
syndication. Also, relative to its size, the institution 
had the highest commitment to Peru of any regular commercial 
bank. The bank achieved its status so quickly because of 
inside contacts and an aggressive lending posture up 
through 1974. A very high executive at the bank is a Peruvian 
national who had worked at the Central Bank of Peru during 
the Belalande years. The commercial bank's knowledge of the 
public sector and the Peruvian market gave Wells Fargo special 
leverage in the country. This was complemented by an 
aggressive lending strategy that saw the bank repeatedly 
undercut the prevailing market terms for Peruvian loans, thus 
making the bank instrumental in Peru's gaining acceptance in 
international markets and in the cheapening of credit for 
the government. The bank also managed to become a major 
lead bank in Peru (and internationally) by cleverly 
establishing working relationships with a wide number of 
small and intermediate-sized banks throughout the world that, 
like Wells Fargo, were mostly newcomers to the international 
scene. The bank also appeared to have no preference about 
what it financed and made no significant use of export credit 
guarantees. Wells Fargo led two large syndicates to finance 
the oil pipeline. The institution's posture became more 
conservative after 1975, following general market behaviour 
in the post-oil crisis period. The bank helped to finance 
the foreign-private Cuajone copper project. 
3. 	 Manufacturers Hanover, U.S.A. Traditionally "Peru's 
banker". In the 1960s this bank was probably the key 
lending institution, because of the volume of loans, its 
high relative commitment, and the fact that it was the major 
organizer of several large multi-institutional credits that 
helped the country through its fiscal and balance of 
payments crises. (It also was a major creditor to the 
private sector). In the 1970s, the bank appears to have 
taken a slightly more conservative view of the country, as 
there was some slippage in its relative commitment. However, 
it continued to be a major force in commercial finance via 
its maintenance of a position as a major creditor and its 
intermediate importance as a lead bank. While it did not 
show an aggressive posture with regard to the pricing of 
loans, it actively extended the traditionally less preferred 
refinance and free disposition credits. It participated in 
the finance of the oil pipeline and took little recourse to 
export credit guarantees. Manufacturers also indirectly 
helped Peru reach a settlement with the U.S. over various 
investment disputes, as a high ranking executive of the bank 
was the key negotiator in the settlement. During the post-
1975 economic crisis this bank was very flexible (within a 
commercial context) and maintained an excellent image with 
both the public and private sectors; it has commonly been 
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characterized as being a 'a<sorable" banking institution. 
When Citicorp withdrew as head of the bankers' Steering 
Committee in 1977, it was this bank which took its place. 
Manufacturers was a commercial lender to the foreign ,private 
Cuajone copper project. 
4. Chemical Bank, U.S.A. Not a significant creditor in 
the 1960s; however, in the 1970s it became a lender of 
intermediate importance to the government. Nevertheless, 
Chemical probably had one of the most restrictive attitudes 
towards the military government. In the late 1960s it 
bought into a local bark. However, the timing of the 
purchase was inappropriate as there was much public concern 
about foreign participation in the financial sector; 
moreover, Chemical made no attempt to consult authorities 
prior to its acquisition. Its equity participation therefore 
was a source of irritation and was a prime mover in the 
civilian government's decision to "Peruvianize" local banks. 
This was followed by outright nationalization of the 
subsidiary by the military government. The bank made no 
secret of its displeasure with this action and with measures 
taken on other TNCs. While almost all major international 
banks had reentered the Peruvian public-sector market by 
1973, Chemical was conspicuous by its absence. It entered 
only in 1974, and then very symbolically as a participant 
in syndicated credit that was part of the formal settlement 
of the investment dispute with the U.S. government. Lending 
was more vigorous thereafter. Ironically, Chemical decided 
to enter the public sector market almost precisely at a time 
when the economic situation of the government was beginning 
to unravel. This bank helped to finance the foreign private 
Cuajone copper project. 
5. Morgan Guaranty Trust, U.S.A. A lender of minor 
importance in the 1960s. In the 1970s it was a lender of 
intermediate importance. Only of minor importance as a lead 
bank in syndication for the government. Never appeared to 
be very enthusiastic about Peru, reflected in a low level of 
relative commitment rather than in the nature of its lending 
or terms. This traditionally conservative bank took the 
symbolic role of heading the syndicated credit that was part 
of the settlement of the investment dispute with the U.S. 
During the economic crisis of the second half of the 1970s 
this bank was considered a hardliner, resisting refinance 
without the presence of the IMF and continuously in favour 
of measures to pressure the government into submitting to 
Fund discipline. Morgan was a creditor to the Cuajone project 
developed by the U.S. -owned Southern Peru Copper Corp. 
6. Bankers Trust, U.S.A. A major lender to Peru in the 
1960s with a high level relative commitment. In the 1970s 
it showed a more cautious attitude; while the nature of its 
lending showed no strong preferences, it slipped to an 
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intermediate level of importance as a lender and there was a 
very marked fall in its relative commitment as well. It 
also revealed average maturities that were significantly 
shorter than those offered by the market. As a lead bank it 
was of minor importance. During the economic crisis in the 
second half of the 1970s this bank took a hard line against 
the government's efforts to avoid the IMF, or assuage the 
effects of its scrutiny. Bankers Trust participated in the 
finance of the Cuajone copper project. 
7. Continental Illinois, U.S.A. A major lender to the 
government in the 1960s with a relatively high level of 
relative commitment. In the 1970s there apparently was a 
much more cautious attitude; while showing no special 
preferences in the nature of its lending or terms, it fell 
to an intermediate level of importance as a lender and its 
relative commitment underwent sharp decline. During the 
economic crisis of the 1970s this bank took a conservative 
position and was one of the hardliners which were adament 
about the necessity of having the government submit to the 
IMF. Participated in the finance of the oil pipeline. 
8. Bank of America, U.S.A. Has had a branch bank in Lima 
since 1966. It was a major creditor in both the 1960s and the197Ds. 
However, its level of relative commitment, while remaining basically 
unchanged in absolute terms over the period,wasonly at an inter-
mediate level relative to other banks in the former period and 
was at a low level in the latter period. While the bank showed 
no special enthusiasm for government loans in the 1970s, it did 
attempt to maintain its market position through the meeting 
of terms and conditions offered by the competition. 
9. Chase Manhattan Bank, U.S.A. In the mid-1960s it 
bought into a Peruvian bank which was later nationalized by 
the military government. Compensation, however, was very 
prompt and quite lucrative for the bank. In both the 1960s 
and 1970s this institution was a major lender to the 
government. Compared to other banks its relative commitment 
was of an intermediate and low level in the 1960s and 1970s, 
respectively. As a lead bank for the government it was of 
minor importance; however, it also led a large 200 million 
dollar credit for the Cuajone copper mine in the private 
sector. During the economic crisis after 1975 Chase fell 
into the group of hardliner banks. It also repeatedly 
interferred in the government's treatment of the Southern 
Peru Copper Corp., e.g. it reportedly threatened to tie the 
success of the 1978-1979 refinance negotiations with major 
private creditors to an adequate settlement of a dispute 
over the handling of the foreign exchange resources of the 
Cuajone copper mine. 
10. Crocker National Bank, U.S.A. A bank of intermediate 
importance as a lender in the 1960s and 1970s; of minor 
importance as a lead bank. Its relative commitments were at 
an intermediate level with respect to other banks in both 
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periods. Appeared to be a rather aggressive lender in the 
early 1970s, both through price cutting and the nature of 
its lending. Participated in the finance of the oil pipeline. 
After 1975, notwithstanding what was a general change in the 
market environment, the bank's attitude turned rather 
conservative. It did not participate in the general 
refinance relief arranged by U.S. creditors in 1976, 
suggesting that it may have had one of the more hardline 
positions with respect to the government's efforts to avoid 
the IMF. In the early 1970s the bank had the uncommon 
practice of explicitly setting the legal jurisdiction of 
loans in Peru. 
11. Bancal Tristate Corporation, U.S.A. Not a significant 
lender in the 1960s, but of intermediate importance in the 
1970s. Had one of the highest relative commitments of any 
regular bank in this latter period, indicating a rather 
aggressive lending strategy towards Peru. However, after 
1975 the bank appears to have turned conservative; like 
Crocker National it did not participate in the general 
refinance credit arranged by U.S. banks in 1976 that was 
designed to bail out the country's external accounts in the 
absence of the IMF. 
12. American Express International, U.S.A. Not a 
significant lender in the 1960s, but of intermediate 
importance in the 1970s. Of minor importance as a lead 
bank. Had one of the highest relative commitments of any 
regular bank. Its style of lending was relatively 
aggressive. Participated basically in loans of refinance, 
free disposition and infrastructural projects. 
13. First Chicago Corp., U.S.A. Not a significant lender 
in the 1960s, but of intermediate importance as a lender in 
the 1970s. Of minor importance as a lead bank. Had a low 
level of relative commitment. Appears to have maintained 
a restricted attitude on the military government as reflected 
in the fact that it held lending back until the government 
reached a formal settlement of investment disputes with the 
U.S. in 1974. 
14. Bank of Nova Scotia, Canada. A lender of intermediate 
importance in both the 1960s and 1970s with a high 
intermediate position in terms of relative commitment. In 
the 1960s it provided considerable short and medium term 
assistance to the financially-strapped civilian government. 
Not an aggressive lender in the 1970s, but it preserved 
its relatively high profile as a lender to the government. 
In the post-1975 economic crisis this bank was the 
representative of Canadian institutions in the Steering 
Committee and was considered to be one of the "soft" banks 
in the long series of negotiation with commercial creditors. 
Scotia Bank participated in the finance of the Cuajone project. 
15. Dresdner Bank, Germany. Was not a significant lender 
in the 1960s, but became of intermediate importance in the 
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1970s. As a lead Bank it was of intermediate importance. The 
bank's lending in the early 1970s was aggressive and after 
Wells Fargo it probably was next in importance in terms of 
bringing general market acceptability and more favourable 
credit conditions to Peru. The bank led a major syndicated 
credit for the oil pipeline. In the post-1975 economic 
crisis the bank represented European institutions in the 
private creditors' Steering Committee. A relatively strong 
advocate of the Peruvian position in negotiations during the 
economic crisis, this bank even extended the government a 
short-term credit to help it pass international reserve 
targets of an IMF stand-by accord. 
16. Bank of Tokyo, Japan. Has had a branch in Lima since 
1965. Was a minor lender to the government in the 1960s 
and was of intermediate importance in the 1970s. Its 
relative commitment was low compared to other banks for both 
periods. As a lead bank it was of intermediate importance. 
This institution was a very aggressive lender in the early 
1970s; not only did it price cut, but it also had a 
relatively high propensity to extend fixed interest rate 
loans and with great frequency it extended the traditionally 
less attractive free disposition loans. The Bank of Tokyo 
was the Japanese representative in the private creditors' 
Steering Committee. Also was a creditor for the private-
foreign Cuajone project. 
17. Credit Lyonnais, France. Has long had a subsidiary 
in Lima. Its participation was reduced to less than 20% 
after the military government's banking reform laws. Was 
not a significant lender in the 1960s, but was classified 
as of intermediate importance in the 1970s. Its relative 
commitment was low. As a lead bank it played a minor role 
in Peru. The bank's lending strategy was rather cautious 
and a high percentage of the credit extended had guarantees 
of French export credit agency. However, in negotiations 
pursued during the post-1975 economic crisis, this 
institution was considered to be in the group of "soft" banks. 
18. Lloyds Bank, U.K. Has had a branch in Lima since 
1936. Was nota significant lender to the government in the 
1960s, but became a lender of intermediate importance in the 
1970s. Its relative commitment to Peru was low in both 
periods. As a lead bank it played a minor role. The bank 
appears to have pursued a slightly cautious lending strategy, 
with significant lending for projects and capital goods 
imports. It helped to finance the oil pipeline. Was the 
lead bank for a 23.5 million dollar syndicated credit for 
Cuajone. 
19. Banca Commerciale Italiana, Italy. Has long held 
indirectly a subsidiary in Lima. Under the military 
government participation was reduced to below 20%. In the 
1960s it was a lender of minor importance, while in the 1970s 
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the institution was of intermediate importance. The bank was 
a lead bank of minor importance. Its relative commitment was 
low in both periods. Involved itself in price cutting in the 
early 1970s, and the nature of its lending was bold with a 
high frequency of refinance loans and credits of free 
disposition. It participated in the finance of the oil 
pipeline. 
20. 	 Schroders Ltd., U.K.; National and Commercial Banking  
Group, U.K.; Banque Francaise du Commerce Exterieur, France; 
Banque de l'Indochine et de Suez, France; Algemene Bank  
Nederland, Holland; Amro Back, Holland; Compagnie Financiere  
de Paris et des Pays-Bas, France; and Banque Worms, France. 
All would be considered to have had a conservative lending 
strategy in the 1970s owing to the fact that a very high 





PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT STABILIZATION PROGRAMME, JUNE '1976; 
MEASURES ADOPTED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS 
EQUILIBRIUM 
Various measures have been implemented in order to 
restore equilibrium in the external sector, including the 
following: 
(a) An increase in the exchange rate from S/. 45 to S/. 65  
per dollar  
The equilibrium exchange rate parity for June was 
estimated at S/. 58.96 per dollar. However, in order 
to further improve the competitiveness of the external 
sector in the short run and compensate the rise in 
costs as a result of the measures which have been 
adopted, parity was fixed at S/. 65 per dollar by 
the Board of Directors of the Central Reserve Bank, in 
consultation with the Government. 
(b) Non-traditional export promotion  
The tax rebate mechanism (CERTEX), previously fixed 
at a basic rate of 40% of the export value, was 
reduced only by 10%, to a basic rate of 30%, so as to 
increase the competitiveness of manufactured goods in 
the international market. 
Industries are expected to respond rapidly to the 
export incentives adopted, generating additional 
foreign exchange due to the idle productive capacity 
resulting from the reduction of internal aggregate 
demand expected as a result of the stabilization 
programme. 
(c) Export promotion of the small and medium mining sector  
The mining acceptance bond, a low interest credit 
mechanism, though reduced from 20% to 10% of the FOB 
export value, has been maintained in order to 
accelerate the reactivation of small and medium sized 
mining enterprises, which have been producing 
approximately 20% of Peru's copper and 35% of its 
silver, lead and zinc. 
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(d) Increase in the effective capital goods import tariff  
This measure, adopted in order to correct excessive 
use of capital intensive production processes, will 
tend to promote labour intensive industries, reduce 
imports and achieve a more rational utilization of 
existing productive capacity. 
(e) Reorganization of the import control system  
A system of annual import programmes and annual foreign 
exchange budgets has been established in order to 
forecast the goods which will have to be imported and 
the foreign exchange necessary for purchasing them. 
This will make the import control system more coherent, 
rational and expeditive, assuring an adequate supply 
of goods to the country while serving as a mechanism 
for restricting the use of foreign exchange in short 
supply, when necessary. 
(f) Priority for foreign exchange generating projects  
Special priority has been given to those projects 
generating foreign exchange through exports or import 
substitution so as to gain and maintain balance-of-
payments equilibrium in the future. 
MEASURES ADOPTED IN ORDER TO SOLVE THE GOVERNMENT'S 
FINANCIAL GAP 
The following measures have been implemented with the 
purpose of increasing fiscal revenues: 
(a) 15% tax on exports of traditional products  
This tax, computed on the basis of the FOB price, was 
created in order to tap windfall profits generated by 
the devaluation. It is estimated that his tax will 
increase fiscal revenues by S/. 7.8 billion during the 
second semester of this year. 
(b) Sales tax on gasoline  
This should generate S/. 5.5 billion during the rest 
of this year. Other petroleum derivates have not been 
affected. 
(c) Increase of the sales tax on goods and services  
All regulations relating to this tax have been 
integrated. The rate on luxury products has been 
increased from 27% to 40%, while the rate affecting 
most other products has risen from 17% to 20%. Taxes 
on foodstuffs and medicines have not been altered. 
This increases are expected to provide S/. 2.0 billion 
in new revenues during the second half of 1976. 
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(d) 	 Increase in effective tariffs for the imports of  
capital goods  
The rise in effective tariff rates, applied 
differentially according to the priority of the 
industry and the type of activity involved, will yield 
and additional revenue of S/. 500 million by December 
of this year. This measure does not affect imports 
of goods already shipped. 
( e ) 
	
The license plate tax has been tripled  
In addition, a tax of 50% in excess of this has been 
established for vehicles assembled abroad since 1970. 
This is expected to generate another 5/. 700 million 
during the followign semester. 
Increase from 67% to 72.5% in the sales tax on  
cigarettes  
This measure, along with the authorized price rise 
of this product should increase fiscal revenues in 
1976 by S/. 500 million. 
(g) 	 Increase in mail and toll rates  
This is expected to yield around S/. 500 million this 
year. 
Additional measures have been adopted, implementing 
an austerity policy for the whole of the public 
sector by reducing current and investment expenditures. 
Among these, the following are included: 
(a) Reduction in current expenditures  
The hiring of new personnel, as well as increases in 
salaries, for the public sector have been suspended 
until December 1976. In addition, purchases of goods 
and services have been severely restricted. 
(b) Reduction in investment expenditures  
Investment expenditures of the Central Government have 
been reduced by S/. 4.5 billion for the present 1975-
1976 fiscal budget. These budget cuts respond to the 
priority level of the corresponding investment projects, 
favouring those destined to support the balance of 
payments. 
MEASURES RELATING TO STATE ENTERPRISES 
(a) 	 Policy making in State enterprises  
Measures have been implemented in order to rationalize 
and improve the efficiency of State enterprises by 
allowing them to function on a basis similar to that 
of private enterprises: managerial decision making, 
adequate working capital, a sound investment policy 
and debt structure, and a profit level at least 
equivalent to the cost of money in the capital market. 
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(b) Reduction in current expenditures  
As a means of rationalizing current expenditures, a 
strict austerity policy has been adopted for State 
enterprises. Hiring may not exceed 2% over the June 
30 level, and wages have been frozen for the rest of 
the year. Increases in other operation cost have been 
linked to, and may not exceed, increases in the cost 
of living index. 
(c) Reduction in investment expenditure  
Investment expenditures have been severely diminished 
by a total of S/. 9,666 million, affecting especially 
those projects not considered critical for balance-of-
payments support by 1980. 
(d) Price policy  
State enterprises have been authorized to adjust the 
prices or tariffs of the products or services they 
sell, in order to cover their costs and generate 
internal funds to act as a counterpart to the external 
financing of their investment programmes or supply 
funds ho the Central Government. These rises are 
expected to increase income by approximately S/. 11.5 
billion, during the second semester of this year. 
MEASURES ADOPTED IN ORDER TO INCREASE INTERNAL SAVINGS 
These include the following: 
(a) An average increase of 3% in the interest rate as from  
July 1  
This is designed to promote personal savings and 
protect them against internal price rises in the medium 
run. The mechanism modifying interest rates has been 
made more flexible in order to allow a more rapid 
response to future price developments. 
(b) Business enterprises will only be allowed to distribute  
10% of their paid capital from 1976 profits to  
shareholders 
In this way, greater revenues generated by price 
increases will result in a higher level of internal 
savings and reduce the demand for working capital from 
the banking system. 
Non-distributed profits, which will increase 
enterprise's reserves, are allowed to be distributed 
after 1977. 
(c) Reinvestment incentives  
Agricultural, industrial, fishing and mining 
enterprises have been allowed to invest profits during 19 
1977, tax free, as part of their working capital. 
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Previously this could only be done to increase fixed 
assets. This measure is designed to increase the 
enterprises' working capital. 
(d) 	 An expansion in the Central Government's current 
account savings  
This will result from increases in tax revenues and 
reductions in current expenditures. 
MEASURES RELATING TO PRICES AND WAGES 
(a) Prices  
The stabilization programme has been designed to 
reduce the demand for non-essential goods, especially 
those with a high imported component. This can be 
clearly seen by the higher prices of gasoline, 
cigarettes and other products resulting from the 
measures previously described. 
In order to assure a normal operation on the pant of 
business enterprises, these have been authorized to 
adjust the prices of their goods and services, 
including those imported, during the next 90 days, 
after which they will again be subject to controls. 
Prices are expected to rise about 25% during the 
second semester as a result of the stabilization 
programme. 
(b) Wages  
Wages have been increased by an average of 10% in 
order to reduce the impact of rising prices on 
purchasing power. This increase, however, has been 
applied on a progressive basis, so that lower income 
groups receive a higher rate. The minimum wage has 
also been increased for the same reason. 
Source: Reproduced from Central Bank, Aide Memoire on the  
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